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This dissertation examines the approach to statutory formalities in South African law.  It 
focuses primarily on formal requirements which result in nullity in the event of non-
compliance, and in particular, on those prescribed for alienations of land (section 2(1) of 
the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981) and suretyships (section 6 of the General Law 
Amendment Act 50 of 1956).    
 
To provide context, the study commences with a general historical overview of the 
development of formal requirements.  It also considers the advantages and disadvantages 
of formalities.  The conclusion is reached that an awareness of both is required if a court is 
to succeed in dealing with the challenges posed by statutory formalities.  
 
The dissertation then considers more specific aspects of the topic of formal requirements, 
including the difference between material and non-material terms.  It also reveals that the 
current interpretation of statutory formalities is quite flexible and tends towards a 
conclusion of validity if reasonably possible.  However, cases involving unnamed or 
undisclosed principals present particular challenges in this context, and the possibility of 
greater consistency, without the loss of theoretical soundness, is investigated. 
 
A discussion of what should be in writing, and with what exactitude, necessarily involves a 
consideration of the extent to which extrinsic evidence is admissible.  The interaction 
between formal requirements and the parol evidence rule is therefore investigated.  
Special attention is paid to incorporation by reference.  After an examination of the 
common-law approach to this topic, the conclusion is reached that room exists for 
developing this area of South African law, especially where a sufficient reference to 
another document is concerned. 
  
Rectification also enjoys detailed examination, due to the unique approach adopted in 
South African law.  Where formalities are constitutive, a South African court first satisfies 
itself that a recordal complies with these requirements ex facie the document, before it will 
consider whether rectification may be appropriate.  An analysis of both civilian and 
common-law judgments suggests that the South African approach is based on a 
misconception of the purpose of rectification.  This leads to the further conclusion that the 
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requirement of ex facie compliance should be abolished as a separate step and that a 
court should rather consider whether awarding a claim for rectification would defeat the 
objects of formalities in general. 
 
Finally, the remedies available to a party who performs in terms of an agreement void for 
formal non-compliance and the effect of full performance in terms of such an agreement, 
receive attention.  An investigation of the remedies available in other legal systems reveals 
that the South African approach of limiting a party to an enrichment claim is unnecessarily 
restrictive.  It is argued that local courts should reconsider their exclusion of estoppel in 
this context, particularly in cases where one party’s unconscionable conduct has led the 
other to rely on the formally defective agreement.  In cases of full performance, no 
remedies are available, but it is argued that a distinction should be drawn between 
reciprocal and unilateral performances. 
 




Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die benadering tot statutêre formaliteite in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
reg.  Dit fokus hoofsaaklik op die formele vereistes wat lei tot nietigheid in die geval van 
nie-nakoming, en in die besonder dié wat voorgeskryf word vir die vervreemding van grond 
(artikel 2 (1) van die Wet op Vervreemding van Grond 68 van 1981) en borgstellings 
(artikel 6 van die Algemene Regswysigingswet 50 van 1956). 
 
Ten einde die nodige konteks te verskaf, begin die studie met ‘n algemene historiese 
oorsig van die ontwikkeling van formaliteite.  Dit oorweeg ook die voor- en nadele van 
formaliteite.  Die gevolgtrekking is dat ‘n bewustheid van beide vereis word indien ‘n hof 
die uitdagings wat deur statutêre formaliteite gestel word, suksesvol wil hanteer. 
 
Die proefskrif oorweeg dan meer spesifieke aspekte van formaliteite, insluitende die verskil 
tussen wesenlike en nie-wesenlike bedinge.  Dit toon ook dat die huidige opvatting van 
statutêre formaliteite redelik buigsaam is en tot ‘n bevinding van geldigheid lei waar dit 
redelikerwys moontlik is.  Gevalle van onbenoemde of versweë prinsipale bied egter 
besondere uitdagings in hierdie verband en die moontlikheid word ondersoek om ‘n meer 
konsekwente, maar tegelyk teoreties-gefundeerde benadering te volg. 
 
‘n Bespreking van wat op skrif moet wees, en met watter mate van sekerheid, behels 
noodwendig ‘n oorweging van die mate waarin ekstrinsieke getuienis toelaatbaar is.  Die 
interaksie tussen formaliteite en die parol evidence-reël word derhalwe ondersoek.  
Spesiale aandag word bestee aan inlywing deur verwysing.  Na oorweging van die 
benadering in gemeenregtelike stelsels, word die gevolgtrekking bereik dat ruimte bestaan 
vir ontwikkeling op hierdie gebied, veral met betrekking tot ‘n voldoende verwysing na ‘n 
ander dokument. 
 
Rektifikasie word ook breedvoerig hanteer, vanweë die eiesoortige benadering in die Suid-
Afrikaanse reg.  Waar formaliteite konstitutief van aard is, sal ‘n Suid-Afrikaanse hof eers 
vasstel dat ‘n ooreenkoms ex facie die dokument aan die formaliteite voldoen, voordat dit 
sal oorweeg of rektifikasie moontlik is.  ‘n Ontleding van sivielregtelike en gemeenregtelike 
beslissings dui daarop dat die Suid-Afrikaanse benadering op ‘n wanbegrip van die doel 
van rektifikasie gebaseer is.  Dit lei tot die verdere gevolgtrekking dat die vereiste van ex 
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facie nakoming as ‘n afsonderlike stap afgeskaf behoort te word en dat ‘n hof eerder moet 
oorweeg of die toestaan van ‘n eis vir rektifikasie die oogmerke van die formaliteite in die 
algemeen sou verydel. 
 
Laastens word aandag geskenk aan die remedies beskikbaar aan ‘n party wat presteer 
ingevolge ‘n ooreenkoms wat nietig is weens nie-nakoming van formaliteite, asook die 
effek van volle prestasie kragtens so ‘n ooreenkoms.  In eersgenoemde geval beperk die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg daardie party tot ‘n verrykingseis.  ‘n Ondersoek van die remedies 
beskikbaar in ander regstelsels toon dat dit onnodig beperkend is.  Dit word aangevoer dat 
Suid-Afrikaanse howe die uitsluiting van estoppel in hierdie konteks moet heroorweeg, 
veral in gevalle waar een party se gewetenlose optrede daartoe lei dat die ander party 
staat maak op die formeel-gebrekkige ooreenkoms.  In gevalle van volledige prestasie is 
daar geen remedies beskikbaar nie, maar dit word aangevoer dat ‘n onderskeid getref 
moet word tussen wedersydse en eensydige prestasies.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 1 Problem identification 
 
For more than a century, various South African statutes have prescribed formal 
requirements for certain types of agreements.1  Despite the lengthy time period in which to 
solve the difficulties surrounding the interpretation of these statutes or their successors, 
recent case law reveals that the passage of time has not minimised the disputes which 
may arise when an agreement is subject to statutory formalities.  For example, in Exdev 
(Pty) Ltd v Pekudei Investments (Pty) Ltd2 (“Exdev”) Leach JA made the following general 
remarks about section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act: 
 
“[T]he section … was designed to promote certainty, and to avoid disputes, litigation and 
possible malpractice.  Unfortunately, history has proved it to be fertile ground for litigation, the 
law reports being replete with decisions concerning the validity of deeds of sale of land.  
Consequently, it has been remarked that the section has failed to achieve its objectives, and it 
has indeed correctly been observed that, reading between the lines, the section is often abused, 
in particular 'by unscrupulous sellers who regret having sold the property at the price they did 
and then try to rescind the contract because of non-compliance with the technical formality 
requirements of the Act'.  This comment is not without substance, but it may be somewhat 
unfair.  Human nature being what it is, there may well have been many more disputes arising 
out of the sale of land, had no formalities been required … Be that as it may, this is another 
case in which a seller of immovable property alleges that the sale is void for non-compliance 
with the section.”3   
 
This quotation highlights important aspects of the topic of statutory formalities.  First, it 
touches upon the notion that formal requirements have advantages and disadvantages.  A 
requirement that an agreement should be in writing and contain certain information 
                                                          
1
 Eg ss 1 and 2 of Law 12 of 1884 (Natal) imposed formal requirements for certain transactions, including 
sales of land and suretyships.  S 17 of Law 20 of 1895 (ZAR) also imposed formalities for sales of land.  At 
the turn of the 20
th
 century, s 30 of Proclamation 8 of 1902 (Tvl) and s 49 of Ordinance 12 of 1906 (OFS) 
stated that sales of land should be in writing.  Eventually, formalities were prescribed throughout South Africa 
for both sales of land (s 1(1) of the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957, the eventual successor of 
which was s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act) and suretyships (s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 50 
of 1956). 
2
 2011 2 SA 282 (SCA). 
3
 Paras 1-2 (footnote omitted). 
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promotes certainty and reduces disputes.  However, the very same requirement can be 
abused by a party who does not wish to be bound by an agreement which was seriously 
intended.  As stated in Senekal v Home Sites (Pty) Ltd:4 
 
“On sudden and unforeseen appreciation of the value of land, the subject-matter of executory 
contracts of sale, there has been evinced a marked tendency on the part of vendors of such 
land to seek with a jaundiced eye in the deed of sale for technical points which might justify, 
under colour of the requirements of sec. 30 [of Proclamation 8 of 1902], a repudiation of sales of 
land duly entered upon in written deeds of sale.”5 
 
This suggests secondly, that compliance with formal requirements involves the (possibly 
mechanical) application of certain rules to determine whether an agreement is enforceable 
or not, irrespective of the merits of a particular case. 
 
However, Leach JA does not allude to the fact that statutory formalities have implications 
for other areas of South African contract law as well as other areas of the law in general.  
For example, it was held in Magwaza v Heenan6 that an agreement which on the face of it 
did not comply with formal requirements could not be rectified, in spite of the fact that the 
apparent invalidity was due to a mistake in the recordal of the agreement.  This rule does 
not apply when a written agreement appears to be invalid, ex facie the document, for a 
reason not related to formalities,7 and the question arises whether the special treatment of 
formal requirements is justified.  The same question arises in the context of estoppel: a 
party may not raise this defence against another who maintains that the agreement is 
formally defective, but who created the impression earlier that he would abide by it.8  It is 
irrelevant if the latter has behaved in an unconscionable manner.  Again, it is debatable 
                                                          
4
 1950 1 SA 139 (W). 
5
 Senekal v Home Sites (Pty) Ltd 1950 1 SA 139 (W) 150 per Dowling J.  It is not only sellers who resort to 
the “technical” defence of formal non-compliance – “[t]he same holds true for purchasers looking for a loop-
hole through which to withdraw from a contract about which they later have their doubts.” (D J Lötz & C J 
Nagel “JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Pine Villa Country Estate (Pty) Ltd case no 617/2007 
(SCA); Pine Villa Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd case no 2/2008 (SCA)” 2010 DJ 
169 174. 
6
 1979 2 SA 1019 (A) 1028A-C. 
7
 See eg Spiller v Lawrence 1976 1 SA 307 (N) 312B-D; Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd v Ping Bai  1997 3 
SA 1004 (SCA) 1010D-H. 
8
 Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen 1964 3 SA 402 (A) 411H. 
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whether formal requirements dictate that the innocent party may not raise estoppel in such 
circumstances.   
 
In other areas of the law, the policy considerations underlying the imposition of formal 
requirements do not always enjoy supremacy.  The recent decision in Legator McKenna 
Inc v Shea9 shows that in the context of full performance of formally defective agreements, 
these considerations may be trumped by other values, so that full performance cures the 
defect in form retrospectively and a party may not reclaim his performance with an 
enrichment remedy.  The question then becomes whether full performance should always 
have this curative effect, irrespective of whether one is dealing with reciprocal or unilateral 
performances and regardless of the fact that different types of policy considerations may 
underlie different types of formal requirements.  
 
1 2 Purpose of the dissertation, research questions and methodology  
 
In view of the preceding discussion, this dissertation aims to consider the current approach 
to statutory formalities in South African law.  Available material is often outdated (although 
not irrelevant), cursory in its treatment, or focuses on only one aspect of the topic.  It is an 
underlying assumption that a comprehensive understanding of the South African approach 
cannot be achieved solely by examining how courts interpret legislation imposing formal 
requirements.  For this reason, the study also considers the interaction between formalities 
and other legal phenomena, like the parol evidence rule, rectification and the remedies 
which may become available in the event of non-compliance with formal requirements.  
Finally, and especially because South Africa is a mixed legal system,10 the dissertation has 
a comparative dimension: the strengths and weaknesses of the South African approach to 
statutory formalities can only be evaluated properly by comparing it to other legal systems.  
Comparisons are drawn primarily with English law (as representative of a common-law 
system) and German law (as a typical example of a civilian system).  Any solutions that 
                                                          
9
 2010 2 SA 35 (SCA) para 28. 
10
 A full account of the factors contributing to the “mixed” nature of the SA legal system is provided by E 
Fagan “Roman-Dutch Law in its South African Historical Context” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) 
Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa 33.  See also C G van der Merwe, J E du 
Plessis, M J de Waal, R Zimmermann & P Farlam “The Republic of South Africa” in V Palmer (ed) Mixed 
Jurisdictions Worldwide (2012) 95. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
may become apparent in the course of this comparison will be considered carefully in 
order to determine whether they are suitable for adoption in South Africa.   
 
Four research questions have been identified, and these serve as the focal points for the 
chapters which follow: 
 
(i) What role do formalities fulfil in the law of contract generally?11  
(ii) How do courts interpret and apply the formal requirements set by various statutes 
and is such interpretation consistent?12   
(iii) What is the interaction between the parol evidence rule, statutory formalities and 
the admission of extrinsic evidence?13   
(iv) What remedies, if any, are available to parties if their agreement does not comply 
with statutory formalities?14 
 
Before turning to the limitations on the scope of this dissertation, two observations must be 
made.  First, there is no general concluding chapter to this study.  The South African 
approach to statutory formalities is examined within several different contexts, each of 
which generates specific problems and requires specialised treatment.  Each chapter 
therefore ends with its own concluding section, summarising the problems identified and 
containing recommendations for development.  Secondly, while formalities may have their 
disadvantages, they do have a role to play in the law of contract, as will become apparent 
in the next chapter.  Therefore, this study does not suggest that formalities should be 
abolished.  Its goals are more modest: the emphasis is on the need to clarify, and in 





                                                          
11
 Ch 2. 
12
 Ch 3. 
13
 Ch 4 (statutory formalities and the parol evidence rule in general) and ch 5 (rectification). 
14
 Ch 6. 
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1 3 Limitations on the scope of the dissertation 
1 3 1 The types of transactions considered 
 
The dissertation focuses primarily on formalities imposed for suretyships and sales of land 
(which constitute one example of an alienation of land falling within the scope of the 
Alienation of Land Act15), although references to other transactions subject to formalities 
are occasionally made to illustrate certain points.  This limited focus is based on a number 
of factors.  First, these transactions are the most commonly encountered, commercially 
important examples of agreements subject to formalities.  Secondly, the relevant statutes 
(or their predecessors) are some of the oldest examples of formal requirements.16  The 
case law surrounding the interpretation of these statutes affords the opportunity to 
examine both the origins and the development of the rules relating to statutory formalities.  
Thirdly, both section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act and section 6 of the General Law 
Amendment Act are particularly vague in their formulation – neither, for example, specifies 
exactly what should appear in the written agreement or with what degree of 
completeness.17  An examination of judicial decisions in this regard therefore has the 
benefit of providing a perspective on curial attitudes to formal requirements and their 
functions.  Finally, non-compliance with these requirements results in invalidity.  As we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, this consequence may limit a party’s right to claim that 
the written agreement should be rectified and the remedies which are available to him 
when he has performed in terms of a formally invalid agreement.  Similarly drastic 





                                                          
15
 Other examples of “alienations” are contracts of exchange and donations of land (s 1). 
16
 More recent examples are provided in s 93 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and s 7 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 68 of 2008 (see also s 50 which provides that the Minister of Trade and Industry may 
prescribe that certain categories of consumer agreements must be reduced to writing; this has not yet been 
done). 
17
 By contrast, see eg the detailed exposition of what should appear in a written agreement for the sale of 
land on instalment in ch 2 of the Alienation of Land Act (see Addendum A and ch 3 (3 2 2). 
18
 As it does in terms of s 93 of the the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (a credit provider must provide the 
consumer with a written copy of the credit agreement). 
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1 3 2 The electronic conclusion of agreements subject to formalities 
 
Beyond what is said here, this dissertation does not consider the electronic conclusion of 
agreements subject to formal requirements.  The reasons for this exclusion will become 
apparent further in the main text. 
 
Section 12 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (“ECTA”) 
provides that the requirement that a document be in writing is met if such document is in 
the form of a data message and accessible in a manner usable for subsequent 
reference.19  Section 13 further provides that where the relevant law also requires that 
such a document be signed, but makes no provision for the type of signature, this 
requirement is only satisfied if an advanced electronic signature (also known as a digital 
signature) is used.20  It is therefore possible that any agreement subject to formalities, at 
least in theory, could be concluded electronically.  However, section 4(4) read with 
schedule 2 of ECTA excludes alienations of immovable property, long-term leases of 
immovable property, wills or bills of exchange from the ambit of its provisions.21  Of the two 
transactions on which this dissertation primarily focuses, these provisions leave only 
suretyships as capable of electronic conclusion. 
  
By prescribing that only a digital signature suffices to authenticate an electronic suretyship 
agreement, ECTA imposes a stricter signature requirement than is found with paper-based 
documents.22  A digital signature employs a pair of keys – a private key kept by and known 
only to the sender to encrypt the message and a public key available to members of the 
                                                          
19
 A data message is any data “generated, sent, received or stored by electronic means” (s 1). 
20
 An electronic signature means data “attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with other data 
and which is intended by the user to serve as a signature”; an advanced electronic signature is a signature 
which meets these requirements and which, in addition, has been created by a process accredited by an 
Accreditation Authority (s 1). 
21
 The SA Law Reform Commission has recently questioned whether these exclusions should be removed 
from the Act – see Issue Paper 27 (Project 126) Review of the Law of Evidence (Electronic Evidence in 
Criminal and Civil Proceedings: Admissibility and Related Issues) (2010) 35 < 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/ipapers/ip27_pr126_2010.pdf > (accessed 12-11-2012).  For criticism of the 
current exclusion of alienations of land, see S W J van der Merwe, L F van Huyssteen, M F B Reinecke & G 
F Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 143-146. 
22
 See ch 3 (3 4 2). 
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public to decode the message.23  Authentication products and services designed for the 
creation of digital signatures must be accredited by the Department of Communications 
(the Accreditation Authority in South Africa).  Such accreditation will only be granted if the 
advanced electronic signature  
 
“(a) is uniquely linked to the user; 
(b) is capable of identifying that user; 
(c) is created using means that can be maintained under the sole control of that user; and 
(d) will be linked to the data or data message to which it relates in such a manner that any 
subsequent change of the data or data message is detectable”.24 
 
Digital signatures therefore appear to provide a greater degree of certainty as to the 
identity of the particular person who sent the electronic communication and the integrity of 
the document, thereby minimising the risk of fraud and unnecessary litigation to a greater 
degree than is the case with paper-based signatures.25  However, there is no case law 
which supports or rejects this conclusion.  This is hardly surprising, since the Department 
of Communications has only granted accreditation to the authentication products of one 
company by late 2011.26   
 
The absence of judicial pronouncements is one reason why this dissertation does not 
engage with the topic of the electronic conclusion of agreements subject to formalities in 
                                                          
23
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 145 n 123; M H M Schellekens Electronic Signatures: Authentication 
Technology from a Legal Perspective (2004) 77-78. 
24
 S 38. 
25
 M Wang “Do the Regulations on Electronic Signatures Facilitate International Electronic Commerce?  A 
Critical Review” (2007) 23 CLSR 32 32-33; I Lloyd “Legal Barriers to Electronic Contracts: Formal 
Requirements and Digital Signatures” in L Edwards & C Waelde Law and the Internet: Regulating 
Cyberspace (1997) 137 142.  It is debatable whether these types of signatures can fulfil certain other 
functions of formalities, like serving to warn a party of the potentially onerous obligation which he is about to 
undertake if he signs a suretyship – see Schellekens Electronic Signatures 79.  In German law, it is thought 
that this cautionary function is not fulfilled by means of an electronic signature and therefore suretyships may 
not be concluded electronically there (see § 766 BGB and the commentary provided in M Habersack “§ 766” 
in M Habersack (ed) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 5 Besonderer Teil III: §§ 705-
853 5 ed (2009) n 1).  See the discussion in ch 3 (3 4 2) on what suffices as a handwritten signature. 
26
 See the address to the 7
th
 ITWEB Security Summit on 16 May 2012 by Deputy Minister of Communication, 
Stella Ndabeni-Abrahams.  The speech is available at 
<http://www.doc.gov.za/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=69&Itemid=104> (accessed 
01-11-2012). 
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subsequent chapters.  More importantly however, it is argued that the principles applicable 
to paper-based agreements would, as a general rule, also be applicable to electronic 
agreements.  For example, compliance with formal requirements imposed for suretyships 
means that the document must contain certain terms, the content of which is sufficiently 
certain that a court does not need to consider evidence regarding the parties’ negotiations 
or oral consensus.27  This rule will be applicable irrespective of whether the document is 
paper-based or electronic.  Similarly, extrinsic evidence will be excluded if it varies or 
contradicts the agreement, whether written or in electronic form.28  It is not the format in 
which these agreements appear which dictates the applicability of the rules, but the fact 
that the agreements are subject to formal requirements.  As a result, an additional chapter 
on the electronic conclusion of agreements would be redundant because it would simply 
repeat arguments made in the context of paper-based agreements in any event. 
 
1 3 3 The constitutionality of statutes prescribing formal requirements 
 
This dissertation also does not consider the constitutional implications of statutory 
formalities.  Again, there are no judicial pronouncements on the topic.  However, while the 
absence of case law in the context of electronic suretyships may be explained by practical 
considerations, it is not immediately apparent why there is no case in which a party has 
challenged the constitutionality of a statute imposing formal requirements and prescribing 
nullity in the event of non-compliance.  Such a challenge would require a court to engage 
in a two-stage analysis.29  In the first stage, it would need to be determined whether a 
fundamental right in the Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) is limited by such a statute.  In the second stage, 
assuming that a fundamental right has been infringed or limited, a court would need to 
consider whether the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36(1) of the 
Constitution.   
 
                                                          
27
 See ch 3. 
28
 See ch 4. 
29
 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) CLOSA 2 2 ed (RS 4 
2012) 34-3-34-6. 
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It is a general principle of contract law that an agreement between parties need not be cast 
in a particular form in order to constitute a valid and enforceable contract.30  Therefore, a 
statute which requires that parties must evidence their consensus in writing upon pain of 
nullity is self-evidently a restriction of a party’s right to contractual autonomy and for this 
reason, limits a party’s right to dignity protected in section 10 of the Bill of Rights.  In 
Barkhuizen v Napier,31 Ngcobo J remarked that  
 
“[s]elf-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs … is the very essence of freedom 
and a vital part of dignity.”32 
 
The limitation of a specific right in the Bill of Rights means that a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the statutory formalities under consideration is one which involves the 
direct application of the Bill in terms of section 8(1):33 
 
“It seems obvious that when a statute’s constitutionality is challenged, appropriately, in a 
dispute between private persons, the [c]ourt … will not hesitate to apply provisions of the Bill of 
Rights directly.  It will not even consider submitting the law at issue to the ‘test’ set out in … 
[section] 8(2).”34  
 
In other words, such a challenge would not run into the difficulties traditionally associated 
with determining whether a right contained in the Bill of Rights applies directly against a 
private party in a contractual dispute.35 
                                                          
30
 See eg Van der Merwe et al Contract 129. 
31
 2007 5 SA 323 (CC). 
32
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 57.  See also S Woolman “Dignity” in S Woolman, M 
Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) CLOSA 3 2 ed (RS 4 2012) 36-11-36-13 on the self-actualisation and self-
governance dimensions of the right to dignity. 
33
 The section provides: “The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary and all organs of state.” 
34
 S Woolman “Application” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) CLOSA 2 2 ed (RS 4 2012) 31-50.  
See also I M Rautenbach “Introduction to the Bill of Rights” in Y Mokgoro & P Tlakula (eds) Bill of Rights 
Compendium (1998 SI 29) 1A-69.   
35
 See eg Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 23-26.  A challenge to a common-law rule relating 
to statutory formalities - eg the rule that an agreement which is void for formal non-compliance cannot be 
rectified – should also invoke the direct application of the Bill of Rights in terms of s 8(1).  Rautenbach 
“Introduction” in Rights Compendium 1A-69, 1A-78; Woolman “Application” in CLOSA 2 31-45.  Both authors 
criticise Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC) paras 31-32 for suggesting that s 8(1) does not apply to 
the common law, because the judgment ignores the wording of s 8(1) which states that it applies to “all law” 




Once a court is satisfied that a fundamental right has been limited, it must engage in a 
limitations analysis in terms of section 36(1): 
 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
At its core, section 36(1) constitutes an investigation into proportionality:36 it requires a 
court to determine whether a statute’s limitation of a particular right is proportionate to the 
purpose served by that statute.37  It is suggested that the probable reason for the paucity 
of case law on the constitutionality of statutory formalities is because South African courts 
have implicitly concluded that the limitation of contractual autonomy is proportionate to the 
purpose served by formalities.   
 
For example, it was recognised early in the 20th century in South African law that the 
purpose of formal requirements imposed for alienations of land is to prevent fraud and 
perjury, and that this purpose is in the public interest.38  The same purpose underlies 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(Rautenbach “Introduction” in Rights Compendium 1A-69-1A-70; Woolman “Application” in CLOSA 2 31-43-
31-44). 
36
 Woolman & Botha “Limitations” in CLOSA 2 34-71, 34-93.  In S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 
104, the court identified the factors implicit in an assessment of proportionality in terms of s 33(1) of 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the Interim Constitution).  These factors were 
made explicit in s 36(1) of the final Constitution. 
37
 Although the main text only focuses on a limitations analysis where a statute’s constitutionality is 
challenged, it should be pointed out that a limitations analysis would be equally applicable if the 
constitutionality of a common-law rule surrounding statutory formalities were challenged (see n 34), because 
such a rule also constitutes a law of general application.  Woolman & Botha “Limitations” in CLOSA 2 34-51-
34-52; S v Thebus 2003 6 SA 505 (CC) para 65. 
38
 Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135 142, 149. 
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formal requirements imposed for suretyships.39  While it may not always be achieved with 
equally great success, it is evident in the quotation from the Exdev case that the Supreme 
Court of Appeal is of the opinion that these formalities have probably prevented more 
disputes than they have created, precisely because they reduce the possibility of 
fraudulent allegations.40  This suggests that South African courts are satisfied (even if only 
by implication) that the limitation of contractual autonomy and therefore the right to dignity 
by a statute imposing formal requirements upon pain of nullity is reasonable and justifiable.  
This suggests further that a litigant who seeks to challenge the constitutionality of such a 
statute would in all likelihood fail. 
  
The notion that contractual autonomy can be limited by formal requirements which serve a 
legitimate purpose is not novel.  This will become apparent in the next chapter, which 
considers the role of formalities and their historical development in greater detail. 
                                                          
39
 Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 343A; Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 
[1999] 2 All SA 304 (A) para 9. 
40
 See 1 1 above. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF FORMALITIES IN CONTRACT LAW 
2 1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the functions of formalities in the law of contract.  
While subsequent chapters will consider formalities in greater detail like what should be in 
writing,1 the relationship between formalities and the admission of extrinsic evidence,2 and 
the remedies available to parties in the case of non-compliance with statutory formalities,3 
the current chapter will operate at a more abstract level, providing the background and 
justification – both historical and jurisprudential – for formalities in general.  
 
The purpose of such an examination is to provide a means by which to evaluate the 
judicial treatment of formalities as discussed in subsequent chapters.  While any judgment 
can be rated for legal soundness, decisions relating to formal requirements should also be 
evaluated on the basis whether they promote the policy considerations underlying their 
imposition: while form has certain advantages, it also has negative consequences which 
may undermine those policy considerations.  A proper evaluation must take both aspects 
into account, so that a court’s approach to a particular set of facts in which formalities are 
at issue can be assessed properly. 
 
Before turning to a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of form, the focus 
will be on a brief historical background to legislation imposing statutory formalities, in order 
to determine whether it is possible to find historical justification for their imposition. 
 
2 2 Historical development of formalities 
 
Form has been described as the oldest norm.4  For example, there are references in the 
Bible to placing the hand under another’s thigh5 and to putting an awl through a slave’s 
                                                          
1
 Ch 3. 
2
 Chs 4 and 5. 
3
 Ch 6. 
4
 R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 82. 
5
 Genesis 24: 2-3. 
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ear, as necessary to render a promise binding.6  The sponsio of Roman law was valid 
because it was performed in a temple and accompanied by an oath to a Roman god or 
goddess.7  Symbolic acts also appeared in Germanic customary law: a transfer into 
household service was represented by the handing over of a lock of hair from the head 
and beard, while the transfer of ownership was symbolised by the delivery of a hat or 
glove.8  In Anglo-Saxon law, the oath (juramentum9), the hand-grasp (on hand syllan) or 
the pledge of good faith (trŷwa) were regarded as prerequisites for the validity of contracts 
which were not in rem10 and in medieval English common law, one type of transfer of land 
had to be accompanied by the handing over of a sod of turf and a twig.11  
 
Over time, the equation of these symbolic acts or ritual words with legal acts disappeared 
as a result of two conflicting developments: the increasing use of written documents to 
record transactions12 and the Canon law idea that informal agreements should be 
binding.13  While the latter development came to dominate the modern law of contract, the 
former eventually culminated in one of the earliest legislative acts to impose formalities on 
certain types of transactions, namely the Statute of Frauds of 1677.14   
                                                          
6
 Deuteronomy 15: 12-17. 
7
 Zimmermann Law of Obligations 71-72.  The binding force of the stipulatio, at least in its original form, can 
be traced back to the fact that it was based on sponsio: 
“[O]ne can well imagine that many Romans still sensed certain oath-like connotations when using the 
word ‘spondeo’ at a time when all sacral effects and sanctions had long fallen away.” (71). 
8
 A Heusler Institutions of Germanic Private Law I (1885), cited in J H Chadbourn Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law by John Henry Wigmore 9 (1981) § 2400.   
9
 The original Anglo-Saxon word cannot be reproduced electronically. 
10
 H D Hazeltine “The Formal Contract of Early English Law” (1910) 10 Colum LR 608 609; J Perillo “The 
Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form” (1973-1974) 43 Fordham LR 39 
65. 
11
 H MacNeil “From the Memory of the Act to the Act Itself.  The Evolution of Written Records as Proof of 




 Century” (2006) 6 Arch Sci 313 315. 
12
 This development was already apparent in Roman law.  See Zimmermann Law of Obligations 78-82 for a 
discussion of the gradual conversion of the oral stipulatio into a written contract.  By contrast, the only 
contract for which writing was originally required in Roman law - the contractus litteris (which could create a 
debt by means of an entry in a ledger (32 n 178)) – had become obsolete by the late Empire (P du Plessis 
Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman Law 4 ed (2010) 304-305).   
13
 Zimmermann Law of Obligations 542-544. 
14
 A history of this development is provided in J H Wigmore “A Brief History of the Parol Evidence Rule” 
(1904) 4 Colum LR 338.  There is some authority for the proposition that the Statute of Frauds was based on 




The reasons for the adoption of the Statute in England were threefold.  First, the social and 
political upheaval created by civil war, the Cromwellian dictatorship and the Restoration 
resulted in many perjured claims.  This led to the complaint that 
 
“every thing is made an action on the case, and actions on the case are become one of the 
great grievances of the nation; for two men cannot talk together but one fellow or other, who 
stands in a corner, swears a promise and cause of action.  These catching promises must not 
be encouraged.  It were well if a law were made whereby some ceremony, as striking hands 
etc., were required to every promise that should bind”.15  
 
Secondly, juries decided matters of fact based on their personal knowledge of events.16  
Finally, parties to the dispute were precluded from giving evidence regarding the 
transaction, because they were not regarded as competent witnesses.17   
 
The Statute of Frauds was accordingly enacted “[f]or prevention of many fraudulent 
Practices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by Perjury and Subornation of 
Perjury.”18  Sections 4 and 17 of the Statute originally listed six types of contracts, 
including sales of land and guarantees (the English equivalent of suretyships in South 
African law), which had to be reduced to writing in order to be enforceable.  This list was 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the French Ordonnance de Moulins 1566, which excluded parol testimony to prove agreements exceeding 
the value of 100 livres.  See E Rabel “The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal History” (1947) 63 LQR 
174 175; A T von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in A T von Mehren (ed) Int Enc Comp L VII (1998) 1 18 n 
79; G H L Fridman “The Necessity for Writing in Contracts within the Statute of Frauds” (1985) 35 UTLJ 43 
45; M Furmston Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract 15 ed (2007) 260; Perillo (1973-1974) 
Fordham LR 67.  A W B Simpson A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit (1975) 605-609 disagrees, stating that there is no direct connection between the Statute of 
Frauds and any other continental legislation which preceded or followed it. 
15
 Buckridge v Shirley (1671) per Sir Hale CJ, cited in Simpson History of the Common Law of Contract 603. 
16
 Simpson History of the Common Law of Contract 604.  See also Fridman 1985 UTLJ 47; English Law 
Revision Committee “Sixth Interim Report: The Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Consideration” (1937) 
XV Can Bar Rev 585 589. 
17
 Simpson History of the Common Law of Contract 605; Fridman 1985 UTLJ 47; English Law Revision 
Committee 1937 Can Bar Rev 589. 
18
 Preamble to the Statute of Frauds. 
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later drastically reduced in England.19  However, the Statute still applies to guarantees and 
that part of it which governed alienations of land was later re-promulgated, with some 
modification, as the Law of Property Act 1925.  This Act itself was repealed and replaced 
by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act in 1989 which, contrary to its 
predecessors, now provides that a sale of land which has not been reduced to writing is 
void rather than unenforceable. 
 
If the Statute had been purely a product of particular historical circumstances, one would 
have expected its provisions to become obsolete once those circumstances changed.  
This has obviously not been the case.  The historical justification for the Statute also does 
not explain why other legal systems, which do not share the same history, nevertheless 
impose formal requirements for similar transactions.   
 
For example, successive South African legislatures imposed formal requirements for sales 
of land.  Although these were not required to be in writing in the Cape, a written recordal 
was required in terms of section 30 of Transvaal Proclamation 8 of 1902, section 49 of 
Free State Ordinance 12 of 1906, and Law 12 of 1884 in Natal.  The wording of the last-
mentioned statute echoed that of the English Statute of Frauds and provided that no 
contract of land could be sued upon unless it was evidenced by some writing and signed.  
The main object underlying the imposition of formalities during this period (with the 
exception of Natal) was not to prevent “fraudulent [p]ractices” but rather to allow the fiscus 
to keep track of land transactions for the purpose of levying transfer duty.20   
 
This pre-Union legislation was later variously repealed and replaced by section 1(1) of the 
General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957, section 1(1) of the Formalities in respect of 
Contracts of Sale of Land Act 71 of 1969 and finally section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land 
Act in 1981.  These Acts all provided that a sale of land must be in writing in order to be 
valid.  The purpose of formal requirements can no longer be attributed to the collection of 
                                                          
19
 In terms of the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act 1954.  In the US however, the Statute still 
applies, for the most part in its original form.  See C N Brown Corbin on Contracts 4: Statute of Frauds §§ 
12.1-23.11 (1997) 5; K Zweigert & H Kötz Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (tr T Weir) (1998) 374. 
20
 A D J van Rensburg & S H Treisman The Practitioner’s Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 2 ed (1984) 22; 
Brink v Wiid 1968 1 SA 536 (A) 541D-E. 
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transfer duty, as this was by now regulated in a separate statute.21  Rather, it appears that 
the choice to continue to prescribe formalities for sales of land was motivated by the need 
to promote uniformity throughout the country.  This is evident in the then Minister of 
Justice’s comments about the clause in the Bill which would later become section 1 of the 
General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957: 
 
“Ons kan tog nie in Suid-Afrika oor so ‘n belangrike saak toelaat dat, as ek hier in die Kaap 
woon ek vryelik ‘n eiendom kan verkoop sonder ‘n geskrewe kontrak nie, maar as ek na 
Bloemfontein verhuis dan moet dit ‘n geskrewe kontrak wees.  Daar moet eenvormigheid 
wees”.22 
 
However, neither the General Law Amendment Act 68 of 1957 nor the Formalities in 
respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act 71 of 1969 addressed the problem created by 
judicial pronouncements on the availability of an enrichment claim when one of the parties 
had performed in terms of a formally invalid sale of land,23 or the effect of full performance 
by both parties in terms of such a contract.24  The Alienation of Land Act, in addition to 
prescribing formalities in section 2(1), was designed to rectify such omissions.25  
 
Suretyships in their turn could be concluded orally at common law in most of South Africa26 
and this rule persisted until the promulgation of section 6 of the General Law Amendment 
Act in 1956.  The only exception was Natal’s Law 12 of 1884 (the echo of the Statute of 
                                                          
21
 The Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949.  See also Van Rensburg & Treisman Guide to the Alienation of Land 
Act 22.   
22
 Hansard 13 June 1957 col 8397.   
23
 See eg Carlis v McCusker 1904 TS 917, in which it was held that a party who had performed in terms of a 
formally defective contract could not reclaim his performance unless he could show that the other party was 
unwilling or unable to perform.  This is discussed in detail in ch 6 (6 3 3 4 2). 
24
 While full performance excluded possible enrichment claims (see Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135), it did not 
validate the contract retrospectively.  This meant, for example, that the purchaser could not sue the seller in 
the event of a defect in the property.  Again, this is discussed in detail in ch 6 (6 5). 
25
 See s 28.  For the sake of completeness, it should be pointed out that those provisions of the Alienation of 
Land Act which regulate sales of land on instalment were promulgated as a result of the failure of the Sale of 
Land on Instalments Act 72 of 1971 to fulfil its purpose, which was to protect buyers of fixed property against 
exploitation by large property developers (Hansard 21 August 1981 col 1581, 1587; Van Rensburg & 
Treisman Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 2).  
26
 C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s The Law of Suretyship 6 ed (2010) 67; N Grové Die 
Formaliteitsvereiste by Borgstelling LLM thesis University of Pretoria (1984) 2; Stride v Wepener 1903 TH 
383 386-387; Silver Garbus & Co (Pty) Ltd v Teichert 1954 2 SA 98 (N) 105.  
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Frauds).  As in the case of sales of land, the historical reason for the imposition of formal 
requirements was a need to ensure uniformity.27  There appears to be no evidence of a 
debate, in the context of either the sale of land or suretyships, regarding the possible 
advantages (and disadvantages) of formalities.28 
 
It is evident then, that the historical backgrounds of the Statute of Frauds, the Alienation of 
Land Act and the General Law Amendment Act are not the same.  Nevertheless, these 
Acts all impose formal requirements on similar contracts.  Nor are England and South 
Africa unique in their choice of these transactions; the same are also subject to formal 
requirements in civil law jurisdictions like Germany.29  Thus, it appears that the imposition 
of formal requirements on certain types of transactions results from a common impetus 
which transcends local circumstances of the time and relates to the role of formalities in 
contract law in general.  It is this general role of formalities which will serve as the focus of 
the next section. 
 
2 3 The functions of form 
2 3 1 Introduction 
 
In the earlier stages of the development of contract law, form fulfilled a constitutive 
function.  A contract was binding, not because it was based on agreement, but because a 
specific ritual which fulfilled certain magical, sacramental and/or psychological functions 
had been followed.30  These rituals could vary, from the very formal (like the stipulatio of 
Roman law, which required that the parties be in the presence of each other and utter 
                                                          
27
 Hansard 22 May 1956 col 6203. 
28
 Regarding sales of land, there are very brief references in the parliamentary debates to the fact that 
prescribing formalities for these types of transactions would prevent unnecessary disputes regarding the 
terms of the agreement (Hansard 13 June 1957 col 8397; Hansard 18 June 1957 col 8771).  Nothing was 
said about the functions of form in suretyships.  This is presumably due to the fact that this topic had already 
been considered at an earlier stage by the SA Law Revision Committee (Second Report 15-16 June 1950; 
unpublished report available at the Brand Van Zyl Law Library, UCT).  The Committee recommended that 
formalities should be imposed for these agreements due to the cautionary function fulfilled by formal 
requirements (para 42).  This function is discussed in 2 3 2 below.  However, the Committee did not 
recommend formal requirements for alienations of land – see 2 4 1 below.  
29
 See § 311b BGB (sales of land) and § 766 BGB (suretyships).   
30
 Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in Int Enc Comp L VII 6; Perillo (1973-1974) Fordham LR 45.  
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ritual words)31 to the seemingly bizarre (for example, in early Bavaria and Alemannia a 
transfer of land was only complete once the small boys who acted as witnesses to the 
ceremony had all received the requisite box on the ear.  It served as an aide-mémoire, and 
without it, the transaction would be void).32  However, irrespective of the choice of ritual, 
they all shared a common element: when the transaction was clothed in the appropriate 
formality, it was valid (despite the possibility that what a party intended and the actual 
effect of the transaction were at odds);33 without the required form, the transaction was 
void.  Unlike the modern position therefore, form was not an additional requirement for 
validity, but the only reason for the enforcement of the transaction.34  As Dulkeit put it, form 
was  
 
“the true basis for the effectiveness of the legal transaction.  Manifested intention as such [had] 
no legal significance … Form [was] … the ground for the legal act’s effectiveness.”35 
 
As societies developed, so too did the idea that a contract should be binding because it 
was based on consensus, and not because it was clothed in a particular form.36  
Zimmermann describes this transition as a shift from verba to voluntas: a change in focus 
from an objective to a subjective approach.37  However, the notion that contracts are 
generally regarded as form-free is limited by the qualification that certain types of contracts 
                                                          
31
 Zimmermann Law of Obligations 68-69; Perillo (1973-1974) Fordham LR 45.  Another example in Roman 
law would be that of mancipatio – see eg H Kötz European Contract Law 1: Formation, Validity, and Content 
of Contracts; Contract and Third Parties (1997) 78. 
32
 C Wasserstein Fassberg “Form and Formalism: A Case Study” (1983) 31 Am J Comp L 627; Zimmermann 
Law of Obligations 86 n 114. 
33
 Zimmermann Law of Obligations 82-84; Kötz European Contract Law 1 79.  It was not only Roman law 
which recognised this constitutive effect of form – see also Genesis 27, 29 in which Isaac’s blessing given to 
Jacob (instead of Esau) and Jacob’s marriage to Leah (instead of Rachel) were both regarded as valid, 
despite Jacob and Leah’s respective deceit. 
34
 Zimmermann Law of Obligations 82.   
35
 Dulkeit Zur lehre vom Rechtsgeschäft im klassischen römischen Recht: Festschrift Fritz Schulz I (1951) 
161-162, cited in Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in Int Enc Comp L VII 6 (translation provided by the 
author).  See also Wasserman Fassberg 1983 Am J Comp L 627-628 who states that 
“[p]rescribed forms were unique and exclusive means of attaining desired results.  Deviations from these 
forms, or defects in their performance, were fatal.” (Footnotes omitted). 
36
 For SA, see Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 287-288 (per Solomon ACJ); 310, 321-322 (per De Villiers 
AJA) and Goldblatt v Fremantle 1920 AD 123 128 (per Innes CJ). 
37
 Law of Obligations 621-622.  See also Perillo (1973-1974) Fordham LR 41. 
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are regarded as so commercially important, or as involving obligations of such an onerous 
nature, that legislatures impose additional requirements such as writing, before they will be 
regarded as valid and/or enforceable.  Form is valued in these modern contexts not 
because it fulfils some sacramental function, but for more secular reasons. 
 
2 3 2 Evidentiary, cautionary and channelling functions  
 
In Wilken v Kohler,38 Innes J stated that  
 
“[r]ecognising that contracts for the sale of fixed property were, as a rule, transactions of 
considerable value and importance, and that the conditions attached were often intricate, the 
Legislature, in order to prevent litigation and to remove a temptation to perjury and fraud, 




And in Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison,40 Miller JA stated, in relation to suretyship 
agreements, that  
 
“[h]owever many objects the Legislature may have had in mind in enacting sec. 6 of Act 50 of 
1956, one of them was surely to achieve certainty as to the true terms agreed upon and thus 
avoid or minimize the possibility of perjury or fraud and unnecessary litigation.  This is a 
purpose which, despite differences in wording, is common to the enactments relating [to formal 
requirements] … The Legislature may also have been influenced by other considerations, for 
example, that suretyship being an onerous obligation, involving as it does the payment of 
another's debts, would-be sureties should be protected against themselves to the extent that 
they should not be bound by any precipitate verbal undertakings to go surety for another but 
would be bound only after their undertaking had been recorded in a written document and 




Although neither Innes JA nor Miller JA referred to any sources which attributed these 
functions to writing they were, in fact, reiterating points that had been made as long ago as 
in the works of Grotius, Austin and Von Jhering.   
                                                          
38
 1913 AD 135. 
39
 Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135 142.  Reducing an agreement to writing ensures that the parties “have 
before [them] in black and white the terms of the agreement [they are] letting [themselves] in for” (Van 
Rooyen v Hume Melville Motors (Edms) Bpk 1964 2 SA 68 (C) 71E). 
40
 1977 1 SA 333 (A).  
41
 342H-343B.   




For example, Grotius states that formalities act as signs of deliberate intent,42 while Austin 
ascribes a dual purpose to them:  
 
“1. To provide evidence of the existence and purport of the contract in case of controversy.  2. 




Von Jhering says the following about formalities: 
 
“[L]egal formalities relieve the judge of an inquiry whether a legal transaction was intended and 
– in case different forms are fixed for different legal transactions – which was intended ... 
[Secondly] [t]he beneficial effect of form ... lies ... especially in the form itself, in the impression 
which it produces on the transacting party in warning him that he is binding himself ... [Finally] 





Despite such clear indications to the contrary, Lon Fuller45 is usually credited with 
explaining the various functions of form, at least in Anglo-American legal systems.46  Fuller 
himself however, cites both Austin and Von Jhering as authorities on the functions of 
form47 and it is probably more accurate to say that to Fuller should be attributed the labels 
for the functions of form. 
 
                                                          
42
 De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres II tr F W Kelsey (1925) 331-332. 
43
 “Fragments – On Contracts” in R Cambell (ed) Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive 
Law II 5 ed (1911) 907. 
44
 L’Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de Son Développement III 2 ed tr O de Meulenaere 
(1877) 177-183 (own translation).  An English translation of the original German version, Geist des 
römischen Recht auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung (1865), can be found in A T von Mehren 
& J R Gordley The Civil Law System: An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Law 2 ed (1977) 898-900. 
45
 “Consideration and Form” (1941) 41 Colum LR 799. 
46
 See E Posner “Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment” (1996) 144 U Pa LR 1971 and 
the sources cited at 1983 n 14; S J Whittaker “Form” in H G Beale (gen ed) Chitty on Contracts I: General 
Principles 30 ed (2008) 379 n 3.    
47
 See eg 1941 Colum LR 800 n 4. 
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The first and most obvious function is an evidentiary one.48  The requirement that an oral 
agreement should be reduced to writing enables proof of (i) the existence of a contract; 
and (ii) the nature, scope and extent of its terms.   
 
Secondly, formalities serve a cautionary and protective function.49  They cause parties to 
pause and think more seriously about the transaction into which they are entering and 
draw attention to any potentially onerous obligations which may be assumed upon contract 
conclusion.  This is particularly relevant in the case of suretyship agreements.50  This 
cautionary concern also underlies section 29A, read with section 2(2A), of the Alienation of 
Land Act, which provides that a cooling-off right afforded to a specific group of purchasers 
of residential property must be recorded in writing.51  A similar cautionary function is 
fulfilled by the German requirement of notarial authentication for sales of land.  
Theoretically at least, the notary’s role is to inform the parties of the nature and import of 
the transaction which they are concluding.52   
 
Finally, the channelling function fulfilled by formalities serves to delineate the transition 
from negotiation to conclusion of the contract.53  Although Fuller saw this function as one 
which distinguishes only between enforceable and non-enforceable transactions, Von 
                                                          
48
 1941 Colum LR 800.  See also Fridman 1985 UTLJ 43; Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in Int Enc 
Comp L VII 9; S W J van der Merwe, L F van Huysteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract: General 
Principles 4 ed (2012) 140. 
49
 Fuller 1941 Colum LR 800; Fridman 1985 UTLJ 49; Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in Int Enc Comp 
L VII 9; Van der Merwe et al Contract 140. 
50
 The English Law Revision Committee 1937 Can Bar Rev 617 stated that the formalities relating to 
contracts of guarantee should be retained on the basis that “there is a real danger of inexperienced people 
being led into undertaking obligations that they do not fully understand”.   
51
 See Gowar Investments (Pty) Ltd v Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC 2007 3 SA 100 (SCA) and 
the discussion of this case in ch 6 (6 2 3).  See also eg s 22 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 
which sets certain requirements for information disclosure.  While these requirements are procedural, similar 
policy considerations underlie their imposition – DTI Memorandum on the Objects of the Consumer 
Protection Bill, 2008 (B19-2008) 86-87.  
52
 Kötz European Contract Law 1 83. 
53
 Fuller 1941 Colum LR 801; Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in Int Enc Comp L VII 9; Van der Merwe 
et al Contract 140. 
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Jhering ascribed an additional quality to it, in the sense that form also helps to distinguish 
between different types of legally enforceable transactions.54   
 
2 3 3 Reduction in administration costs: formal requirements and penalty defaults 
 
Formalities can also be justified from an economic perspective.  The requirement that 
parties should reduce their agreement to writing (which usually also involves the need to 
seek legal advice) increases their transaction costs.55  This increase can be justified on the 
basis that 
 
“the major benefit [of formalities] is a reduction in the cost of resolving contract disputes.  The 
cost of proving the existence and terms of a contract is reduced; the probability of an erroneous 
decision is reduced; and the predictability of the outcome of contract litigation is increased”.56 
 
These benefits follow from the fact that the relevant statutory rule imposing the formality is 
a “penalty default”.57  Penalty defaults are a species of default rules.  A default rule 
governs unless the parties contract around it.  Usually, the consequence of a default rule is 
one which the parties are assumed to have wanted in the absence of a term to the 
contrary.58  Penalty defaults provide consequences that the parties would not have wanted 
to govern their contract.  They are designed to act as incentives to parties to disclose 
information, because they are motivated to contract so as to avoid the consequences 
                                                          
54
 L’Esprit du Droit Romain III 179: “[L]a forme … indique quel est l’acte qu’on a entendu conclure, dans les 
cas où pour divers actes diverses forms ont été determinées.”  (“[F]orm … indicates which act one intended 
to conclude in cases where different forms are prescribed for different acts” – own translation.)  This 
additional effect of the channelling function is also mentioned in Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in Int 
Enc Comp L VII 9; Whittaker “Form” in Chitty on Contracts I 379. 
55
 Transaction costs are regarded as obstacles to socially efficient markets and include the costs of obtaining 
information, and of searching for, negotiating and enforcing agreements – see P Burrows & C G Veljanovski 
“Introduction: The Economic Approach to Law” in P Burrows & C G Veljanovski (eds) The Economic 
Approach to Law (1981) 1 10.  According to I Erlich & R Posner “An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Rulemaking” (1974) 3 J Legal Stud 257 269-270, the major cost of the Statute of Frauds lies in the legal and 
negotiation costs incurred in order to comply with its provisions. 
56
 Posner & Erlich 1974 J Legal Stud 270. 
57
 This label is provided by I Ayres & R Gertner “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules” (1989) 99 Yale LJ 87.   
58
 See Ayres & Gertner 1989 Yale LJ 87; Posner 1996 U Pa LR 1981. 
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imposed by the penalty default59 - in the context of statutory formalities, the penalty default 
prescribes invalidity, unenforceability or voidability.60  These penalties encourage the 
disclosure of information in writing, which in turn creates certainty as to the terms of the 
agreement and leads to the reduction in subsequent administration costs.61  In this way it 
coincides with the evidentiary function identified by Fuller.  This information disclosure also 
has a cautionary function: “to caution is to give information”.62  Finally, the production of 
information helps to determine which type of transaction the parties are concluding and 
therefore assists in channelling their intentions.63 
 
The characterisation of the statutory rules imposing formalities as penalty defaults explains 
why the parties would want to comply with formal requirements – to avoid the negative 
consequences of non-compliance.  However, it does not explain why it is insufficient (for 
example when section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act or section 4 of the Statute of 
Frauds are applicable) for parties simply to avoid the penalty default by stating that they 
want their oral contract enforced.64  They must do something more in order to ensure 
enforcement – that “something more” is compliance with the relevant statutory 
formalities.65  To this extent, rules which result in invalidity or unenforceability in the event 
of formal non-compliance would be immutable rules, as opposed to mere default rules.   
 
Immutable rules are rules which parties cannot agree to ignore or avoid.66 They operate as 
a restriction on contractual freedom because parties cannot achieve a different result to 
that imposed by the immutable rule, irrespective of their intention.  For example, one 
cannot enter into an agreement to murder a third party; such a contract will always be 
contrary to public policy and therefore void, irrespective whether the parties state that their 
intention is otherwise.  Formalities resemble immutable rules in that they operate as a 
restriction on contractual freedom because the parties are not free to formulate the 
contract as they wish.  Once they follow the prescribed formalities however, they achieve 
                                                          
59
 Ayres & Gertner 1989 Yale LJ 124. 
60
 See ch 6 (6 2). 
61










 Posner 1996 U Pa LR 1982; Ayres & Gertner 1989 Yale LJ 87. 
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their shared intention.67  Unlike true immutable rules therefore, formal requirements do not 
prevent behaviour; they only ensure that parties follow a prescribed format. 
 
Posner has argued that the evidentiary, cautionary and channelling functions that Fuller 
attributes to formal requirements, and the related information-disclosure role ascribed to 
them by economic theorists, cannot explain why certain rules imposing statutory 
formalities should have this immutable quality; at most, the functions require a default 
rule.68  This leads Posner to conclude that this immutable aspect can only be explained on 
the basis of the prevention of fraud and perjury.69  Rules imposing statutory formalities 
exist “to prevent people from defrauding victims with whom they do not necessarily have a 
contractual relationship.”70  Unlike Fuller, Posner sees this as the purpose of formalities 
and as distinct from, rather than contained within, the evidentiary function.71   
 
It should be pointed out that Posner’s analysis can only apply to formal requirements 
which affect the validity or enforceability of a contract.  Formal requirements which result in 
voidability in the event of non-compliance have no immutable dimension.72  A party is 
always entitled to avoid the penalty default by choosing to enforce, rather than rescind, the 
contract.  It is argued that this absence of immutability may be attributed to the fact that 
these requirements are imposed primarily for the purpose of providing information to the 
weaker contracting party; they do not address the more fundamental question of how the 
existence of the contract should be proved in order to avoid fraud.73 
 
The value of Posner’s analysis, in the context of formal requirements imposed for the 
validity or enforceability of certain agreements, is that it emphasises that the overarching 
                                                          
67








 1984-1985 n 19. 
72
 See eg s 2(2A) of the Alienation of Land Act (cooling-off right of certain purchasers must be recorded in 
writing) and s 93 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (credit provider must provide the consumer with a 
written copy of the credit agreement). 
73
 A similar argument is made in M Ní Shúilleabháin “Formalities of Contracting: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Requirements that Contracts Must Be Evidenced in Writing” (2005) 27 DULJ 113 142.  See also ch 6 (6 2 3) 
for an extensive discussion of the policy considerations underlying the different consequences imposed for 
non-compliance with formal requirements.  
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purpose of these formal requirements is the prevention of fraud.  In most cases, formalities 
will achieve this purpose through fulfilling evidentiary, cautionary and channelling 
functions.  In some cases however, formalities may encourage fraud.  For example, it is 
entirely possible that a party relies on formal defectiveness to escape an oral agreement 
which was seriously intended.  The question then becomes whether a court gives greater 
weight to the functions of formalities and holds that the agreement is invalid, or whether it 
allows itself to admit that the purpose of formalities, as identified by Posner, has failed and 
that the innocent party should be afforded a remedy which could lead to the enforcement 
of the actual agreement, in spite of the fact that there is no written evidence of such an 
agreement.  This is considered in greater detail in a subsequent chapter.74  For the 
present, the discussion that follows will consider the recognised exceptions to formal 
requirements.  
 
2 3 4 Exceptions to formal requirements 
 
Fuller has argued that  
 
“[t]he need for investing a particular transaction with some legal formality will depend upon the 
extent to which the guaranties that the formality would afford are rendered superfluous by forces 
native to the situation out of which the transaction arises.”75 
 
One indeed finds that certain fact patterns which would otherwise fall within the scope of 
the relevant formal requirements are treated as exempt from these requirements.  One 
such exception can be found in German legislation.  According to paragraph 350 HGB, 
guarantees given by merchants (Kaufleute)76 in the course of their business activities (ie 
mercantile transactions) do not have to be reduced to writing.  However, this only applies 
when the merchant guarantees a debt in a commercial transaction; if the same merchant 
were to guarantee the debt of a friend, the exception would not apply and the guarantee 
would have to be in writing in order to be valid.77  This exception exists not only because it 
is assumed to promote efficient commercial activity, but also because merchants are 
                                                          
74
 Ch 6 (6 4). 
75
 1941 Colum LR 805.  See also Perillo (1973-1974) Fordham LR 49.  
76
 As to what constitutes a “merchant”, see § 1(1) HGB. 
77
 A T von Mehren “Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Comparative Analysis” (1958-
1959) 72 Harv LR 1009 1029. 
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thought not to be in need of the added protection afforded by a writing requirement, due to 
their commercial experience.78   
 
A similar distinction between commercial and non-commercial transactions is made in 
English law, where courts have held that certain oral guarantees are enforceable because 
they are merely incidental to a larger transaction which indicates that the purpose of the 
guarantee was to provide some business or pecuniary advantage to the guarantor.79  
Unlike paragraph 350 HGB, this common-law exception is judge-made and has been 
described as a deliberate evasion of the Statute of Frauds.80 
 
One example of where this exception has been held to be applicable is in the case of 
guarantees provided by del credere agents.  These are agents who, for a higher 
commission, guarantee the performance of the parties with whom they contract on behalf 
of their principals.  In Couturier v Hastie,81 it was held that the Statute of Frauds does not 
apply to this type of guarantee, and that it may be concluded orally, for the following 
reasons: 
 
“[B]eing the agents to negotiate the sale, the commission is paid in respect of that employment; 
a higher reward is paid in consideration of their taking greater care in sales to their customers, 
… and also for assuming a greater share of responsibility than ordinary agents, namely, 
responsibility for the solvency and performance of their contracts by their vendees. This is the 
main object of the reward being given to them; and though it may terminate in a liability to pay 
the debt of another, that is not the immediate object for which the consideration is given.”82 
 
In other words, although the agent provides a guarantee, this is only incidental to the main 
purpose of the contract with his principal, which is to ensure that he exercises greater care 
by choosing to sell only to solvent purchasers in return for a higher commission.83   
 
                                                          
78
 Von Mehren (1958-1959) Harv LR 1029-1030; “Formal Requirements” in Int Enc Comp L VII 81.  
79
 This exception is also recognised in US law, where it is referred to as the “main purpose” or “leading 
object” rule.  See Brown Corbin on Contracts 4 313-314. 
80
 Furmston Law of Contract 266; E Peel Treitel’s The Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 194. 
81
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Similarly, an agreement to pay off an encumbrance on property does not fall within the 
scope of the Statute.  Although the encumbrance arises out of another’s debt, the 
guarantee is incidental to the larger purpose, which is to rid the property, in which the 
guarantor has an interest, of a liability.84  However, the guarantee given by a majority 
shareholder that he will pay the company’s debts should it fail to do so, in order to prevent 
its assets from being attached, does not fall outside the ambit of the Statute of Frauds.85  
The exception does not operate to save guarantees which are motivated by personal 
interests; it only operates to exempt transactions when the guarantor also has a legal 
interest in the subject matter of the main contract.86 
 
It is difficult to reconcile these cases in which an oral guarantee has been enforced with 
the precise wording of section 4 of the Statue of Frauds.  However, it is possible to justify 
the so-called “del credere” and “property” exceptions from the perspective of the functions 
of formalities.  The guarantors in the examples discussed above are not motivated by 
sentiment.  Therefore, like the merchants who fall within the scope of paragraph 350 HGB, 
they do not need the caution afforded by reducing the guarantee to writing.87  These 
guarantors furthermore receive a direct benefit as a result of the provision of the oral 
guarantee – the nature of the transaction itself “supplies relatively unambiguous evidence 
supporting the assertion that the [guarantor’s] promise was made”.88  The need for a 
written agreement to serve as evidence of the transaction is superfluous. 
 
Unlike its German and English counterparts, South African law does not recognise any 
exception to the rule that suretyship agreements must be reduced to writing.  However, 
                                                          
84
 Fitzgerald v Dressler 141 ER 861 (1859).  In this case, A sold linseed to B, who sold it for a higher price to 
C.  A, as the original vendor, had a lien over the goods until B paid him.  A agreed to deliver the linseed to C 
before B paid him, in return for an oral promise from C that he would be liable for this payment.  According to 
the court: 
“At the time the promise was made, the defendant was substantially the owner of the linseed in question, 
which was subject to the lien of the original vendors for the contract price.  The effect of the promise was 
neither more nor less than this, to get rid of the incumbrance, or, in other words, to buy off the plaintiffs' 
lien.  That being so, it seems to me that the … case is not within the [S]tatute.” (869). 
85
 Harburg India Rubber Comb Co v Martin [1902] 1 KB 778. 
86
 787, 791, 792. 
87
 Brown Corbin on Contracts 4 317. 
88
 Brown Corbin on Contracts 4 317; Peel Contract 194. 
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section 3(1) of the Alienation of Land Act does provide that formal requirements do not 
apply to the sale of land at public auctions.89  As Jansen J noted in Gibbs v Vantyi,90  the 
reason for this exception is that 
 
“an agreement of sale at a public auction is concluded publicly at the fall of the auctioneer’s 
hammer, [so] there is little scope for uncertainty, disputes or malpractices.  The process has 
been conducted in public.  The conditions of sale have been read publicly to those present who 
accept those conditions by their continued participation in the procedure.  The procedure is 
concluded formally in public when the auctioneer’s hammer falls.”91 
 
It appears then, that while most legal systems impose formalities for similar kinds of 
contracts, this similarity does not extend to recognised exceptions.  The South African 
insistence on written suretyships, without exception, may avoid problems relating to 
investigation of the purpose of the transaction or the expertise of the surety, but does so at 
the expense of commercial efficacy.  Many cases in which the defence of formal invalidity 
is raised, involve parties who are experienced businessmen.  These parties probably have 
sufficient acumen and experience not to require the protection of a written suretyship 
agreement.  It is arguable that such sureties should not be allowed to resort to the 
technical defence of formal invalidity in order to escape their obligations on the assumption 
that they were unaware of their nature.  
 
Such concerns relate to criticisms which have been lodged against formalities in general.  




                                                          
89
 Public auctions were also regarded as exceptions to the formal requirements set out in s 30 of Transvaal 
Proclamation 8 of 1902 (Schuurman v Davey 1908 TS 66) and s 49 of Free State Ordinance 12 of 1906 (De 
Villiers v Parys Town Council 1910 OPD 55).  See also Sugden v Beaconhurst Dairies (Pty) Ltd 1963 2 SA 
174 (E) 184F-187A.  
90
 2010 2 SA 606 (ECP). 
91
 611A-B. 
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2 4 The dysfunctions of form92 
2 4 1 Introduction 
 
It was stated above that the South African legislature was motivated largely by a desire to 
ensure uniformity throughout the Union in its decision to prescribe formal requirements for 
both suretyships and sales of land.93  This decision had been supported by an earlier Law 
Revision Committee Report in the context of the former;94 it was wholly at odds, however, 
with the Committee’s recommendation in relation to the latter.95 
 
According to the Committee, the best way to achieve uniformity in sales of land would 
have been through the abolition of all pre-Union legislation prescribing formal requirements 
and the simultaneous return to the common-law rule that such transactions could be 
concluded orally.96  Its recommendation was due, in large part, to the fact that  
 
“on the whole, the requirement of formalities may promote as many frauds as it prevents, for it 
affords a dishonest man a technical ground for escaping his obligations with impunity.”97 
 
The Law Revision Committee was requested by Cabinet to reconsider its 
recommendation.98  Although it politely refused to do so,99 it was overruled, for reasons 
                                                          
92
 This label is used by Perillo (1973-1974) Fordham LR 39 to describe the disadvantages of formalities.  
93
 See 2 2. 
94
 Second Report (15-16 June 1950) para 42. 
95
 Para 29. 
96
 Paras 11, 29.  This was also the majority view of the judges of the Appellate Division, which was one of 
the interest groups approached by the Law Revision Committee for its view on this topic.  A minority had 
recommended that formal requirements should be prescribed for sales of land between parties belonging to 
certain racial groups who, allegedly, had a tendency to engage in numerous transactions of this type – “[i]n 
this regard the Indian community of Natal was mentioned” (para 30).  This recommendation did not elicit a 
favourable response: 
“The Committee feels … that this is not a sufficiently cogent consideration … [to] warrant the introduction 
of legislation on the subject which should be confined to a particular racial group in the Provinces, or in 
one or more of them.” (Para 30). 
97
 Para 16.  A further reason was the fact that since most contracts for the sale of land would in any event be 
concluded in writing, the recommendation that an oral sale of land should be valid would, in the Committee’s 
opinion, have had very little practical impact (para 29).   
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which remain undocumented.100 However, one could hazard a guess: the legislature 
presumably subscribed to the view expressed in Wilken v Kohler101 that the temptation to 
commit fraud and perjury in the context of sales of land, traditionally regarded as 
transactions of considerable value and importance, was sufficient to justify the imposition 
of formal requirements, even if these requirements might in themselves promote 
unconscionable conduct.102 
 
Nevertheless, the concern raised by the Committee, namely that formalities often promote 
rather than prevent fraud, is one of the main criticisms directed towards formal 
requirements.  In addition, formalities can be criticised because they require technical skill 
in drafting and can lead to unnecessary litigation.103  Each of these issues will now be 
considered in greater detail. 
 
2 4 2 Formal requirements and drafting difficulties 
 
The most obvious disadvantage of formal requirements is that compliance is both time-
consuming and a potential source of technical pitfalls.104  The fact that legislation imposing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
98
 See Eighth Report (27 July 1956) para V(3).  Unpublished report available at the Brand Van Zyl Law 
Library, UCT. 
99
 Para V(7): 
“It is unnecessary … to repeat the reasons which led the Committee … to making the recommendation 
that [legislation imposing formal requirements for sales of land] should be repealed … [I]t is respectfully 
submitted that they fully support the [recommendation] which [was] made.” 
100
 There is no further reference to this aspect in any of the subsequent reports of the Law Revision 
Committee.  It is also not addressed in any of the parliamentary debates.   
101
 1913 AD 135 142. 
102
 The Law Revision Committee’s concern that formal requirements might promote fraud was raised again 
by J C de Wet Memorandum insake Artikel 1(1) van Wet 68 van 1957 (27 June 1966) 1-2, unpublished 
memorandum available as part of the JC de Wet collection in the JS Gericke Library of the University of 
Stellenbosch, in which he also suggested that formalities for sales of land should be abolished.    
103
 R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 114-115 provide 
some additional “unenthusiastic … observations” (115) on formalities in the South African context. 
104
 Grové Borgstelling 6; Peel Contract 188.  As stated in the Motive zu dem Entwurfe eines Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuches (1888), translated in Von Mehren & Gordley The Civil Law System 900, “the observation of 
form requires both a precise knowledge and the skill necessary to use forms.” 
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formalities often does not specify what should appear in the written agreement105 means 
that parties have to resort to legal practitioners in order to ensure that their contract 
complies with the relevant provision.  While the increase in transaction costs may be 
justified on the basis of the resultant information disclosure and the related evidentiary, 
cautionary and channelling advantages, the existence of transaction costs in the context of 
statutory formalities has also led to the increasing use of standard form contracts.  As 
Grové points out,  
 
“[d]it is maklik om te bepaal dat ‘n benoemde kontrak, om geldig en afdwingbaar te wees, op 
skrif gestel moet word.  So ‘n bepaling het egter nie sonder meer tot gevolg dat jou individuele 
en onervare verbruiker beskerm word nie.  Die rede hiervoor is daarin geleë dat vormvereistes 
slegs die uiterlike manifestasie van ‘n ooreenkoms reël.  Die inhoud van die ooreenkoms word 
steeds deur die partye self bepaal.  Daarom dat statutêre vormvereistes noodwendig tot gevolg 
het dat standaardvormkontrakte onstaan.”106 
 
The benefit of standard form contracts is that they make available a suitable set of terms at 
no extra cost to the parties.  These terms may be used repeatedly, thereby saving time 
and removing the need to resort to costly legal assistance, resulting in a reduction of 
transaction costs.107  However, these types of contracts, which are prepared in advance by 
one party and presented to another for signature on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, can hardly 
be said to induce the careful deliberation allegedly inspired by formalities.108  The party to 
whom the contract is presented often does not read it or if he does, probably does not fully 
understand its terms or may be powerless to vary them.109  In these instances, the 
                                                          
105
 Eg, s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act merely states that the parties’ agreement must be contained within 
a deed, while s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act simply provides that a suretyship agreement must be 
embodied in a written document.  The relevant provisions of the Statute of Frauds and the BGB are similarly 
vague.  
106
 Borgstelling 6-7. 
107
 P J Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract, and the Law (1979) 24; M J Trebilcock & D N 
Dewees “Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts” in P Burrows & C G Veljanovski (eds) The Economic 
Approach to Law (1981) 93 96. 
108
 Christie & Bradfield The Law of Contract 109; C F C van der Walt “Die Huidige Posisie in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg met betrekking tot Onbillike Kontraksbedinge” (1986) 103 SALJ 646 657; Fridman 1985 
UTLJ 49-50. 
109
 G T S Eiselen Die Beheer oor Standaardbedinge: ‘n Regsvergelykende Ondersoek LLD thesis University 
of Potchefstroom (1988) 31-33; Trebilcock & Dewees “Standard Form Contracts” in The Economic Approach 
to Law 94.  Arguably, s 22 of the Consumer Protection Act, which specifies that any notice or document 
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cautionary function of form is rendered nugatory and South African courts have had to 
resort to the law on mistake in order to determine whether a party should be protected 
against the consequences of his decision to sign such a standard form contract.110  
 
2 4 3 Formalities as a source of unnecessary litigation 
 
The second general criticism directed towards formalities is that they may increase rather 
than reduce the scope for litigation.  The fact that an agreement has been reduced to 
writing does not prevent litigation about its content.  For example, disputes arise as to the 
sufficiency of the description of the parties or the subject matter or whether the agreement 
can consist of more than one document.  Furthermore, any statute that prescribes 
formalities for specific contracts increases the likelihood of definitional problems: is the 
contract before the court one which falls within the scope of the relevant statute, or not?  
This problem is most apparent when it comes to distinguishing between different forms of 
personal security.   
 
Conceptually, it is possible to distinguish between a suretyship, a guarantee and an 
indemnity.111  In South African law, the surety’s liability is secondary in the sense that his 
obligation only becomes enforceable once the principal debtor (whose liability is primary) 
breaches his contract with the creditor.112  The surety’s liability is also accessory, because 
it is dependent on the existence of a valid principal debt.113  In a contract of guarantee, the 
guarantor undertakes to indemnify the creditor against the consequences of one or other 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
provided to a consumer must be written in plain and intelligible language, is aimed at addressing this 
problem. 
110
 This is most evident in cases dealing with standard credit application forms which also contain suretyship 
agreements.  See eg Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) SA 419 (SCA); Keens Group Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Lötter 1989 1 SA 585 (C); Davids v Absa Bank Bpk 2005 3 SA 361 (C); Roomer v Wedge Steel (Pty) 
Limited 1998 1 SA 538 (N); Blue Chip Consultants (Pty) Ltd v Shamrock 2002 3 SA 231 (W); Absa Bank Ltd 
v Trzebiatowsky 2012 5 SA 134 (ECP).  
111
 The discussion in the main text will not engage in the debate surrounding the correct definition of 
suretyship, as to which see Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 28 and especially nn 6, 7; the minority judgment 
per Stegmann J in Carrim v Omar 2001 4 SA 691 (W) para 31 ff; J J Henning & K L Mould “Suretyship” in J 
A Faris & L T C Harms (eds) LAWSA 26 2 ed (2011) para 285 n 1.  Irrespective of which definition is 
adopted, the defining characteristics of a suretyship, as apparent in the main text, remain the same. 
112
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 28-29; G F Lubbe “Die Onderskeid tussen Borgtog en Ander Vorme van 
Persoonlike Sekerheidstelling” (1984) 47 THRHR 383 385. 
113
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 29-30; Lubbe 1984 THRHR 385. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
 
future event.114  His liability is therefore primary and is not dependent on the existence of 
another obligation.115  Finally, an indemnity exists when the indemnifier “[undertakes] a 
principal obligation to indemnify another should that other suffer a loss as a result of 
undertaking a particular activity”.116  
 
While it is possible to draw a theoretical distinction between the various forms of personal 
security, the distinction is less clear in practice.117  This problem of classification existed 
prior to the promulgation of the General Law Amendment Act.118  According to Forsyth,119 
one advantage of the limited application of the Act is that it has led to a sharpening of the 
(theoretical) distinction between suretyship and other forms of personal security.120  While 
this may be true, the problem of classification and the subsequent disputes surrounding 
the nature of an agreement are not alleviated simply because the Act now prescribes 
writing specifically for suretyship agreements.121   
 
This means that the channelling function attributed to writing, at least as that function was 
understood by Von Jhering,122 does not assist a court in determining which type of contract 
                                                          
114
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 32.  Suretyship is therefore a form of guarantee in its broadest sense - see 
Lubbe 1984 THRHR 392. 
115
 Lubbe 1984 THRHR 391; Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 32. 
116
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 35.  The authors indicate that the difference between an indemnity and 




 See eg Renou v Walcott (1905-1910) 10 HCG 246; Imperial Cold Storage and Supply Company Limited v 
Julius Weil and Co 1912 AD 747. 
119
 “Suretyship” in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South 
Africa (1996) 417 419, 422 
120
 In England, s 4 of the Statute of Frauds has been held to be applicable only to guarantees (suretyships in 
the SA sense) - see S J Whittaker “Suretyship” in H G Beale (gen ed) Chitty on Contracts II: Specific 
Contracts 30 ed (2008) 1639 1664; Bourkmire v Darnell 91 ER 663 (KB) 663. The failure to include 
indemnities (guarantees in the SA context) within the ambit of the Statute of Frauds has been explained as a 
judicial attempt to restrict the scope of the Statute (Peel Contract 194) and has been criticised on the basis 
that the effect has been “many hair-splitting distinctions of exactly that kind which brings the law into hatred, 
ridicule and contempt by the public” (Yeoman Credit Ltd v Latter [1961] WLR 828 835). 
121
 As is evident in cases like Northern Assurance Co Ltd v Delbrook-Jones 1966 3 SA 176 (T); List v 
Jungers 1979 3 SA 106 (A); Diner’s Club South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Durban Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1980 3 SA 
53 (A).  The mere fact that the parties had reduced their agreement to writing did not assist the respective 
courts in determining which type of personal security had been given. 
122
 See 2 3 2 above. 
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has been concluded in this context.  It has been pointed out that Fuller described the 
channelling function of form as one which distinguishes between enforceable and non-
enforceable transactions of the same type.  However, Von Jhering ascribed an extra 
dimension to the channelling function: it also assists in distinguishing between different 
types of legal transactions.  In theory, this characteristic of formalities as a means to “mark 
off” one type of transaction from another should also assist a court in distinguishing 
between suretyship and other forms of personal security, since the former must be in 
writing and the latter may be given orally.  Yet this aspect of the channelling function is not 
borne out in practice.  This can be attributed to the fact that the terms “suretyship”, 
“guarantee” and “indemnity” are used interchangeably,123 which means that the words 
themselves do not assist the court – it remains necessary to search for the parties’ 
intention.  The task of classification is also not made easier by parties’ tendency to reduce 
their agreements to writing as a matter of course.124  Finally, Von Jhering’s understanding 
of the channelling function wrongly assumes that everyone knows, and abides by, the 
rules.   
 
Leaving aside the problems relating to the classification of different forms of personal 
security, it is not entirely clear why only one form of such security, namely suretyship, 
should be reduced to writing.  Persons who undertake liability as sureties are no more 
vulnerable to the risk of perjured claims or to making hasty decisions than those who give 
                                                          
123
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 32; J T Pretorius “Suretyships and Indemnity” (2001) 13 SA Merc LJ 95 
96; Grové Borgstelling 67-68.  Forsyth and Pretorius Suretyship 28 n 6 have noted that “the usage of the 
variants of the word ‘guarantee’ where suretyship is meant is ingrained in the law reports and the written 
contracts themselves and very difficult to eradicate”.  The point is illustrated in Mouton v Die Mynwerkersunie 
1977 1 SA 119 (A) 138C where Wessels JA said that the word “guarantee” usually means to bind oneself as 
surety and in Basil Read (Pty) Ltd v Beta Hotels (Pty) Ltd 2001 2 SA 760 (C), in which the court held that the 
“contract guarantee” was “in the nature of a suretyship” (766D).  See also the confusing use of terminology in 
Carrim v Omar 2001 4 SA 691 (W) 695H-696D. 
124
 Of course, this statement applies equally to all types of contracts and not merely to those providing 
personal security.  Fridman 1985 UTLJ 49 states that “the nature of the transaction, its monetary value, or 
the character of the parties could render the use of writing to contain or evidence the contract and its terms a 
practical, everyday necessity”.  There is also the common belief that any contract must be in writing in order 
to be valid, which may explain why parties generally tend to reduce their agreements to writing irrespective 
whether it is statutorily required (50).  See also Kötz European Contract Law 1 79-80. 
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a guarantee.125  It does not appear that South African courts have considered the 
possibility that section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act is in fact broad enough that it 
could be interpreted to be applicable to all forms of personal security.  Such an 
interpretation would avoid the problems associated with the confusing use of terminology 
and take into account the policy considerations underlying the imposition of formalities.126  
The absence of such judicial consideration has meant that at least in some instances, 
there has been an unnecessary proliferation of litigation and further, resort to the technical 
defence of non-compliance with statutory formalities in order to escape liability.  Both 
these points are illustrated in the case of Carrim v Omar127 (“Carrim”). 
 
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows.128  Mrs Omar, the respondent, originally 
invested a sum of money with Volkskas Bank.  In terms of the Islamic faith, the interest 
which accrues on such a deposit is regarded as haram and not halaal.  The respondent 
accordingly sought to invest her money with an Islamic bank in terms of a Mudhaarabah 
contract.129  This investment would be a “nest-egg” for Mrs Omar and provide for her 
financially upon her husband’s death.  Unfortunately, the Islamic bank experienced 
difficulties and was subsequently liquidated. 
 
The respondent sought to reclaim her investment from the appellant (a director of the 
Islamic bank) on the basis that he had given an oral guarantee for the capital amount.  The 
                                                          
125
 The same point is made in Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 26 n 2; S Scott & E Dirix “To Have Your Cake 
and Eat It [Bespreking van Carrim v Omar 2001 4 SA 691 (W)] (2004) 15 Stell LR 333 343.  Both guaranties 
and indemnities are required to be in writing in British Columbia in terms of s 59(6) of the Law and Equity Act 
1996.  This provision is exactly the same as s 5 (1) of the British Columbia Statute of Frauds 1958, in relation 
to which the Law Reform Commission indicated that it would not distinguish between suretyship and 
indemnity for the purposes of a writing requirement.  Not only was such a distinction illogical in the opinion of 
the Commission, but the cautionary concern was equally evident in both suretyships and indemnities.  See 
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report on the Statute of Frauds (1977) Ch 3 E: Guarantees 
and Indemnities; Fridman 1985 UTLJ 54.  
126
 J T Pretorius “Die Formaliteitsvereiste by Borgstelling” (1988) 10 MB 122 129; Scott & Dirix 2004 Stell LR 
343. 
127




 This nature of this type of contract is explained in 731D-F of the majority judgment.  The investor’s funds 
are invested in the bank, who then acts as representative of the investor to grow the funds.  No interest is 
paid, but profits are divided between the bank and the investor.  Losses are borne by the investor alone 
(although the loss may never exceed the capital amount). 
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appellant in turn argued that if there was a contract between the parties, then that contract 
was an oral suretyship and therefore void in terms of the relevant statutory formalities. 
 
The majority held that an oral guarantee had been given.  Although Scott and Dirix argue 
that this conclusion is based on factual statements rather than legal reasoning,130 it is also 
true that a Mudhaarabah contract merely requires the bank to act as representative of the 
investor to grow the funds; the investor bears the risk of any loss in the case of a bad 
investment.  Taking this into account, it would not have made sense to conclude a 
suretyship, because there was no principal obligation created between the bank and the 
respondent which could be breached so that recourse could be had against the surety.131  
 
In relation to the writing requirement, the majority merely considered the argument that it 
might have been prudent for the agreement to have been reduced to writing, but did not 
take the matter any further.132  However, had the agreement been reduced to writing, there 
might at least have been greater certainty as to its terms, if not its classification, and both 
parties would have been protected against the possible fraud or perjury of the other. 
 
It has been suggested, rather speculatively, that the reason for the majority’s finding in the 
Carrim case had less to do with the existence of evidence supporting such a conclusion 
and more with the fact that the majority wanted to assist Mrs Omar on the basis of 
equitable considerations.133  If the majority had concluded that an oral suretyship existed 
between the parties, then it would have been faced with the problem that there is no 
recognised exception in South African law to the rule that a suretyship should be in writing.  
However, on the facts of the case, it was evident that the appellant was not merely a 
disinterested party, acting out of sentiment.  He received certain advantages from his 
undertaking: the offer of personal security assisted in the recruitment of Mrs Omar as an 
investor with the bank,134 which in turn entitled the appellant to loans from the bank without 
giving security for such loans.  Alternatively, where collateral was required, the accounts of 
                                                          
130
 2004 Stell LR 340.  The reasons for the court’s conclusion are summarised in Carrim v Omar 2001 4 SA 
691 (W) 739I-740C. 
131
 Carrim v Omar 2001 4 SA 691 (W) 740B; see also C F Forsyth & M du Plessis “Suretyship, Guarantee 
and Islamic Banking” (2002) 119 SALJ 671 673. 
132
 Carrim v Omar 2001 4 SA 691 (W) 739A-C. 
133
 Scott & Dirix 2004 Stell LR 340-341. 
134
 Carrim v Omar 2001 4 SA 691 (W) 733B. 
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investors which he had recruited were accepted.135  In the absence of a recognised 
exception, the conclusion that an invalid oral suretyship existed between the parties would 
have meant that the appellant escaped liability, despite the probability that he had had the 
serious intention to be bound at the time of contracting.  This would have left the 
respondent without her “nest-egg” and without any recourse against the appellant.  It is 
therefore possible that the majority may have been motivated, if only implicitly, by the 
awareness that in certain cases statutory formalities may promote, rather than prevent, 
fraud. 
 
2 4 4 Formalities and the promotion of fraud or unconscionable conduct 
 
When strictly applied, formalities can provide a refuge, by allowing a party to rely on formal 
incompleteness to escape an oral agreement which was seriously intended.136  This is 
probably one of the “hardships” which Innes J had in mind when he expressed doubts, in 
Wilken v Kohler,137 about the desirability of a provision requiring sales of land to be in 
writing upon pain of nullity.   
 
As will become apparent in subsequent chapters, South African courts vacillate between 
strict insistence on compliance with formal requirements and an approach which 
acknowledges that formalism can lead to inequitable results.  For example, when it comes 
to determining with what degree of precision parties must record the terms of their 
agreement, they have held that meticulous accuracy in the recordal is not required, in spite 




 In relation to the English Statute of Frauds, the comment has been made that a strict application of its 
provisions may encourage rather than prevent fraud - see Simon v Metivier (or Motivis) (1766) 1 Wm Bl 
599 601 per Wilmot J.  The same criticism has been lodged against the Statute of Frauds as it is applied in 
the US (Brown Corbin on Contracts 4 6) and against SA legislation prescribing formalities for certain types of 
contracts (see eg G F Lubbe & C M Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract - Cases, Materials and 
Commentary 3 ed (1988) 206 n 4; Van Rensburg & Treisman Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 23; Van 
Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 989; Senekal v Home Sites (Pty) Ltd 1950 1 SA 139 
(W) 150; Exdev (Pty) Ltd v Pekudei Investments (Pty) Ltd 2011 2 SA 282 (SCA) para 1.  In Weinerlein v 
Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282, this potential for the abuse of statutory formalities led to the recognition of 
the remedy of rectification in the context of agreements subject to statutory formalities - see ch 5). 
137
 1913 AD 135 142.  See also the remarks made by the SA Law Revision Committee Second Report (15-
16 June 1950) para 16, quoted in 2 4 1 above. 
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of the fact that this is probably the best way to give effect to the evidentiary function.138  
This more lenient approach has been adopted in order to prevent the relevant legislation 
being used as an instrument of fraud.  In the context of formalities relating to sales of land, 
Watermeyer CJ stated in Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd139 that 
 
“if [the relevant legislation were] to be construed so as to require a written contract of sale to 
contain, under pain of nullity, a faultless description of the property sold couched in meticulously 
accurate terms, then such a construction would merely be an encouragement to the dishonest 
purchaser to escape from his bargain on a technical defect in the description of the property, 
even in cases where there was no dispute at all between the parties.  Such construction would 




However, when it comes to granting remedies to a party to a formally invalid agreement, 
South African courts have followed a strict interpretation of the consequence of invalidity 
for non-compliance.141  The general position is that a party is limited to an enrichment 
remedy to reclaim his performance and is not awarded what he bargained for, in spite of 
the fact that the other party may have led him to believe that he would abide by the 
formally defective agreement.  Such a restrictive approach does not take into account the 
possibility that statutory formalities are being abused and that the party raising the defence 
of non-compliance may have acted unconscionably.  Other legal systems afford more 
explicit recognition to the criticism that formalities can be used as an instrument of fraud 




                                                          
138
 Estate du Toit v Coronation Syndicate, Ltd 1929 AD 219 224. 
139
 1948 1 SA 983 (A). 
140
 Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 989.  Ch 3 considers the interpretation of the 
relevant statutory requirements in greater detail.  The current position referred to in the main text is more 
lenient than was previously the case, where the Appellate Division held that “the subject-matter [in a sale of 
land] must be defined or described with a degree of precision which will enable it to be identified without 
recourse to the evidence of the parties concerned”.  Estate du Toit v Coronation Syndicate, Ltd 1929 AD 
219 224, discussed in A J Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease 3 ed (2004) 93 ff.  Such a strict interpretation not 
only permits the statutory requirements to be used as instruments of fraud, but also suggests that a higher 
degree of certainty is required for agreements subject to formalities than for other contracts.  See, in this 
regard, J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 324. 
141
 See ch 6 for further detail. 
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2 5 Conclusion 
 
The primary object of this chapter has been to provide an overview of the history, purpose, 
functions and shortcomings of statutory formalities.  Formalities may promote certainty, in 
that compliance with the relevant provisions forces parties to reduce their agreement to 
writing, with the document serving as evidence of that agreement.  The need to reduce an 
agreement to writing can also draw a party’s attention to the fact that he may be assuming 
a potentially onerous obligation and that he should exercise caution before doing so.  
Finally, writing can signal the end of the negotiation phase, and serve as a means to 
distinguish between enforceable and unenforceable transactions (and also, according to 
some, between different kinds of enforceable transactions).142 
 
The advantages of formalities have been set out in detail, because they illustrate why it is 
permissible to limit contractual freedom in a legal system whose point of departure is that 
contractual liability is based on the will of the parties.143  Fuller noted that the value of 
contractual autonomy – which underlies the notion of contractual freedom – is only one 
norm or value in any legal system.  It can be outweighed by other concerns, like the need 
for certainty, protection of parties or the prevention of fraud, when these are prevalent in 
certain types of transactions.144   
 
However, as discussed in similar detail above, it is also true that formalities have certain 
disadvantages.145  They require skill and technical knowledge which most lay persons do 
not have, forcing them to resort to legal assistance.  The resultant increase in transaction 
costs has led to the increased use of standard form contracts, which in turn can have 
negative consequences of its own.  In addition, the regular disputes regarding whether 
there has been sufficient compliance with formal requirements shows that formalities can 
increase, rather than decrease, litigation.  Finally, affording a party the possible escape 
                                                          
142
 These functions are discussed in 2 3 2-2 3 3. 
143
 Saambou-Nasionale Bouvereniging v Friedman 1979 3 SA 978 (A) 995H-996A. 
144
 1941 Colum LR 808; 813-814.  See also D Kennedy “From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private 
Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s ‘Consideration and Form’” (2000) 100 Colum LR 94 131.  For this reason, it was 
argued in ch 1 (1 3 3) that it is unlikely that a challenge to the constitutional validity of statutes imposing 
formal requirements, upon pain of nullity for non-compliance, would succeed. 
145
 See 2 4. 
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route of non-compliance with statutory formalities means that they can be used as a 
vehicle for fraud and perjury. 
 
This weighing-up of the functions and dysfunctions of form, and the recognition that the 
advantages of formalities always come at a cost, is referred to by Kennedy as a 
“conflicting considerations” analysis.146  This type of analysis, in the context of formalities, 
is evident in the work of Von Jhering.  He identified the benefits of rules imposing statutory 
formalities as certainty of transaction and control over judges,147 but also indicated that 
these benefits come at the cost of over- and/or under-inclusiveness.148   
 
Instances of over- and under-inclusiveness have been discussed above.149  For example, 
it was pointed out that there are no recognised South African exceptions to the rule that 
suretyships must be reduced to writing, in spite of the fact that there may be certain fact 
patterns which indicate that the concerns which formalities are intended to address are not 
evident or can be addressed in some other way.  At the same time, the rule that only 
suretyships must be reduced to writing is under-inclusive, because it does not extend to 
other contracts, like guarantees, which are functionally similar and which raise the same 
policy concerns. 
 
The benefit of subjecting formalities to a conflicting considerations analysis is that it 
reminds us that  
 
                                                          
146
 2000 Colum LR 94. 
147
 L’Esprit du Droit Romain dans les Diverses Phases de Son Développement I 2 ed tr O de Meulenaere 
(1877) 54 (emphasis in the original): 
“En effet, l’importance de cette ... qualité [de la réalisabilité formelle] n’est pas seulement de faciliter, de 
simplifier, et par conséquent d’accélérer l’application du droit, mais encorer d’assurer la realisation 
uniforme du droit.”  (“In effect, the importance of this quality of formal realisability is not only the 
facilitation, simplification and as a consequence, speedy application of the law, but also the assurance of 
a uniform application of the law” – own translation.) 
148
 L’Esprit du Droit Romain I 54-55, also discussed in Kennedy 2000 Colum LR 112; D Kennedy “Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1975-1976) 89 Harv LR 1685 1687-1694.  The under- and over-
inclusiveness of rules imposing formalities is also implicit in a statement in Zweigert & Kötz Comparative Law 
375: “provisions regarding form often cut more deeply than is required to implement the underlying policy 
grounds”. 
149
 See 2 3 4 and 2 4 3. 
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“it never makes sense to justify a rule by appeal to its administrability - one must always add: 




It also reminds us that, at a more abstract level, the treatment of formal requirements 
reveals the tension between formalism and flexibility:  
 
“[Formalism] makes for certainty of the law, [flexibility] for equity – the two principles on which 
justice is based.  These principles are antagonistic.  Yet [a] legal system must try to realize both 
simultaneously.  That makes ideal justice a Utopian idea, for the one principle must always be 
precariously balanced against the other.  To carry through the one without any regard to the 
other would lead to extreme injustice: summum ius summa iniuria.”151   
 
It is argued that these conflicting considerations (however they may be worded) should 
inform every judgment in which formal requirements are at issue.  Sometimes it is 
necessary to give effect to the policy considerations underlying the imposition of 
formalities.  On other occasions, it may be that the dysfunctions of form are such that a 
strict interpretation of the formal requirements may promote an inequitable result.  
Therefore, the following chapters, while focusing on the black-letter rules of formal 
requirements, will also examine the curial treatment of formalities in the light of these 
conflicting considerations. 
 
                                                          
150
 Kennedy 2000 Colum LR 113.  Note that while Fuller viewed the conflict as existing between the functions 
of formalities on the one hand and private autonomy on the other, he seems to have missed the point that a 
conflict also exists between the functions and dysfunctions of form itself (138-139). 
151
 Zimmermann Law of Obligations 88-89 (italics added; footnote omitted). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERPRETATION OF FORMAL REQUIREMENTS 
3 1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that despite differing historical motivations for the 
imposition of formal requirements, South African, English and German law all prescribe 
formalities for sales of land and suretyships.  While the same types of transactions are 
subject to formalities, the degree of formality can vary from one system to another and 
from one type of transaction to another.1 
 
In England, a mere memorandum or note is sufficient to render a guarantee enforceable,2 
while a contract including all the express terms of the agreement is necessary for a valid 
sale of land.3  In Germany, a declaration of suretyship must also be in writing,4 whereas 
the sale of land must meet the stricter requirement of notarial authentication.5  No 
distinction is drawn between the formal requirements for suretyships and sales of land in 
South Africa: both must be in writing in order to be valid.6  In all legal systems, the 
signature of one or both parties is also required. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the judicial interpretation of some of these 
provisions.  It commences by drawing basic distinctions which are essential to 
understanding the South African interpretation of the formal requirements under 
consideration.7  The discussion then moves on to case law which illustrates what must 
appear in a suretyship or sale of land in order to ensure that these transactions are 
formally valid.8  Finally, the chapter concludes by examining various aspects related to the 
requirement that the document must be signed by one or both parties.9 
 
                                                          
1
 The relevant legislative provisions are reproduced in Addendum A. 
2
 S 4 of the Statute of Frauds. 
3
 S 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act. 
4
 § 766 BGB. 
5
 § 311b.  
6
 S 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act; s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act. 
7
 3 2. 
8
 3 3. 
9
 3 4. 
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Before considering these aspects in greater detail, the following three observations must 
be made.  First, this chapter does not purport to deal with each and every problem which 
has confronted a court in interpreting a statutory provision imposing formal requirements.  
Not only would this be an almost impossible task, but it would not serve the purpose of 
providing a general overview of the judicial interpretation of legislation imposing 
formalities.  Secondly, and also in the light of this purpose, the discussion which follows is 
more descriptive than in subsequent chapters.  The goal is to set out what should appear 
in the written agreement; the reasons why courts have come to their conclusions, and the 
interaction between these conclusions and other aspects of contract law, are largely dealt 
with in other chapters.  It will be necessary however, to make certain remarks which 
anticipate topics explained in greater detail later, in order to contextualise the interpretation 
which is the topic here.  Finally, the primary focus is on South African law and comparative 
observations are limited chiefly to those that illuminate the South African approach.  The 
advantages and disadvantages of this approach compared to that of other legal systems 
can really only be appreciated if it is clearly understood in the first place.   
 
3 2 Some basic distinctions 
3 2 1 The nature of the written document: contract or memorandum? 
 
Despite the differences in wording, both section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act10 and 
section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act require that the parties’ agreement must be 
in writing in order to be valid.11  By contrast, the Statute of Frauds envisages two 
alternative means to comply with its provisions: either the parties’ agreement is reduced to 
writing, or there must be some note or memorandum of it.  Implicit in these two alternatives 
                                                          
10
 Read together with the definition of “alienation” and “deed of alienation” in s 1.  A J Kerr The Law of Sale 
and Lease 3 ed (2004) 82 has criticised the Act’s definition of “alienation”: it does not denote the transfer of 
ownership but rather a sale, exchange or donation.  The writer argues further that the statutory description of 
a “contract” is also contrary to ordinary legal usage (83), because it appears to be limited to “a deed of 
alienation under which land is sold against payment by the purchaser to, or to any person on behalf of, the 
seller of an amount of money in more than two instalments over a period exceeding one year” (see s 1 and 
Addendum A).  For these reasons, Kerr suggests an alternative formulation of s 2(1): 
“No sale, exchange, or donation of land … shall be of any force or effect unless it is contained in a written 
document or documents signed …” (83, footnote omitted). 
11
 R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 131; Fourlamel 
(Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 341D-342H. 
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is the notion that an agreement in writing and a mere note or memorandum are not the 
same type of recordal.12   
 
The distinction between a written contract and a memorandum has also been recognised 
in South African law, at least as early as 1898.  In Richmond v Grofton,13 De Villiers CJ 
stated: 
 
“The English cases in the construction of the Statute of Frauds do not assist the Court in 
construing the meaning of the terms ‘contract in writing’ … In the case of [In Re New Eberhardt 
Company (1890) LR 43 ChD 118], the question arose whether a ‘contract in writing’ had been 
registered within the meaning of the Companies Act [1867], and Lord Justice Fry made the 
following observations:  
 
‘Nothing can be more different than the language of this statute and the language of the Statute of 
Frauds.  That is satisfied if the contract be in writing, or if the memorandum of the contract be in writing 
signed by the party to be charged therewith, but here the contract must be in writing, by which I 
understand that both parties to the contract must signify their assent to the terms of it in writing, and 





Leaving aside for the time being the reference to a signature as a means to indicate 
assent to the terms contained in the written document,15 it is apparent from Lord Fry’s 
statement that when a contract is required to be in writing, the contract itself should be 
embodied in the document.  It must reflect the parties’ intention to contract.16   
 
This conclusion is also evident in Jackson v Weilbach’s Executrix17 (“Jackson”).  The court 
was confronted with the question whether the declarations of the purchaser and seller 
made for transfer duty purposes constituted a written “contract of sale of fixed property” as 
required by section 30 of Proclamation 8 of 1902:  
 
                                                          
12
 Elpis Maritime Co Ltd v Marti Chartering Co Inc [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 311 314. 
13




 See 3 4 below. 
16
 See also Christie & Bradfield Contract 119. 
17
 1907 TS 212. 
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“But do these declarations of purchaser and seller constitute such a contract?  In form they 
certainly do not; the declaration of the seller is not an offer, and the declaration of the purchaser 
is not an acceptance.  Nor is there anything to show that the parties, when they signed these 
declarations, intended to enter into any contract.  The declarations were signed for revenue 
purposes, and they purport not to embody a contract constituted in terms of the documents 
themselves, but to record that a prior contract had been entered into at a date therein 
mentioned.”18 
 
Similarly, in Raywood v Short19 (“Raywood”) Solomon J concluded that a receipt for 
payment of the purchase price  
 
“was merely a certificate acknowledging that £90 had been paid as the purchase-price of the 
two stands … [T]here had been a verbal sale some months before; but no amount of evidence 
to prove a verbal contract can supply the defect that the contract was not in writing … If the 
provisions of our law were the same as those of the Statute of Frauds, it might perhaps have 
been said that the document was a ‘note or memorandum of the contract signed by the party to 
be charged therewith.’  As our law, however, contains no similar provision it [is] unnecessary to 
consider that point.”20  
 
Thus, where section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act prescribes that the contract must 
appear in a deed of alienation, it means that the recordal itself must embody the parties’ 
animus contrahendi.21  This may be achieved either by incorporating the parties’ common 
intention to be bound in one document22 or by recording the parties’ respective 








 At first glance, it may appear somewhat odd that decisions concerning formal requirements imposed for 
sales of land under earlier legislation are relied upon to interpret s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.  
However, these older decisions are still relevant today, because the meaning and purpose of formal 
requirements imposed for alienations of land have remained the same over time (Just Names Properties 11 
CC v Fourie 2007 3 SA 1 (W) para 30; Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd v Ping Bai 1997 3 SA 1004 (SCA) 
1008I).  See also Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 18 (in which the court specifically 
relied upon Jackson v Weilbach’s Executrix 1907 TS 212 to support its conclusion that the execution of 
conveyancing documents does not constitute a written acceptance as required by the Alienation of Land 
Act).   
22
 See eg Poole and McLennan v Nourse 1918 AD 404 416; Vermeulen v Goose Valley Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 2001 3 SA 986 (SCA) para 3. 
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declarations of intention (ie a written offer and written acceptance)23 so that a contract is 
constituted by reading the two documents together.  In Hirschowitz v Moolman,24 the rule 
that the parties’ agreement must be reduced to writing was held to be applicable also to an 
agreement creating a right of pre-emption, in spite of the fact that such an agreement does 
not constitute an “alienation”,25 in order to prevent the circumvention of formalities by 
means of the so-called Oryx mechanism (which allows the holder of a right of pre-emption 
to conclude an agreement of sale with the grantor of the right in the event that the latter 
infringes that right26).  However, the court’s conclusion was formulated in broad terms: 
 
“In general a pactum de contrahendo is required to comply with the requisites for validity, 
including requirements as to form, applicable to the second or main contract to which the parties 
have bound themselves” (766D). 
 
Upon a literal interpretation, this statement would apply equally to an option (which is also 
a pactum de contrahendo), although theoretically only that part of the option which 
consists of the substantive offer (and the acceptance of that offer) should be in writing and 
not also the agreement to keep the offer open.27  Therefore, a document which fails to 
reflect the parties’ intention to create a right of pre-emption will be invalid.  Similarly, a 
document which fails to embody an agreement to keep open an offer to alienate, may also 
be invalid.  
 
                                                          
23
 Trever Investments (Pty) Ltd v Friedhelm Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 1 SA 7 (A) 18D; Legator McKenna 
Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 18. 
24
 1985 3 SA 739 (A) 767F-H. 
25
 The SA approach to agreements creating rights of pre-emption should be contrasted with the approach to 
other types of agreements where the transfer of land is involved, but which do not have to be in writing 
because they are regarded as falling outside the definition of “alienation”.  These agreements are discussed 
in Kerr Sale and Lease 78-79; A D J van Rensburg & S H Treisman The Practitioner’s Guide to the 
Alienation of Land Act 2 ed (1984) 35-36; Christie & Bradfield Contract 116-117.  The list includes service 
contracts where a transfer of land is promised as remuneration, an undertaking to transfer land in exchange 
for a loan and the transfer of land as a prize for winning a competition.  
26
 Associated South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte Bäckereien (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 893 (A) 
907E. 
27
 For support of this argument and criticism of Hirschowitz v Moolman 1985 3 SA 739 (A) in general, see eg 
G F Lubbe & C M Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract - Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 93 n 
5; G F Lubbe “Law of Purchase and Sale” 1985 ASSAL 133 140-142; A D J van Rensburg 
“Formaliteitsvoorskrifte, Voorkoopregte en Opsies” (1986) 49 THRHR 208; S W J van der Merwe, L F van 
Huyssteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 70-71, 74-75. 
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It has in fact been held that a receipt constitutes a sufficient memorandum of the 
agreement between the parties in terms of the Statute of Frauds.28  The same conclusion 
has been drawn in relation to a letter written to an agent29 or a recital in a will.30  In none of 
these cases did the English courts require that an intention to contract must be embodied 
in the document.31  As stated in Re Hoyle:32 
 
“The Court is not in quest of the intention of parties, but only of evidence under the hand of one 
of the parties to the contract that he has entered into it.  Any document signed by him and 
containing the terms of the contract is sufficient for that purpose.”33 
 
A memorandum therefore does not need to reflect the parties’ intention to contract but 
simply the fact that there was this intention at some stage prior to the creation of the 
document.  It acts as evidence of the parties’ prior verbal agreement, rather than the 
embodiment of their agreement.  Although South African courts do not appear to be 
inclined to refer to a document which is drawn up unilaterally and signed by one party to 
an agreement as a memorandum, cases like Jackson and Raywood reflect the perception 
that such documents generally do not constitute the embodiment of the parties’ 
agreement.34  As a result, and irrespective of the label, both South African and common-
law courts recognise that the limitations on the use of extrinsic evidence discussed in the 
next chapter do not apply to these types of unilateral documents.35 
                                                          
28
 Beckett v Nurse [1948] KB 535.  See also Auerbach v Nelson [1919] 2 Ch 383, in which the court was 
required to consider whether the description of property contained in a receipt was sufficiently ascertainable.  
At no point in the judgment did the court question whether a receipt itself could constitute a sufficient 
memorandum. 
29
 Gibson v Holland (1865-66) LR 1 CP 1. 
30
 Re Hoyle [1893] 1 Ch 84. 
31
 Beckett v Nurse [1948] KB 535 537-538 per Tucker LJ, 540 per Jenkins LJ; Gibson v Holland (1865-66) 
LR 1 CP 1 8; Re Hoyle [1893] 1 Ch 84 98 per Lindley LJ; 99 per Bowen LJ; 100 per Smith LJ. 
32
 [1893] 1 Ch 84. 
33
 99 per Bowen LJ. 
34
 This is not an invariable rule, as will become apparent further below in the main text. 
35
 For SA, see Cunningham v Holcroft 1907 TS 251 252-253; Arthur v Central News Agency, Ltd 1925 TPD 
588 593-594; Weintraub v Oxford Brick Works (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 1090 (T) 1092-1093; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 150-151; Christie & Bradfield Contract 202-203.  For the common-law position, see eg J H 
Chadbourn Evidence in Trials at Common Law by John Henry Wigmore 9 (1981) § 2454; Beckett v Nurse 
[1948] KB 535 540-541 per Jenkins LJ; Wemhoff v Investors Management Corporation of America 528 A 2d 
1205 (1987) 1207 in which the court quoted Hackney v Morelite Construction 418 A 2d 1062 (1980) 1065 n 1 
(emphasis in the original): 




The distinction between a contract in writing and a unilateral document not intended to 
constitute the embodiment of an agreement (or memorandum in the English sense) 
requires some elaboration in the context of suretyships.  It was stated above that section 6 
of the General Law Amendment Act requires that the terms of a “contract of suretyship” 
must be in writing.  A literal interpretation of this provision suggests that the parties should 
conclude an agreement and record this agreement in a document.36  However, it seems 
that it is only the surety’s declaration of intent which must take a written form. 
 
This is most clearly illustrated in Jurgens v Volkskas Bank Ltd37 (“Jurgens”) in which the 
respondent creditor sent printed bank forms containing blank spaces, designed to be 
completed as suretyships, to the appellants.  Relevant for the purposes of this discussion 
is the court’s characterisation of the documents once these were completed:  
 
“It is trite that an offer cannot be accepted unless and until it has been brought to the attention 
of the offeree … A prerequisite for a contract of suretyship is that the offer communicated by the 
would-be surety to the creditor must be complete.  In the instant case, so it seems to me, the 
appellants communicated their offers to the respondent when the documents in question, duly 
filled in, were delivered by or on behalf of the appellants to the respondent.  It cannot be 
suggested that, on the face of them, these offers were in any respect incomplete.  At that 
juncture they contained the terms essential for the [formal] validity of a contract of suretyship … 
Each … document bore the signatures of those of the appellants named therein.  It is not in 
dispute that the suretyships thus delivered to the respondent were accepted by it.”38 
 
While it may not have been in dispute that the offers of suretyship were accepted by the 
creditor, the judgment does not clarify how this acceptance took place.  Statements made 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
“‘The relationship between the parol evidence rule and the [S]tatute of [F]rauds frequently has been made 
more intimate than either rule requires.  The former bars the admission of prior written or prior or 
contemporaneous oral evidence that adds to or is inconsistent with the terms of a written document that 
constitutes a complete and final (integrated) statement of the parties' agreement. The latter bars 
enforcement of certain oral agreements unless there is a written memorandum signed by the party to be 
charged ... [T]he statute ... does not require an exhaustive, integrated statement of the agreement in 
writing, but only a sufficient statement to establish that there in fact was an agreement and that the party 




 Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 341G-H. 
37
 1993 1 SA 214 (A). 
38
 218I-219E. 
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in subsequent case law and academic commentary imply that the suretyships were signed 
by the creditor,39 but there is no indication in Jurgens that the creditor signified his 
acceptance in this manner.  In fact, it has been argued that a written offer to stand surety, 
like a written offer to donate falling within the ambit of section 5 of the General Law 
Amendment Act, may be accepted orally or even tacitly.40  It would therefore appear that 
the formal validity of a suretyship is determined solely on the basis of a written declaration 
of intent by the surety, provided that that declaration is complete by the time of delivery to 
the creditor and provided it is accepted by the latter, albeit not necessarily in writing.  This 
conclusion raises two questions.  First, is it possible to reconcile the decision in Jurgens 
with those cases dealing with alienations of land which have held that there must be a 
written offer and a written acceptance in order to comply with a formal requirement that the 
contract must be in writing?  Secondly, how does a declaration of intent by the surety in 
any event comply with section 6, which requires that a “contract of suretyship” must be 
recorded in writing?  
 
With regard to the first question, it should be pointed out that the court in Jurgens was not 
of the opinion that a unilateral undertaking by a surety is sufficient to constitute an 
agreement.  In fact, it emphasised that a suretyship, like a sale of land for example, is a 
bilateral legal act: it is based on an agreement between a creditor and a surety.41  It is 
argued that the apparent anomaly which arises between cases dealing with alienations of 
land and the conclusion drawn in Jurgens may be explained on the basis that while both 
types of contract are based on agreement, the former usually consists of reciprocal 
performances42 while the latter deals only with the unilateral performance of the surety.43  
                                                          
39
 Fraser v Viljoen 2008 4 SA 106 (SCA) para 4; D J Lötz “The Law of Purchase and Sale” 2008 ASSAL 
1058 1059. 
40
 See P R Owens & H Daniels “Donations” in W A Joubert (ed) LAWSA 8(1) 2 ed (2005) para 305. 
41
 Jurgens v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 218I; African Life Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Score 
Food Holdings Ltd 1995 2 SA 230 (A) 239A-B; C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s The Law of Suretyship 6 
ed (2010) 61.  The statement in the main text may appear trite, but there is case law which suggests that a 
unilateral undertaking to stand surety, provided it is clear and unequivocal, is sufficient to impose obligations 
(see eg Bouwer v Lichtenburg Co-Operative Society 1925 TPD 144 148; Federated Timbers (Pretoria) (Pty) 
Ltd v Fourie 1978 1 SA 292 (T) 297B-C). 
42
 The one exception to this analysis would be donations of land, which are also defined as an “alienation” in 
terms of s 1 of the Alienation of Land Act.  Both the offer to donate and its acceptance would have to be in 
writing.  However, this does not imply that the performance in terms of a donation of land is not unilateral.  
Rather, it has to do with the fact that s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act specifies that both the donor and the 
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It is necessary for both parties to an alienation to reduce their declarations of intent to 
writing, because this ensures that certainty is achieved regarding their respective 
obligations.44  If the performance is unilateral, such as a surety’s, then it is that 
performance which must be rendered certain by reduction to writing, so that the surety 
may be protected from fraudulent claims and in order to warn him about the onerous 
nature of his performance.  It is presumably for this reason that section 6 prescribes that 
the surety alone must sign the document and it is also presumably for this reason that it is 
sufficient if only the surety’s declaration of intent has been reduced to writing, in spite of 
the fact that a suretyship is based on agreement and not a unilateral intention to be bound 
on the part of the surety.45 
  
The court in Jurgens does not explain how a document which is signed by the surety alone 
and which therefore appears to record only his declaration of intent, can constitute a 
“contract of suretyship” and not a memorandum in the English sense or the equivalent 
unilateral record in the South African sense.  However, it has been stated elsewhere that  
 
“[t]he mere fact that the document is signed by only one party does not prove that it is a 
unilateral act, for there may be a second party who acts on the face of it as part of a transaction.  
That being so, the fact that a document is not signed by [one of the parties is] … not decisive. 
The real question is whether the parties intended the [document] to record the terms of the 
[agreement]”.46 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
donee must sign the deed of alienation.  It is possible that the legislature envisaged that in the context of the 
alienation of land, a donee would have to undertake certain obligations which, although not rendering the 
donation reciprocal, nevertheless require the certainty that a written record of those obligations would 
promote.  An example of such a donation may be found in Scholtz v Scholtz 2012 5 SA 230 (SCA) para 3, in 
which the donee was required to pay the costs of transfer involved in registering the donated property. 
43
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 36. 
44
 Trever Investments (Pty) Ltd v Friedhelm Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 1 SA 7 (A) 18D-E. 
45
 Cf § 766 BGB sentence 1: only the surety’s declaration of intent is required to be in writing, but this does 
not change the fact that a suretyship is based on consensus and that there must be some form of 
acceptance, whether oral or tacit, on the part of the creditor.  See M Habersack “§ 766” in M Habersack (ed) 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 5 Besonderer Teil III: §§ 705-853 5 ed (2009) nn 5, 
26. 
46
 Union Government (Minister of Finance) v Chatwin 1913 TPD 317 321.  The case dealt with a mortgage 
bond, but the same conclusion has been reached in relation to a document recording a suretyship.  See the 
unreported judgment of Union Bank of S. A. Ltd v Shatz TPD, April 1940 (the judgment is available at the 
library of the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria).   




And in Baker v Afrikaanse Nasionale Afslaers en Agentskap Maatskappy (Edms.) Bpk.,47 it 
was held that 
 
“een of beide partye mag op ander maniere as deur hul handtekening te kenne gee dat hul 
ooreenkom op terme wat in ‘n geskrif vervat is; en as hul weersydse instemming met die 
skriftelike terme dan bewys word, is hul net soseer daaraan gebonde asof hul dit onderteken 
het.”48 
 
These cases admittedly did not focus specifically on formal requirements.  Nevertheless, 
this does not detract from the point that a document which appears to record a declaration 
of intent by one party can amount to the recordal of a contract.49  Provided the parties 
intended the document to constitute or embody their agreement, a court will give effect to 
that intention.  It is argued that this conclusion is also applicable to the facts of the Jurgens 
case.  There, written offers containing all the material terms of the envisaged agreement 
were delivered to the creditor for his acceptance.  Since these offers were accepted, the 
inference is that the parties intended that the declarations by the sureties would constitute 
the complete record of the suretyship agreements. 
 
It is argued further that the Jurgens case should not be seen as supporting a conclusion 
that the South African equivalent of a memorandum is sufficient for the purposes of 
compliance with section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act.  Not only were the written 
offers of suretyship made with the requisite intention to contract (an intention which is 
absent from either a unilateral recordal or memorandum), but they were also accompanied 
by the intention that they would constitute the sole memorial of the parties’ agreement 
upon acceptance.  For this reason, the parol evidence rule is applicable to suretyships but 
not, as stated above, to memoranda as required by the Statute of Frauds or their South 
African equivalent. 
 
This discussion has referred to the Statute of Frauds in general terms.  However, the 
Statute now applies only to guarantees (suretyships in South African law).50  That part of 
                                                          
47




 See also Christie & Bradfield Contract 202-203. 
50
 See ch 2 (2 2). 
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the Statute which related to alienations of land was re-enacted in section 40(1) of the Law 
of Property Act 1925.51  According to this provision, both parties to a sale of land would 
only be bound if each of them, at the very least, signed a memorandum.  If the purchaser 
alone signed a memorandum, then only he could be sued – the agreement would be 
unenforceable against the seller.  This potentially lopsided effect of section 40 was one of 
the most significant reasons motivating the English Law Commission to suggest that 
formalities relating to sales of land should be amended.52  
 
The Law Commission’s recommendations resulted in section 2 of the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.  It is no longer sufficient to prove the existence of a 
memorandum – there must be a contract, containing all the express terms of the parties’ 
agreement and signed by or on behalf of both parties.53  While the Act permits the contract 
to consist of more than one document,54 it presupposes that the document containing the 
terms, or the reference to another document recording the terms, will be signed by both 
parties (unless contracts are exchanged).55  Like their South African counterparts, English 
courts now also require that a recordal for the sale of land must embody the parties’ 
intention to contract.56 
 
To summarise: when a formal requirement prescribes that the parties’ agreement be in 
writing, it is insufficient to provide a recordal that merely serves as evidence of the fact that 
an oral agreement has been concluded some time prior to the recordal.  Rather, the 
document must embody the parties’ consensus.  If the contract is one in which 
                                                          
51
 See Addendum A. 
52
 See, in particular, Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of Land (Working Paper No 92) (1985) para 3.2 
and Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of Land (Law Com No 164) (1987) paras 1.7, 4.8.  Another 
important reason for the suggested amendment related to the uncertainty created by the doctrine of part 
performance.  This is discussed in ch 6 (6 4 2).  The initial impetus for the Law Commission’s investigation 
however, was the decision in Law v Jones [1974] Ch 112 124, in which it was held that a document marked 
“subject to contract” could constitute a sufficient memorandum (see Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of 
Land (Working Paper No 92) (1985) paras 1.3-1.6).  Although this decision was apparently overturned in 
Tiverton Estates Ltd v Wearwell Ltd [1975] Ch 146 160, 165, the Law Commission nevertheless continued 
with its project for the reasons stated above. 
53
 S 2(1). 
54
 S 2(2). 
55
 S 2(3). 
56
 See Firstpost Homes Ltd v Johnson [1995] 1 WLR 1567 1573; Ruddick v Ormston [2006] 1 P & CR DG 21 
D 58; Frances v Berndes Limited 2011 WL 5903330 para 36. 
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performances are reciprocal, this requirement is only met if that common intention is 
embodied in a single document or alternatively, when each party’s declaration of intent has 
been reduced to writing and reflects the conclusion of a written contract.  Where a contract 
requires a unilateral performance, like a suretyship for example, it appears as if it is usually 
sufficient that only the declaration of the party who is required to perform is reduced to 
writing.  In this type of case, it is argued that despite the fact that the document ostensibly 
records a unilateral declaration, it will nevertheless amount to an embodiment of a 
concluded contract if the parties intended this consequence.   
 
3 2 2 Material and non-material terms 
 
In addition to reflecting the parties’ animus contrahendi, it has also been held by South 
African courts that an agreement subject to formalities must contain all the material terms 
of the agreement.57  It is settled that this means, at the very least, that the essentialia of a 
suretyship or sale of land respectively should be reflected in the written agreement.58  
Essentialia are those terms which indicate that an agreement belongs to a particular class 
of contract.59  The requirement does not apply to the naturalia of the contract, because 
these are incorporated automatically due to the fact that the agreement falls within a 
particular class of contract.60  It is unclear however, which other terms are required to 
appear in writing.  This is largely due to the fact that there is no fixed definition of what 
constitutes a non-essential, albeit material, term.61   
 
                                                          
57
 For more recent statements by the Supreme Court of Appeal confirming this requirement, see Stalwo (Pty) 
Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 7 (sale of land); Industrial Development Corporation of 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 5 (suretyship); Scholtz v Scholtz 2012 5 SA 230 (SCA) para 
9 (executory donations). 
58
 Particularly authoritative decisions in this regard include Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 
1978 4 SA 1 (A) 12B-C (suretyship) and Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 937H (land).   
59
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 245. 
60
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 246; Van Rensburg & Treisman Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 50-51; 
Kerr Sale and Lease 84; Jones v Wykland Properties 1998 2 SA 355 (C) 359A; Just Names Properties 11 
CC v Fourie 2007 3 SA 1 (W) para 33. 
61
 It should be pointed out that a material term in this context is not one which is so important that the 
innocent party cannot reasonably be expected to abide by the contract if the term is breached and which 
therefore justifies cancellation of the contract (see also Van Rensburg & Treisman Guide to the Alienation of 
Land Act 52).  For this alternative meaning of a material term, see C Maxwell “Obligations and Terms” in D 
Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 233 248.  
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For example, a material term has been described as one  
 




“which the parties regard as important enough to insert in their contract”,63 
 
or which passes the following test:  
 
“(a) did the parties apply their minds to the term [and] 
 (b) did they agree, either expressly or impliedly, 
(i) that the term should form part of their contract; and 
(ii) be binding on them?”64 
 
Possibly the most useful definition of a material term is reflected in the judgment of 
Jajbhay J in Just Names Properties 11 CC v Fourie65 (“Just Names”): 
 
“To my mind the question is not whether the parties regarded the term as material and as one to 
be incorporated in writing.  The issue is whether they intended a particular aspect of their 
relationship to be governed by a special provision agreed upon by themselves rather than by 
the naturalia of the agreement or the general principles of contract.  If so, the term in question is 
a material one as regards the particular contract and one which, on account of the need to 
achieve certainty in respect of transactions governed by the formalities legislation, is required to 
be in writing”.66 
                                                          
62
 Mulder v Van Eyk 1984 4 SA 204 (E) 206A.  
63
 P M Wulfsohn Formalities in respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act (71 of 1969) (1980) 75.  See also 
Raven Estates v Miller 1984 1 SA 251 (W) 256B. 
64
 Jones v Wykland Properties 1998 2 SA 355 (C) 359A. 
65
 2007 3 SA 1 (W). 
66
 Just Names Properties 11 CC v Fourie 2007 3 SA 1 (W) para 33.  This aspect of the judgment was not 
discussed on appeal in Just Names Properties 11 CC v Fourie 2008 1 SA 343 (SCA), but it does find 
approval in academic commentary: see T Naudé “The Law of Purchase and Sale” 2007 ASSAL 1039 1048-
1049.  The rather cryptic reference to “general principles of contract” presumably means the remedies which 
arise upon breach of contract and the prerequisites for their enforcement.  See Van Rensburg & Treisman 
Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 39, 51-52 and the reference to this source in Just Names Properties 11 
CC v Fourie 2007 3 SA 1 (W) para 33.  It is unclear why the court regarded these remedies and the rules for 
their enforcement as requiring a separate category of “general principles of contract” and not simply falling 
within the scope of naturalia. 




This suggests that material terms are all the incidentalia agreed upon by the parties: 
additional terms which supplement the essentialia and naturalia or which vary the naturalia 
of the agreement.67  They would include terms which regulate the time, place and manner 
of performance; qualify the duty to perform (like a suspensive condition); or set out special 
remedies in the event of breach of contract and the requirements for their enforcement.  
According to academic opinion, immaterial terms would then be those terms which relate 
to the provision of information only.68  Both types of terms are required to be in a written 
agreement of sale of land used, or intended to be used, mainly for residential purposes 
and which is paid for in more than two instalments over a period exceeding one year.69  
Presumably immaterial terms are required to be reduced to writing in that context in order 
to fulfil the protective purpose underlying chapter II of the Alienation of Land Act.70  
 
Although it assists in determining what constitutes a material term, the quotation from Just 
Names does create the impression that the failure to include such a term in the written 
agreement would render it formally invalid.71  By contrast, the current approach to the 
determination of formal validity focuses on the written agreement itself in order to establish 
whether the parties intended to include certain material terms.72  If there is no indication of 
such an intention ex facie the recordal, then the fact that the parties have orally agreed 
upon a material term is irrelevant.  This does not mean that the omitted term is not 
material; it simply means that a party will need to seek rectification of the written 
agreement in order to include the omitted material term in the agreement so that it may be 
enforced.73 
 
                                                          
67
 See also van der Merwe et al Contract 146 n 135, 247; Lubbe & Murray Contract 199 n 4.   
68
 Van Rensburg & Treisman Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 52; Lubbe & Murray Contract 199 n 4. 
69
 See s 6 and the definition of “land” and “contract” in s 1.  Ss 6(1)(g), 6(1)(l) and 6(1)(m) appear to be 
material terms as defined in Just Names Properties 11 CC v Fourie 2007 3 SA 1 (W) para 33, while others 
like s 6(1)(t)(i-vi) provide information only (and would therefore appear to be immaterial terms).   
70
 Merry Hill (Pty) Ltd v Engelbrecht 2008 2 SA 544 (SCA) para 13. 
71
 The distinction between formal and substantive validity is explained further in ch 4 (4 3 4).  Briefly, an 
agreement is formally valid if it complies with formalities; it is substantively valid if it (also) complies with the 
other requirements imposed for contractual validity.  See Van der Merwe et al Contract 157-158. 
72
 See ch 4 (4 3 4). 
73
 See ch 5 for the discussion of the SA approach to the rectification of agreements subject to formalities. 
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This analysis also explains apparently contradictory case law.  For example, certain 
judgments have held that the manner of payment of the purchase price is a material term 
in an agreement for the sale of land,74 while others have held that the failure to include 
such a term in the written agreement does not render it formally invalid.75  A closer 
examination of the cases falling within the former category however, reveals that in each 
case, the parties had included in the written agreement a material term which attempted to 
govern how the purchase price would be paid.76  Because the content of this term was not 
objectively ascertainable, the respective agreements did not comply with formalities.  
Thus, in Patel v Adam77 the court stated: 
 
“In the agreement in issue in the present case, clause 3 provides that the purchase price ‘shall 
be payable in monthly instalments free of interest’.  The clause contains no statement of the 
amount of the monthly instalments, and there are no other provisions in the agreement from 
which the amount, or the period in which the purchase price has to be paid, can be inferred.  
The agreement, it seems clear, leaves it to the purchaser alone to decide what amount he 
wishes to pay every month, with the result that a court of law would not be able to determine the 
monthly amount to be paid by him.” 78 
 
In those cases which have held that the failure to indicate the manner of payment of the 
purchase price was not destructive of the agreement’s validity, there was no evidence in 
the document itself that the parties had attempted to include such a term.  In Herselman v 
Orpen,79 for instance, the parties’ agreement simply read  
 
“‘I, Dorrien Arthur Geard Orpen, hereby axcept (sic) the offer of R100000 for [Erf 1675, Walmer], 
that is at present registered in my name, from Mr P R Herselman.’”80  
 
This led to the inference that the parties did not intend to regulate the manner in which 
payment would occur and further, that this matter would be governed by the naturalia of 
the contract.81   
                                                          
74
 See eg Jammine v Lowrie 1958 2 SA 430 (T); Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A). 
75
 See eg Venter v Liebenberg 1954 3 SA 333 (T); Herselman v Orpen 1989 4 SA 1000 (SE). 
76
 Jammine v Lowrie 1958 2 SA 430 (T) 431A; Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A) 664A. 
77




 1989 4 SA 1000 (SE). 
80
 1002E.   




It is suggested, accordingly, that broad statements to the effect that the manner of 
payment of the purchase price or that the time by which payment should be made are 
(always) material terms of a sale of land should be approached with caution.82  What is 
required is an examination of the written agreement itself in order to determine whether the 
parties had attempted to regulate these matters in writing.  In the absence of such an 
indication, the inference is that the parties were content to let the naturalia of the 
agreement determine such aspects.83  If this inference is incorrect, then a party must seek 
rectification of the written agreement so that the omitted material term may be included.   
 
The previous two sections have considered some basic distinctions necessary to 
understand the South African approach to formal requirements imposed for sales of land 
and suretyships.  First, the legislation imposing formalities for these transactions has been 
interpreted as requiring that a document must embody the parties’ agreement, rather than 
simply evidence the fact that an agreement had been concluded at some earlier stage.  
Secondly, the written agreement of suretyship or sale of land must record all the material 
terms of the parties’ agreement.  Material terms include both the essentialia of a suretyship 
or sale of land and additional terms specifically agreed upon and intended to regulate the 
parties’ agreement.  The focus now shifts away from these basic theoretical distinctions to 




                                                                                                                                                                                                
81
 Namely, payment in cash upon registration (Herselman v Orpen 1989 4 SA 1000 (SE) 1006B-C).  See 
also Exdev (Pty) Ltd v Yeoman Properties 1007 (Pty) Ltd 2008 All SA 223 (SCA) para 7 (“[a]n option to 
purchase immovable property (and of course a simple contract for the sale of immovable property), is not 
invalid merely because it does not set out the method of and time for payment. In the absence of express 
agreement the law implies these terms.”). 
82
 Eg Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK 2002 3 SA 653 (NC) 667D-E; Chretien v Bell 
2011 1 SA 54 (SCA) para 11.  In both cases, however, the parties had recorded these terms in their written 
agreements (Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK 2002 3 SA 653 (NC) 660H; Chretien v 
Bell 2011 1 SA 54 (SCA) paras 4, 11), which means that the broad statement by each court was in fact 
borne out by the facts of that case.  
83
 The same point is made in G F Lubbe “Law of Purchase and Sale” 2002 ASSAL 301 305; R Sharrock “The 
General Principles of the Law of Contract” 2010 ASSAL 543 561; Kerr Sale and Lease 84 n 56. 
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3 3 Terms which must appear in an agreement subject to formalities 
3 3 1 Introduction 
 
The following discussion considers South African case law on what must appear in a 
written suretyship and sale of land.  It bears repeating that it does not purport to be 
exhaustive.  A few select cases have been chosen to illustrate the South African approach.  
Furthermore, the focus is on case law relating to the essentialia of these two transactions.  
For suretyships, this entails that the identity of the creditor, surety and principal debtor, as 
well as the nature and amount of the principal debt, should be in writing.84  A formally valid 
sale of land requires the written identification of the seller and purchaser, a description of 
the land sold and an indication of the purchase price.85  Although the discussion will be 
limited to these aspects, the general principles which become evident below are equally 
applicable to non-essential, albeit material, terms (as indicated in the previous section)86 
and to alienations of land in the form of exchange or donation.87  Finally, unless it becomes 
necessary to distinguish specific principles applicable only to the sale of land or 
suretyships, the following discussion applies to both transactions equally. 
 
3 3 2 The identity of the parties 
 
The discussion below is organised according to certain general principles which guide a 
court in determining whether an agreement is formally valid.  These principles are derived 
from case law and are intended to serve as a means to group together certain typical fact 
patterns.  They are not, however, unique to the topic of statutory formalities.88  
Furthermore, it is entirely possible that more than one principle will guide a court in the 
determination of formal validity; the fact that they are discussed separately does not mean 
that they are mutually exclusive. 
                                                          
84
 Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 12B-D. 
85
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 937H. 
86
 See 3 2 2: where parties have agreed upon a specific mode of payment of the purchase price, this 
material term must be objectively ascertainable. 
87
 See eg Hoeksma v Hoeksma 1990 2 SA 393 (A) 897C: in a contract of exchange, the performances must 
be identified or identifiable.  See also Van Rensburg & Treisman Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 49-50; 
P J Aronstam The Alienation of Land (1985) 36 
88
 Eg the fact that the terms of a contract must be objectively ascertainable is a general requirement for the 
validity of all contracts and not only those subject to formalities. 




3 3 2 1 The principle of objective ascertainability 
 
While the simplest means of identification of the parties to an agreement would entail the 
recordal of their names, the facts surrounding the conclusion of the agreement sometimes 
necessitate a less specific form of identification.  For example, an agreement is not void 
where it identifies the principal debtor(s)89 or purchaser(s)90 as “A and/or B”.  Such a 
clause should be interpreted as making provision for the future possibility that either A, or 
B, or both A and B will be principal debtors or purchasers.91  In spite of the criticism which 
has been lodged against the phrase “and/or”,92 courts have held that this type of 
identification is not vague and extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify the actual party 
(or parties) on the facts.93  Similarly, an agreement which states that a surety is bound to 
“X Ltd and each of its subsidiaries” has been held to contain a sufficient description of the 
creditors.94  When a suretyship agreement identifies the creditor as a member of a class, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify which of that class is in fact the creditor.95  
 
These examples illustrate the general principle that South African courts do not require 
meticulous accuracy in the recordal of the identity of the parties.96  As stated in the 
previous chapter,97 it has been recognised in cases dealing with the question, that a 
judicial insistence on strict compliance with formal requirements would “merely be an 
encouragement to [a dishonest party] to escape from his bargain on a technical defect in 
                                                          
89
 Du Toit v Barclays Nasionale Bank Bpk 1985 1 SA 563 (A). 
90
 Berman v Teiman 1975 1 SA 756 (W). 
91
 Berman v Teiman 1975 1 SA 756 (W) 757F-H; Du Toit v Barclays Nasionale Bank Bpk 1985 1 SA 563 (A) 
570G-H. 
92
 Eg in Ex Parte McDuling 1944 OPD 187 189, Van den Heever R described the phrase as “daardie 
Engelse ongerymdheid”, stating that it was “‘n greep om helder begrippe te ontwyk, nie om hulle uit te druk 
nie; mens kan net sowel sê: ‘trousers is and/or are’”. 
93
 Du Toit v Barclays Nasionale Bank Bpk 1985 1 SA 563 (A) 569H-I.  The relationship between extrinsic 
evidence, the parol evidence rule and statutory formalities is discussed in ch 4. 
94
 African Lumber Co (Pvt) v Katz 1978 4 SA 432 (C) 435A-G. 
95
 A more complex illustration of the principle that a party may be identified as a member of a class is found 
in Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A).  See ch 4 (4 3 1). 
96
 See eg Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 989; Credit Guarantee Insurance 
Corporation of SA Ltd v Schreiber 1987 3 SA 523 (W) 525C. 
97
 Ch 2 (2 4 4). 
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the [recordal], even in cases where there was no dispute at all between the parties”.98  
While this does not mean that a court will make a contract for the parties when it is unable 
to ascertain their intention with a reasonable degree of certainty,99 it does mean that  
 
“inelegance, clumsy draftsmanship or loose use of language in a commercial document 
purporting to be a contract, will not impair its validity as long as one can find therein, with 
reasonable certainty, the terms necessary to constitute a valid contract.”100 
 
This general principle - that the terms of the agreement are only required to be objectively 
ascertainable - also explains why it is sufficient to describe the seller in a sale of land as 
“the owner”,101 which may mean the registered owner or the person entitled to dispose of 
the property whose name has not yet been registered.102  This form of identification is 
objectively ascertainable, because regard may be had to the Deeds Registry or some 
other objective evidence, to determine the exact identity of “the owner”.  By contrast, a 
suretyship will be formally invalid if the principal debtor, for example, is identified simply as 
“the debtor” in the document.103  Identification of the exact principal debtor which the 
parties had in mind would require evidence of their negotiations or consensus.  This, in 
turn, would create the possibility of fraud and perjured claims and thus defeat the purpose 
of formal requirements.104 
 
3 3 2 2 The principle of a reasonable construction in favour of formal validity 
 
A different principle is reflected in cases where the parties are adequately identified, albeit 
mistakenly, by the same name.  An illustration of the curial approach to this type of 
problem is found in Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC105 
                                                          
98
 Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 989. 
99
 Clements v Simpson 1971 3 SA 1 (A) 7D-E. 
100
 Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 1 SA 669 (W) 670G-H. 
101
 Hill v Faiga 1964 4 SA 694 (W) 596G-H; Roodt v G E Symons, Styane, Thornton & Co (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 
SA 458 (T) 463G-H; Day v Charlet Properties (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 391 (C) 395A-D. 
102
 Roodt v G E Symons, Styane, Thornton & Co (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 458 (T) 464F-G; Day v Charlet 
Properties (Pty) Ltd 1986 2 SA 391 (C) 395A-B. 
103
 Wallace v 1662 G & D Property Investments CC 2008 1 SA 300 (W) paras 19-22. 
104
 Para 20. 
105
 1996 2 SA 246 (N). 
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(“Republican Press”) and Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles106 (“Intercontinental 
Exports”).  Both cases dealt with suretyships.  In the former, the document identified both 
the creditor and the principal debtor as “Republican Press (Pty) Ltd”.107  In the latter, the 
principal debtor was identified as “Mr Frank Fowles” while the surety was described as 
“Frank Turner Fowles”.108  In these types of cases, the agreement is capable of at least 
two possible interpretations.109  The first is that the parties are one and the same person.  
On such an interpretation, the suretyship would be invalid due to non-compliance with 
statutory formalities.  The second possible interpretation is that the parties are in fact 
different but with identical or similar names; the consequence of this would be that the 
agreement is found to be formally valid.  Which interpretation is adopted by the court 
depends on whether the parties are natural or juristic persons. 
 
Thus, in Republican Press, the court concluded that since there cannot be more than one 
company with the same registered name, it could not reasonably interpret the names as 
belonging to two different persons and therefore held that the suretyship was invalid.110  By 
contrast, it was decided in Intercontinental Exports that although the names reflected as 
principal debtor and surety were similar, they were not identical and, ex facie the 
document, did not necessarily refer to the same person. Even if the two names were to be 
identical, it did not follow as a matter of course that they referred to the same person.111  
This suretyship was therefore capable of being construed ex facie the document as 
reflecting a creditor, principal debtor and surety and was held to comply with the statutory 
formalities. 
 
The distinction drawn by these two cases has been criticised on the basis that 
 
                                                          
106
 1999 2 All SA 304 (A). 
107
 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 248I. 
108
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 15. 
109
 Para 18. 
110
 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 251G-I.  The same 
reasoning was adopted in Nuform Formwork and Scaffolding (Pty) Ltd v Natscaff CC 2002 4 All SA 575 (D) 
in which a close corporation was identified as both surety and principal debtor. 
111
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 17.  See also Inventive Labour 
Structuring (Pty) Ltd v Corfe 2006 3 SA 107 (SCA) paras 10-11. 
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“[c]hance may determine whether the transcription error in question, in addition to giving the 
same name to two parties, introduces a slight difference into the name thereby allowing the 
principle of Intercontinental Exports to operate or whether the name is identical so the case falls 
within Republican Press (Pty) Ltd”.112   
 
Although the distinction does appear arbitrary at first glance, this criticism loses sight of 
one simple fact: companies may not have the same name while natural persons can and 
often do.  It carries greater weight however, when one considers that the content of the 
transcription error will determine whether a party is entitled to claim rectification of the 
written agreement.  This is considered in greater detail in a subsequent chapter;113 for 
current purposes, these cases are mentioned because they illustrate that a court will 
favour an interpretation which leads to formal validity where a document is reasonably 
capable of such a construction. 
 
3 3 2 3 The principle that the document as a whole determines formal validity 
 
When determining whether parties have been adequately identified, a court will consider 
the document as a whole before concluding that it is formally valid or invalid.114  This 
principle finds application in a number of factual circumstances.  For example, when a 
suretyship is contained within the contract creating the principal debt, the failure to identify 
the creditor in the former does not render it invalid, because it is assumed that the creditor 
is the same party as that identified in the principal agreement.115  Similarly, an agreement 
which identifies the “purchaser” or “seller” in the body of the document as a juristic person, 
but which contains the unqualified signature of a natural person as “purchaser” or “seller”, 
will also be valid.  In such a case, a court will interpret the words “seller” or “purchaser” 
throughout the recordal as meaning the juristic person so identified in the body of the 
document.116  Since somebody must always sign on behalf of a company, the only 
                                                          
112
 C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s The Law of Suretyship 5 ed (2002) 71.  This opinion is expressed 
again in the sixth edition (76 n 73).  
113
 See ch 5. 
114
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 15.   
115
 Warricker and Another NNO v Senekal 2009 1 SA 509 (W) para 12. 
116
 Hamdulay v Smith NO 1984 3 SA 308 (C) 312B-C.  See also Major v Business Corners (Pty) Ltd 1940 
WLD 84; Meter Motors (Pty) Ltd v Cohen 1966 2 SA 735 (T); Hutchinson v Hylton Holdings 1993 2 SA 405 
(T); S A I Investments v Van der Schyff NO 1999 3 SA 340 (N). 
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reasonable construction of the document, read as a whole, is that the signatory intended to 
sign as a representative of the company.117   
The same principle determines whether a blank space in the document where the name of 
one of the parties should have appeared is fatal to the agreement’s validity.  Provided that 
that party’s name appears elsewhere in the recordal, the agreement will comply with 
formalities;118 the opposite conclusion will be reached if reading the document as a whole 
does not adequately identify a party.  This is illustrated in Mineworkers’ Union v Cooks119 
(“Mineworkers”).   
 
There, the unqualified signature of the seller belonged to “J F B Botha”.  In the body of the 
document, the seller’s identity was left blank, followed by the description  
 
“duly authorised hereto by virtue of a power of authority and acting in his capacity as general 
secretary of the Mineworkers’ Union.  (Hereinafter referred to as the seller)”.120   
 
According to Dowling J, it was not possible to use the identity of the signatory to complete 
the blank space: 
 
“I do not think … that as a matter of construction I can say that because reference to a person 
unnamed is made as agent for the applicant which is described as 'seller' that thereafter any 
person signing as 'seller' at the foot of the agreement must be taken to be acting in a capacity 
and on behalf of the seller and not in proprio persona.”121 
 
Reading the document as a whole would not have provided clarity as to the identity of the 
seller: if the signatory’s name had been inserted in the blank space, it would still not have 
indicated whether the seller was Botha or the Mineworkers’ Union.122  Extrinsic evidence of 
                                                          
117
 Hamdulay v Smith NO 1984 3 SA 308 (C) 312B-C. 
118
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 15.   
119






 See also Van der Merwe v Kenkes (Edms) Bpk 1983 3 SA 909 (T) 915H-916A: 
“Indien Botha se naam in die oopgelate spasie ingevul was, is dit ewe moontlik dat Botha nog steeds in 
eie naam die verkoper kan wees.  Dit is moontlik dat die woorde ‘([H]ereinafter referred to as the seller)’ 
steeds sou terugverwys na die persoon wie se naam in die oopgelate spasie ingevul was en nie na die 
Mynwerkers-Unie nie.” 
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the parties’ negotiations or consensus would have been necessary to resolve the 
uncertainty which, as we shall see in the next chapter, is traditionally excluded in 
determining whether an agreement is formally valid.   
 
There is one last example of the alleged failure to identify a party to the agreement which 
merits discussion.  These are instances where someone is identified as one of the parties 
to the agreement and signs the agreement ostensibly in his personal capacity, but is 
subsequently alleged to have acted on behalf of an unnamed principal or in the interests of 
an undisclosed principal.  A representative acts on behalf of an unnamed principal when 
he concludes an agreement with a third party, clearly in a representative capacity but 
without disclosing the identity of his principal.  This is a true instance of representation, 
because the rights and duties created by the contract enure to the principal and not to the 
representative.123  By contrast, an intermediary who acts in the interests of an undisclosed 
principal concludes a contract in his own name – he is both a contracting party and the 
bearer of rights and obligations arising from that contract.124  The doctrine of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
A similar observation was made in Muller v Pienaar 1968 3 SA 195 (A) 202F-G; S A I Investments v Van der 
Schyff NO 1999 3 SA 346 (N) 348D-E. 
123
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 221 n 62; J C De Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg & 
Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 100-101. 
124
 The notion that the intermediary acts in his own name is criticised by A J Kerr The Law of Agency 4 ed 
(2006) 210 n 13: 
“This hypothesis ought not to be adopted … If the agent is not acting as an agent [ie because he is acting 
in his own name] he has no principal, disclosed or undisclosed”. 
Contrary to Kerr’s opinion, it is suggested there is nothing inherently wrong in stating that the intermediary 
(or “agent” as Kerr would have it) acts in his own name, provided it is understood to mean that the actual 
agreement is concluded between the intermediary and the third party (which is the sense in which the phrase 
was used in Cullinan v Noordkaaplandse Aartappelkernmoerkwekers Koöperasie Bpk 1972 1 SA 761 (A) 
766H-767A read with 769B and 770D-E) – a point which Kerr also appears to doubt (Agency 212-213).  It 
falls outside the scope of this dissertation to discuss the operation of the doctrine of the undisclosed principal 
in detail, although it should be pointed out that Kerr’s argument that the contract is in fact concluded between 
the third party and the principal (Agency 213) does not appear to find support in Cullinan v Noordkaaplandse 
Aartappelkernmoerkwekers Koöperasie Bpk 1972 1 SA 761 (A) 770D-E.  Furthermore, Lord Anderson’s 
statement in Craig v Blackater 1923 SC 472 (“Craig”), to the effect that “if A contracts for an undisclosed 
principal, A may sue and is liable to be sued as a principal, the third party having no knowledge that he is 
anything but a principal”, does not support Kerr’s argument that the intermediary may be bound to a contract 
to which he did not intend to be a contracting party on the basis of estoppel (Agency 213 n 32).  Lord 
Anderson’s remark on the knowledge of the third party relates to whether that party has an election to sue 
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undisclosed principal allows the principal to sue the other contracting party once the 
former discloses his identity.  Similarly, once the other contracting party becomes aware of 
the existence of the principal, he may choose to sue him rather than the intermediary.125   
 
A court is required to answer two questions when it is alleged that an ostensible party to 
an agreement subject to formalities has in fact acted on behalf of an unnamed principal or 
in the interests of an undisclosed principal.  First, to what extent is extrinsic evidence 
permissible to show that there is another party entitled to sue on the written agreement 
despite the fact that he remains unidentified in the document itself?  Secondly, does the 
failure to identify the principal render the agreement formally invalid?   
 
As will become apparent in the following chapter, the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is 
governed by the parol evidence rule and the rules relating to statutory formalities.  Usually, 
both prevent the admission of extrinsic evidence if it varies, contradict or supplements the 
written agreement.126  However, the type of fact pattern described above is one of those 
instances where such rules result in opposing conclusions, at least insofar as it relates to 
evidence tendered to show that an apparent party to the agreement was in fact acting in 
the interests of an undisclosed principal.127  The parol evidence rule does not prohibit 
extrinsic evidence showing that there is an undisclosed principal: the evidence is not 
intended to discharge the intermediary from liability (and therefore it does not vary what 
appears ex facie the document), but is intended to show that there is an additional party 
entitled to sue on the written agreement.128   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the undisclosed principal or the intermediary, a choice which arises only once the third party becomes aware 
of the principal (see Lord Anderson’s statement made immediately after the one quoted above).    
125
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 263; De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 126. 
126
 See eg Union Government v Vianini Ferro-Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 43 47 (parol evidence rule), 
Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 9 (formal 
requirements) and the discussion in ch 4 (4 2). 
127
 The rules relating to the admission of extrinsic evidence to show that an agent has acted on behalf of an 
unnamed principal are discussed further below in the main text. 
128
 Cook v Aldred 1909 TS 150 152; Muller v Pienaar 1968 3 SA 195 (A) 204E-G; Christie & Bradfield 
Contract 210; D J Joubert Die Suid-Afrikaanse Verteenwoordigingsreg (1979) 35, 57-58. 
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However, it has been held that statutory formalities will exclude extrinsic evidence of the 
existence of an undisclosed principal.  In Grossman v Baruch129 (“Grossman”) a written 
offer to purchase was directed to “[t]he Seller” and signed by one Wiggill (as “[t]he Seller”), 
without any qualification to indicate that he was acting in a representative capacity.130  The 
plaintiff alleged that the signatory was his agent and that he was in fact the true seller of 
the property, although he remained unidentified in the document.  The point raised on 
exception by the defendants was that 
 
“as there [was] nothing to indicate that Wiggill accepted the offer in any representative capacity 
but that indeed he acted as the agent of an undisclosed principal, the latter, ie the plaintiff, 
[could] derive no benefit from the contract entered into by his agent.  It [was] argued that … 
because of the [formal] provisions [relating to sales of land], no evidence [could] be led to 
identify the true seller, who, in this case, [was] said to be the plaintiff.”131 
 
Coetzee J agreed with the defendants’ contention.  He referred, inter alia, to Muller v 
Pienaar132 in which the court made the obiter remark that while the parol evidence rule 
may not preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence relating to an undisclosed principal, 
formal requirements may have such an exclusionary effect.133  Coetzee J therefore 
concluded that  
 
“as a result of the statutory requirements the identity of the parties is something that must 
appear ex facie the writing.  In the present case this is of course not so and the identity of the 
parties to the contract relied upon by the plaintiff certainly does not appear from the writing.  
Consequently, the point taken by the defendants is well taken”.134 
 
The exact import of Coetzee J’s conclusion is unclear.  The defendants argued that the 
failure to identify the plaintiff as the seller ex facie the document meant that he could not 
sue upon the written agreement.  The judge agreed, for the reason quoted above.  This is 
not the same as arguing that the agreement is void as against the ostensible seller, 
namely Wiggill, and yet Coetzee J creates this impression by citing a statement made in 
                                                          
129






 1968 3 SA 195 (A) 204G-H. 
133
 Grossman v Baruch 1978 4 SA 340 (W) 342G. 
134
 343A. 
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the Mineworkers case discussed above:135 if extrinsic evidence is necessary to establish 
the identity of one of the parties, the agreement will be invalid.136  
 
It is argued that a distinction should be drawn between the document which served before 
the court in Mineworkers and that before Coetzee J.  Ex facie the document in the former 
case, it was unclear whether the seller was “J F B Botha” or the Mineworkers’ Union – 
inadmissible extrinsic evidence of the parties’ consensus or negotiations would have been 
necessary to obtain clarity on this point.  As a result the agreement was invalid.  By 
contrast, the document before Coetzee J did indeed identify a seller, as well as contain all 
the other material terms.  Ex facie the document, the agreement appeared to comply with 
formal requirements.  The confusion is created by the fact that the judge states that 
extrinsic evidence may not be used to introduce an additional party to an agreement 
subject to formalities when that party is unidentified in the document, but he 
simultaneously seems to suggest that this evidence may well be used to indicate that the 
agreement is formally invalid for failure to identify “the true seller”.  However, such an 
implication overlooks the fact that an intermediary who acts in the interests of an 
undisclosed principal intends to conclude the contract in his own name and to be the 
bearer of rights and duties created by that contract.  For all intents and purposes, the 
intermediary is the “true” seller at the time of conclusion of the contract, and the agreement 
should not be invalid as against that intermediary. 
 
Whether or not Coetzee J actually concluded that the deed of sale was formally invalid, 
Grossman has been interpreted as authority for such a conclusion.  In Mills NO v 
Hoosen137 (“Mills NO”) an offer to purchase was addressed to “Andre Kitshoff” as the 
“[p]rovisional [t]rustee/[l]iquidator …/… [e]xecutor” of a named deceased estate.138  
Kitshoff signed in his personal capacity in spite of the fact that he had been appointed in 
writing to act as agent on behalf of the appellant.139  Counsel for respondent argued that 
                                                          
135
 Mineworkers’ Union v Cooks 1959 1 SA 709 (W) 712B-C. 
136
 Grossman v Baruch 1978 4 SA 340 (W) 341G.  P M Nienaber “Oor die Beskrywing van Partye in ‘n 
Koopkontrak van Grond” in Q de Wet (gen ed) Aangebied aan Professor Daniel Pont op sy Vyf-En-
Sewentigste Verjaarsdag (1970) 250 258-259 also concludes that the agreement will be formally invalid in 
this type of case. 
137
 2010 2 SA 316 (W). 
138
 Para 4. 
139
 Para 3. 
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the agreement was formally valid because it identified the true seller ex facie the 
document, namely the deceased estate.140  Since a deceased estate has no legal 
personality however, dominium in the assets vests in the executor of the estate – in other 
words, the “true” seller is not the deceased estate, but the executor of that estate.141  This 
led the court to conclude that  
 
“[i]f evidence dehors the agreement is necessary to establish the identity of the seller, the 
agreement is invalid.  [Formalities do] not permit an undisclosed or unidentified principal to be a 
party to the sale.  Thus when an agreement is signed by an agent, with nothing to indicate that 
he was signing as agent of the seller, the agreement of sale would be invalid.  In Grossman … 
an agent accepted an offer without indicating that he was signing as agent of the seller.  As the 
identity of the seller did not appear ex facie the deed, and evidence to identify the true seller 
was inadmissible, the deed of sale was held to be invalid and could not sustain a cause of 
action.”142 
 
The court’s conclusion is problematic, because it conflates the legal phenomena of an 
undisclosed and an unnamed principal.   As discussed above, an intermediary who acts in 
the interests of an undisclosed principal concludes the contract in his own name.  He is the 
true party to the contract and his intention is to assume personal liability in terms of that 
contract.  For this reason, it is suggested that an agreement which identifies the 
intermediary as seller or purchaser does comply with formal requirements, and is not 
invalid as stated in Mills NO and implied in Grossman.143 
                                                          
140
 Para 10. 
141
 Para 12. 
142
 Para 13 (footnotes omitted). 
143
 Mills NO v Hoosen 2010 2 SA 316 (W) served as the basis for the recent decision in Booysen v Booysen 
2012 2 SA 38 (GSJ) (“Booysen”). There, the surviving spouse of a couple married in community of property 
sold immovable property forming part of the joint estate without the consent of the executor and before the 
estate was finalised.  The respondents contended that Mills NO v Hoosen 2010 2 SA 316 (W) was 
inapplicable, because the seller in Booysen was acting in his personal, rather than a representative, capacity 
(para 14).  According to the court this argument was incorrect, on the basis that Mills NO v Hoosen 2010 2 
SA 316 (W) makes it clear that since a deceased estate has no legal personality of its own, the executor of 
the estate is the true seller and it is his identity which must appear in the document (para 14).  It has been 
suggested, correctly it is submitted, that the respondents’ contention was indeed sound and that the court 
should have concluded that the sale of land was formally valid, because the seller was acting in his personal 
capacity (R Sharrock “Contract” (January-March 2012) JQR para 2.4.1 
<http://ipproducts.jutalaw.co.za.ez.sun.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=Publish:10.10
48/Enu > (accessed 08-11-2012).)  The real reason why the agreement was invalid in that case was 




By contrast, an agent who acts on behalf of an unnamed principal does not intend to 
assume personal liability.  It should also be pointed out that the other contracting party is 
aware of the fact that he will be concluding an agreement, not with the agent, but with an 
unidentified principal.144  However, any extrinsic evidence tendered to show that the agent 
is not personally liable would contradict the appearance of personal liability ex facie the 
written agreement.145  Furthermore, it is a general rule that formal validity is determined 
from the terms of the document itself – extrinsic evidence which contradicts the 
appearance of formal validity ex facie the document is inadmissible.146  As stated in 
Swanepoel v Nameng:147 
 
“[T]he determination of the question whether … formalities … have been complied with does not 
involve an enquiry into the intention of the parties”.148   
 
Therefore, both the parol evidence rule and statutory formalities would seem to prevent a 
court from taking into account that despite what appears on the face of the document, 
neither the agent nor the other contracting party intended that the former would be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
because the seller lacked the necessary capacity to conclude the contract (Sharrock (January-March 2012) 
JQR para 2.4.1).  Therefore, this case is not discussed in the main text because it is not a true example of a 
party acting on behalf an unnamed principal or in the interests of an undisclosed principal. 
144
 See B Kuschke & D Hutchison “Parties to Contracts” in D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 219 225-226 (footnote omitted): 
“Where [an agent] informs [the other contracting party] that he or she acts on behalf of [a principal], 
whose identity he or she refuses to disclose, and [the other contracting party] is prepared to contract on 
that basis, the ensuing contract will be solely between [that other contracting party] and the unidentified 
principal.” 
145
 Kruger v Rheeder 1972 2 SA 391 (O) 394D-E; Joubert Verteenwoordigingsreg 35, 57-58.    
146
 Van Oudtshoorn v Investec Bank Ltd (558/10) [2011] ZASCA 205 (25-11-2011) para 37; Intercontinental 
Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) paras 13, 20.  See also ch 4 (4 3 4).  It will be recalled that 
the type of factual scenario discussed in the main text is one where the document identifies the agent as a 
party to the contract and contains his signature without any qualification to indicate that he is signing in a 
representative capacity.  It is a different matter if it is evident ex facie the document that a party is acting on 
behalf of an unnamed principal – in such a case, the agreement will be formally invalid because it is evident 
on the face of the document that one of the parties to the agreement remains unidentified.  This is illustrated 
in JPS Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Kruger 1976 1 SA 89 (W), in which a suretyship was held to be invalid because 
it described the creditor(s) as “J. Perkel, Silverman & Co., acting for and on behalf of various nominees”. 
147
 2010 3 SA 124 (SCA). 
148
 Para 16. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
70 
 
personally liable.  At the very least, this means that the unnamed principal would not be 
able to sue or be sued in terms of the agreement.  Although this is not the prevailing 
opinion,149 it is argued that the exclusion of extrinsic evidence in this context means that 
the agreement is formally valid and could, in theory, be enforced against the agent in his 
personal capacity.  However, it is suggested that this is not an insurmountable problem.  It 
has always been an exception to both the parol evidence rule and formal requirements 
that evidence may be tendered to show that despite the appearance of consensus ex facie 
the document, there was in reality no such consensus and that the agreement is void for 
that reason.150  It is suggested that this exception would be applicable here: neither party 
to the contract agreed that the agent would be personally liable.  There is no consensus on 
what appears in the written agreement and it is void for that reason, and not because it is 
formally defective.151 
 
While an unnamed principal would not be able to enforce an agreement subject to 
formalities, the conclusion in Grossman that an undisclosed principal is precluded from 
doing so merits further consideration, because case law on formalities in suretyships 
contradicts this conclusion.     
 
First, there is the obiter remark in Durity Alpha (Pty) Ltd v Vagg152 (“Durity”) that formal 
requirements do not preclude the possibility that an undisclosed principal, as creditor, may 
sue the surety once the former discloses his identity.  The court does not explain why it 
                                                          
149
 In addition to Mills NO v Hoosen 2010 2 SA 316 (W), see also eg Andre Robert Construction CC v Port 
Elizabeth Municipality 1998 JDR 0039 (SE) (14-11-1997) 12-13; J Pretorius “Surety Issues: A Survey of 
Recent Cases” (2006) 14 JBL 164 169 for the statement that an agreement concluded on behalf of an 
unnamed principal, but which fails to identify that principal in the document, is formally invalid.  Pretorius 
relies on N Grové Die Formaliteitsvereiste by Borgstelling LLM thesis University of Pretoria (1984) 170-171 
for his conclusion, but it is not entirely clear whether the latter author was of the opinion that the agreement 
would be formally invalid in this situation, or simply that the unnamed principal would not be entitled to sue 
and be sued in terms of the agreement.  
150
 See ch 4 (4 3 4). 
151
 It is suggested that rectification of the contract (see ch 5) would not be possible in this situation.  Although 
the parties’ common intention is that the agent would not be personally liable, their common intention is also 
that the principal would remain unidentified.  To rectify the contract by inserting the identity of the principal 
would be contrary to that intention and would, in effect, amount to the judicial variation of the parties’ 
agreement. 
152
 1991 2 SA 840 (A) 842F-H. 
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comes to this conclusion or how it may be reconciled with the general rule that the 
identities of the parties should appear in the document.   
 
Secondly, both the agreement creating the principal debt and the suretyship in Sasfin 
Bank Ltd v Soho Unit 14 CC t/a Aventura Eiland153 (“Sasfin”) specifically made provision 
for the possibility that the original creditor’s rights might be ceded after conclusion of the 
agreement.154  This meant that the possibility that an undisclosed principal might sue on 
the suretyship was already foreshadowed in the suretyship agreement itself: once the 
principal made himself known, he became entitled to the rights of the intermediary (the 
original creditor) by virtue of an ex lege cession.155  The court continued: 
 
“If [the undisclosed principal] is in fact to be regarded as the cessionary of the rights originally 
acquired by [the intermediary], as I perceive the position to be, the argument [that the suretyship 
is formally invalid because it fails to identify the plaintiff as creditor] has, in fact, already been 
considered and was rejected by Muller JA in Pizani and Another v First Consolidated Holdings 
[(Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 69 (A)] at 79E - G: 
 
‘The [argument] ... was that, since the name of the creditor is an essential term of a suretyship 
agreement and must therefore be contained in writing (Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 (1) SA 
333 (A) at 344-5), and since by cession of the principal debt a new creditor (not the one named in the 
deed of suretyship) was created, the sureties were not bound because they had not agreed in writing 
to the substitution of a new creditor and hence the deed fell foul of s 6 of [the General Law 
Amendment Act] ... Here, as I have pointed out, the sureties bound themselves in writing also to the 
successors or assignees of the creditor.  The identity of such creditor's cessionary may validly be 




Therefore, when a suretyship provides for the possibility that the creditor’s rights may be 
ceded to someone else, this provision is broad enough to include both a consensual and 
ex lege transfer of rights.  Any extrinsic evidence necessary to identify the actual creditor 
would not relate to the consensus or negotiations of the (original) parties to the agreement, 
                                                          
153
 2006 4 SA 513 (T). 
154
 Paras 10, 31. 
155
 Para 34. 
156
 Para 36. 
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but simply amount to the application of the terms of the agreement to the facts of the 
case.157   
 
Neither Durity nor Sasfin are particularly useful for the purpose of concluding, in general, 
that an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued in terms of an agreement subject to 
formalities.  However, it is submitted that the argument that formalities preclude this 
because the identities of the parties to the agreement must appear in writing is 
unconvincing.  For example, the “huur gaat voor koop” rule has been interpreted to allow a 
purchaser to sue a surety for the lessee’s obligations despite the fact that that purchaser 
has not been identified in the suretyship as creditor,158 and it appears that a cessionary 
could be allowed to sue a surety in spite of the fact that the suretyship does not stipulate 
that the surety bound himself to the creditor or his “successors and assigns”.159  The 
argument that an undisclosed principal may not sue or be sued in terms of an agreement 
subject to formalities because he remains unidentified in the agreement presupposes that 
he, and not the intermediary, is the real party to the agreement.  As pointed out above, this 
amounts to a fundamental misunderstanding of the operation of the doctrine of the 
undisclosed principal.  Like a cessionary or purchaser affected by the “huur gaat voor 
koop” rule, the undisclosed principal becomes a subsequent party to the agreement – he 
does not substitute the intermediary as the actual party to the agreement at the time of 
contract conclusion.   
 
The real reason, it is argued, why the doctrine of the undisclosed principal will usually not 
be allowed to operate in the context of agreements subject to formalities is simply because 
the principal has not signed the document in his capacity as purchaser or seller in the 
context of a sale of land, or as surety to a suretyship agreement.  This conclusion does not 
contradict what was said previously in relation to the application of “huur gaat voor koop”, 
the possibility that an unidentified cessionary may sue in terms of a suretyship or the 
                                                          
157
 Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 12B-D. 
158
 Mignoel Properties (Pty) Ltd v Kneebone 1989 4 SA 1042 (A) 1051H-I.    
159
 SA Breweries Ltd v Van Zyl 2006 1 SA 197 (SCA) paras 9-10.  This case has been criticised on the basis 
that it suggests that a cession of future debts is not possible (contrary to what was held in First National 
Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn NO 1996 2 SA 339 (A) 360A-C) – see Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 48-49 n 94; 111 
n 73; Pretorius 2006 JBL 164-165.  For current purposes, the decision is relevant because there is no 
indication in the judgment that the fact that the suretyship omitted to mention the possibility of a cession 
rendered it formally invalid as against the cessionary. 
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Sasfin case, because a creditor is not required to sign a suretyship agreement.160  By 
analogy, the operation of the doctrine would therefore appear to be limited to the case 
where the undisclosed principal, as creditor, seeks to sue the surety.161  Where the 
intermediary has acted as surety, or in the capacity of purchaser or seller, there is no room 
for the doctrine to operate.   
 
3 3 2 4 Conclusion 
 
This section has considered some of the general principles which a court will consider in 
determining whether a recordal contains a sufficient description of the parties to the 
contract.  Some judgments appear to ignore these general principles, as well as the rule 
that formal validity must be determined from the document itself.  For example, we have 
seen that courts have held that a sale of land apparently concluded by a party in his 
personal capacity, but who is in reality acting on behalf of an unnamed principal or in the 
interests of an undisclosed principal, is formally invalid for failing to identify the “true” party 
to the agreement.  This is not a convincing argument. 
 
In the case of an agent acting on behalf of an unnamed principal, the parties intend that 
the unnamed principal will be the true party to the agreement.  Nevertheless, both the 
parol evidence rule and statutory formalities preclude evidence to this effect, because it 
varies what appears ex facie the contract.  For this reason, the written agreement will be 
formally valid (because it identifies the agent as a party to the agreement), but the 
unnamed principal will not be able to sue or be sued in terms thereof.  It has been argued 
however, that it may be possible to show that the written agreement is substantively 
invalid, because neither the agent nor the other contracting party intended that the former 
would incur personal liability.  
 
In the case of an intermediary acting in the interests of an undisclosed principal, it is 
suggested that the agreement will be both formally and substantively valid as against the 
                                                          
160
 For this reason, it is suggested that even if a written option to purchase in favour of the lessee could be 
transferred to the purchaser in terms of the “huur gaat voor koop rule”, it would be unenforceable against that 
purchaser due to the absence of his signature as grantor of the option.  See Spearhead Property Holdings 
Ltd v E & D Motors (Pty) Ltd 2010 2 SA 1 (SCA) para 38. 
161
 The same conclusion is drawn in Pretorius 2006 JBL 169. 
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intermediary: he intends to conclude the contract in his personal capacity and the 
document which records his identity identifies the true party to the agreement.  It is 
therefore incorrect, it is submitted, to state that the agreement is formally invalid because it 
fails to identify the undisclosed principal.  The real reason why the doctrine of the 
undisclosed principal is generally not applicable to agreements subject to formalities is 
simply because the principal has not signed the agreement.  This means that the principal 
may not sue or be sued in terms of the agreement; the intermediary and the other 
contracting party however, may enforce the agreement against each other. 
 
The requirement that an agreement subject to formalities must be signed is considered 
later in the chapter.162  In the following section, the extent to which the content of the 
parties’ obligations must appear in writing is examined.  Because the general principles 
which guide a court in the determination of formal validity have been illustrated in some 
detail above, the following section is fairly brief. 
 
3 3 3 Identification of obligations 
 
3 3 3 1 Sale of land: description of the res vendita and the purchase price 
 
The approach to determining whether there is an adequate description of the land to be 
sold is summarised in Clements v Simpson.163  The test is whether the contract describes 
the land with sufficient certainty so that it may be “identified on the ground” without 
recourse to the parties’ negotiations or oral consensus.164  There are two alternative 
means to comply with this test.  First, the contract itself may provide a sufficient 
description.  For example, it may describe the land by name if it is a farm,165 by an address 
if it is residential property,166 or by reference to a diagram or plan.167  Provided the 
                                                          
162
 See 3 4. 
163




 See eg Van Aardt v Galway 2012 2 SA 312 (SCA) para 11. 
166
 Eg Herselman v Orpen 1989 4 SA 1000 (SE) 1002E. 
167
 Eg Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 993; Le Riche v Hamman 1946 AD 
648 651 (which described the land to be sold in terms of its physical location and the relevant transfer deed).  
Further examples of what constitutes a sufficient description are provided in Van Rensburg & Treisman 
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description renders the land objectively ascertainable, this will be sufficient for the purpose 
of formal validity.168 
 
Secondly, the contract may indicate that the parties intend that the buyer, the seller or a 
third party would choose the merx from a genus or class.169  Thus, in Exdev (Pty) Ltd v 
Pekudei Investments (Pty) Ltd170 the document provided, inter alia, that the first appellant 
would sell “an office unit of 260 m2, together with eight parking bays, in the building [that it 
intends] to build at Twindale”.171  While the size of the unit and its general location was 
indicated, it was implicit in the description that the parties had agreed that the precise 
shape of the unit and its position in the building would be left to the choice of the seller.172  
Until the choice was made, the merx was admittedly not identified.  Nevertheless, this type 
of description satisfies the formal requirements.  Although the choice of a specific piece of 
land falls within the discretion of one of the parties, the description of the land is objectively 
ascertainable, because 
 
“the objection or reluctance of the other party cannot thereafter influence or obstruct the 
selection [because] the matter has been placed beyond the reach of consensus or cavil”.173  
 
In other words, while extrinsic evidence would be necessary to identify the specific piece of 
land chosen, this evidence would not be of the parties’ negotiations or consensus, but of 
the choice made by a party within the parameters agreed upon in the contract.174    
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 46-48; Aronstam Alienation of Land 32-34; Christie & Bradfield Contract 
124-126; Kerr Sale and Lease 91-92. 
168
 This principle has recently been confirmed, in relation to the description of the land, in Swanepoel v 
Nameng 2010 3 SA 124 (SCA) para 13. 
169
 See eg Clements v Simpson 1971 3 SA 1 (A) 6G-H; JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pine Villa Country 
Estate (Pty) Ltd; Pine Villa Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd 2009 4 SA 302 (SCA) 
para 22. 
170
 2011 2 SA 282 (SCA). 
171
 Para 4. 
172
 Para 19. 
173
 Odendaalsrust Municipality v New Nigel Estate Gold Mining Co Ltd 1948 2 SA 656 (O) 665, confirmed in 
Clements v Simpson 1971 3 SA 1 (A) 8A. 
174
 Exdev (Pty) Ltd v Pekudei Investments (Pty) Ltd 2011 2 SA 282 (SCA) para 19.  There is an implied 
limitation of the power to choose the specific piece of land sold - the determination must be bona fide (see 
also JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pine Villa Country Estate (Pty) Ltd; Pine Villa Country Estate (Pty) Ltd v 
JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd 2009 4 SA 302 (SCA) para 22). 




Once the parties have indicated the means of identifying the land sold in the written 
agreement, that choice is final.  If it appears ex facie the document that the parties 
intended to identify the land solely by means of a description in the contract, then a 
deficient description will render the agreement void.175  It is then not possible to argue, in 
the absence of an express or implied indication to the contrary in the document itself, that 
the intention was that some person would subsequently be entitled to choose the particular 
piece of land or property.  Thus, in Botha v Niddrie176 it was stated that  
 
“[i]f the parties had intended to leave the northern boundary undefined and to give the seller the 
right to fix its position, they would undoubtedly have said so in the contract. They have not done 
so, and the mere fact that they have failed to fix the position of the northern boundary does not 
give rise to any inference that they intended it to be fixed by either party at his pleasure.”177 
 
The fact that the choice of identification of the land is final can have certain harsh 
consequences.  For example, in Magwaza v Heenan,178 the buyer appointed a land 
surveyor to draw up a survey diagram of the land to be sold.  This diagram was at odds 
with the description of the land in the contract itself and the buyer sought rectification of 
the latter to conform to the former.  However, because the description of the land sold was 
not sufficiently ascertainable, and because there was no indication in the contract that the 
parties had agreed to leave final determination to a third party, the court concluded that the 
agreement was formally invalid and therefore could not be rectified.179   
 
Regarding the purchaser’s obligation to pay the purchase price, it would be sufficient if the 
document simply fixed the amount to be paid, or rendered it objectively ascertainable by 
                                                          
175
 However, the court is not confined to examining the clause in which the property itself is described but 
may consider the document as a whole in order to determine whether that description is completed 
elsewhere in the contract (see also 3 3 2 3 above).  This approach was recently illustrated in Vorster v 
Vorster (CA366/2011) [2013] ZAECGHC 1 (10/1/2013) paras 9-17. 
176
 1958 4 SA 446 (A). 
177
 Botha v Niddrie 1958 4 SA 446 (A) 450H-451A.  See also Parsons v M C P Bekker Trust (Edms) Bpk 
1978 3 SA 101 (T) 104C-E. 
178
 1979 2 SA 1019 (A). 
179
 1024B-F.  See also ch 5. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
77 
 
means of an external standard.180  The latter means of fixing the price would include a 
reference in the written agreement to another document containing the price – provided 
certain requirements are met, the two documents may be read together and the 
agreement will be formally valid.181  Specific provisions determining when and where 
payment should occur are unnecessary, because these aspects are regulated by the 
naturalia of the contract.182  Disputes arise when parties include terms in the document 
which vary these ex lege provisions.  As already pointed out,183 these terms would 
constitute material terms and this leads to the related problem whether they have been 
recorded in the document with sufficient certainty to render extrinsic evidence of the 
parties’ consensus or negotiations unnecessary.  Since the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence is discussed in detail in the next chapter, nothing further will be said here.  
Rather, the following section will consider those terms which determine the scope of a 
surety’s obligations and which must, as a result, be reduced to writing. 
 
3 3 3 2 Suretyship: the nature and amount of the principal debt 
 
Because a suretyship creates an accessory obligation, a description of the nature and 
amount of the principal obligation which it secures is essential to the creation of the 
surety’s liability and therefore to the validity of the agreement:  
 
“It is a term of the contract in the true sense, in that it both defines and limits the surety's 
obligation under the contract and determines the extent or scope of the rights and obligations of 
the parties”.184  
 
There is no requirement that the principal debt sought to be secured by the suretyship be 
limited to a contractual debt.  A debt arising out of a delict may also be secured.  In fact, 
                                                          
180
 Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 1 SA 669 (W) 670C-D; Hartland 
Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK 2002 3 SA 653 (NC) 667G-H.    
181
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 197; Coronel v Kaufman 1920 TPD 207 209.  For an example where it was 
not possible to incorporate another document in order to supply the purchase price, see Hartland 
Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK 2002 3 SA 653 (NC) 670E-672B.  Incorporation by reference 
is discussed in ch 4 (4 4). 
182
 These naturalia, however, vary according to whether the sale is one for cash or credit.  See G Bradfield & 
K Lehmann Principles of the Law of Sale & Lease 3 ed (2013) 98-101.  
183
 3 2 2. 
184
 Fourlamel v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 345B. 
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the principal debt can be anything for which a person may become bound to another as a 
debtor.185  This includes an agreement giving rise to a natural obligation – although the 
debt itself is unenforceable, it is capable of serving as the basis of a valid suretyship 
obligation, provided only that the debt itself is not the result of a prohibited transaction.186   
 
The general principles highlighted in the discussion on the identity of the parties are also 
applicable in determining whether the description of the principal debt is sufficient to 
comply with formal requirements.  Thus, the nature and amount of the principal debt may 
be determined by reading the document as a whole, or by means of extrinsic evidence 
where the description is objectively ascertainable.  For example, in De Villiers v Nedfin 
Bank, a division of Nedcor Bank Ltd,187 the surety bound himself for payment of “all 
amounts of whatever nature and/or [for] performance of any obligation”.188  The court held 
that the agreement was not invalid for failure to identify which of the debts owed by the 
principal debtor were secured by the surety – it was evident from the rest of the document 
that the surety was liable for all the obligations of a specific principal debtor which were 
owed to a particular creditor.189  Similarly, in Swiftair Freight v Singh190 the surety bound 
himself for obligations arising from “various transactions”.191  The court concluded that 
“various” meant transactions of whatsoever nature and however divergent, basing this 
interpretation on the dictionary meaning of the word “various”, as well on other terms of the 
                                                          
185
 It is therefore not limited to a money debt, but includes an obligation ad factum praestandum.  Whether 
the creditor and surety intended that the latter would become liable to render the performance in terms of the 
principal debt is a matter of interpretation of the suretyship (J J Henning & K L Mould “Suretyship” in J A 
Faris & L T C Harms (eds) LAWSA 26 2 ed (2011) para 292; Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 107 n 56.  
However, if performance of the principal debt depends upon the personal skill or characteristics of the 
principal debtor, a court will conclude that the intention was that the surety would pay damages upon breach 
by the principal debtor, rather than deliver the performance itself (Henning & Mould “Suretyship” in LAWSA 
26 para 26 n 6; Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 107 n 56; Corrans v Transvaal Government and Coull’s 
Trustee 1909 TS 605 614, 624, 628).   
186
 Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 39-40; BOE Bank Ltd v Bassage 2006 5 SA 33 (SCA) para 9. 
187




 81I-82A.  
190
 1993 1 SA 454 (D).  
191
 455A. 
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agreement which indicated that the creditor intended to cast the net as widely as 
possible.192   
 
These cases also illustrate that it is not essential that the principal obligation exists at the 
time that the suretyship agreement is entered into, nor is it necessary to describe it 
explicitly as being a future obligation.193  If it is clear from the rest of the document that the 
obligation in question is yet to be incurred, that suffices.194  Where the deed of suretyship 
does refer to a future obligation, whether expressly or by implication, extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to prove both that the principal debt has since arisen and what it amounts to.195   
 
To this point, the discussion has focused on which terms should appear in a written 
suretyship or sale of land.  Formalities also require that the document be signed by one or 
both of the parties.  What follows therefore addresses the questions of who may sign, what 
constitutes a signature and when a signature should be appended to the agreement. 
 
3 4 Signature of the document 
3 4 1 Who may sign? 
 
In addition to requiring that the terms of the agreement must be in writing, both the 
Alienation of Land Act and the General Law Amendment Act require that the agreement be 
signed.  Suretyships need only be signed by the surety, while sales of land require the 




 Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 11G; Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch 
1977 3 SA 562 (A) 585G per Corbett JA (Jansen JA concurring).  If the principal obligation is to come into 
existence in the future, the liability of the surety under the suretyship will only arise once the principal 
obligation has been contracted.  Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Frysch 1977 3 SA 562 (A) 584G-H. 
194
 Trust Bank v Frysch 1977 3 SA 562 (A) 585G. 
195
 Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 12A-D.  It is possible however, that the 
amount of the principal debt is not proved by means of extrinsic evidence, but rather by means of a 
certificate of indebtedness.  The suretyship may further provide that such a certificate will serve as 
conclusive proof of the debt.  This is permissible provided that the author of the certificate is not the creditor, 
in which case the provision will be contra bonos mores – see Ex Parte Minister of Justice: In Re Nedbank Ltd 
v Abstein Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Donelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1995 3 SA 1 (A) 22C-D (but see 
Society of Lloyd’s v Rohman 2006 4 SA 23 (C) para 125, in which it was suggested that the notion that a 
conclusive proof certificate of which the creditor is the author is always contrary to public policy should be 
reconsidered). 
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signatures of both seller and purchaser.196  Both Acts also make provision for the 
possibility that an agent may sign the document and here again, there is a discrepancy 
between the two statutes.  An agent who signs on behalf of a surety does not need written 
authorisation to do so.197  By contrast, written authority is required for an agent who signs 
on behalf of a seller or purchaser of land.198  As a result, courts have been confronted with 
the problem of who, exactly, constitutes an “agent” for the purposes of the Alienation of 
Land Act.   
 
Briefly, the requirement of written authority has been held to be applicable only to those 
representatives of principals who could have entered into the sale of land themselves.  
This conclusion was explained in Potchefstroom Dairies and Industries Co., Ltd. v 
Standard Fresh Milk Supply Co.:199  
 
                                                          
196
 If two or more individuals act together as purchaser or seller, then the signature of all those individuals is 
required (see eg D’Arcy v Blackburn, Jeffereys & Thorpe Estate Agency 1985 2 SA 178 (E), discussed in 
Kerr Sale and Lease 79-80 and criticised in 85-88 on another point); the same principle applies if two or 
more sureties have intended to be liable as co-sureties (eg Nelson v Hodgetts Timbers (East London) Ltd 
1973 3 SA 37 (A); Industrial Development Corporation of SA Ltd v See Bee Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 
136 (C); Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 80). 
197
 Prior to its amendment by s 34 of the General Law Amendment Act 80 of 1964, s 6 of the General Law 
Amendment Act did not make provision for an agent to sign on behalf of the surety.  In Levitan, NO v Petrol 
Conservation (Pty), Ltd 1962 3 SA 233 (W) (“Levitan”) the court concluded that this meant that the legislation 
required a surety to sign personally and that signature by an authorised representative was insufficient 
(239F-H).  According to Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 68 and De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 393-394 n 
14 it was presumably due to this decision that s 6 was amended to include the possibility that an agent may 
sign on behalf of a surety.  There is no requirement that the agent be authorised in writing.  If the legislature 
was indeed motivated by the Levitan decision to amend the relevant legislation, then it appears to have 
overlooked the concern raised in that case that oral authorisation defeats the object of certainty underlying 
the formal requirements imposed for suretyships (239G-H).  
198
 Although the main text goes on to consider the meaning of “agent” in s 2(1), it should be pointed out that 
the requirement of written authorisation has been interpreted quite flexibly by South African courts.  Any form 
of writing will suffice (see eg Hugo v Gross 1989 1 SA 154 (C) 162F-G) and it is unnecessary for the principal 
to append his signature to that document, provided it is clear that the authorisation emanated from the 
principal (a matter which may be proved through the admission of extrinsic evidence – see Hugo v Gross 
1989 1 SA 154 (C) 163A-C; Van der Merwe v D S S M Boerdery BK 1991 2 SA 320 (T) 329F).  A full 
discussion of the requirement of written authorisation, as well as other aspects relating to the topic of agency 
and sales of land is found in Kerr Agency 55 ff.  
199
 1913 TPD 506. 
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“[A] contract of sale, if not signed by the principal, must be signed by his agent ‘duly authorised 
in writing’.  That must … mean ‘authorised in writing by the principal’.  The principal must 
therefore be capable of giving the agent the power which he is appointed to exercise.  And for 
this purpose, he must be capable of exercising those powers himself.  Moreover the use of the 
word ‘authorised’ points … to an express authorisation as distinct from one arising by 
implication of law … [T]he agency contemplated by the section is one expressly created by a 
person who could himself have exercised the delegated power had he chosen to do so.  
[Therefore] tutors, curators, corporations and partnerships are all excluded.  Tutors and curators 
are excluded because the acts which they are appointed to perform are ex hypothesi acts which 
their wards cannot perform.  Corporations are excluded because having neither minds nor 
hands of their own they cannot themselves do what their agents do for them.  And partnerships 
are excluded because the agency of a partner for his co-partner is not expressly created but 
arises by implication of law as soon as the partnership relation is constituted.”200 
 
The examples listed in the above quotation have been confirmed in subsequent 
decisions.201  The deed of alienation will be void, however, if a trustee signs on behalf of a 
number of trustees,202 or an executor on behalf of himself and his co-executor,203 without 
written authorisation.204 
 
                                                          
200
 512-513 per Bristowe J. 
201
 See eg Ten Brink NO v Motala 2001 1 SA 1011 (D) 1013A-B (guardian and ward); Muller v Pienaar 1968 
3 SA 195 (A) 201C-E (partner on behalf of partnership); Trever Investments (Pty) Ltd v Friedhelm 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 1 SA 7 (A) 18F-G (director on behalf of company); Northview Shopping Centre 
(Pty) Ltd v Revelas Properties Johannesburg CC 2010 3 SA 630 (SCA) para 22 (member on behalf of a 
close corporation; this decision overturned Lombaard v Droprop CC 2009 6 SA 150 (N) which had held the 
opposite). 
202
 Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA) para 15. 
203
 Tabethe v Mtetwa, NO 1978 1 SA 80 (D) 84B-85B. 
204
 Neither a trust, nor a deceased estate, is a legal persona - the assets and liabilities of the trust or the 
deceased estate vest in the co-trustees or co-executors respectively (Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 
(SCA) para 9; Tabethe v Mtetwa, NO 1978 1 SA 80 (D) 84H).  Unlike a partnership however (which is also 
not a legal persona), co-trustees and co-executors are not authorised by law to act on behalf of a trust or 
deceased estate.  Therefore, in the absence of a contrary indication in the trust deed or will, co-trustees or 
co-executors must act jointly (Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA) para 9; Tabethe v Mtetwa, NO 
1978 1 SA 80 (D) 84H-85A).  To ensure that the signature of a single co-trustee or co-executor will render 
the deed of alienation binding, the other co-trustee(s) or co-executor(s) must therefore authorise the 
signatory in writing (Thorpe v Trittenwein 2007 2 SA 172 (SCA) paras 14-15; Tabethe v Mtetwa, NO 1978 1 
SA 80 (D) 85B). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
82 
 
A point which has not yet been settled is whether a person who is not an officer of a 
company may act on behalf of that company without written authorisation to do so.  For the 
sake of clarity, such a person will be referred to as an outside agent.205   Those cases 
which have held that written authorisation is not a requirement, have based their 
conclusion on the wording of section 69(1)(a) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, which 
provided that  
 
“[a]ny contract which if made between individual persons would by law be required to be in 
writing signed by the parties to be charged therewith may be made on behalf of the company in 
writing signed by any person acting under its authority, express or implied, and may in the same 
manner be varied or discharged.” 
 
Cases which have held that this provision also applied to outside agents generally focused 
on two points.  First, this section differed from its historical predecessor, section 74 of the 
Companies Act 31 of 1909, which specifically stated that an agent acting on behalf of a 
company required the written authority of the directors of that company.  The change in 
wording was interpreted as a deliberate change in intention on the part of the legislature, 
leading to the inference that any representative acting on behalf of a company, whether an 
officer of the company or an outsider, might be authorised orally to do so.206  Secondly, 
and related to the first point, section 69(1)(a) referred to “any person” acting on behalf of 
the company, which was taken as an indication that the provision was intended to apply to 
outside agents as well.207 
 
By contrast, some commentators held that section 69(1)(a) did not apply to outside agents 
because the section dealt only with the situation where the contract was signed “by the 
parties to be charged therewith” and not where the parties were represented by outside 
                                                          
205
 Icodev (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1985 3 SA 824 (T) 828H; Northview Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd v Revelas 
Properties Johannesburg CC 2010 3 SA 630 (SCA) para 11. 
206
 Roodia Beleggings (Flora) (Edms) Bpk v Marais 1979 4 SA 488 (T) 492A-F; Icodev (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 
1985 3 SA 824 (T) 829E-H. 
207
 Roodia Beleggings (Flora) (Edms) Bpk v Marais 1979 4 SA 488 (T) 492H; Icodev (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1985 
3 SA 824 (T) 829I.  It was also held in Myflor Investments (Pty) Ltd v Everett NO 2001 2 SA 1083 (C) 1096A-
C that the phrase “any contract” in s 69(1)(a) was broad enough to include alienations of land and that this 
implied that the provision was intended to override the requirements of s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.  
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agents.208  In other words, it was concerned with “the manner in which a company as a 
juristic person without an intellect of its own, is to express its intention to the outside world 
in a case where formal confirmation of that intention is required by law”.209  The section 
therefore focused on the requirements for the authorisation of officers of the company 
(which might include employees) which was derived from the memorandum and articles of 
association of the company, and which could be express or implied.210  If the section were 
interpreted to apply to outside agents as well, it would lead to the peculiar result that a 
natural person would have to authorise his agent in writing, while a company might 
authorise an outside agent orally.211  Furthermore, while there can be no uncertainty as to 
the authority of an organ or officer of a company to act on its behalf (because that authority 
arises by implication of law), the same cannot be said of an outside agent who acts on 
behalf of such a company – permitting such an agent to act upon oral authority could give 
rise to the very uncertainty and disputes which the requirement of written authority in the 
Alienation of Land Act is intended to prevent.212 
 
There is no provision equivalent to section 69(1)(a) in the new Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
In light of the preceding discussion, it is argued that this means that both outside agents 
acting on behalf of companies and agents acting on behalf of individuals will now need to 
be authorised in writing before they may validly conclude a sale of land.  Such consistency 
has the benefit of being logically appealing and, in addition, gives better effect to the 





                                                          
208
 See eg Van Rensburg & Treisman Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 62-63; J R Harker “The 
Authorization of an Agent Who Concludes a Contract for the Sale of Land On Behalf Of a Company” (1980) 
97 SALJ 546 549.  See also Northview Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd v Revelas Properties Johannesburg CC 
2010 3 SA 630 (SCA) para 14, in which the court doubted whether s 69(1)(a) was ever intended to be 
applicable to outside agents. 
209




 Harker 1980 SALJ 549-550; Wulfsohn Formalities 153-154. 
212
 Harker 1980 SALJ 549; Northview Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd v Revelas Properties Johannesburg CC 
2010 3 SA 630 (SCA) para 26. 
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3 4 2 What is a signature? 
 
There are no general statutory definitions of the terms “signature” and “to sign”.213  
Although the usual understanding of a signature is self-identification by the writing of one’s 
full name or initials and surname, other forms of identification have also been held to 
constitute a signature.214  Thus, it is acceptable to sign with an ‘X’ or a thumbprint, or by 
means of initials only.215  In common-law jurisdictions stamped,216 printed217 and 
typewritten signatures218 have received judicial approval in the past, but the signature 
requirement imposed by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act will only be 
satisfied by a handwritten signature.219  In German law, only a handwritten signature or a 
notarially attested mark is acceptable.220   
 
The validity of a signature is tested according to the function it fulfils.  In Jurgens,221 
Hoexter JA held that  
 
“[t]he function of a signature is to signify that the writing to which it pertains accords with the 
intention of the signatory.  It conveys an attestation by the person signing of his approval and 
authority for what is contained in the document; and that it emanates from him”.222   
 
                                                          
213
 The discussion here focuses on handwritten signatures and paper-based documents.  The possibility that 
a suretyship (but not an alienation of land) may be concluded electronically and the requirement of an 
advanced electronic signature were discussed in ch 1 (1 3 2). 
214
 In In re Trollip (1895) 12 SC 243 246, it was held that “[to] sign one’s name, as distinguished from writing 
one’s name in full, is to make such a mark as will represent the name of the person signing the document.”   
215
 Putter v Provincial Insurance Co Ltd 1963 3 SA 145 (W) 148H; Van Niekerk v Smit 1952 3 SA 17 (T) 25C-
E. 
216
 Goodman v J Eban LD [1954] 1 QB 550. 
217
 Brydges (Town Clerk of Cheltenham) v Dix (1891) 7 TLR 215. 
218
 Newborne v Sensolid (Great Britain) LD [1954] 1 QB 45. 
219
 Firstpost Homes Ltd v Johnson [1995] 1 WLR 1567 1575-1576.  The reasons for the court’s conclusion 
were first, that a handwritten signature requirement accorded with the common-sense understanding of a 
signature and secondly, that a stricter signature requirement would be in line with the purpose of the new 
Act, which was to promote certainty.  It is, however, sufficient if the handwritten signature takes the form of 
initials, provided it is clear that such signature was intended to authenticate the contents of the document.  
See Newell v Tarrant 2004 WL 741782 para 47. 
220
 § 126 BGB. 
221
 Also discussed above in 3 2 1. 
222
 Jurgens v Volkskas Bank 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 220E.   
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One would assume that in order for a signature to fulfil this authenticating function, it would 
need to be appended to the document only once it has been completed.  However, this 
approach has not been adhered to strictly by South African courts in relation to sales of 
land and suretyships. 
 
3 4 3 When should the signature be appended to the agreement? 
 
Neither section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act nor section 6 of the General Law 
Amendment Act specify when the written agreement should be signed: nothing is 
prescribed as to the sequence in which completion of the document and affixing of a 
signature must occur.223  This can become problematic when a party signs a document 
containing blank spaces, which are then completed subsequent to signature.  In 
considering the South African courts’ approach to this problem, no distinction is drawn 
between the signing of suretyships and sales of land because the rules outlined here have 
been held to be applicable to both types of agreements.224 
 
Initially, the Appellate Division held in Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison225 (“Fourlamel”) that 
a party’s signature should be appended to a completed document.226  The function of a 
signature is to indicate the adoption and approval of the recorded terms.227  This function 
cannot be fulfilled if a party signs what in effect amounts to a blank piece of paper.228  
Furthermore, allowing the unilateral completion of the document by the other contracting 
party would open the door to fraud, perjury and unnecessary litigation.229  
 
This broad conclusion was limited in the subsequent Jurgens decision.  The court drew a 
distinction between a document signed in blank which is then delivered to the other 




 In both Just Names Properties 11 CC v Fourie 2008 1 SA 343 (SCA) paras 16-21 and Fraser v Viljoen  
2008 4 SA 106 (SCA) para 4, it was held that the rules relating to the signing of suretyships were equally 
applicable to alienations of land. 
225








 342H-343C.  Since the court had to decide on the formal validity of a suretyship, it also pointed out that 
the cautionary function of formalities would be subverted if a surety could be bound to a document which he 
had signed while it was still incomplete.  
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contracting party to complete (as in Fourlamel), and one which is signed in blank and 
subsequently completed by the signatory himself or his representative prior to delivery (the 
facts of Jurgens).230  According to the court, whether the document is signed before or 
after completion is irrelevant,231 provided it is completed by the time of delivery to the other 
party.232  This is due to the fact that a signature can still fulfil an authenticating function if it 
is appended to a document prior to completion.233   
 
It is argued that the conclusion in Jurgens is one example of a successful resolution of the 
tension between “formalism” (which promotes certainty) and “flexibility” (which encourages 
fairness).234  While there would be a need to protect a surety who delivers a signed but 
incomplete agreement to the creditor from potentially fraudulent claims, the same concern 
does not arise when a surety signs an incomplete document and then completes the terms 
himself or authorises someone to do so on his behalf.  In the latter case, it is the creditor’s 
reliance on an apparently valid agreement which should be protected against the resort to 
the mere technical defence of formal non-compliance.235    
 
                                                          
230
 Jurgens v Volkskas Bank 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 219A-B. 
231
 Jurgens v Volkskas Bank 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 221A-B.  It is not entirely clear why this part of the judgment 
is criticised: 
“The difficulty with the approach in [Jurgens] is that, if it is ‘immaterial’ whether signature preceded 
completion, it provides no principled basis for distinguishing between such a case – where the suretyship 
is completed by the agent of the surety after signature by the surety – and the case where the suretyship 
is completed by the creditor after delivery of the document to him – which all are agreed does not result in 
a valid suretyship.”  (Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 79). 
This criticism overlooks the fact that it is evident in the judgment that a completed document must be 
delivered to the creditor (see n 232 below). 
232
 Jurgens v Volkskas Bank 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 219A-D, 220A-D; Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Jaap de Villiers 
Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1978 3 SA 955 (W) 958D; Fraser v Viljoen 2008 4 SA 106 (SCA) para 4. 
233
 Jurgens v Volkskas Bank 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 220H-221A in which the court cites a passage from Corbin 
on Contracts (the passage is repeated in C N Brown Corbin on Contracts 4: Statute of Frauds §§ 12.1-23.11 
(1997) 805) as support for this conclusion.  Presumably, the court also intended the limitation in that passage 
to be applicable - a court must be satisfied that a signature appended prior to completion of the document 
was intended to fulfil an authenticating function. 
234
 See ch 2 (2 5). 
235
 A similar argument is made in Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 78.   
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In Jurgens, the written offers of suretyship were signed by the sureties and then completed 
on their behalf by their representatives before delivery to the creditor.236  This should be 
distinguished from the case where the signatory delivers a signed, incomplete document to 
the other contracting party and authorises the latter to complete the document.  In Fraser v 
Viljoen237 the court concluded that the agreement would be invalid in this type of situation 
because the authorised party would be acting in the dual capacity of both contracting party 
and agent for the signatory.238  This would  
 
“open the door to uncertainty as to precisely what the parties orally agreed upon and what the 
other party was authorised to do [and therefore] the object of certainty would disappear”.239   
 
The cases discussed above all deal with the signing of an incomplete document where 
subsequent completion related to essential terms.  However, it is possible that a document 
is signed in incomplete form while the blank space relates to a non-essential, albeit 
possibly material, term.  In Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd240 (“Wizard Holdings”) 
the defendant sureties alleged that they signed suretyships which contained blank spaces 
making provision for the limitation of their liability.  These incomplete agreements were 
then delivered to the plaintiff creditor, who inserted the word “unlimited” in the blank 
spaces.241  The defendants argued that the omission of this word from their respective 
agreements at the time of signature rendered them formally invalid.242 
 
The court’s point of departure was to engage in an analysis of case law relating to blank 
spaces in written agreements.243  According to one commentator,244 this missed the point 
of the sureties’ contention: the argument was not that the agreements were invalid 
                                                          
236
 Jurgens v Volkskas Bank 1993 1 SA 214 (A) 217D. 
237
 2008 4 SA 106 (SCA). 
238
 Fraser v Viljoen 2008 4 SA 106 (SCA) para 6.  See also the obiter remarks to this effect in Fourlamel 
(Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 344B-D. 
239
 Fraser v Viljoen 2008 4 SA 106 (SCA) para 6.  The position is the same in English law, where it is 
possible for a memorandum to be signed by one person as agent for both contracting parties, but one 
contracting party cannot sign as agent for the other.  Sharman v Brandt (1871) L R 6 QB 720; Wright v 
Dannah (1809) 2 Camp 203. 
240
 2010 5 SA 523 (GSJ). 
241
 Para 12. 
242
 Para 13. 
243
 Para 14 ff. 
244
 Sharrock 2010 ASSAL 567. 
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because they omitted a term which should have been in writing, but rather that the 
agreements had not been completed by the time they had been signed and delivered to 
the plaintiff.  This criticism is rather harsh.  The court’s analysis was not irrelevant, but 
simply incomplete: it failed to discuss, as a preliminary issue, how a court should approach 
a document that has been signed while it still contains a blank space. 
  
It was stated above that the correct time to determine whether a document is complete is 
when it is delivered to the other contracting party.  In other words, if the document still 
contains blank spaces at the time of delivery, it is that ostensibly incomplete recordal 
which must be examined.245  Where a blank space relates to an essential term, as was the 
case in Fourlamel, the agreement will be invalid.  If it relates to a non-essential term, the 
question is whether the parties intended that such term should form part of their written 
agreement.  Sometimes this is a question which can only be answered through the 
admission of extrinsic evidence.246  Often however, the problem can be solved simply as a 
matter of construction or interpretation of the document.247  The facts of Wizard Holdings 
fall into this latter category. 
 
                                                          
245
 This point is specifically made in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Jaap de Villiers Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1978 
3 SA 955 (W) 958H, and it is implicit in the approach adopted in Just Names Properties 11 CC v Fourie 2008 
1 SA 343 (SCA) paras 21-22.  Despite the fact that the document in the latter case appeared to record a 
complete sale of land, the court nevertheless considered its formal validity at the time that it was released for 
delivery to the purchaser.  At that stage, the purported agreement contained two blank pages initialled by the 
sellers: they had rejected a clause proposed by the purchaser and the estate agent, who had acted as 
intermediary between the parties, suggested that they initial blank pages which would then be completed by 
her to reflect the amended agreement.  The court concluded that the agreement was formally invalid, 
because it was signed while still incomplete.  It should be pointed out that the court’s conclusion was based 
upon the assumption that the sellers’ rejection of the relevant clause did not transform their acceptance into 
a counter-offer (paras 18-20).  This analysis has been rightly criticised, inter alia on the basis that the sellers 
would not have concluded the agreement if their proposed amendment had not been accepted.  See 
Sharrock 2010 ASSAL 391-392, which should be read together with his argument that the estate agent in 
this case was given a mandate by the sellers to change the terms of the offer on their behalf – “Contract” 
(April-June 2007) JQR para 2.3.2 < 
http://ipproducts.jutalaw.co.za.ez.sun.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=Publish:10.104
8/Enu> (accessed 05-11-2012).   
246
 See Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) and the discussion in in ch 4 (4 3 2). 
247
 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Jaap de Villiers Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1978 3 SA 955 (W) 959A; Johnston v 
Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 940G-941A; Pizani v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 69 (A) 80G-H. 
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Although a term limiting a surety’s liability could be a material term if the parties had 
agreed upon it,248 it is nevertheless a term which operates for the benefit of the surety.249  
If the surety signs the document without completing that term, the more probable inference 
is that the parties never intended the clause to form part of their agreement and that the 
suretyship would be unlimited.250  The term is then regarded as pro non scripto,251 and the 
agreement will be formally valid.  
 
The suretyships which were delivered to the plaintiff in the Nedbank case therefore 
constituted the complete agreement between the parties, in spite of the fact that the 
documents contained a blank space relating to the possible limitation of liability.  The 
subsequent completion of that blank space by the plaintiff was irrelevant, because it simply 
confirmed what the parties had agreed upon, namely that the suretyships were intended to 
be unlimited.252  While it is argued that this conclusion is correct, it is somewhat odd that 
the court chose to confine itself only to a consideration of the defendants’ affidavit and the 
fact that there was no allegation that the parties had intended the suretyships to be limited 
to a certain amount.253  According to the court, this led to the irresistible inference that the 
intention was always to conclude unlimited suretyships.  Possibly this inference would 
have been more irresistible had the court supported its conclusion also by reference to 
clause 1 of the suretyships themselves and the fact that it was worded in a manner which 
suggested that the sureties had agreed to unlimited liability.254  
                                                          
248
 Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 523 (GSJ) para 16; Pizani v First Consolidated 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 69 (A) 81B-C. 
249
 Pizani v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 69 (A) 81G. 
250
 Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 523 (GSJ) para 22; Pizani v First Consolidated 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 69 (A) 81F; Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 941B-C; D J Joubert “Blanko 
Spasies” (1973) 36 THRHR 285 288.  
251
 Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 523 (GSJ) paras 15, 18-19; Johnston v Leal 1980 3 
SA 927 (A) 941A-C. 
252
 Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 523 (GSJ) para 28. 
253
 Para 28. 
254
 In part, the relevant clause read that the surety bound himself   
“as surety and co-principal debtor . . . for the repayment on demand of all amounts which the principal 
debtor may now or at any time hereafter owe Nedbank Ltd” (Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 
2010 5 SA 523 (GSJ) para 12). 
Cf Pizani v First Consolidated Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1979 1 SA 69 (A) 81H-82A, in which similar clauses were 
held to support the court’s conclusion that the relevant suretyships were intended to be unlimited.  These 




In conclusion then, the sequence in which a document is signed and its terms completed is 
irrelevant, provided a complete document is delivered to the other contracting party.  A 
document can still be complete if it contains a blank space at the time of delivery, provided 
it does not relate to the essentialia of the agreement and provided the parties did not 
intend that term to form part of their agreement.  What is not permissible is for the other 
contracting party to complete the document unilaterally, or to act as representative of the 
signatory and complete it on his behalf.  
 
3 5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered some basic principles relevant to the interpretation of formal 
requirements prescribed for sales of land and suretyships in South African law.  
Fundamental to an understanding of the South African approach is that the document 
which is examined for the purposes of determining formal validity must embody the parties’ 
agreement.255  We have seen that this requirement may be met even if the document 
records the declaration of intention of one party alone, provided that the performance is 
unilateral and provided that the relevant statutory formalities do not prescribe that the 
document should be signed by both parties.  As we shall see in subsequent chapters, the 
notion that the document constitutes the embodiment of the parties’ agreement has a 
profound impact on the rules relating to extrinsic evidence,256 rectification257 and the 
remedies available to a party in the event of formal invalidity.258 
 
A further distinction considered in this chapter has been the difference between material 
and non-material terms.259  It was argued that material terms (insofar as these do not 
relate to the essential terms of the parties’ agreement) constitute all the incidentalia of the 
parties’ agreement.  However, the mere fact that the parties have (orally) agreed upon a 
material term should not render the written agreement formally invalid if it is not included in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
clauses were considered in conjunction with the appellants’ plea (81C-E) which contained no allegation that 
the parties had agreed on a limitation of liability as a material term of their agreement. 
255
 3 2 1. 
256
 Ch 4. 
257
 Ch 5. 
258
 Ch 6. 
259
 3 2 2. 
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it – there must be an indication in the document itself that the parties intended to regulate 
their contractual relationship by means of certain additional terms.   
 
This chapter has also highlighted certain general principles which will guide a court in the 
determination of the formal validity of a specific sale of land or suretyship.260  Meticulous 
accuracy in the recordal of a term is not required – objective ascertainability will suffice.  
Furthermore, if a document lends itself to an interpretation consistent with formal validity, 
then that is the interpretation which will be adopted by the court.  Finally, the document 
should be examined as a whole in order to determine whether the agreement complies 
with formal requirements.   
 
The last two principles seem to have been ignored in recent cases which have held that an 
agreement which appears to have been concluded by a party acting in his personal 
capacity, but who is acting on behalf of an unnamed or undisclosed principal, is formally 
invalid.  It is argued that contrary to these decisions, the agreement is not formally invalid: 
ex facie the document, all the essential and other material terms have been recorded.  
However, in the case of an unnamed principal, the agreement is in all likelihood 
substantively invalid – neither the agent nor the other contracting party intended that the 
former would be personally liable.  This lack of consensus on what appears ex facie the 
written agreement will render it void.  By contrast, an agreement concluded by an 
intermediary in the interests of an undisclosed principal will be both formally and 
substantively valid, but only against the intermediary: he intends to conclude the contract 
in his personal capacity and to be the bearer of rights and duties in terms of that 
agreement.  The undisclosed principal will not be able to sue or be sued in terms of an 
agreement subject to formalities.  The reason for this conclusion is not because the 
document does not identify the principal, but rather because the principal has not signed it.  
For this reason, it is argued that the only sphere of application of the doctrine of the 
undisclosed principal is where the principal wishes to sue as creditor in terms of a 
suretyship, because it is not a requirement that the creditor signs the agreement. 
 
                                                          
260
 3 3. 
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Finally, this chapter has considered certain aspects surrounding such signatures as are 
required.261  Particular attention was paid to when the agreement should be signed: the 
general rule is that the signed document must be complete by the time it is delivered to the 
other contracting party (or, in the event of reciprocal obligations where the agreement 
consists of two written declarations of intent, each document must be complete by the time 
of delivery).  The notion of what constitutes a complete recordal should also not be 
interpreted literally: a document which contains blank spaces may nevertheless reflect a 
complete agreement, provided those blank spaces do not relate to essential terms.  In 
such a case, a court may be able to reach a conclusion of formal completeness simply 
upon a reasonable construction of the document as a whole.  In others, a court will need to 
resort to extrinsic evidence to reach a conclusion.  This latter scenario, and other 
instances of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, serve as the focus of the next chapter. 
                                                          
261
 3 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: STATUTORY FORMALITIES, THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE 
4 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter considered the way in which South African courts have interpreted 
the formal requirements imposed by the Alienation of Land Act and the General Law 
Amendment Act.  It is apparent that these Acts have been interpreted in a manner that 
requires all the material terms of the agreement to be embodied in a written document.  
Passing reference was also made to instances where extrinsic evidence was admitted. 
 
The current chapter will set out in greater detail when and why extrinsic evidence is 
admissible and how South African courts reconcile this with the parol evidence rule and 
the statutory requirement that all material terms of the agreement be reduced to writing.1  
Particular attention will be paid to the principle of incorporation by reference, as applied in 
the South African context2 and in certain common-law jurisdictions.3  Due to the important 
role played by the parol evidence rule in the context of the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence, the next section will set out the parameters of this rule and its relationship to 
statutory formalities.  Reference will also be made, where relevant, to similar aspects in 
German law, which does not appear to recognise anything resembling the parol evidence 
rule, but which does also recognise that contracts which are required to be in writing 
should not be amended too easily on the basis of extrinsic evidence. 
 
4 2 The admissibility of extrinsic evidence  
4 2 1 Introduction 
 
There are two rules which generally preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence in the 
context of agreements subject to formalities.  First, there is the requirement that the terms 
of a contract that is required by law to be in writing must appear from the written document 
itself: where the written document is incomplete, it cannot be supplemented by extrinsic 
                                                          
1
 4 2-4 3 below. 
2
 4 4 1. 
3
 4 4 2. 
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evidence.4  To admit extrinsic evidence in this instance would subvert at least some of the 
objects of formalities legislation, namely to minimise uncertainty and disputes.5   
 
The consequence of this rule was set out in Van Wyk v Rottcher's Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd6 
where Watermeyer CJ said the following:   
 
“In a simple written contract which need not by law be in writing it is possible to describe a piece 
of land by reference, e.g. the land agreed upon between the parties, and in that case testimony 
as to the making of the oral agreement may be admissible to identify the land, but when a 
contract of sale of land is by law invalid unless it is in writing, then it is not permissible to 
describe the land sold as the land agreed upon between the parties.  Consequently testimony to 
prove an oral consensus between the parties which is not embodied in the writing is not 
admissible for any purpose, not even to identify the land sold.”7  
 
Secondly, if a contract constitutes the exclusive memorial of the agreement, the parol 
evidence rule also precludes the admission of extrinsic evidence, to the extent that such 
evidence adds to, varies or contradicts a contract reduced to writing (this rule applies 
irrespective of whether formalities are imposed).8  The rule itself is said to consist of two 
independent sub-rules.  The “integration rule” determines the extent to which extrinsic 
evidence may be used to prove the terms of the written contract:9 it defines “the limits of 
the contract”.10  The “interpretation rule” determines the extent to which extrinsic evidence 
is admissible to interpret the meaning of the terms used in that contract.11    
                                                          
4
 African Lumber Co (Pvt) Ltd v Katz 1978 4 SA 432 (C) 434H-435A; Industrial Development Corporation of 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 9. 
5
 See the discussion on the functions of formalities in ch 2 (2 3). 
6




 Union Government v Vianini Ferro-Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 43 47. 
9
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 943A; S W J van der Merwe, L F van Huysteen, M F B Reinecke & G F 
Lubbe Contract - General Principles 4 ed (2012) 149; R H Christie & G B Bradfield Christie’s The Law of 
Contract 6 ed (2011) 200-201. 
10
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 943A.  Or, as D T Zeffertt & A Paizes Parol Evidence with Particular 
Reference to Contract (1986) 1 state, the integration rule deals with the question of the written document’s 
“conclusiveness”.  It should be pointed out that A J Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 
354 considers this part of the parol evidence rule to be an expression of the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent 
and refers to Harlin Properties (Pty) Ltd v Los Angeles Hotel (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 143 (A) to support his 
conclusion.  However, in that case the court relied on the doctrine to justify its finding that the appellant was 
bound to a term contained in a letter sent to it by the respondent and which modified a written lease 
agreement.  Because the appellant failed to react to the term proposed in the letter (but nevertheless signed 
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The rationale for the parol evidence rule is that it is supposed to promote certainty, 
minimise disputes and restrict the risk of perjury.12  Where a contract is statutorily required 
to be reduced to writing, the parol evidence rule therefore tends to be supportive of the 
functions served by formalities themselves.13  This functional overlap between the parol 
evidence rule and statutory formalities is not mere coincidence: the final stage in the 
development of the parol evidence rule in England is linked to the promulgation of the 
Statute of Frauds in 1677.  In terms of the Statute’s original provisions, certain transactions 
could be validly concluded only if they were reduced to writing.  According to Wigmore,14  
 
“[t]he scope of these provisions was limited; but their moral and logical influence was wide and 
immediate.  The [S]tatute now began to be appealed to, in all questions of ‘parol evidence,’ as 
setting an example and typifying a general principle.”15 
 
Thus, the impact of the Statute of Frauds was broader than the scope of its direct 
application: where a transaction had been reduced to writing, that writing was regarded as 
the sole memorial of the parties’ agreement, and extrinsic evidence was regarded as 
inadmissible, irrespective of whether that agreement fell within the scope of the Statute.16 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
the written lease agreement after receipt of the letter), the court concluded that it was bound to the terms of 
the modified lease agreement (148G-149B).  The court specifically pointed out that the parol evidence rule 
was not applicable and that the respondent could not be held to the terms of the written lease agreement 
alone, because that agreement was not intended to be an integration of all the terms of the contract between 
the appellant and respondent (149H-150B).  It is unclear therefore, how this decision supports Kerr’s 
argument that the parol evidence rule (or at least that part of it known as the integration rule) reflects the 
doctrine of quasi-mutual assent. 
11
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 943A; Van der Merwe et al Contract 149; Christie & Bradfield Contract 
212.  The boundaries between the two sub-rules are not always very clear – see 4 2 3. 
12
 See eg Du Plessis v Nel 1952 1 SA 513 (A) 534C-E per Van den Heever JA; G F Lubbe & C Murray 
Farlam & Hathaway Contract - Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 216 n 2; Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 152-153. 
13
 A L Corbin “The Parol Evidence Rule” (1944) 53 Yale LJ 603 609. 
14
 “A Brief History of the Parol Evidence Rule” (1904) 4 Colum LR 338. 
15
 352.  See also English Law Commission The Law of Contract: The Parol Evidence Rule (Law Com No 
154) (1986) para 2.3. 
16
 Wigmore 1904 Colum LR 352-353; T Cole “The Parol Evidence Rule: A Comparative Analysis and 
Proposal” (2003) 26 UNSW LJ 680 687. 
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The parol evidence rule was received in South Africa from English law on the assumption 
that it constituted a rule of evidence.17  However, many have pointed out that the rule is, or 
may be, a rule of substantive law in which case it should never have been received in 
South African law at all.18  Not only does the reception of the rule rest on these dubious 
foundations, but it is anomalous in a legal system whose point of departure is that 
contractual liability is based upon the parties’ intention.19  The rule, of course, precludes 
evidence of this intention. 
 
Even in England, consideration was given to the question whether the rule should be 
abolished (or at least, that part of the rule known as the integration rule) by means of 
legislation to this effect.  In 1986, the English Law Commission decided that legislation 
was unnecessary, because the rule no longer had the scope or effect it once did and, in 
particular, 
 
“no parol evidence rule today requires a court to exclude or ignore evidence which should be 
admitted or acted upon if the true contractual intention of the parties is to be ascertained and 
effect given to it.”20 
 
The reason why the Commission came to this conclusion was due to the existence of the 
many so-called “exceptions” to the integration leg of the rule.  It is the existence of these 
many exceptions that has led at least one commentator to state that the rule, if not dead, 
has at least been semivivus for quite some time.21   
 
From a civil law perspective, the parol evidence rule  
 
“has always seemed to be a quaint confusion of the law of evidence and the substantive law on 
contractual interpretation.”22 
                                                          
17
 Stiglingh v Theron 1907 TS 998 1007; Cassiem v Standard Bank of South Africa 1930 AD 366 369; Venter 
v Birchholtz 1972 1 SA 276 (A) 282C-D; Van der Merwe et al Contract 148.   
18
 See eg Schroeder v Vakansieburo (Edms) Bpk 1970 3 SA 240 (T) 242E-G; Von Ziegler v Superior 
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 399 (T) 403C-F; Zeffertt & Paizes Parol Evidence 14-15. 
19
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 152; Zeffertt & Paizes Parol Evidence 24-25. 
20
 The Parol Evidence Rule para 1.7.  By contrast, legislation was thought to be necessary to abolish the 
parol evidence rule in Scotland – see s 1 of the Contract (Scotland) Act 1997. 
21
 S Vogenauer “Interpretation of Contracts: Concluding Comparative Observations” in A Burrows & E Peel 
(eds) Contract Terms (2007) 123 135. 
22
 135. 
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Thus, in German law all types of extrinsic evidence are admissible, including subjective 
statements of intent (whether prior, simultaneous or subsequent to contract conclusion), 
previous negotiations, and subsequent conduct.23  This does not mean that written 
contracts are subject to being changed at the slightest hint that the extrinsic evidence 
suggests a conflict with the written text.  A document is presumed to be a complete and 
accurate recordal of the parties’ agreement; extrinsic evidence regarding its content is 
admissible, but the weight afforded to such evidence is less if it conflicts with the written 
text.24  This presumption of completeness and accuracy is even stronger when the 
agreement is statutorily required to be in writing.25  In such a case, a German court will 
engage in a two-step process.  First, it will determine the content and meaning of the 
contract, weighing the relevant extrinsic evidence in light of the presumption of 
completeness.  In certain cases, the weight of the extrinsic evidence is sufficient to dispel 
the presumption and leads to a result which is not evident from the literal meaning of the 
contract.  As a second step therefore, a court is required to determine whether the contract 
is valid with this new content.  To prevent the circumvention of the relevant formal 
requirement, a court will only reach a conclusion of validity if there is an allusion to, or 
some indication of, the true content of the contract in the written document itself.  This 
approach is referred to as the Andeutungstheorie (“theory of indication”).  If there is no 
such allusion, the contract will be void for failure to comply with the relevant formalities 
because “the formal requirement has not been adhered to if the content of the contract 
cannot be established from the written words”.26   
 
The Andeutungstheorie tries to maintain a balance between giving effect to the parties’ 
actual intention and the need to promote the evidentiary function of statutory formalities.27  
Nevertheless, the theory is severely criticised on the basis that it is vague and may give 
rise to artificial interpretations of the written agreement – a court may conclude that there 




 137-138.  See also BGH NJW 2002, 3164 (translated by Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 
137). 
25
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is an “indication” or allusion to terms which will add to or contradict the written text in any 
situation where it wishes to achieve a desired result.28  
 
The process adopted by South African courts is the opposite of that adopted by German 
courts.  As we have seen, German courts generally allow extrinsic evidence as to content 
and meaning and only then determine whether the agreement is valid in the light of this 
extrinsic evidence.  As a result of the interaction between the parol evidence rule and 
statutory formalities, South African courts determine first, whether a valid contract has 
been concluded (with particular terms) and then what the terms of that contract mean.   
 
4 2 2 The limitations on the use of extrinsic evidence to prove the terms of a written 
contract in South African law 
 
The limitations on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in determining whether a valid 
contract has been concluded were described in Johnston v Leal29 (“Johnston”).  Both the 
parol evidence rule and formalities legislation preclude extrinsic evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous agreements which vary, alter, add to or supplement the written 
contract.30  While the parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous agreements which do not alter or supplement the agreement, formalities 
legislation excludes such agreements where they purport to contradict the written 
agreement, by virtue of the rule that all material terms of the contract must be reduced to 
writing.31  Finally, the parol evidence rule does not exclude evidence of subsequent oral 
agreements, but formalities legislation will have such an effect if the oral agreement seeks 




                                                          
28
 Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 139.  See also B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The 
German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 2 ed (2006) 138; J Busche “§ 133” in F J Säcker (ed) 
Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 1 Allgemeiner Teil: §§ 1-240 5 ed (2006) n 57. 
29




 938H-939A.   
32
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 938F-G; A J Burger “The Parol Evidence Rule in Contract” (1996) 31 
TM 141 142; Corbin 1944 Yale LJ 607; Venter v Birchholtz 1972 1 SA 276 (A) 282E-G.   
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4 2 3 The limitations on the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret a written contract in 
South African law 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently had the opportunity to pronounce on the 
current approach to interpretation in South African law.  In Natal Joint Municipal Pension 
Fund v Endumeni Municipality,33 Wallis JA held: 
 
“Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document … having 
regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the 
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence.  
Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the 
light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; 
the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its 
production.  Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighed in the 
light of all these factors.  The process is objective, not subjective.  A sensible meaning is to be 
preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent 
purpose of the document.  Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to 
substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words actually used.  
To do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between 
interpretation and legislation; in a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties 
other than the one they in fact made.  The 'inevitable point of departure is the language of the 
provision itself', read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the 
background to the preparation and production of the document … [T]he proper approach to the 
interpretation of documents … [is] that from the outset one considers the context and the 
language together, with neither predominating over the other.  This is the approach that courts 
in South Africa should now follow, without the need to cite authorities from an earlier era that 
are not necessarily consistent and frequently reflect an approach to interpretation that is no 
longer appropriate.”34  
 
While it is not a core aspect of this thesis to analyse the South African approach to the 
interpretation of written contracts in general, it is necessary to make some remarks on the 
                                                          
33
 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA). 
34
 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) paras 18-19 (footnotes 
omitted).  The judgment reiterates the notion that a contract should be interpreted in a manner which gives it 
a commercially sensible meaning (see eg Ekhuruleni Metropolitan Municipality v Germiston Municipal 
Retirement Fund 2010 2 SA 498 (SCA) para 13) and its description of the approach to interpretation as a 
whole has been accepted as correct in Comwezi Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd 
(759/11) [2012] ZASCA 126 (21-09-2012) para 5 and Khula Enterprise Finance Limited v Geldenhuys 2012 
JDR 2210 (SCA) para 18. 
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above quotation in order to determine its impact on the interpretation of agreements 
subject to formalities in particular. 
 
First, the process of interpretation is described as objective: its purpose is not to ascertain 
the common intention of the parties,35 but to determine the meaning that the document 
would convey to a reasonable person in the position of the parties.36  Secondly, in order to 
place the interpreter in the position of the parties, the document or provision must be read 
in context, which includes “the circumstances attendant upon [the contract] coming into 
existence”.37   
 
At first glance this phrase is broad enough to include evidence of prior negotiations as part 
of the context, but not evidence of subsequent conduct (because this can never explain 
the background to the conclusion of the contract).  However, such an interpretation is not 
supported by other South African case law.   
 
For example, in KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd,38 Harms DP 
abolished the distinction between “background” and “surrounding” circumstances, as well 
as the prerequisite of ambiguity before evidence of the latter could be admitted.39  All 
                                                          
35
 According to Wallis JA, describing the process of interpretation as an attempt to determine the parties’ 
common intention is counter-productive – see Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 
2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) paras 20-24 as well as M Wallis “What’s in a Word?  Interpretation through the Eyes of 
Ordinary Readers” (2010) 127 SALJ 673 675-677.  Wallis JA’s views on contractual interpretation in general 
are closely aligned with those of Lord Hoffmann – see L Hoffmann “The Intolerable Wrestle with Words and 
Meanings” (1997) 114 SALJ 656 and his judgment outlining the principles of interpretation in English law in 
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 912-913, both of 
which are variously cited or discussed by Wallis 2010 SALJ 683-685. 
36
 This is not stated explicitly in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 
(SCA), but that this is what is meant by adopting an objective approach is evident in Wallis 2010 SALJ 682, 
686 and Comwezi Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd (759/11) [2012] ZASCA 126 
(21-09-2012) para 15 (in which the court’s judgment was also delivered by Wallis JA).  See also Investors 
Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 912.   
37
 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) para 18. 
38
 2009 4 SA 399 (SCA). 
39
 KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 4 SA 399 (SCA) para 39; Masstores (Pty) Ltd v 
Murray & Roberts Construction (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 654 (SCA) para 7.  Prior to these cases, the traditional 
approach to contractual interpretation was that set out in Coopers & Lybrand v Bryant 1995 3 SA 761 (A): 
the point of departure was to interpret the contract by looking at the literal meaning of the words, together 
with the context in which they were used and “background circumstances” explaining the genesis and 
purpose of the contract (767E-768).  Only if the meaning of the terms proved to be ambiguous could the 
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evidence, according to the court, was admissible as part of the “factual matrix” of the 
contract.40   
 
Harms DP did not explain what he intended with the term “factual matrix”.  The term itself 
echoes the terminology used by Lord Hoffman in Investors Compensation Scheme v West 
Bromwich Building Society,41 (“ICS”) which is regarded as the leading case on contractual 
interpretation in current English law.42  However “factual matrix” as it is used in the English 
sense excludes evidence of the parties’ prior negotiations,43 as well as evidence of 
subsequent conduct.44  It is unclear to what extent Harms DP intended these limitations on 
the different types of extrinsic evidence also to apply in the South African context, because 
he did not refer to ICS at all.  As a result, some cases and commentators interpret “factual 
matrix” to mean all evidence, including that of prior negotiations and subsequent 
conduct,45 except direct evidence of a party’s intention.46  More recently however, Wallis 
JA has held that evidence regarding the parties’ prior negotiations is inadmissible47 but 
that the opposite is true of subsequent conduct.48  If the parties’ conduct subsequent to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
court consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ prior negotiations and subsequent conduct (768C-D), or the 
so-called “surrounding circumstances”.   
40
 KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 4 SA 399 (SCA) para 39. 
41
 [1998] 1 WLR 896. 
42
 See eg G McMeel The Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, and Rectification 2 ed (2011) 
26 ff; K Lewison The Interpretation of Contracts 5 ed (2011) 1 ff. 
43
 Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 989. 
44
 A Burrows “Construction and Rectification” in A Burrows & E Peel (eds) Contract Terms (2007) 77 81 n 21.  
The exclusion of these types of evidence is criticised: see Burrows “Construction and Rectification” in 
Contract Terms 81 ff; G McMeel “Prior Negotiations and Subsequent Conduct – The Next Step Forward for 
Contractual Interpretation?” (2003) 119 LQR 272 293-295; D Nicholls “My Kingdom for a Horse: The 
Meaning of Words” (2005) 121 LQR 577. 
45
 Grobler v Oosthuizen 2009 5 SA 500 (SCA) para 13-14; Mkhize v Umvoti Municipality 2010 4 SA 509 
(KZP) para 17; C Maxwell “Interpretation of Contracts” in D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of 
Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 255 264. 
46
 According to Maxwell “Interpretation of Contracts” in The Law of Contract in South Africa 264-265, direct 
evidence of a party’s intention as an aid to interpretation is probably still excluded, even after KPMG 
Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 4 SA 399 (SCA), because its admission would lead to 
uncertainty and endless disputes.   
47
 Van Aardt v Galway 2012 2 SA 312 (SCA) para 9. 
48
 Comwezi Security Services (Pty) Ltd v Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd (759/11) [2012] ZASCA 126 (21-09-
2012) para 15.  This is somewhat odd, considering Wallis JA’s express approval of the English approach to 
contractual interpretation (see eg the authorities referred to Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) paras 18-20 and Wallis 2010 SALJ 685 ff).  One possible explanation is 
that Wallis JA is under the impression that it is only evidence regarding prior negotiations which is excluded 
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conclusion of the contract is regarded as a reliable indicator of the meaning of that 
contract, then it is not self-evident why evidence regarding prior negotiations is 
inadmissible, particularly in view of the fact that this may be an even better indicator of the 
meaning of the contract.49  Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether Wallis JA intended 
to exclude all evidence of prior negotiations, or only that relating to a party’s individual 
intent.  For example, if there is written correspondence indicating that both parties 
attached a particular meaning to a word or phrase in the contract, must this evidence also 
be excluded simply because it originates from prior negotiations?50 
 
Again, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage comprehensively with the 
ramifications of the current approach to interpretation in South African law.  However, it is 
suggested that South African courts should consider adopting a more flexible approach to 
contractual interpretation by admitting evidence of the parties’ negotiations where such 
evidence establishes objectively what the parties meant with a particular provision or 
phrase.  Such an approach would not have to be applied restrictively in the context of 
agreements subject to formalities.  Using the example in the previous paragraph, one 
could hardly argue that there is a danger of fraud or perjury where the evidence (in the 
form of correspondence) of what the parties intended is objective.  More generally, such 
an approach to contractual interpretation would have the added benefit of being in line with 
international instruments on this topic.51 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
in English law (see eg his statement in Wallis 2010 SALJ 686), an impression which is not borne out by 
English case law – see eg Whitworth Street Estate (Manchester) Ltd v James Miller & Partners Ltd [1970] 
AC 583 614-615 and Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd v L Schuler AG [1974] AC 235 261, in which Lord 
Wilberforce stated that  
“[i]t is one and the same principle which excludes evidence of statements, or actions, during negotiations, 
at the time of the contract, or subsequent to the contract”.   
According to McMeel 2003 LQR 276,  
“[p]resumably [this] common principle is that both prior negotiations and subsequent conduct are 
unhelpful in that they do not record the consensus at the moment when contractual responsibility 
crystallises. 
49
 The same argument is made by D McLauchlan “Contract Interpretation: What Is It About?” (2009) 31 SLR 
5 48. 
50
 Admitting evidence of this type does not contradict the characterisation of the process of interpretation as 
objective.  See Burrows “Construction and Rectification” in Contract Terms 82-83; McLauchlan 2009 SLR 12-
13. 
51
 See Art II.-8.102 of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (2009) and Art 4.3 of the Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (2010).  Both international instruments list, as matters relevant to 
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Although the discussion above proceeds from the assumption that a clear distinction can 
be drawn between the integration and interpretation sub-rules of the parol evidence rule, in 
practice the distinction is less easy to draw and to some extent, the two overlap.52  For 
example, extrinsic evidence is admissible for identification purposes.53  This appears to be 
as much an application of extrinsic evidence to determine what a term means, as it is an 
attempt to determine whether the term itself is sufficiently ascertainable and whether, 
therefore, a valid contract has been concluded.  For this reason, the discussion below on 
the types of admissible and inadmissible extrinsic evidence will simply refer to the parol 
evidence rule as a whole, unless a particular problem relates only to one of the two sub-
rules. 
 
4 3 Some specific illustrations of admissible and inadmissible extrinsic evidence 
where agreements are subject to formalities 
 
Despite the interaction of the parol evidence rule and statutory formalities, the following 
examples will illustrate that admission of extrinsic evidence in the case of agreements 
subject to formalities is not absolutely prohibited. 
 
4 3 1 Identification 
 
It is permissible to lead extrinsic evidence to identify the actual creditor, principal debtor or 
surety from a listed group of potential creditors, principal debtors or sureties.54  Similarly, 
where the suretyship agreement refers to a future obligation, a court will admit extrinsic 
evidence to prove both that the principal debt has indeed arisen and what it amounts to.55  
The description of the land to be alienated may be supplemented by extrinsic evidence to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
interpretation, the parties’ prior negotiations and conduct subsequent to contract conclusion.  The argument 
in the main text is also made, inter alia, by McMeel 2003 LQR 289 in relation to the current English approach 
to contractual interpretation which he describes as “an increasingly isolated one”. 
52
 See also Maxwell “Interpretation of Contracts” in The Law of Contract in South Africa 257. 
53
 See 4 3 1 below. 
54
 Eg African Lumber Co (Pvt) v Katz 1978 4 SA 432 (C) 435A-G (potential creditors identified as “Plate 
Glass Industries (Rhodesia) Ltd and each of its subsidiaries”); Du Toit v Barclays Nasionale Bank Bpk 1985 
1 SA 563 (A) 569H-I (potential principal debtors described as “A and/or B”). 
55
 Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 12A. 
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indicate its precise location and boundaries.56  Finally, extrinsic evidence is also 
admissible where a description in a written contract could apply to more than one person 
or thing.  In such circumstances extrinsic evidence may be resorted to in order to establish 
which of the persons or things is actually referred to in the written document.57  
 
While the instances of the admission of extrinsic evidence referred to above may appear to 
be exceptions to the parol evidence rule and the objects of statutory formalities, it was 
pointed out in previous chapters that, although the material terms of agreements subject to 
formalities are required to be in writing, absolute certainty is not required.58  Certum est 
quod certum reddi potest: it is sufficient if the content of the terms is ascertainable, in 
which case extrinsic evidence is admitted for the purpose of conclusive identification.59  In 
African Lumber Co (Pvt) Ltd v Katz,60 the court pointed out that the language of a contract 
must of necessity be applied to physical facts and that this makes recourse to extrinsic 
evidence unavoidable.61  It referred with approval to a statement made by Van den Heever 
J in Oberholzer v Gabriel62 that 
 
“there are two notions we should not confuse, namely the sufficiency of a demonstration of the 
subject-matter on the one hand and its application to physical phenomena on the other.  There 
never has been and there cannot be a rule to exclude parol evidence on the latter.”63 
                                                          
56
 See eg Le Riche v Hamman 1946 AD 648 651 read with 653; Vermeulen v Goose Valley Investments 
(Pty) Ltd 2001 3 SA 986 (SCA) para 14. 
57
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 20; Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v 
Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 251F-G. 
58
 See chs 2 (2 4 4) and 3 (3 3 2 1). 
59
 This point is made in numerous cases on suretyships and sales of land.  See eg Credit Guarantee 
Insurance Corporation of South Africa Ltd v Schreiber 1987 3 SA 523 (W) 524G-I; Heathcote v Finwood 
Papers (Pty) Ltd 1997 2 All SA (E) 39; Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 
365 (SCA) para 9; Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 12B-D; Le Riche v 
Hamman 1946 AD 648 653; Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 990; Coronel v 
Kaufman 1920 TPD 207 209. 
60
 1978 4 SA 432 (C) 435B. 
61
 See also Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 990 in which Watermeyer CJ 
pointed out that 
“[a] contract of sale of land in writing is in itself a mere abstraction, it consists of ideas expressed in 
words, but the relationship of those ideas to the concrete things which the ideas represent cannot be 
understood without evidence.” 
62
 1946 OPD 56. 
63
 59. 
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Where the evidence is adduced to link the actual party or the actual subject-matter of the 
transaction to the description in the contract, such evidence is not objectionable.  It cannot 
contravene the parol evidence rule because such evidence neither varies, nor contradicts, 
nor supplements the terms of the agreement as these have been reduced to writing – it 
only gives meaning to the terms.64  Furthermore, provided the terms of the contract are 
sufficiently described, the admission of such evidence cannot lead to fraud or perjury (and 
therefore formalities legislation is not contravened). 
 
A case which illustrates the interaction between the parol evidence rule and formalities 
particularly well is Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd,65 which dealt with the 
validity of a suretyship in which seven parties (called promissors) were identified as 
potential debtors or potential sureties, depending on subsequent events.  If any of the 
seven incurred a debt (to one of a group of stipulated creditors), the other promissors 
would automatically become liable to the creditor as sureties for that debt.66   
 
The court pointed out that where a suretyship agreement is concluded for a future debt, 
extrinsic evidence must necessarily be admitted to prove that the principal obligation has 
since come into existence and, where the suretyship is an unlimited continuing suretyship, 
to establish the amount of the principal debt.67  Furthermore, the admission of evidence to 
indicate which of the promissors (who had, until that point, merely been potential debtors 
or potential sureties) had become indebted to which of the creditors did not amount to the 
admission of evidence concerning the consensus between the sureties and creditors.  
Until the debt had been incurred, the relevant promissor was merely a potential surety; 
once the debt was incurred, the relevant promissor ceased to be potential surety and 
became a principal debtor.  Any evidence of the agreement creating the debt was 
evidence relating to the agreement between the creditor and principal debtor, and not 
between the creditor and sureties.68 
 
                                                          
64
 The admission of extrinsic evidence of an identificatory nature is in fact merely the application of the terms 
of the contract to the facts of the case (A J Kerr The Law of Sale and Lease 3 ed (2004) 92; Delmas Milling 
Co Ltd v Du Plessis 1955 3 SA 447 (A) 454F). 
65
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This decision circumvents neither the parol evidence rule nor the functions of formalities.  
The parol evidence rule merely excludes evidence of prior and contemporaneous 
agreements and not evidence of subsequent transactions.69  While formalities legislation 
has been interpreted as prohibiting subsequent oral variations of the written agreement,70 
the subsequent transaction in this case was an agreement creating the principal debt 
which the suretyship was intended to cover.  Evidence thereof did not vary the suretyship; 
it merely assisted the court in the application of its terms.  Furthermore, those terms which 
related to the potential debtors/potential sureties were sufficiently ascertainable because 
the identities of the promissors were listed in the suretyship agreement;71 extrinsic 
evidence was only necessary to identify who in that list had become the debtor and who 
the sureties.   
 
Although extrinsic evidence may be admitted for the purposes of final identification, its 
admission is contingent upon the adequacy of the description of the terms in the 
contract.72  Where there is no description at all, or an inadequate description, the extrinsic 
evidence ceases to serve an identificatory purpose and amounts to an attempt to 
supplement the terms of the written contract.  This simultaneously opens the door to 
uncertainty, fraud or perjury.   
 
For example, in Wallace v 1662 G&D Property Investments CC,73 two deeds of suretyship 
failed to identify the principal debtor by name, but simply referred to him as “the debtor”.74  
When asked by the court what extrinsic evidence he would seek to lead to identify the 
debtor, plaintiff’s counsel replied that he would ask who the debtor was to which the 
suretyship agreements referred.75  According to the court, this type of evidence was 
excluded both by the objects of the General Law Amendment Act and by the parol 
evidence rule.  With regard to the former, it would create significant potential for fraud and 
perjury, thereby subverting the underlying policy of the Act.76  The latter rule precluded the 
                                                          
69
 Wallace v 1662 G&D Property Investments CC 2008 1 SA 300 (W) para 18. 
70
 See 4 3 5 below. 
71
 Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co (SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A) 10B. 
72
 African Lumber Co (Pvt) v Katz 1978 4 SA 432 (C) 435C-D. 
73
 2008 1 SA 300 (W). 
74
 Para 6. 
75
 Para 19. 
76
 Wallace v 1662 G&D Property Investments CC 2008 1 SA 300 (W) paras 20-22.  The absence of a closed 
list of potential debtors like the one contained in the suretyship in Sapirstein v Anglo African Shipping Co 
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leading of such evidence because it would amount to evidence of the negotiations 
between the parties and their consensus in that it would reveal what the parties had in 
mind when they referred to “the debtor” in the documents.77   
 
4 3 2 Blank spaces 
 
In the previous chapter,78 reference was made to cases in which parties who were 
required to sign the written agreement had done so while the document still contained 
blank spaces.  It was stated there that the question whether the document nevertheless 
constituted a complete recordal could often be solved upon a construction of the document 
itself, without recourse to extrinsic evidence.  However, where the document contains 
conflicting indicia as to whether the term containing the blank space was intended to be 
part of the written agreement, extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine why there are 
blank spaces in the agreement.79  According to the case law, there are at least three 
possible reasons for the existence of such blank spaces.80  First, the parties did not intend 
the clause to form part of their contract.  Secondly, the parties intended the clause to form 
part of their contract but, at the time the contract was signed, had not yet agreed on the 
content of the clause.  Finally, the parties intended the clause to form part of their contract 
and agreed upon its content, but simply omitted to fill in the blank spaces for some reason.   
 
Where the parties did not intend the clause to form part of their contract, the court will 
regard the clause containing the blank space as pro non scripto and, provided the contract 
still contains all the material terms of the agreement (including the essentialia), enforce it.81 
If, however, the extrinsic evidence proves the second or third possibility above, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
(SA) Ltd 1978 4 SA 1 (A), created the possibility that evidence could be led to indicate that “the debtor” 
meant an unlimited number of debtors. 
77
 Wallace v 1662 G&D Property Investments CC 2008 1 SA 300 (W) para 21.  It is permissible however, to 
identify the seller in a written sale of land as the “owner”, because extrinsic evidence to establish his identity 
would not relate to the parties’ negotiations or consensus – see ch 3 (3 3 2 1). 
78
 See ch 3 (3 4 3). 
79
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 941D-H; Nedbank Ltd v Wizard Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2010 5 SA 523 
(GSJ) para 25. 
80
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 940B-C.  See also Heathcote v Finwood Papers (Pty) Ltd 1997 2 All 
SA 28 (E) 32. 
81
 940D. 
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agreement will be void, either because the writing does not constitute a valid enforceable 
contract or because it failed to record the parties' whole agreement in writing.82  
 
4 3 3 Conditions and tacit terms 
 
As a general rule, evidence that the written agreement is subject to an oral suspensive 
condition is admissible while evidence of a resolutive condition is precluded.  According to 
Christie, “it is difficult to see how evidence of a resolutive condition could ever be given 
without contradicting or varying the terms of the written document.”83  This opinion has 
recently been confirmed in Sealed Africa (Pty) Ltd v Kelly84 where the court refused to 
admit evidence of a resolutive condition which would have had the effect of discharging a 
loan agreement which, ex facie the document recording the agreement, appeared to be 
fully operative.85 
 
In the case of evidence relating to an oral suspensive condition however, it is often stated 
that extrinsic evidence of such a suspensive condition is admissible because it does not 
vary the terms of a contract.86  For example, in Stiglingh v Theron87 the court held the 
following: 
 
“[E]vidence is admissible of a separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent to the 
attachment of any liability under the written instrument.  This is an exception to the general 
principle, more apparent than real, because such evidence does not essentially tend to vary the 
document.  Accepting its terms as they stand, it aims at suspending its operation … [In] Wallis v 
Littell (31 L.J. C P. 100) … what we should call a written assignment of lease was sued upon.  
Evidence was tendered to the effect that the whole arrangement was to be suspended pending 
the consent of the ground landlord, and that until he gave his consent no obligation was to arise 








 The Law of Contract in South Africa (2001) 4 ed 224. 
84
 2006 3 SA 65 (W). 
85
 Para 20. 
86
 See Stiglingh v Theron 1907 TS 998; Aymard v Webster 1910 TPD 123 129; Union Government v Vianini 
Ferro-Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 43 47.    
87
 1907 TS 998.  
88
 1003. 
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It is argued that a close examination of this quotation reveals two possible consequences 
of a suspensive condition.  The first is that a suspensive condition suspends, in whole or in 
part, the operation of the obligations arising from the contract.  This has also come to be 
the generally accepted definition of a suspensive condition in South African law.89  The 
second view of a suspensive condition is that it suspends the coming into existence of a 
contract, rather than simply suspending its enforceability.  On such a view, extrinsic 
evidence of an oral suspensive condition would not be excluded by the parol evidence 
rule, because its admission would not vary the terms of the “contract”, but go towards 
showing that no contract existed, unless and until the suspensive condition was fulfilled.90  
This exception to the parol evidence rule can be traced to the English case of Pym v 
Cambell91 and the concept of a “condition precedent”, which “strips a written deed of its 
                                                          
89
 Tuckers Land & Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Strydom 1984 1 SA 1 (A) 10D-E per Van Heerden 
JA; Odendaalsrust Municipality v New Nigel Estate Goldmining Co Ltd 1948 2 SA 656 (O) 666-667; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd v Lynn NO 1996 2 SA 339 (A) 335E-G; D P De Villiers “Die Betekenis van die 
Opskortende Voorwaarde by ‘n Ooreenkoms I” (1943) 7 THRHR 13 21; Van der Merwe et al Contract 251.  
The one exception to this generally accepted definition of a suspensive condition can be found in a long line 
of cases dealing with contracts of sale, which appear to favour the definition of a suspensive condition as 
suspending the existence of the contract until it becomes apparent that the condition is fulfilled (some of the 
cases adopting this approach are discussed in detail in Geue v Van der Lith 2004 3 SA 333 (SCA) paras 7-
13).  In Quirk’s Trustees v Assignees of Liddle and Co (1884-1885) 3 SC 322 (“Quirk”), De Villiers CJ relied 
on D 18 1 80 3 and Voet 18 1 26 to come to the conclusion that a contract of sale which contained a term 
suspending the transfer of ownership did not come into existence until the “condition” was fulfilled (326).  
However both Voet and the relevant Digest excerpt deal with the fact that a term which provides that 
ownership will never pass to the buyer is inconsistent with the essence of a contract of sale. These sources 
do not provide support for the notion that a suspensive condition, attached to a contract of sale, prevents the 
coming into existence of the contract itself (see De Villiers 1943 THRHR 18-19); Tuckers Land & 
Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Strydom 1984 1 SA 1 (A) 11G-12A).  Nevertheless, the view adopted in 
Quirk as to the effect of a suspensive condition in a contract of sale has been followed (and never 
overturned) in a number of subsequent cases: see eg Massey-Harris Co (SA) Ltd v Van der Walt 1932 EDL 
115; South African Land & Exploration Co Ltd v Union Government 1936 TPD 174; Corondimas v Badat 
1946 AD 548; Palm Fifteen (Pty) Ltd v Cotton Tail Homes (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 872 (A); Soja (Pty) Ltd v 
Tuckers Land & Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 1981 3 SA 314 (A).  The effect of these cases on 
alienations of land has since been nullified, because the Alienation of Land Act provides that “to alienate” 
means to “sell, exchange or donate, irrespective of whether such sale, exchange or donation is subject to a 
suspensive or resolutive condition” (s 1).  The exception to the parol evidence rule, discussed in the main 
text above, remains. 
90
 See M Mendelowitz “The ‘Parol Evidence Rule’ and Suspensive Conditions in Contracts” (1978) 75 SALJ 
32 33-34; Van der Merwe et al Contract 152. 
91
 (1856) 6 E & B 370. 
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contractual effect until that condition has been fulfilled.”92  In the above quotation, it is 
apparent that the court transposes the exception relating to “conditions precedent” to 
suspensive conditions as these are understood in the South African sense.  While it is 
possible that parties may have intended a particular suspensive condition to have the 
same effect as a condition precedent,93 it is simply not true, as a general rule, that extrinsic 
evidence of a suspensive condition will never vary the terms of a written contract.94  This 
point is illustrated in Thiart v Kraukamp95 (“Thiart”).   
 
On 14 September 1966, the parties had concluded a written agreement for the sale of 
land.  Subsequently, the applicant sought to cancel the sale on the basis of alleged breach 
of contract on the respondent’s part.96  The respondent in turn alleged that the agreement 
was subject to an oral suspensive condition to the effect that he would acquire a loan 
within 120 days in order to finance the sale.  This loan was not awarded and the 
respondent argued that the agreement had lapsed as a result.97  He alleged further that 
evidence of this oral suspensive condition was admissible because it did not contravene 
the parol evidence rule. 
 
Trengove J held that one must distinguish between the situation where the parties 
intended to suspend the coming into existence of the contract itself until the happening of 
an uncertain future event, and one where the parties intended the contract to come into 
existence immediately, but merely to suspend its operation.98  The effect which the parol 
evidence rule has on the admission of evidence relating to the suspensive condition is the 
following: 
                                                          
92
 See Thiart v Kraukamp 1967 3 SA 219 (T) 225F-226D; D T Zeffertt, A P Paizes & A St Q Skeen The South 
African Law of Evidence (formerly Hoffmann and Zeffertt) (2003) 336.  See also D Hochberg “Exclusion of 
Extrinsic Evidence In Substitution Of, To Contradict, or Add To Documents” in H M Malek (ed) Phipson on 
Evidence 16 ed (2005) 1238 1263. 
93
 Zeffertt et al The South African Law of Evidence 337; Mendelowitz 1978 SALJ 47. 
94
 In Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) 23E-F, the exception was 
confirmed, although the court acknowledged that “[i]t remains problematical … to determine in what 
circumstances this exception to the parol evidence rule would apply, and when extrinsic evidence of a 
suspensive condition would be admissible”.  See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 151-152; Zeffertt et al 
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“[In die eerste geval is] [d]ie getuienis … altyd toelaatbaar om te bewys dat wat prima facie 
voorkom as ‘n skriftelike ooreenkoms, inderdaad geen skriftelike ooreenkoms is nie, omdat die 
partye om een of ander rede vooraf ooreengekom het dat die skriftelike stuk geen werking 
hoegenaamd as ‘n kontrak tussen hulle sal hê nie.  Dit is na my mening heeltemal ‘n ander 
geval waar die partye ‘n skriftelike kontrak aangaan wat op die oog onvoorwaardelik is en dit 
dan wil omskep in ‘n voorwaardelike kontrak op grond van ‘n voorafgaande mondelinge 
ooreenkoms … [B]ewys van die mondelinge ooreenkoms waarvolgens die onvoorwaardelike 
kontrak omskep word in ‘n voorwaardelike kontrak, bots na my mening met die inhoud van die 
skriftelike kontrak.”99 
 
The contract included terms which stated that the respondent had to pay a part of the 
purchase price within fourteen days of contract conclusion; that the failure to do so would 
entitle the applicant to sue for the amount; and a term stating that the respondent would 
get occupation of the property in the beginning of October.100  None of the obligations 
created by these terms appeared to be conditional upon the respondent receiving a loan 
within 120 days (ie that the obligations would only arise and become enforceable if the 
loan was received) and thus, evidence of such an oral condition would be contrary to what 
appeared ex facie the written contract.101 
 
It is a different matter if there are terms in the contract which are consistent with the 
existence of a tacit suspensive condition.  In Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd102 
(“Stalwo”) the court held that the description of land to be sold as “plots 5, 6, 7, & 8 of [a] 
proposed subdivision” indicated that it was a tacit term of the agreement that it would be 
conditional upon a successful application for subdivision.103  As such, the suspensive 
condition automatically formed part of the written agreement.   
 






 See also Mutual Construction Company v Victor 2002 3 All SA 807 (W) para 15.  The fact that a 
suspensive condition can constitute a variation of terms also underlies the judgment of Tshiqi AJA in 
Rockbreakers and Parts (Pty) Ltd v Rolag Trading (Pty) Ltd 2010 2 SA 400 (SCA) in which an offer to 
purchase, with the addition of a manuscript insertion that the sale would be subject to successful subdivision, 
was signed by the respondent as purchaser.  Tshiqi AJA concluded that in the circumstances, the 
manuscript insertion constituted a material alteration of the proposed contractual terms and therefore 
amounted to a counter-offer which was not accepted in writing by the seller (para 8).   
102
 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA). 
103
 Paras 11-12. 
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This decision accords with the general South African approach to the admissibility of 
extrinsic evidence to prove the existence of a tacit term in an agreement subject to 
formalities.  For example, in Wilkens NO v Voges,104 Nienaber JA held that  
 
“a tacit term, once found to exist, is simply read or blended into the contract.  Not being an 
adjunct to but an integrated part of the contract, a tacit term does not [contravene statutory 
formalities].”105  
 
When viewed in a broader context, the South African approach appears somewhat 
illogical.  It admits evidence which is traditionally excluded by both the parol evidence rule 
and statutory formalities106 to prove that there is a tacit term based on the parties’ 
unexpressed consensus or an imputed consensus107 but as we shall see below,108 it will 
exclude such evidence when a party seeks to prove the existence of an oral material term 
which is based on the parties’ actual consensus.  This leads to the peculiar situation that a 
party who wishes to convince the court of the existence of a tacit term, despite the lack of 
an articulated consensus, is in a better position than a party who can prove that there was 
actual consensus regarding such a term.  Furthermore, while a court will not easily 
conclude that there is in fact a tacit term in an agreement,109 thereby minimising the 
chance that it will be swayed by fabricated evidence, it is not immediately apparent why 
the same caution cannot be exercised when a party alleges that an oral term has been 
omitted from a written agreement.  Instead, such a party has to claim that the contract 
                                                          
104




 Maxwell “Interpretation of Contracts” in The Law of Contract in South Africa 262-263. 
107
 These are the two alternative bases upon which a tacit term can be based: 
“A tacit term, one so self-evident as to go without saying, can be actual or imputed.  It is actual if both 
parties thought about a matter which is pertinent but did not bother to declare their assent.  It is imputed if 
they would have assented about such a matter if only they had thought about it - which they did not do 
because they overlooked a present fact or failed to anticipate a future one.”  (Wilkens NO v Voges 1994 3 
SA 130 (A) 136H-I). 
108
 See 4 3 4. 
109
 In Wilkens NO v Voges 1994 3 SA 130 (A) 136H it was stated that a tacit term must be “self-evident”; a 
similar sentiment is evident in Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1974 3 
SA 506 (A) 532G-533A.  More recently, in Rockbreakers and Parts (Pty) Ltd v Rolag Trading (Pty) Ltd 2010 
2 SA 400 (SCA) para 23, Wallis AJA stated that  
“a tacit term is not lightly to be imputed to parties who have chosen to embody their agreement in writing.  
The reason is that one infers, from the fact that they have chosen to adopt that course, that they have 
thought about its terms, and the document reflects those terms.” 
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should be rectified if he wants that oral term to be enforced.  This seems unnecessarily 
complicated.  It is for this reason alone that the Stalwo decision is supported: the court 
erred in concluding that there was a tacit suspensive condition in the agreement by basing 
it on the parties actual expressed consensus,110 but at least it avoided the circuitous 
procedure which must be adopted if a party wants a court to enforce a term which the 
parties actually agreed upon but omitted to include in their written agreement.111  
 
Returning to the more specific topic of suspensive conditions it is also possible, according 
to Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC112 (“Philmatt”), to bring evidence of 
an oral suspensive condition when the purpose is not to vary or contradict the contract, but 
to prove that it is formally invalid. 
 
Here the respondent bought a property (“the Paternoster property”) with the purpose of 
developing a township comprising 72 erven.  It concluded a sale agreement in terms of 
which the respondent agreed to sell 23 erven for R18 639 per erf (the amount was said to 
be the cost price of an erf113) to Wale Street or its nominee.114  A finance agreement was 
also concluded, which obliged Wale Street to acquire financing for the purchase price of 
the entire Paternoster property, as well as the costs of developing the township.  Although 
Wale Street did receive some financing, it was not for the full amount.115  Finally, a 
nomination agreement was concluded, nominating the appellant as purchaser.116  The 
appellant sought transfer of the erven and it was common cause that if the respondent was 
required to transfer the erven at the price indicated in the sale agreement, the 
consequence would be its insolvency.117   
 
As a result, the respondent sought to prevent transfer of the erven.  In the court a quo it 
relied on two grounds.  The first was that the sale agreement should be rectified so as to 
                                                          
110
 Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) paras 5, 11.  For criticism of this aspect 
of the case, see R Sharrock “Contract” (January to March 2008) JQR para 2.4.1 < 
http://ipproducts.jutalaw.co.za.ez.sun.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=Publish:10.104
8/Enu> (accessed 05-11-2012). 
111
 See ch 5.  
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relieve the respondent from the duty to transfer.  This argument was rejected on the basis 
that rectification cannot be awarded against an innocent third party like the appellant.118  
The second argument, and this was also the basis for the appeal, was that the sale 
agreement did not comply with statutory formalities because it failed to include all the 
material terms of the parties’ agreement in writing.  The alleged material term was an oral 
suspensive condition that the sale agreement would be subject to the acquisition of 
financing by Wale Street for the entire project (ie the purchase price of the Paternoster 
property and development costs of the proposed township).119  The failure to include this 
suspensive condition, according to the respondent, rendered the sale agreement void. 
 
The appellant argued first, that evidence of such a suspensive condition would be contrary 
to the parol evidence rule.120  The court confirmed the general rule as stated in Stiglingh v 
Theron121 above, that admission of extrinsic evidence regarding a suspensive condition is 
allowed, but acknowledged that the circumstances in which this exception is applicable 
remain difficult to determine.122  Therefore it sought to show that extrinsic evidence of this 
condition was admissible on another basis, namely that 
 
“[t]he object of the respondent in seeking to adduce this extrinsic evidence was not to 
incorporate the suspensive condition as a term of the deed of sale, and then to enforce such 
term by relying on Wale Street's failure to comply with the suspensive condition.  Nor did the 
respondent seek to contradict, alter, add to or vary the terms of the deed of sale as such.  The 
respondent merely wished to introduce the extrinsic evidence in order to establish the existence 
of a material oral term which was not incorporated in the deed of sale, and to show that the 
deed of sale therefore did not constitute a valid and enforceable deed of alienation in terms of s 
2(1) of the [Alienation of Land] Act.”123 
 
                                                          
118
 Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) 20I-21A.  See eg D J Joubert 
“Rektifikasie en die Belange Van Derdes” (1983) 46 THRHR 326; B R Bamford “Rectification in Contract” 
(1963) 80 SALJ 528 537 
119




 1907 TS 998.  
122
 Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) 22I-23G. 
123
 Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) 23G-H.  See also Kerr The Law of 
Contract 6 ed (2002) 350-351, who agrees with the court’s justification for the admission of extrinsic 
evidence in this context. 
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The court found support for its conclusion that extrinsic evidence to prove the formal 
invalidity of the agreement of sale was admissible in Johnston, where Corbett JA, quoting 
from Hoffmann’s South African Law of Evidence,124 held that  
 
“’[t]he fact that a transaction has been embodied in a document does not preclude a party from 
attacking its validity.  For example, evidence may be adduced to prove that it was induced by 
fraud, duress or misrepresentation, or that it is void for mistake, illegality or failure to comply 
with the terms of a statute.’”125 
 
Hoffmann, in turn, relied on a similar statement in Cross on Evidence,126 in which the case 
of Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Gall127 (“Campbell”) is cited as support for the fact that 
extrinsic evidence is always admissible to prove that a written agreement does not comply 
with statutory formalities.   
 
However, it is debatable whether this case in fact supports such a proposition.  There, the 
defendant bought a second-hand car from B for £265 in terms of a hire-purchase 
agreement.  He paid £65 as a deposit and agreed to pay the rest of the purchase price in 
weekly instalments of a certain amount, over a period of 18-24 months.  He signed a blank 
hire-purchase agreement provided by the plaintiff, leaving the blanks to be filled in by B.  B 
inserted a false purchase price (with the effect that the agreement fell outside the ambit of 
the Hire-Purchase Act 1938) and changed the amount of the instalments as well as the 
period over which they would be paid.  The plaintiff company, which was unaware of the 
fact that the terms of the oral agreement had been changed, subsequently sought to claim 
in terms of the written agreement.128 
 
The defendant argued that first, no agreement had ever been concluded between himself 
and the plaintiff and secondly, even if there was an agreement, it was unenforceable 
because it failed to comply with statutory formalities.129  It was argued on appeal that parol 
                                                          
124
 2 ed (1970) 215. 
125
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 945G.  This statement is repeated in Zeffertt et al The South African 
Law of Evidence 327-328. 
126
 R Cross, J A Gobbo, D Byrne & J D Heydon Cross on Evidence 4 ed (1980) 536.  The statement is 
repeated in C Tapper Cross & Tapper on Evidence 10 ed (2004) 720. 
127
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evidence was inadmissible to show that the parties had agreed to something other than 
that which appeared in the written document.130  Holroyd Pearce LJ responded as follows: 
 
“The Hire-Purchase Act ... cannot in my judgment be excluded by documents which, though 
purporting to be outside the Act, represent a transaction which is in truth within it ... [P]arol 
evidence has always been admissible to show the true nature of a written transaction which 
appears to satisfy or exclude the Act although that evidence varies or contradicts the 
documents.  Such evidence is admissible here for the purpose of showing that the true bargain 
was within the Hire-Purchase Act (although the written document is outside it)”.131 
 
From this quotation, it appears that the judge was allowing extrinsic evidence to show the 
true nature of the agreement – it was mere coincidence that this “true bargain” happened 
to fall within the ambit of the Hire-Purchase Act 1938 and was therefore subject to certain 
statutory formalities.  In other words, the purpose of the extrinsic evidence was not to show 
that the agreement was unenforceable, but that the defendant had intended to agree to 
different terms.  That this is the actual basis of the judge’s decision is also evident from 
other statements made in the judgment.132  For example, he states that  
 
“the defendant is not bound by the purported hire-purchase agreement.  It was not the contract 




“[the plaintiff company] ... believed that [the document] was a genuine document.  They did not 
know the defendant's signature or anything about the defendant, save what the document told 
them.”134 
 
This suggests that the true ratio of the decision is the lack of consensus between the 
parties and that extrinsic evidence was admissible, not to prove non-compliance with 
statutory formalities, but to show that the defendant had intended something different to 
that which appeared in the written document.  The plaintiff, of course, accepted the terms 
as they appeared on the document.  There could not have been consensus between the 
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parties: a clear statement to this effect appears in Harman LJ’s judgment, where he stated 
that “there never was any consensus, and nothing on which the plaintiff company could 
sue.”135 
 
If this is the correct interpretation of the Campbell case, then it does not provide support 
for the general statement that extrinsic evidence is always permissible to prove that an 
agreement does not comply with the terms of a statute.  Rather, the Campbell case simply 
reiterates two exceptions to the parol evidence rule: the first is that it is always permissible 
to bring evidence relating to the absence of consensus between the parties and the 
second, that it is always permissible to introduce extrinsic evidence to show the true nature 
of the parties’ agreement.136  The facts of the Philmatt case do not square neatly with 
either of these exceptions – there was consensus, and the true nature of the agreement 
was not in dispute.  Indeed, it is arguable that the only way in which evidence of the oral 
suspensive condition could have been introduced in Philmatt, was on the basis of the 
definition of a suspensive condition as suspending the existence of the contract, rather 
than its operation. 
 
However, on the assumption that Hoffman’s interpretation of the Campbell case is sound 
and that the court in Philmatt was correct in holding that the parol evidence rule does not 
exclude evidence of the oral suspensive condition, the question remains whether the fact 
that the parties’ agreement was subject to statutory formalities precluded evidence of the 
suspensive condition.  This will be considered in the next section. 
 
4 3 4 Validity 
 
Prior to discussing the admission of extrinsic evidence to determine the validity of an 
agreement, it is necessary to distinguish between formal and substantive invalidity.  
Formal invalidity relates to defects in the form of the transaction, for example the name of 




 See eg Moodley v Moodley 1991 1 SA 358 (N).  See also Beaton v Baldachin Bros 1920 AD 312 315, in 
which Innes CJ stated that 
“[t]he general rule is clear: a party to a written agreement cannot vary its terms by parol evidence.  But a 
party to such a writing which is sought to sue against him, may lead evidence to show that the document 
in question is not a contract at all, that it was not intended by its signatories to operate as such, but was 
given for another purpose.  And when he has thus got rid of the writing, he may, if he can, establish 
another verbal contract as the true agreement.” 
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the surety has been omitted from the written agreement, or the deed of alienation fails to 
provide an adequate description of the land to be sold.  Substantive invalidity relates to the 
failure to comply with other requirements for contractual validity, like legality, possibility 
and certainty of performance.137   
 
Extrinsic evidence is always admissible to prove that the contract is substantively void, 
voidable or a simulation.138  Evidence may be adduced to prove that the contract was 
induced by fraud, duress or misrepresentation or that it is void as a result of mistake, for 
example.  These instances do not amount to true exceptions to the parol evidence rule (or 
at least that part of it known as the integration rule) because such evidence relates to 
whether there was consensus between the parties and not to the terms of the contract.   
 
Whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that the agreement is formally invalid is 
a more complex issue.  As stated in the previous chapter, South African courts have held 
that legislation imposing statutory formalities requires that all the material terms of the 
parties’ agreement must be reduced to writing.139  This raises the following question: is it 
permissible for a party to produce extrinsic evidence of an oral material term (which is not 
an essential term of the relevant agreement) upon which the parties have agreed, but 
which has not been reduced to writing, in order to show that the agreement is formally 
invalid? 
 
The answer to this question appears to depend on whether the omission of the material 
term is evident ex facie the document recording the agreement.  For instance, where there 
is a blank space relating to what would be a material term, extrinsic evidence is always 
permissible to determine why the parties omitted to complete it, where reading the 
document as a whole has not provided an answer.140  However, where the omission of the 
                                                          
137
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 157-158. 
138
 Burger 1996 TM 145; S Cornelius “Die Toelaatbaarheid van Ekstrinsieke Getuienis by die Uitleg van 
Geskrewe Kontrakte” 2001 TSAR 415 426; Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 945G-E. 
139
 Ch 3 (3 2 2). 
140
 Heathcote v Finwood Papers (Pty) Ltd 1997 2 All SA 28 (E) 32-33; Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 
947A-C, in which it is stated that in this type of situation  
“the Court is concerned with a document which on the face of it is incomplete and this raises a number of 
possible factual inferences, one of which leads to the validity of the contract, others to its invalidity.  The 
writing already contains uncertainty as to its contents and the seeds of dispute between the parties.  
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material term is not evident ex facie the document, so that the document itself appears to 
record a formally valid agreement, the traditional approach did not permit evidence of the 
omitted term in order to prove that the written agreement was formally invalid. 
 
The relationship between the omission of material terms, formal validity and extrinsic 
evidence is illustrated in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Cohen (1)141 (“Cohen (1)”).  
Here, the surety alleged that the two suretyship agreements which he had signed were 
formally invalid, because they failed to record two material terms which the parties had 
agreed upon – first, that the plaintiff would not advance credit to the principal debtor in 
excess of the amount guaranteed by the defendant and secondly, that no credit would be 
advanced until the debtor had ceded its book debts to the plaintiff as security.142  However, 
the suretyship agreements themselves did not appear to be incomplete;143 furthermore, 
they both contained merger clauses as well as certificates of completion.144 
 
The court set out two reasons for its decision not to admit evidence regarding the material 
terms.  The first was that the parties intended the written agreements to act as 
integrations, which the court inferred from the presence of the certificates of completion 
and merger clauses.145  Thus, to admit evidence of the material terms would not only 
contradict these terms,146 but would also supplement the written agreements with terms of 
a prior oral agreement.147  
 
The second reason was that to admit evidence of the omitted material terms would be 
contrary to the functions of formalities: 
 
“[O]ne of the objects of the requirement of writing is to achieve certainty as to the true terms 
agreed upon by the parties, [and] this object will certainly be defeated if the parties are allowed 
to have an otherwise valid document invalidated by proof that there are other terms which have 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Extrinsic evidence to resolve the problem and to determine the issue of validity would thus … not be 
inconsistent with the policy of the Act.” 
141
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been agreed upon prior to or contemporaneous with the written contract.  Such a course would 
open the door to all the mischief which the Legislature sought to prevent.”148 
 
De Wet and Van Wyk make a similar argument, although they are not referred to in the 
Cohen (1) judgment.149  They state that 
 
“[i]n ons regspraak word soms vertel dat die kontrak in sy geheel op skrif moet wees.  Dit is ‘n 
misleidende manier om die situasie te beskryf.  Mits die skriftelike stuk, op ‘n deugdelike 
interpretasie daarvan, ‘n [kontrak] weerspieël, is dit die kontrak wat partye se regte en 
verpligtings bepaal.  Het hulle ander afsprake mondeling gemaak maar nie in die skriftelike stuk 
opgeneem nie, is daardie afsprake nie deel van die kontrak nie.”150  
 
It is implicit in this quotation that extrinsic evidence regarding omitted material terms would 
be inadmissible.  This rule is not limited to agreements subject to formalities which contain 
merger clauses.  Also in the absence of such clauses, courts have held in the past that 
extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to prove that there was an oral material term not 
contained in the document and that the agreement was invalid for that reason.151  
Therefore, the only option available to a party who wishes to have oral material terms 
taken into account, rather than simply ignored, is to seek rectification of the written 
document to include them.152   
 
This was the traditional approach until it was overruled (at least implicitly) in the Philmatt 
decision.  It will be recalled that there, the respondent sought to introduce evidence that 
the deed of alienation between itself and the appellant was formally invalid because it did 
not contain an oral suspensive condition.  After holding that evidence of such a term did 
not contravene the parol evidence rule, the court considered whether evidence of such a 
condition would be contrary to statutory formalities.  
 




 Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992). 
150
 324 n 56. 
151
 Kroukamp v Buitendag 1981 1 SA 606 (W) 609A-B; Northern Cape Co-Operative Livestock Agency Ltd v 
John Roderick & Co Ltd 1965 2 SA 64 (O) 69E-71H. 
152
 See Kroukamp v Buitendag 1981 1 SA 606 (W) 609H; Northern Cape Co-Operative Livestock Agency Ltd 
v John Roderick & Co Ltd 1965 2 SA 64 (O) 69H-70A; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Cohen (1) 1993 3 
SA 846 (SE) 853C-D.   
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As the court pointed out, a suspensive condition is a material term.153  Thus, even if 
evidence of such a term does not contravene the parol evidence rule, it has been held that  
 
“where a contract of sale of land is complete and regular on the face of it, the admission of 
extrinsic evidence not excluded by the integration rule, eg evidence of an oral consensus 
providing for a suspensive condition not contained in the writing, would be regarded as being 
contrary to the section and the Act, even though the evidence were tendered not to contradict or 
vary the writing but merely in order to show that the writing failed to record the whole agreement 
of the parties and, therefore, did not comply with the section.  Here it might be said that the 
admission of extrinsic evidence would permit a party to the contract to introduce uncertainty and 
disputes where, on the face of it, none exists.”154 
 
It was also for this reason that the court in Thiart rejected the evidence of an oral 
suspensive condition.  As a material term of the contract, it should have been reduced to 
writing in accordance with the relevant statutory formalities.  Because this was not the 
case, it simply was not binding.155  Although the court did not refer to any authority for this 
standpoint, it is consistent with the rule that when a material term has not been reduced to 
writing, and its absence is not evident ex facie the contract, it is simply ignored. 
 
It is on this point that the Philmatt case differs.  At one point the court itself stated that 
 
“[j]udging only by the terms of the deed of sale, read with the nomination agreement, the 
respondent appears to be obliged, subject to due performance by the appellant, to transfer the 
23 erven into its name.”156 
 
This implies that there was nothing ex facie the written sale agreement which suggested 
that a material term had been omitted.  Nevertheless, the court held that proof of the oral 
suspensive condition was admissible in order to show that the agreement was formally 
invalid.  It allowed such evidence on the basis that  
 
                                                          
153
 Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) 24F-G.  See also Johnston v Leal 
1980 3 SA 927 (A) 938A; Van Leeuwen Pipe and Tube (Pty) Ltd v Mulroy 1985 3 SA 396 (D) 400F-I, cited 
with approval in Rockbreakers and Parts (Pty) Ltd v Rolag Property Trading (Pty) Ltd 2010 2 SA 400 (SCA) 
para 7. 
154
 Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 946H-947A. 
155
 Thiart v Kraukamp 1967 3 SA 219 (T) 225D. 
156
 Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) 20G-H. 
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“[e]xtrinsic evidence to procure rectification of a contract of sale of land, or to prove that the 
contract is not binding because it was induced by fraud would, for instance, be admissible even 
though such evidence would introduce uncertainty and disputes ... The respondent tenders the 
extrinsic evidence for a similar reason and should in my opinion be allowed to do so.  It should 
be pointed out once again that the respondent does not seek to introduce the oral term with a 
view to contradict, alter, add to or vary the terms of the deed of sale.”157 
 
It is not entirely clear how the court reconciles the admission of extrinsic evidence for the 
purposes of proving formal invalidity with instances of rectification or fraudulently induced 
contracts, unless it seeks to emphasise that what all these instances of admitted extrinsic 
evidence have in common is the notion that to enforce an agreement which does not 
accurately reflect one or both parties’ intention promotes unconscionable behaviour.  
Moreover, while it is true that the respondent did not seek “to contradict, alter, add to or 
vary the terms of the deed of sale”, the same holds true for the parties in prior cases where 
the court refused to permit evidence of a material term in order to prove that the 
agreement was formally invalid.  The court in Philmatt could not have been unaware of this 
contradictory precedent,158 and yet it makes no mention of these cases beyond a passing 
reference to the Thiart case in support of the notion that it is difficult to determine when the 
parol evidence rule will not preclude evidence of an oral suspensive condition.159  
 
Furthermore, it is difficult to establish the impact of the Philmatt decision on cases dealing 
with the rectification of agreements subject to formalities.  As discussed in the following 
chapter,160 the current approach to the rectification of such agreements limits itself to 
determining formal validity ex facie the recordal.161  Any extrinsic evidence (either for or 
against formal validity) is ignored for the purposes of this determination.  Only if the 
agreement appears to be valid ex facie the document, will the court consider the extrinsic 
evidence in order to determine whether the document should be rectified.  It is not entirely 
clear how this position relates to that set out in the Philmatt case.  
 
It is also uncertain to what extent the court was influenced by the fact that the respondent 
could not claim rectification of the agreement due to the involvement of an innocent third 




 See eg the list of cases referred to by counsel (but not cited by the court) which included that of Standard 
Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen (1) 1993 3 SA 846 (SE). 
159
 Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) 23F. 
160
 Ch 5 (5 3 2 1 2). 
161
 See Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 20. 
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party and by the fact that if the sale agreement were to be enforced, it would result in the 
respondent’s insolvency.  Finally, it should be noted that in this case, the respondent’s 
allegation of the existence of an oral suspensive condition was supported to some extent 
by the existence of the written finance agreement between itself and Wale Street.  The 
possibility of fraud was therefore less than it would have been in the absence of such a 
written document.  
 
Philmatt illustrates the unhappy marriage between the parol evidence rule, statutory 
formalities and the need to ensure a just result in the particular circumstances of the case.  
If the court’s interpretation of the exception set out in the Campbell case is correct, namely 
that extrinsic evidence is always permissible to prove the formal invalidity of an agreement, 
then this conclusion is directly at odds with the rule formulated in the context of 
agreements subject to formalities, to the effect that extrinsic evidence is not permissible to 
contradict an agreement which appears to be valid ex facie the document.  If the court’s 
conclusions on the applicability of the Campbell case and the admissibility of evidence 
relating to material terms in the context of statutory formalities are incorrect, then this 
would resolve the discrepancy between the parol evidence rule and statutory formalities, 
but it would place a party like the respondent in an untenable position.  It could not seek 
rectification of the agreement in the circumstances (due to the involvement of an innocent 
third party) and would inevitably have been declared insolvent.  There does not appear to 
be a solution which reconciles all of these principles, other than the very pragmatic one 
adopted by the court. 
 
4 3 5 Variations 
 
There is one further instance of inadmissible extrinsic evidence which has not been 
addressed, namely the possibility of introducing evidence of subsequent oral material 
variations of the contract.  As discussed above, the parol evidence rule itself does not 
preclude evidence of these variations, but it is a well-settled rule that the existence of 
statutory formalities does prevent evidence of this nature.162  Apparently, to allow oral 
variations in this instance would be contrary to the objects of statutory formalities, because 
                                                          
162
 See 4 2 2 above and also Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 939G-H; Neethling v Klopper 1967 4 SA 
459 (A) 465A-B; Kuper v Bolleurs 1913 TPD 334; Da Mata v Otto NO 1971 1 SA 763 (T) 772B-C (discussed 
in Kerr The Law of Contract 146-146).  The same position applies in England: see eg McCausland v Duncan 
Lawrie Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 38 44-45. 
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it could result in a situation where the parties’ actual agreement no longer exists wholly in 
writing, with the corresponding problem of an increase in uncertainty and disputes.163  This 
does not mean that the rule is not interpreted restrictively, however. 
 
For example, it has been held that a waiver can, in certain instances, circumvent the 
prohibition against oral variations.164  The same applies in instances of substituted (full) 
performance which is different to that stipulated in the contract.165  Finally, oral cancellation 
of the contract is also permitted.166  Underlying all these exceptions is the notion that the 
terms of the contract and the obligations which they create are not being varied; rather, 
they are suspended (waiver), terminated or discharged (albeit in some manner not 
specified in the contract). 
 
De Wet criticises the rule that all material variations of the written agreement must be in 
writing, because it requires a distinction to be drawn between material and non-material 
variations.167  It could also be argued that it operates on the assumption that a variation 
results in the replacement of the original contract with a new contract (which must be in 
writing) rather than the replacement of one term for another.168  Finally, certain exceptions 
to the rule are difficult to apply.169 
                                                          
163
 Neethling v Klopper 1967 4 SA 459 (A) 464F-G per Steyn CJ. 
164
 See eg Impala Distributors v Taunus Chemical Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd 1975 3 SA 273 (T); Van As v 
Du Preez 1981 3 SA 760 (T); Kovacs Investments 724 (Pty) Ltd v Marais 2009 6 SA 560 (SCA). 
165
 Van der Walt v Minnaar 1954 3 SA 932 (O); Kovacs Investments 724 (Pty) Ltd v Marais 2009 6 SA 560 
(SCA); Kerr The Law of Contract 145-146. 
166
 Van der Walt v Minnaar 1954 3 SA 932 (O); Neethling v Klopper 1967 4 SA 459 (A); Leyland Finance Co 
Ltd v Van Rensburg 1970 4 SA 145 (T); Visser v Theodore Sassen & Son (Pty) Ltd 1982 2 SA 320 (C). 
167
 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 325.   
168
 An example of this type of reasoning can be found in P J Aronstam The Alienation of Land (1985) 18.  By 
contrast, the revival of an agreement subject to formalities which has been cancelled or which has lapsed 
due to the non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition does constitute a new agreement and should, in theory, 
be required to be in writing (see eg De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 325-326; D J Joubert General 
Principles of the Law of Contract (1987) 160 n 66).  Nevertheless, SA courts have held that a revival of a 
lapsed or cancelled agreement may occur informally, unless there is a variation of the terms of the original 
written contract.  See eg Neethling v Klopper 1967 4 SA 459 (A) 465H-466A; Sewpersadh v Dookie 2008 4 
SA 127 (D) para 32 (overturned on appeal (Sewpersadh v Dookie 2009 6 SA 611 (SCA)), but not on this 
point); Fairoaks Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Oliver 2008 4 SA 302 (SCA) para 21 (the revival of an 
agreement which has lapsed due to non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition, and which contains a term 
which modifies the original suspensive condition, amounts to a variation of the original contract and must be 
in writing).  For commentary on these cases, see eg C Pretorius “Reliance, Waiver and the Tacit Revival of 
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Thus far, this chapter has considered the rules relating to the admission of extrinsic 
evidence in general, and instances of admissible and inadmissible evidence.  The 
following section will consider in greater detail one specific example of the interaction 
between statutory formalities, the parol evidence rule and the admission of extrinsic 
evidence, namely incorporation by reference. 
 
4 4 Incorporation by reference  
4 4 1 South Africa 
 
Incorporation by reference occurs when one document’s terms are supplemented by 
importing the terms of another.170  In the context of agreements subject to statutory 
formalities, it is a recognised means of supplementing the deficiencies in a written 
agreement which would otherwise be invalid for failure to comply with those formalities.  
Neither section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act nor section 2 of the Alienation of 
Land Act prevents the terms of a suretyship or sale of land from appearing in more than 
one document.171  Thus, where a deed of suretyship or alienation does not identify, for 
instance, the principal debtor or the purchase price, but refers to another document which 
does so, that document may be proved in order to complete the suretyship or alienation 
respectively. 
 
To prevent the circumvention of the objects of formalities and the parol evidence rule, 
South African courts have determined that before the terms of another document may be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Contracts Governed By the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981” (2011) 74 THRHR 482; R Sharrock “The 
General Principles of the Law of Contract” 2008 ASSAL 388 409-411.  
169
 Eg the difference between a waiver and a variation.  As pointed out in Lubbe & Murray Contract 191 n 3, 
“[i]t is difficult to determine how a waiver is to be effected, what may be waived, and the precise effect of the 
waiver.”    
170
 Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 6. 
171
 For suretyships, see F J Mitrie (Pty) Ltd v Madgwick 1979 1 SA 232 (D) 235B-E; Heathcote v Finwood 
Papers (Pty) Ltd 1997 2 All SA 28 (E) 31; Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 
SA 365 (SCA) para 6; Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Cotton 1976 4 SA 325 (N) 329G-H; Trust Bank van Afrika 
Bpk v Sullivan 1979 2 SA 765 (T).  Cases supporting this proposition in the context of the sale of land 
include Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme BK 2002 3 SA 653 (NC) 667B-C; Johnston v 
Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) 937G-H; Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (AD) 990-991; 
Coronel v Kaufman 1920 TPD 207 209.  In fact, s 1 of the Alienation of Land Act defines a deed of alienation 
as “a document or documents under which land is alienated”. 
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incorporated into an agreement, there must be an express reference to the former 
document in the latter agreement.  What constitutes a sufficiently express reference in 
these circumstances and the extent to which extrinsic evidence may be admitted to 
complete such a reference, was apparently settled in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
decision in Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver.172  However, in 
order fully to understand that decision and to place it in context, regard must be had to 
various decisions which preceded it.173  
 
Some of the earliest observations on the nature of the reference required before a 
document may be incorporated, were made in the context of sales of land.  In Coronel v 
Kaufman,174 (“Coronel”) Wessels J stated that 
 
“I will not go so far as to say that the actual [price] must be mentioned in the contract; the 
doctrine id certum est quod certum reddi potest, to my mind may in many cases apply to the 
sale of land.  But it must be clear to what the reference is, and it must not depend upon the oral 
evidence of the parties.  If, for instance, the price had been stated as ‘the price contained in 
your advertisement in the 'Farmers' Weekly,’ so that all that was necessary was to refer to that 
particular document, … I think that would be sufficient.”175 
 
And in the same case, Mason J held that 
 
“the price is certain if it can be ascertained in some certain manner.  Accepting that proposition, 
it seems to me that the reference must be a reference to some other document, which 
therefore, as a writing, is incorporated by means of that reference.  That reference must be such 
as not only to refer to some other writing but also to refer to that writing with certainty and 
precision.”176 
 
Both judges seemed to require that the reference to another document be so specific that 
it need merely be produced and compared to the reference in the agreement in order to 
                                                          
172
 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA). 
173
 See also C Lewis “Miscellaneous Contracts (Carriage, Loans, Partnership, Service, Suretyship)” 1979 
ASSAL 153 164 ff and J T Pretorius “Gebrekkige Borgaktes: Inlywing By Wyse Van Verwysing” (1982) 45 
THRHR 317 for a discussion of the cases preceding Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA). 
174
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conclude that it is the document sought to be incorporated.  However in Van Wyk v 
Rottcher's Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd177 (“Van Wyk”) Watermeyer CJ held as follows: 
 
“It has been suggested that a written contract does not satisfy the provisions of the statute 
unless the mere reading of the document is sufficient to identify the land sold without invoking 
the aid of any evidence dehors the document, but a moment's reflection and an appreciation of 
the fact that a written contract is merely an abstraction until it is related, by evidence, to the 
concrete things in the material world will show at once that [that] suggestion makes [the statute] 
demand performance of an impossibility.”178 
 
This implies also that the reference to another document need not be as specific as 
suggested in Coronel before incorporation by reference can occur.  In other words, is it 
possible to complete a reference with extrinsic evidence?  The answer to this question 
sparked a heated debate, this time in the context of suretyship agreements. 
 
In Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Cotton,179 (“Cotton”) a deed of suretyship did not identify the 
principal debtor, but contained a reference to an acknowledgement of debt which did do 
so.  The deed itself provided that the surety bound himself to pay  
 
“as surety and co-principal debtor in solidum to The Trust Bank of Africa Ltd., its orders or 
assigns, for the due and proper payment by [blank space] (hereinafter called the debtor) of the 
amount of R25 029,75 (the principal debt) together with finance charges thereon as set out or to 
be set out in an acknowledgment of debt signed or to be signed by the debtor in favour of The 
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd.”180  
 
The court was required to decide whether the acknowledgement of debt could be read 
together with the suretyship in order to identify the debtor.  As its point of departure, it held 
that section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act merely required that the terms of the 
contract must be embodied in a written document signed by the surety or on his behalf.  It 
did not require that all the writing must necessarily be contained in one document.181  
Therefore, the principle of incorporation by reference was also applicable to suretyship 
agreements.  Counsel for the surety did not oppose the court’s conclusion on this point, 
                                                          
177
 1948 1 SA 983 (A). 
178
 Van Wyk v Rottcher's Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 1 SA 983 (A) 990.  Referred to with approval by Scott JA 
in Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 9. 
179
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but submitted that the document referred to in the suretyship agreement had to be 
identifiable ex facie the agreement itself and that oral evidence was not admissible to 
identify the second document.182 
 
Miller J disagreed.  He held that the general rule that the essential terms of a suretyship 
agreement must appear in a written agreement without the aid of oral evidence was less 
rigid than counsel contended it to be.183  In this regard the court reiterated the general 
principle, as set out inter alia in Van Wyk, relating to the admission of extrinsic evidence 
when it comes to agreements required to be in writing: the content of the agreed terms is 
merely required to be ascertainable, in which case extrinsic evidence is admissible for the 
purposes of final ascertainment.184  Thus, while evidence of the parties’ negotiations and 
consensus may not supplement a deficient suretyship agreement, oral evidence to identify 
physically that which is referred to in the suretyship agreement is not only permissible but 
often very necessary.185  By analogy then, the reference to the acknowledgement of debt 
in the suretyship agreement need only be such that it is ascertainable, in which case 
extrinsic evidence is permissible to complete the identification.  The reference need not be 
so complete that the document referred to is identifiable ex facie the suretyship. 
 
In the Cotton case, the suretyship stated that the principal debt was for a certain capital 
amount together with finance charges thereon. It also identified the principal debtor by 
reference to “an” acknowledgement of debt.  Miller J continued: 
 
“A written acknowledgment of debt, signed by [the purported principal debtor] for the amount 
stated in the deed of suretyship and containing details of finance charges as indicated in the 
deed, is produced in evidence.  Moreover, the written acknowledgment of debt so produced was 
signed at Ladysmith on the very day on which the deed of suretyship was there signed.”186 
 
While these factors tended to indicate that the acknowledgement of debt signed by the 
principal debtor was the one referred to in the suretyship,187 they did not conclusively 
identify the document.  As counsel for the surety contended, the reference in the deed of 










 330 E-F. 
187
 Presumably this is what Miller J meant when he stated that “these factors … [tended] to identify the 
acknowledgment of debt with the deed of suretyship” (330F-G). 
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suretyship was not such that it served to exclude the possibility that there may have been 
a second acknowledgement of debt in favour of the plaintiff, signed on the same day and 
for the same amount but which did not create the obligation that the suretyship in issue 
was intended to secure.  While the court agreed that there remained a certain degree of 
ambiguity,188 it allowed extrinsic evidence to complete the reference to “an” 
acknowledgement of debt on the basis that the parol evidence rule does not exclude 
consideration of background circumstances when interpreting a written document, 
particularly when such evidence assists in physically identifying the document referred to 
in the deed of suretyship.189  As a result the suretyship, read together with the 
acknowledgement of debt, was held to be sufficient to satisfy section 6 of the Act. 
 
Approximately five months later and this time in the Appellate Division, in the decision of 
Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison,190 (“Fourlamel”), the same judge held that a lease 
agreement expressly referred to in a domicilium clause of a suretyship could not be 
incorporated into that agreement in order to supply missing terms relating to the identity of 
the creditor and the principal debtor.191  Nor was he swayed by the fact that the lease 
agreement itself required the lessee to provide the lessor with security in the form of a 
suretyship.192  According to Miller JA,  
 
“the document with which we are now concerned refers in the final paragraph thereof to ‘the 
leased premises referred to in the deed of lease annexed hereto’, but that paragraph deals 
exclusively with the selection of domicilium and is in no way linked with any debt or debts for 
which respondent was to be a surety.  Nor does the fact that the deed of lease requires the 
lessee to furnish the lessor with a guarantee in the form of a standard suretyship deed, achieve 
the necessary link.  The object of appellant in attempting to read the deed of lease into the 
document is to establish in writing the identity of the creditor and principal debtor, left blank in 
the document as signed by the respondent.  The mere fact that the lease is referred to in the 
context of a domicilium executandi provision in the document, does not by any means, without 
evidence of the verbal agreement of the parties, establish that the lessee described in the deed 
of lease is the principal debtor in respect of whose debts the respondent was undertaking to be 
a surety.”193 
                                                          
188
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Both these cases were considered in Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Sullivan194 (“Sullivan”).  
Here too the relevant suretyship agreement failed to identify the principal debtor, but 
simply described it as “the lessee”.195  However, the suretyship did contain an express 
reference to a lease agreement, and its date, as creating the principal obligation that the 
suretyship was intended to secure.  The deed of suretyship also proved to have been 
signed on the same day as the lease agreement produced in court.196 
 
Viljoen J recognised that the principle of incorporation could be used to supplement 
missing details in a suretyship, but held that a prerequisite for such incorporation was that 
the reference to the second document must be such that the second document is properly 
identified by mere production and comparison.197  According to him this would be 
consistent with the general principle that a suretyship agreement is valid if the terms are 
ascertainable.198  If extrinsic evidence was necessary to determine which document was 
intended, incorporation by reference could not occur because it would be contrary to the 
parol evidence rule.199  
 
Viljoen J criticised the Cotton decision as amounting to an incorrect application of the law 
to the facts.  He was of the opinion that in that case, the reference to the written 
acknowledgment of debt was insufficient to render the document ascertainable, since 
extrinsic evidence was required to supplement the description in the deed of suretyship in 
order to identify the acknowledgement of debt signed by the principal debtor as the one 
referred to as “an” acknowledgement of debt.200  While he did not exclude the possibility 
that evidence may be required to indicate that the second document has been retrieved 
from a file or other place where it was kept, a mere comparison between the two 
documents must make it clear that the second document is the one to which reference is 
made ex facie the suretyship agreement.201  The fact that the same judge in the Cotton 
case had come to an apparently opposite conclusion in the subsequent Fourlamel case 
                                                          
194















Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
suggested to Viljoen J that Miller JA had come to different insights and that this fact 
provided support for his conclusion that 
 
“[i]n die huidige geval ontbreek na my mening die nodige nexus.  Daar is ‘n verwysing in die 
borgakte na ‘n ‘lease’ tussen die verhuurder en die huurder maar die huurder se naam is blanko 
gelaat.  Die datums op die twee dokumente is dieselfde, maar dit mag toevallig gewees het.  
Die handtekeninge van die borge is ook dieselfde as die handtekeninge van die twee persone 
wat namens die huurder geteken het, maar ook dit mag toevallig gewees het.  Dit skakel nie die 
moontlikheid uit dat daar ander ooreenkomste tussen dieselfde partye op dieselfde dag 
aangegaan is nie, en dat dieselfde borge geteken het vir enige ander ooreenkoms nie.  Die 
ontbrekende naam moes dus aangevul word deur mondelinge getuienis wat verwys na die 
ooreenkoms, en die ooreenkoms was nie by blote voortbrenging so geïdentifiseer dat dit gesê 
kan word dat dit die ooreenkoms is waarna verwys is in die borgakte nie.”202 
 
Despite the fact that Viljoen J was of the opinion that he was merely confirming the 
conclusion drawn in the Fourlamel judgment, it is arguable that the judge lost sight of a 
number of factors.  First, if Miller JA did indeed come to different insights in the five months 
between delivering the Cotton and Fourlamel judgments, then the lack of reference to the 
former judgment in the latter strikes one as peculiar.  In F J Mitrie (Pty) Ltd v Madgwick,203 
James JP observed that 
 
“if [Miller JA] had considered that anything in the judgment in [Fourlamel] conflicted with his 
remarks in the Trust Bank case, he would have dealt with the conflict and resolved it.  Since he 
delivered judgment in the Trust Bank case on 11 June 1976, and the Fourlamel case on 5 
November 1976, it is … inconceivable that he would have overlooked his earlier judgment.”204 
 
Secondly, and related to the first point, if Miller JA did not intend to overturn his earlier 
Cotton judgment, then this implies that he discerned a very real difference between the 
facts of the Cotton and Fourlamel cases.  This does indeed appear to be so: the former 
dealt with the degree of specificity with which a reference, made in the correct context, 
should identify a further document to be incorporated; the latter deals with the sufficiency 
of the context in which the reference was made – it was not apparent from the suretyship 
that the parties had agreed that the lease agreement gave rise to the principal debt since it 
was only referred to incidentally in the domicilium clause.   




 1979 1 SA 232 (D). 
204
 235A. 
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Finally, while the court in Cotton did appear to broaden the concept of objective 
ascertainability, it was not in fact adopting a new approach.  What the court in the Sullivan 
case appears to lose sight of, and what is only referred to indirectly in Cotton, is the fact 
that the reference in the suretyship to “an” acknowledgement of debt in the latter case was 
latently ambiguous.  As noted in Estate Du Toit v Coronation Syndicate Ltd,205  
 
“[although], from a perusal of the document, the [object] may appear to be adequately 
described, nevertheless it may be found in fact to fit more than one [object], or the physical facts 
may introduce uncertainty.  Ambiguity of that kind would be latent and evidence would be 
permissible to dispel the doubt raised not by the document itself, but outside it.”206 
 
Furthermore, it is simply not correct to assume, as Viljoen J seemed to do, that when a 
reference is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence to indicate which document was intended to be 
incorporated by the parties must be precluded.  The judge seemed to think that this 
evidence would necessarily relate to the parties’ prior negotiations or consensus.  There is 
a difference between inferring the parties’ intention from background circumstances and 
inferring their intention from evidence of their negotiations or actual oral consensus 
itself.207 
 
The effect of the Sullivan decision therefore appears to be that a reference to another 
document must fulfil two requirements before that document can be incorporated.  First, 
the reference must indicate the relationship between the absent term and the document to 
be incorporated and secondly, the reference must be so specific that the document can be 
identified ex facie the agreement which refers to it.208  As discussed above, this approach 
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 See eg the court’s discussion of the relevant evidence which indicated that the particular 
acknowledgement of debt was the one referred to in the suretyship agreement and which formed part of the 
background circumstances in Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Cotton 1976 (4) SA 325 (N) 330H-331F.  The rule 
relating to the invariable exclusion of evidence relating to negotiations and consensus has since been 
relaxed so that it is now admissible when such evidence is tendered for identification purposes, and not to 
supplement an incomplete agreement.  See General Accident Insurance Company SA Ltd v Dancor 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 968 (A) 978G; Heathcote v Finwood Papers (Pty) Ltd 1997 2 All SA (E) 40. 
208
 The requirements set out for a sufficient reference in Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Sullivan 1979 2 SA 765 
(T) were subsequently adopted in Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme 2002 3 SA 653 (NC) 
669F-G per Van den Heever AJ, this time in the context of the sale of land: 
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is less flexible than that in Cotton, in terms of which further extrinsic evidence is 
permissible to complete the reference. 
 
As a result of these apparently contradictory judgments, the following question has been 
raised in relation to the principle of incorporation:  
 
“Is it necessary that the reference in the suretyship to the other document be sufficiently clear 
for it to be identified ex facie itself and the suretyship, or is it sufficient if the other document can 
be identified by further oral evidence?”209   
 
The second option was favoured, on the basis that identification of the other document by 
oral evidence would not frustrate the policy behind the General Law Amendment Act.210  
This question, and the judgments which gave rise to it, was addressed in Industrial 
Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver211 (“Industrial Development 
Corporation”). 
 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Appeal was also required to determine the validity of a 
suretyship which contained a blank space for the name of the principal debtor.  The 
document specified the amount of the principal debt, that the debt was incurred in terms of 
“the loan agreement”, and that the loan agreement was to be entered into simultaneously 
with the deed of suretyship.212  The loan agreement sought to be incorporated not only 
identified the principal debtor, but it also appeared to be for the same amount as that 
referred to in the deed of suretyship, was signed on the same day as the suretyship and 
furthermore, contained a provision that any money lent in terms of the agreement was 
conditional upon the respondent standing surety for the principal debtor’s obligations.213 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
“Indien ‘n koopkontrak nie die koopprys omskryf nie, en daar staatgemaak word daarop dat die koopprys 
in ‘n ander dokument beskryf is en daardie dokument deur verwysing geïnkorporeer is, moet die ander 
dokument nie alleen identifiseerbaar wees met verwysing na die koopkontrak nie, maar die koopkontrak 
moet dit ook inkorporeer in verband met die koopprys of die bepaling daarvan.”  
209
 C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s The Law of Suretyship 5 ed (2002) 68. 
210
 68.  
211
 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA).  
212
 Para 2. 
213
 Para 3. 
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The court explicitly confirmed that the principle of incorporation by reference applied not 
only to sales of land but also to contracts of suretyship.214  It also reiterated the rule set out 
in Oberholzer v Gabriel215 to the effect that where there is a sufficient description of the 
subject-matter referred to in a contract, parol evidence can never be excluded to link that 
description to its physical counterpart.  This evidence of relationship (or then, identification) 
may be given by the parties themselves or by anyone else, provided only that it does not 
amount to evidence of negotiation or consensus.216 
 
Against this background, the court proceeded to distinguish the judgment in Fourlamel.  It 
held that the reason why the lease could not be incorporated into that deed of suretyship 
was due to the fact that it was not apparent ex facie the deed of suretyship that the lease 
sought to be incorporated was the document giving rise to the indebtedness secured:217 
the reference to the lease agreement was made in a domicilium clause, and not in the 
context of the description of the secured debt.  If extrinsic evidence were to be admitted, 
such evidence would not only have to identify the lease as the one referred to in the deed 
of suretyship, but would also have been necessary to establish that the debt created by 
the lease was the debt secured by suretyship.  This additional evidence would of necessity 
have been direct evidence of what the parties had intended and therefore inadmissible.218   
 
As for Cotton, the court held that that had been correctly decided because  
 
“it was clear ex facie the deed of suretyship that the document sought to be incorporated did 
indeed give rise to the indebtedness secured by the suretyship.  All that was required, therefore, 
                                                          
214
 Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 6. Until this 
decision, the principle had only been applied in High Court decisions and in Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 
1977 1 SA 333 (A), the then Appellate Division was only prepared to assume for the sake of argument that 
incorporation by reference applied to suretyship agreements, without deciding the issue. 
215
 1946 OPD 56 59.  Quoted above in 4 3 1. 
216
 Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 10.  This limitation 
on extrinsic evidence appears to contradict the conclusion drawn in General Accident Insurance Company 
SA Ltd v Dancor Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 968 (A) 978G, in which it was held that extrinsic evidence of 
the parties’ negotiations or consensus is permissible for the limited purpose of identification.  Presumably, 
the exclusion relating to evidence of negotiations or consensus referred to direct evidence of what the parties 
had intended, because General Accident Insurance Company SA Ltd v Dancor Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 
968 (A) is cited with approval - see Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 
365 (SCA) para 9. 
217
 Industrial Development Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 1 SA 365 (SCA) para 11. 
218
 Para 11.   
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was extrinsic evidence identifying that document as the document referred to in the deed of 
suretyship.”219 
 
Since Sullivan fell in the same category as Cotton, it should have been decided differently, 
since all that was required there was extrinsic evidence identifying the lease agreement as 
the one referred to in the suretyship agreement.220  According to the court in Industrial 
Development Corporation, the reference in the suretyship before it also fell into this 
category: 
 
“[T]he deed of suretyship ... similarly makes it clear that the debt secured is the loan in terms of 
the loan agreement sought to be incorporated.  Extrinsic evidence identifying the loan 
agreement as the one referred to is all that would be required and is therefore admissible.”221 
 
At this point in the judgment, it becomes apparent that what the court considers to be a 
sufficient reference ex facie the suretyship is less than what the Sullivan judgment 
required.  In Sullivan, Viljoen J had held: 
 
“Indien [die] wesenlike besonderhede nie uitdruklik in die borgakte voorkom nie, maar daar in 
die borgakte verwys word na ‘n ander dokument waarin hulle wel voorkom, kan dit moontlik 
gesê word dat die wesenlike voorwaardes by wyse van verwysing in die borgakte ingelyf is, 
maar dan moet die ander dokument ex facie die borgakte, met ander woorde, ooreenkomstig 
die verwysing in die borgakte, behoorlik identifiseerbaar wees by wyse van blote voortbrenging 
en vergelyking.”222 
 
Thus, the nature of the reference to the other document must be so specific that that 
document can simply be produced, its content compared with the reference ex facie the 
suretyship, and the conclusion drawn that this is indeed the document referred to in the 
deed. 
 
If the court in Industrial Development Corporation subscribed to the same requirement, 
then extrinsic evidence should have been unnecessary to identify “the loan agreement” as 
the one being produced in evidence.  It would appear, therefore, that when the court stated 
that “it was clear ex facie the deed of suretyship that the document sought to be 
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incorporated did indeed give rise to the indebtedness secured by the suretyship”223 it was 
not referring to the specificity of the reference, but rather to the fact that the reference to 
another document must be made in a manner which indicates its relationship to the term it 
is supposed to complete or supplement, simply by examining the face of the suretyship.   
 
Where a suretyship fails to identify a principal debtor, but refers to a loan agreement which 
does, the reference must make it clear that it is that loan agreement which constitutes the 
principal debt and which the suretyship is intended to secure, before its terms can also be 
used to identify the principal debtor.  It is the absence of this contextual link that prevented 
a lease agreement, which created the principal debt but which was only referred to in a 
domicile clause, from being incorporated in the suretyship in the Fourlamel case.  Had the 
court permitted the lease to be incorporated, extrinsic evidence would not only have had to 
identify the lease as the one referred to, but also that the parties had agreed that the 
suretyship was intended to secure the debt created by that lease.  This would have been 
contrary to both the parol evidence rule and statutory formalities. 
 
The effect of Industrial Development Corporation on the principle of incorporation by 
reference appears to be the following: the relationship between the absent term, the 
context in which the other document is referred to, and that document itself must be clear 
ex facie the agreement required to be in writing.  Arguably, there are good policy reasons 
for such a requirement: in the absence of such a nexus, any document could be 
incorporated and the possibility of fraud, perjury or uncertainty increased.  Secondly, the 
description of the document sought to be incorporated must be sufficiently certain that 
extrinsic evidence linking the description to the actual document is for identification 
purposes alone.  Contrary to the Sullivan decision, this description does not need to be so 
precise that the document need merely be produced and compared to the description.  
However, it should be of such a nature that the parties need not give direct evidence of 
their intention in order to identify that document.  The fact that a description like “the loan 
agreement” or “an” acknowledgement of debt could refer to more than one particular loan 
agreement or acknowledgement of debt has less to do with the sufficiency of the reference 
itself, and more to do with the difficulty of applying the description to the actual facts.  Such 
a latent ambiguity, however, is always capable of being resolved through the admission of 
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extrinsic evidence.  In other words, it becomes an issue of interpretation and applying the 
terms of the agreement to the facts of the case. 
 
A consideration of the South African approach to incorporation by reference raises the 
following question: should incorporation by reference be limited to cases in which an 
agreement expressly refers to the document sought to be incorporated or can the same 
effect be achieved in another manner?  Here an examination of certain common-law 
jurisdictions may be enlightening.224   
 
4 4 2 Common-law jurisdictions 
 
Common-law jurisdictions also use the principle of incorporation by reference (or “joinder 
of documents”) in order to ensure compliance with the Statute of Frauds or its functional 
equivalents.225  In England, it was already settled by the nineteenth century that a plaintiff 
might rely on two or more documents to prove his case, provided that the agreement 
specifically and on its face referred to the other document(s).226  As in Sullivan, it appears 
that the reference was required to be so specific that the other document needed merely to 
be produced and compared in order to conclude that it was the document referred to in the 
agreement.227  
 
However, the requirement that there must be an express reference to another document in 
an agreement subject to formalities has subsequently been relaxed further in both English 
and American law.  It now appears that an implied reference will suffice.   
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 In German law, the application of the Andeutungstheorie permits more than one document to be read 
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What constitutes an implied reference is illustrated by the following case law.  In Long v 
Millar228 (“Long”) Long signed a formal agreement to purchase three plots of land at 
Hammersmith and paid a deposit of £31.  On receiving the deposit, Millar signed a 
separate document which indicated that he had “[received] £31 as a deposit on purchase 
of three plots of land at Hammersmith”.229  The formal agreement contained all the 
essential terms except the name of the vendor.  The question was whether the receipt, 
which contained the vendor's name and signature, could be incorporated into this 
agreement in order to supplement the missing terms.   
 
According to Bramwell LJ, 
 
“the point to be established by the plaintiff is that the defendant has bound himself, and a 
receipt was put in evidence signed by him, and containing the name of the plaintiff, the amount 
of the deposit, and some description of the land sold.  The receipt uses also the word 
'purchase,' which must mean an agreement to purchase, and it becomes apparent that the 
agreement alluded to is the agreement signed by the plaintiff, as soon as the two documents 
are placed side by side.  The agreement referred to may be identified by parol evidence.”230 
 
And Thesiger LJ held: 
 
“The first question is whether there is a sufficient reference in the receipt signed by the 
defendant to allow us to connect it with the document signed by the plaintiff.  When it is 
proposed to prove the existence of a contract by several documents, it must appear upon the 
face of the instrument signed by the party to be charged that reference is made to another 
document; and this omission cannot be supplied by verbal evidence.  If, however, it appears 
from the instrument itself that another document is referred to, that document may be identified 
by verbal evidence.  A simple illustration of this rule is given in Ridgway v. Wharton [6 HLC 238; 
27 LJ (Ch) 46]; there 'instructions' were referred to; now instructions may be either written or 
verbal; but it was held that parol evidence might be adduced to show that certain instructions in 
writing were intended.  This rule of interpretation is merely a particular application of the 
doctrine as to latent ambiguity.  Although parol evidence may be given to identify the document 
intended to be referred to, it must be clear that the words of the document signed by the party to 
be charged will extend to the document sought to be identified.”231 
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A more complicated example of joinder of documents is found in Clipper Maritime Ltd v 
Shirlstar Container Transport Ltd,232 in which three telexes, and possibly the addition of the 
actual charter-party, were read together to constitute a sufficient memorandum of a 
guarantee given by the defendant.  The first telex set out the terms of the guarantee, but 
contained no express reference to subsequent documents and was not signed by the 
guarantor.233  The second telex referred to “the letter of guarantee” contained in the 
previous telex.  The third referred back to the second by its reference number and was 
signed on behalf of the guarantor, indicating that it considered itself bound to the terms of 
the guarantee.  Joinder of the documents was permitted because the first set out the 
terms, the second referred to those terms and the third (which was signed by the 
guarantor) referred to the second by reference number and thus, by implication, to the 
terms contained in the first.234  
 
Therefore, where several documents deal with the same subject-matter, these documents 
are regarded as impliedly referring to each other and can be read together to constitute a 
sufficient memorandum.  This so-called “same transaction test”235 is also applied in certain 
jurisdictions in the United States, most notably in a series of New York cases.236  The 
leading decision in this regard is that of the New York Court of Appeals in Crabtree v 
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.237   
 
Here, the plaintiff sought to hold the defendant company liable for breach of contract, 
because it failed to pay an alleged increase in his salary as indicated in two separate 
payroll change cards, signed by representatives of the company.  While each payroll card 
set out the terms of the employment relationship,238 neither one indicated that it would 
continue for a period of more than one year.239  However, there was another document, 
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setting out the terms of the employment relationship and its duration, which had been 
drafted at an earlier stage, and the court was required to consider whether this document 
could be read together with the others in order to constitute an enforceable memorandum. 
 
The court reiterated the basic principle that the applicable statute of frauds does not 
require a memorandum to be contained in a single document, but permits it to be pieced 
together from separate writings connected to one another either expressly or by the 
internal evidence of “subject-matter and occasion”.240  Where signed and unsigned 
documents appear to refer to the same subject-matter or transaction, oral evidence is 
permitted to finalise the connection between them and to establish the acquiescence of the 
party to be charged to the contents of the unsigned document.241 
 
However, there are two threshold requirements before the relevant documents will be read 
together.  First, the document which establishes the contractual relationship between the 
parties must be signed by the party against whom the memorandum will be enforced.242  
On the facts, this was indeed the case because both payroll change cards contained the 
names of the parties, the plaintiff’s job description and the terms of payment and they were 
signed by representatives of the company as employer.243  Secondly, ex facie the 
documents, it must be clear that the unsigned document relates to the same transaction as 
the signed document.244  According to the court, these two threshold requirements would 
minimise the possibility of fraud and perjury.  In these circumstances, 
 
“[p]arol evidence to portray the circumstances surrounding the making of the memorandum 
serves only to connect the separate documents and to show that there was assent, by the party 
to be charged, to the contents of the one unsigned.  If that testimony does not convincingly 
connect the papers, or does not show assent to the unsigned paper, it is within the province of 
the judge to conclude, as a matter of law, that the statute has not been satisfied.  True, the 
possibility still remains that, by fraud or perjury, an agreement never in fact made may 
occasionally be enforced under the subject matter or transaction test.  It is better to run that risk, 
though, than to deny enforcement to all agreements, merely because the signed document 
made no specific mention of the unsigned writing.  As the United States Supreme Court 
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declared [in Beckwith v Talbot 95 US 289 292], in sanctioning the admission of parol evidence 
to establish the connection between the signed and unsigned writings[,]  
 
‘[t]here may be cases in which it would be a violation of reason and common sense to ignore a 
reference which derives its significance from such (parol) proof.  If there is ground for any doubt in the 
matter, the general rule should be enforced.  But where there is no ground for doubt, its enforcement 
would aid, instead of discouraging, fraud.’”245 
 
A generous approach to joinder of documents is also evident in the conclusion that an 
implied reference permits the joining of an envelope and the document contained within it.  
Thus a letter beginning “Dear Sir” and signed by the defendant can be joined with the 
envelope in which it was sent so as to identify the addressee, since the existence of a 
letter sent by post implies the existence of an envelope containing it.246  Similarly, the mere 
physical connection of documents has also been held to constitute a sufficient 
reference.247  The justification for reading these documents together is that the 
circumstances are such that the possibility of fraud is sufficiently negated.248 
 
Brown argues that the necessity of any internal reference whatsoever, let alone the 
necessity of a comprehensively identifying internal reference, should depend on the 
character of the evidence led to connect documents.249  Where the evidence is such that 
the court is convinced that there is little possibility of fraud and that the two or more 
documents establish the terms of the agreement with reasonable certainty, internal 
references should be dispensed with altogether and parol evidence liberally allowed to link 
the writings.  Where the accompanying evidence is less convincing, she maintains, the 
absence of an internal nexus may be fatal.250   
 




 Pearce v Gardner [1897] 1 Q B 688; Freeman v Freeman [1891] 7 TLR 431; Stokes v Whicher [1920] 1 
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According to the author, refusal of relief to an applicant or plaintiff need not be justified “by 
picky insistence upon doctrines not stated in the statute itself, to the effect that the 
memorandum must state every material term or that an unsigned memorandum cannot be 
used unless it is so referred to in a signed one as to be identified without the aid of parol 
testimony”.251  Apparently she would prefer the court to take responsibility for its own 
conclusion either that fraud is or may be perpetrated, or that this possibility has been 
sufficiently negated by the evidence presented. 
 
While this seems to be a tenable suggestion, it appears that the generous approach to 
incorporation by reference in England is no longer possible, at least in the context of the 
sale of land.  As noted in the previous chapter,252 the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act was the product of the English Law Commission’s recommendation that its 
predecessor, the Law of Property Act 1925, should be replaced.  In relation to 
incorporation by reference, the Commission pointed out that the development of the rule 
under the old Act created uncertainty as to the sufficiency of the reference required and 
the degree to which extrinsic evidence would be permitted to complete that reference.253  
For this reason, the Commission suggested that while incorporation should still be 
permitted under the new regime, the document containing the reference to another 
document should be signed.254  This suggestion is reflected in section 2(3) of the Law of 
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.255 
 
It is unclear to what extent an implied reference is still permissible under the new Act.  
While the Law Commission was of the opinion that the “same transaction” test should still 
be applicable,256 one of the few cases dealing with incorporation by reference under the 
new Act did not address the issue.  In Firstpost Homes Ltd. v Johnson,257 a letter signed 
by the defendant as vendor indicated that she agreed to sell a piece of land, “as shown on 
the enclosed plan”, for a certain sum per acre.258  The plan was attached to the letter with 




 See ch 3 (3 2 1). 
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a paperclip and this plan, but not the letter, was signed by a representative of the plaintiff 
company as purchaser. 
 
Peter Gibson LJ made the following remarks about section 2 of the Act: 
 
“Section 2 [has] brought about a markedly different regime from that which obtained hitherto … 
Whereas the contract or the memorandum or note evidencing the contract previously could be 
contained in more than one document, only one document is now allowed, save where 
contracts are exchanged, although reference to another document may be permitted in the 
circumstances laid down in subsections (2) and (3). Whereas the memorandum or note needed 
for section 40 [of the Law of Property Act 1925] did not have to contain every term of the 
contract, all the terms must now be contained in the document in question … It is to my mind 
plain that the Act of 1989 … was intended to make radical changes to such contracts in a way 
that was intended to simplify the law and to avoid disputes, the contract now being in a single 
document containing all the terms and signed by all the parties. Thereby it has been sought to 
avoid the need to have extrinsic evidence as to that contract.”259 
 
The last part of this quotation implies that a more narrow approach to the admission of 
extrinsic evidence will be applied to contracts falling within the scope of the new Act.260  
Furthermore, section 2(1) of that Act provides that all the express terms of the parties’ 
agreement must appear in a recordal.261  Taken together, this suggests that implied 
references to other documents will no longer suffice for joinder to take place and that the 
English approach is now similar to the South African: where the parties have agreed upon 
the incorporation of another document, that agreement must be reflected in an express 
term (ie a reference) in the document.  However, it is uncertain to what extent English 
courts would also insist that the relationship between the missing term and the document 
sought to be incorporated should be evident ex facie the signed document.  If they did 
import such a requirement, then the type of reference in the Long case would presumably 
be insufficient in terms of the new Act.  In any event it is unlikely that the documents used 
in the Long case would constitute a valid contract under the new Act.  As in Firstpost, the 
document setting out the terms of the agreement between Millar and Long only contained 
the signature of one of the parties, rather than both of them as required by the Act. 
 
 




 McMeel Construction of Contracts 155. 
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4 4 3 The approaches to incorporation by reference compared 
 
Two different approaches to incorporation by reference have been discussed above.  The 
South African approach (and presumably now also the approach adopted in English law in 
terms of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act) requires an express 
reference to another document before the latter will be incorporated.  By contrast, the 
approach adopted by common-law systems which are still subject to the Statute of Frauds 
or an equivalent thereof (which would include English law insofar as it relates to 
guarantees) is rather more liberal, in that an implied reference to another document is 
sufficient.  This raises two questions.  First, how may one explain this discrepancy in the 
type of reference held to be sufficient for incorporation to occur?  Secondly, is there any 
room to develop the South African approach, so that it too could recognise that in certain 
situations, an implied reference should suffice? 
 
The answer to the first question relates to a topic discussed in the previous chapter, 
namely the distinction between a contract and a memorandum.262  It was stated there that 
a memorandum is usually not intended to constitute the exclusive memorial of the parties’ 
agreement.  The parol evidence rule is therefore not applicable to these kinds of 
documents and this allows for greater flexibility in the type of references regarded as 
sufficient for joinder to take place.  The only barrier to a successful joinder of documents 
where there has been an implied reference is the Statute of Frauds itself.  However, as 
indicated above in Crabtree v Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp.,263 the Statute will not prevent 
an implied reference as a matter of course; it will only do so if there is a danger of fraud.264 
 
By contrast, a formal requirement which prescribes that an agreement should be in writing 
results in the treatment of that recordal as the sole record of the parties’ agreement.  As a 
result, both formalities and the parol evidence rule preclude the admission of extrinsic 
evidence to supplement the written agreement.  In the context of incorporation by 
reference, this limitation on the use of extrinsic evidence finds expression in the 
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requirement that there must be an express reference to the document sought to be 
incorporated.  In South African law, there is the additional requirement that the reference 
must be made in a manner which indicates the relationship between the absent term and 
the document which is intended to supplement the missing detail.  In other words, it must 
be evident ex facie the agreement subject to formalities that the parties agreed that the 
document would be incorporated in order to supply the missing detail.  Apparently this 
relationship is required to be evident on the face of the agreement because in its absence, 
the parties would have to give evidence of what they intended, thereby leading to the 
possibility of fraud, disputes or perjury.  
 
The question is whether there is room for development of the South African approach, so 
that it too could recognise that implied references should suffice in certain circumstances.  
Arguably the answer should be in the affirmative.  An important (if not the overarching265) 
purpose of statutory formalities is to prevent fraud and there is nothing in either the 
Alienation of Land Act or the General Law Amendment Act which suggests that an express 
reference to the document sought to be incorporated is the only way, or even the best 
way, to achieve this purpose.  For example, it would be particularly formalistic to argue that 
when it is evident that the parties intended two documents to be read together, the 
absence of an express reference should prevent this possibility.  This point is illustrated in 
F J Mitrie (Pty) Ltd v Madgwick,266 in which the missing identity of the principal debtor in a 
suretyship was supplemented by information contained in a factoring agreement, not 
because the suretyship referred to the factoring agreement, but because it was common 
cause that the parties intended that the two agreements should be kept together as a 
written record of the entire transaction.267  Although the court’s decision was contrary to 
the rules relating to incorporation by reference, it is arguable that it did not circumvent the 
purpose of formalities: one can hardly contend that there is a danger of fraud or perjury 
where both parties have agreed that two documents should be read together as a record 
of their agreement.   
 
It is therefore argued that instead of focusing on whether there is a sufficiently express 
reference made in the correct context before incorporation can occur, a South African 
court should rather focus on the weight to be afforded to the evidence tendered to 
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convince it that the parties intended that the two documents should be read together.  If 
the evidence is unconvincing, then incorporation should be denied.  However, if the 
evidence is convincing and there is little chance of fraud, then incorporation should be 
allowed, in spite of the absence of an express reference to another document. 
 
4 5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the interaction between the parol evidence rule, statutory 
formalities and the admission of extrinsic evidence.  It was pointed out that South African 
courts will admit extrinsic evidence in order to apply the terms of the contract to the facts of 
the case (in other words, extrinsic evidence is admitted for the purpose of identification).268  
Extrinsic evidence is also admitted to determine whether there is a valid and enforceable 
agreement (a question which may arise as a result of possible error, fraud, duress or 
misrepresentation)269 or to determine why parties have omitted certain details from their 
agreement.270  These are not true exceptions to either the parol evidence rule or the rules 
relating to statutory formalities, because the evidence is not tendered for the purpose of 
varying, contradicting or supplementing the terms of an agreement subject to formalities, 
but rather to clarify the terms of the agreement or to show that there was no consensus in 
in the first place. 
 
Somewhat more problematic however, is the South African approach to the admission of 
evidence regarding an oral suspensive condition.271  Case law which has served as 
authority for the fact such evidence is always admissible appears to construe a suspensive 
condition as one which suspends the coming into existence of the contract rather than 
adhering to the generally accepted view in South African law that such a condition merely 
suspends the enforceability of the agreement.  It is suggested that this authority should be 
approached with caution.  Evidence tendered for the purpose of showing that what 
appears to be a fully enforceable agreement ex facie the document is in fact subject to an 
oral suspensive condition which suspends its enforceability should not be admissible, 
precisely because it varies or contradicts the written agreement.  
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A second problem relates to the admission of evidence to show that the written agreement 
does not contain a material term and is for that reason formally invalid.272  The traditional 
approach to the determination of formal validity focuses solely on the terms contained in 
the document in order to determine whether the written agreement complies with formal 
requirements.  If the agreement appears to be formally valid, then this approach specifies 
further that extrinsic evidence may not be admitted to show that the agreement is formally 
invalid.  The decision in Philmatt, which has held that extrinsic evidence of an oral 
suspensive condition (which is an example of a material term) is always admissible to 
prove that the agreement is formally invalid, cannot be reconciled with this approach.  It is 
therefore suggested that Philmatt should be understood in the light of its particular facts, 
and should not serve as authority for the general conclusion that such evidence is always 
admissible to prove that an agreement is formally invalid. 
 
Consideration was also given to the principle of incorporation by reference, both from a 
South African and common-law perspective.273  From a South African point of view, it 
becomes clear that the application of this principle in the context of agreements subject to 
formalities is both justified and governed by the rules relating to the admission of extrinsic 
evidence in general.  The current approach to this principle dictates that two requirements 
should be met before incorporation will occur.  First, there must be a sufficiently express 
reference to the document sought to be incorporated so that any extrinsic evidence 
necessary to complete the reference would simply assist in identifying the exact document 
referred to in the agreement.  Secondly, the reference must be made in such a manner 
that the relationship between the absent term, the context in which the other document is 
referred to, and that document itself must be clear ex facie the agreement required to be in 
writing.  In the absence of such a nexus, any document could be incorporated and this, in 
turn, could create the temptation to commit fraud or perjury. 
 
However, an examination of the common-law approach to incorporation by reference in 
terms of the Statute of Frauds or a common-law equivalent thereof, illustrates that in 
certain cases, an implied reference may be sufficient.  Although the discrepancy between 
the South African and common-law approach may be explained on the basis of the nature 
of the document required in each jurisdiction (a contract in the former and a memorandum 
in the latter) it is suggested that the merit of the common-law approach is that it places the 
                                                          
272
 4 3 4. 
273
 4 4. 
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emphasis, correctly it is argued, on whether the extrinsic evidence necessary to connect 
two or more documents is convincing enough that the possibility of fraud is minimal.  It is 
therefore submitted that there is room for development of the South African approach in 
the light of the overarching objective of formalities, namely the prevention of fraud, so that 
in certain cases it should be sufficient for incorporation to take place in spite of the 
absence of an express reference. 
 
One further point of interaction between statutory formalities, the parol evidence rule and 
extrinsic evidence which has not been considered, is that of rectification.  This remedy is 
granted on the strength of extrinsic evidence relating to the parties' actual consensus - 
evidence which is inadmissible when interpreting the agreement.274  Furthermore, certain 
additional requirements apply to the rectification of agreements subject to formalities which 
are not imposed on agreements which are form-free.  This topic therefore merits special 
attention and is the subject of the next chapter. 
                                                          
274
 See 4 2 3 above. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE RECTIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO 
STATUTORY FORMALITIES 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, it was noted that where an agreement subject to formalities has 
been reduced to writing, extrinsic evidence of the parties' oral agreement and negotiations 
is generally excluded by two rules.1  First, there is the statutory rule that the terms of a 
contract that is required by law to be in writing must appear from the written document 
itself: where the written document is incomplete, it cannot be supplemented by extrinsic 
evidence.  Secondly, if a written contract constitutes the exclusive memorial of the 
agreement, the parol evidence rule also precludes the admission of extrinsic evidence, to 
the extent that such evidence adds to, varies or contradicts any part of it.  It was also 
evident in that chapter that while the rules precluding the admission of extrinsic evidence 
are not absolute, most instances of the admission of such evidence do not really constitute 
exceptions to either rule. 
 
This chapter deals with the rectification of agreements subject to formalities – the process 
of correcting a written document so that it gives effect to the parties’ true intention.  From 
one perspective, the rules relating to rectification could simply be regarded as part of the 
rules governing the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.  Strictly speaking, rectification could 
therefore have been considered in the previous chapter.  However, there are so many 
unique aspects to the South African approach to rectification of agreements subject to 
statutory formalities that it rather merits a chapter of its own. 
 
In what follows, attention will be paid to whether the South African approach to rectification 
of agreements subject to formalities is consistent;2 whether the procedure adopted by our 
courts promotes the functions of formalities;3 and whether the interpretation of the 
requirements for a successful claim for rectification is consistent with the policy underlying 
the imposition of formalities.4  Comparative observations will also be made where relevant. 
                                                          
1
 Ch 4 (4 2). 
2
 5 3. 
3
 5 3. 
4
 5 4. 




5 2 The origins of rectification and the current South African approach 
 
Rectification is an equitable remedy, designed to correct a document which is an 
inaccurate reflection of the parties’ agreement.5  The precise origins of the remedy in 
South African law are unclear.  Some judgments and commentators maintain that the 
remedy is English in origin and that it was received in South African law as a necessary 
exception to the English parol evidence rule.  For example, in one of the earliest cases on 
rectification, Saayman v Le Grange,6 the court stated that rectification was based on 
English law and that no similar remedy could be found in Roman and Roman-Dutch law.7  
The relationship between rectification and the parol evidence rule was indicated inter alia 
in Meyer v Merchant’s Trust Ltd8 where the court held that 
 
“owing to the acceptance of the English rule that, when a contract has been expressed in 
writing, the writing is regarded as the exclusive memorial of the transaction, so that in a suit 
between the parties no evidence to prove the terms of the contract may be given save the 
document … the need has arisen, as in English practice, for rectification”.9 
 
Rectification is also regarded as an exception to the parol evidence rule in English law: 
 
“[T]he remedy of rectification can be seen as a specific response to two major characteristics or, 
one might be tempted to say, shortcomings of the traditional English approach to contractual 
interpretation ... The first of these is literalism.  Rectification enables the court to deviate from 
the ‘plain and unambiguous’ meaning that a term has in the ordinary language because the 
context and the circumstances indicate that this meaning is not what the parties actually 
intended.  The second is the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence.  Rectification necessarily 
                                                          
5
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 11. 
6
 (1879) 9 Buch 10. 
7
 12 per De Villiers CJ; 13 per Dwyer J.   
8
 1942 AD 244. 
9
 Meyer v Merchant’s Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 253 per De Wet CJ.  See also Caithness v Fowlds 1910 EDL 
261 264-265; Venter v Liebenberg 1954 3 SA 333 (T) 338C; Brits v Van Heerden 2001 3 SA 257 (C) 266D-
E, 278F; Von Ziegler v Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 399 (T) 410A-C; H J 
Liebenberg “Die Begrip 'Mutual Error' by Rektifikasie van Kontrakte” (1994) 15 Obiter 137; D T Zeffertt & A 
Paizes Parol Evidence with Particular Reference to Contract (1986) 10. 
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presupposes that such evidence is admitted in order to establish the parties’ intentions ... In fact 
rectification is usually listed among the exceptions to the parol evidence rule.”10 
 
If South African law did indeed receive the remedy of rectification from English law, then 
the requirements for a successful claim were relaxed by the South African courts.  In the 
1920s, the then Appellate Division held that a party need not prove the existence of a 
prior, validly concluded contract in order to succeed with a claim for rectification of a 
subsequent recordal – proof of a prior agreement was sufficient.11  This requirement was 
further relaxed by the same court some 20 years later, so that a prior common intention 
(rather than agreement or contract) would suffice.12  In English law, this matter was only 
settled in the 1970s.13 
 
Other South African cases, like Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd14 and Neuhoff v York 
Timbers Ltd,15 suggest that rectification has civilian roots and is based on the exceptio doli 
generalis.16  The exceptio doli in turn has its roots in Roman law and was a defence that 
could be raised whenever it would be inequitable or unjust for an agreement to be strictly 
enforced: a party should not be allowed to base his claim on a document which he knows 
is not an accurate reflection of the parties’ actual agreement.  Thus, in Weinerlein v Goch 
Buildings Ltd,17 one finds statements to the effect that  
 
“[f]rom the earliest times the Roman law has set its face against a person benefitting himself by 
his own fraud or by a mutual mistake even if the strict interpretation of the law seems at first 
blush to give him that right”18  
                                                          
10
 S Vogenauer “Interpretation: Concluding Comparative Observations” in A Burrows & E Peel (eds) Contract 
Terms (2007) 123 139-140.  The author also points out that there is a causal link between the parol evidence 
rule, which developed in the late sixteenth century, and the appearance of the remedy of rectification in the 
early seventeenth century (139 n 53). 
11
 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 288 per De Villiers JA. 
12
 Meyer v Merchant’s Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 253.  This development is discussed in detail in 5 4 2 below. 
13
 Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 98. 
14
 1925 AD 282 292-293 per Wessels JA; 296-297 per Kotze JA. 
15
 1981 4 SA 666 (T) 673E.  See also Mouton v Hanekom 1959 3 SA 35 (A) 40A-B; Van Aswegen v Fourie 
1964 3 SA 94 (O) 98A; Otto v Heymans 1971 4 SA 148 (T) 156A-B. 
16
 See also R Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil 
Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) 217 227-228.    
17
 1925 AD 282. 
18
 291-292 per Wessels JA. 




and that  
 
“the rectification of a written document ... is a well-settled rule with us in South Africa; and it is 




“the Court will not allow [an agreement subject to statutory formalities] to be used as an engine 
of fraud … and in order to prevent this it will cause the written contract … to be rectified … 
[T]his right is an inherent right of our courts and is well within their traditional equitable 
jurisdiction.”20   
 
However rectification and the exceptio doli are not identical in their scope.  The latter was 
only a defence to a claim based on an inaccurate recordal, while the former can also be 
used to correct that recordal.21 
 
Still others have argued that the remedy is neither an exception to the parol evidence rule, 
nor based on the exceptio doli, but is simply a reflection of the general rule that a contract 
is binding because of the parties' consensus or a reasonable reliance on consensus.22   
 
Irrespective of its origin, underlying the acceptance of the remedy in South African law is 
the broad general principle that “in contracts regard must be had to the truth of the matter 
rather than to what has been written, and the mistake must yield to the truth”.23  
                                                          
19
 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 297 per Kotze JA.  See also the references to civilian 
sources in the judgment of De Villiers JA (289), although it is not entirely clear whether the judge was of the 
opinion that rectification was received from English law but that it showed similarities with the civilian 
approach (as argued by J F Malan Aspekte van Rektifikasie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg LLD thesis 
Pretoria (1987) 5) or whether the judge was in fact pointing out that rectification has civilian roots. 
20
 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 293 per Wessels JA.  See also A J Kerr The Principles of 
the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 146 n 644. 
21
 See Zimmermann “Good Faith and Equity” in Southern Cross 229.  Although it was decided in Bank of 
Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 3 SA 580 (A) 607A-B that the exceptio doli did not form part 
of the South African common law, the remedy of rectification remains.  
22
 S W J van der Merwe, L F van Huysteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract - General Principles 4 ed 
(2012) 153-154; Strydom v Coach Motors (Edms) Bpk 1975 4 SA 838 (T) 840E-F.   




While rectification of agreements subject to formalities is permitted, the South African 
approach in such cases consists of two distinct steps.  These steps will serve as the focal 
points of this chapter.  First, ex facie the document, there must be compliance with 
statutory formalities, because there cannot be rectification of a formally invalid 
agreement.24  Thereafter, the party seeking rectification of the valid agreement must meet 
the traditional requirements of the remedy: he must prove that the parties at least shared a 
common intention which they intended to express in their written document, but which they 
failed to do by virtue of a mistake.25  In Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles26 the 
court held that factual allegations relevant to the second step may not be considered in the 
first step.27  Although the court did not clarify this statement, its justification presumably lies 
in the fact that recourse to extrinsic evidence is generally excluded by both the parol 
evidence rule and statutory formalities when considering the formal validity of a 
document.28   
 
The adoption of the South African two-step approach is ascribed to the decision of the 
Appellate Division in Magwaza v Heenan29 (“Magwaza”).  Here the parties failed to 
describe with sufficient certainty the land which was the object of the contract of sale 
between them.  The question for decision was whether the document could be rectified to 
present an accurate record of the parties' agreement in spite of the fact that, ex facie the 
document, it did not comply with statutory formalities.   
 
Before reaching its conclusion, the court considered divergent opinions in both case law 
and academic commentary.  On the one hand, there were dicta in earlier cases like 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
23
 Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 1 SA 418 (A) 426C-D per van Blerk JA.  See also Weinerlein v Goch Buildings 
Ltd 1925 AD 282 289 per De Villiers JA.   
24
 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 254E; Intercontinental 
Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 10.  See 5 3 below. 
25
 See 5 4 below and eg Meyer v Merchants' Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 253; Lazarus v Gorfinkel 1988 4 SA 123 
(C) 131D; Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 4 SA 388 (C) 395H. 
26
 1999 2 All SA 304 (A). 
27
 Para 10. 
28
 This was discussed in ch 4 (4 3 4) and will be discussed further in 5 3 2 2 below. 
29
 1979 2 SA 1019 (A). 
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Dowdle's Estate v Dowdle30 (“Dowdle”) and Kourie v Bean31 (“Kourie”) to the effect that 
one could not rectify a document which did not comply with statutory formalities, because 
this would amount to investing a void transaction with validity.  In the Dowdle case, this 
conclusion was thought to be implicit in Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd32 (“Weinerlein”). 
 
On the other hand, there were cases like Vogel NO v Volkersz,33 where Botha J expressed 
doubt as to whether Weinerlein actually supported the conclusion drawn in Dowdle.  As 
pointed out by the judge, the court in Weinerlein was confronted with the question whether 
rectification of a formally valid agreement would be contrary to statutory formalities and not 
whether a court could rectify a formally invalid document in order to make it comply with 
statutory formalities.34  There was therefore nothing in De Villiers JA’s judgment in the 
Weinerlein case which compelled the court in Dowdle to come to the conclusion that 
formal invalidity precludes rectification. 
 
Finally, the court in Magwaza considered academic commentary including that of De Wet, 
who pointed to the illogicality of requiring a document which ex confesso represents an 
inaccurate record of the parties' agreement first to comply with statutory requirements 
before it could be rectified.35  De Wet does not explain this statement.  Presumably, it is 
illogical because it requires a written agreement, which is by one or both parties’ 
admission an incorrect record of their true agreement, to be formally correct before it can 
be substantively corrected.  In other words, 
 
                                                          
30
 1947 3 SA 340 (T) 354. 
31
 1949 2 SA 567 (T) 572. 
32
 1925 AD 282.  See Dowdle's Estate v Dowdle 1947 3 SA 340 (T) 354. 
33
 1977 1 SA 537 (T) 557A.  Although the discussion in the main text focuses on Botha J’s comments on 
Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282, the judge also held that a party could seek rectification of a 
clause inserted into an agreement subject to formalities solely in its favour, in spite of the fact that that clause 
was void for vagueness (548F-549A read with 557H).  This conclusion is discussed in Kerr The Law of 




 J C de Wet & A H van Wyk De Wet en Yeats Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) 
286 n 55 (the statement is not repeated in the corresponding passage in J C De Wet & A H van Wyk Die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg & Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 323 n 55). 
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“[t]o insist that [a faulty transcription] is nevertheless incapable of rectification unless it proves 
the validity of the underlying transaction is ... to treat as decisive of that issue a record which ex 
hypothesi is erroneous.”36 
 
In spite of this criticism of the necessity for ex facie compliance with statutory formalities, 
the court in Magwaza concluded that the position as stated in Dowdle, namely that an 
agreement subject to statutory formalities must first comply with those formalities before it 
can be rectified because one cannot rectify a nullity, was correct.37  In any event, the court 
held, to ignore the first step would be “in theory subversive of the [functions of] statutory 
formalities, and in practice … must inevitably prove emasculatory of them.”38  
 
In Magwaza, there are two interrelated justifications presented for requiring ex facie 
compliance with statutory formalities.  The first is the notion that non-compliance with 
statutory formalities renders the agreement void and therefore precludes rectification.  The 
second is the argument that rectification of a non-compliant agreement creates uncertainty 
and the possibility of perjured claims, and is therefore contrary to the intention underlying 
the imposition of statutory formalities.  In what follows, these arguments supporting the first 
step will be considered.  Thereafter, the second step, namely the requirements for a 
successful claim of rectification, will be discussed in greater detail. 
 
5 3 The first step: no rectification of void agreements  
5 3 1 Introduction 
 
The following two examples are used to illustrate the theory underlying the requirement 
that an agreement must appear to be formally valid before it can be rectified.  In the first 
example, the document records a sale of land.  Ex facie the document, the description of 
the land is so deficient that it cannot “be identified on the ground by reference to the 
provisions of the contract”.39  On the face of it, the document therefore appears to record a 
void agreement because it lacks one of the essential terms required to be in writing by the 
                                                          
36
 Spiller v Lawrence 1976 1 SA 307 (N) 311C. 
37




 Clements v Simpson 1971 3 SA 1 (A) 7F.  See also ch 3 (3 3 3 1) in which the means to comply with this 
test is set out in detail. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
156 
 
Alienation of Land Act.  In the second example, a document records the sale of shares.  
The document contains a term which amounts to the giving of financial assistance for the 
purchase of the shares, in contravention of the relevant company legislation.40  Ex facie 
the document, this sale also appears to be void.  However, in a claim for rectification, a 
court will rectify the document in the second example but not the first. 
 
The reason for these different outcomes is explained in Spiller v Lawrence (“Spiller”):41   
 
“The two situations are fundamentally different.  In the [second example], when the question of 
validity relates to the substance of the transaction and not its form, nullity is an illusion produced 
by a document testifying falsely to what was agreed.  In the [first example], … the cause of 
nullity is indeed to be found in the transaction's form.  When it is said to consist of a failure to 
observe the law's requirement that the agreement be reflected by a document with particular 
characteristics the document itself is necessarily decisive of the issue whether the stipulation 
has been met; for it has been only if this emerges from the document.  Appearance and reality 
therefore coincide.  Nullity, when the document shows it, is no illusion.”42  
 
Therefore, when a court is asked to rectify a document for which statutory formalities are 
not prescribed, a distinction can be drawn between the document recording the agreement 
and the underlying agreement itself.  Provided the underlying agreement is valid, “it follows 
inevitably that at the heart of the matter lies, not a void transaction, but a valid transaction 
incorrectly documented [and] the particular effect of the mistake in the document is 
wrongly to give the impression of nullity.”43  However, in the case of an agreement subject 
to formalities, there is no distinction between the underlying agreement and the document, 
because the prescribed formalities are constitutive in nature: the document and the 
obligation come into existence simultaneously.  The document no longer serves simply as 
the evidence of the agreement; it is the agreement.44  When such a document does not 
comply with formalities, no obligation is created and as a consequence there is nothing to 
rectify.45  Hence the necessity for the first step.  
                                                          
40
 This example is taken from the facts of Spiller v Lawrence 1976 1 SA 307 (N). 
41






 Van der Merwe et al Contract 157. 
45
 This point is confirmed in Milner Street Properties (Pty) Ltd v Eckstein Properties (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 1315 
(SCA) para 26, in which Nienaber JA states that “where compliance with the statutory formalities is a 




South African courts consistently require ex facie compliance with statutory formalities as a 
prerequisite to a successful claim for rectification.  One would expect uniformity in the 
courts' approach to such an apparently self-evident requirement, but a careful study of 
case law on the point reveals that uniformity here is itself an illusion.  It will also become 
apparent that there are in fact two dimensions to the problem of ex facie compliance with 
statutory formalities.  The first is whether a court adopts a strict or lenient approach to the 
question whether the document is formally valid.  The second is whether the notion of ex 
facie compliance relates to formal validity only or whether it includes issues relating to 
substantive validity.  
 
5 3 2 The two dimensions of the requirement of ex facie compliance 
5 3 2 1 A strict versus a lenient approach to formal validity  
5 3 2 1 1 A strict approach 
 
A strict interpretation of the requirement of formal validity is represented by the majority 
judgment in Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC46 (“Republican 
Press”), the facts of which were briefly discussed in a previous chapter.47  The plaintiff 
sought to rectify a deed of suretyship in which the name “Republican Press (Pty) Ltd” was 
erroneously inserted as both the principal debtor and the creditor.  It was common cause 
that the parties had agreed on the identities of all the relevant parties, prior to reducing 
their agreement to writing.48  Counsel for the plaintiff argued that there was ex facie 
compliance with the relevant formalities (albeit that two of the three parties identified 
shared the same name)49 or alternatively, if there was doubt about whether the document 
complied with the relevant formalities, then the prevailing judicial trend was to interpret the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
prerequisite for the actual formation of an agreement, a failure to comply means that nothing is constituted 
and consequently there is by definition nothing that can be rectified”. 
46
 1996 2 SA 246 (N). 
47
 See ch 3 (3 3 2 2).  
48
 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 256G-H. 
49
 251C. 
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document in such a manner as to render it formally valid, in order to proceed with 
rectification.50 
 
With regard to the first argument, counsel for the plaintiff suggested that there was nothing 
on the face of the document to suggest that it was formally invalid; this was not a situation 
where the name of one of the parties had been completely omitted for example.  In support 
of his argument, he sought to draw an analogy with the situation where two of the parties 
to the suretyship were identified as the same natural person, but who were in fact father 
and son.  In such a case, the document could not be presumed to be formally invalid.51  
Hurt J, writing for the majority, responded to this argument by indicating that first, in a 
situation such as that, rectification would be unnecessary.  If formal invalidity were 
pleaded, it could be met with the replication that the two parties were in fact related to 
each other.52  Secondly, extrinsic evidence would be admissible to identify these parties as 
father and son.  According to the judge, such evidence would always be admissible in 
cases of doubt as to whether there were in fact three parties identified in the document.53   
 
However, because the court was confronted with a document which identified two of the 
three parties as “Republican Press (Pty) Ltd”, and because there cannot be two 
companies with the same name, there could be no doubt that the document was referring 
to the same party as both principal debtor and creditor and was for that reason formally 
invalid.54 
 
Furthermore, the court disagreed with counsel’s contention that in cases of doubt as to 
whether a document was formally valid, a court would adopt an interpretation which 
favoured validity rather than invalidity.  First, according to the court, there were no cases 
where such a statement had been explicitly made.55  Secondly, the decision in Magwaza 
was a clear indication that the policy considerations underlying the imposition of formalities 
took precedence over the equitable considerations underlying the remedy of rectification, 
in spite of the fact that formalities may not be the best way to promote these policy 
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considerations and in spite of the fact that ex facie compliance with statutory formalities as 
a prerequisite to rectification could also lead to anomalous results.56  Finally, where there 
seemed to be an implication that a benign approach should be adopted in determining 
whether there had been compliance with statutory formalities, as in Litecor Voltex (Natal) 
(Pty) Ltd v Jason,57 this was either wrong or at best confusing.58  
 
In closing, Hurt J made the following remark: 
 
“[A] strict approach to the test of whether the document ostensibly complies with the statute is 
[not], in practice, all that unfair to the parties.  The creditor is invariably the party who stipulates 
for a suretyship undertaking as a condition for the giving, or prolonging, of terms of credit.  He is 
the party who benefits from the undertaking by having an extra debtor, or debtors, against 
whom he can proceed in the event of default by the principal debtor.  It is little enough to ask of 
him to ensure that, when the undertaking is executed, it has the correct names in the correct 
places and, as I understand the purport of the decisions of the Appellate Division, a creditor who 
omits this simple step may find that he has (to purloin an intriguing expression used by [G A] 
Mulligan KC [‘No Orchids for Misrepresentation?’] in 1951 SALJ [157] 161) to 'dree his weird'.”59 
 
Although this appears to be an obiter remark, this justification for a strict approach 
confuses the first step – formal validity – with the requirements of the second step, namely 
the elements to be proved in order to succeed with a claim for rectification.  More 
specifically, it appears as if the judge was resurrecting, perhaps indirectly, the notion that 
the party seeking rectification must prove that the mistake is reasonable.60  There is no 
                                                          
56
 253A-D, 255B-E. 
57
 1988 2 SA 78 (D). 
58
 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 253E-254I.  Litecor Voltex 




 See eg cases like Van der Byl v Van der Byl & Co 1899 16 SC 338 349 per De Villiers CJ; Quinn v 
Goldschmidt 1910 EDL 158 164; Patel v Le Clus (Pty) Ltd 1946 TPD 30 34; Bushby v Guardian Assurance 
Co 1915 WLD 65 71 and the statement by Kerr The Law of Contract 157-159: 
“[T]he line of distinction [to determine which errors will be corrected] lies between, on the one hand, cases 
in which parties give the problem [of the recordal of an essential term] the consideration it requires and 
take care over the recording of their agreement but overlook an error of commission or omission; and, on 
the other hand, cases in which they give the problem little consideration or make no serious attempt to 
complete their contract in writing … What is fatal is language so obscure, or an omission of such a nature, 
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reason to require that the mistake be reasonable, because both parties know what the true 
agreement is.  Reasonableness in the context of dissensus and mistake is imposed in 
order to protect the party who relies on the agreement as it appears to be; in the context of 
rectification, both parties are usually aware of the fact that the ostensible agreement does 
not reflect their actual agreement and neither party, therefore, needs the additional indirect 
protection that the mistake should be reasonable.61   
 
A similarly strict approach to formal validity is evident in the earlier case of Brack v 
Citystate Townhouses (Pty) Ltd62 (“Brack”).  Here the parties had concluded a written 
agreement for the sale of land.  The heading of the document indicated that the agreement 
had been entered into by the respondent as seller, represented by its duly authorised 
representative (identified by name in the heading), and the applicant as purchaser.63  The 
concluding portion of the document provided spaces, above the typed words “Seller” and 
“Purchaser”, for the signatures of the parties as well as spaces for the signatures of 
witnesses.  The document itself did not reflect a signature of the “Seller”, but did contain 
an illegible signature (said to be that of the seller’s representative) in the space for a 
witness to the seller’s signature.  This same signature appeared as witness to the 
purchaser’s signature.64   
 
Counsel for the applicant argued that ex facie the document, it was uncertain whether 
there had been compliance with formal requirements.  More specifically, this uncertainty 
was created by the fact that  
 
“the space above the word 'seller' was left blank, coupled with the fact that the person 
designated in the heading of the document as the person who was to sign on behalf of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
that when the parties look at the document(s) before signing they should realise that the requirements of 
the statute in question have not been fulfilled.”  (Footnotes omitted). 
More recent cases have indicated that a reasonable mistake is not a requirement, including Humphrys v 
Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 3 SA 388 (C) 399A-I; Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Knysna Development 
Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 4 SA 24 (C) 28F-G; Van Aswegen v Fourie 1964 3 SA 94 (O) 102B-C.  See also B R 
Bamford “Rectification in Contract” (1963) 80 SALJ 528 533-534. 
61
 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 29-30.  
62
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seller, … signed next to the blank space and to the left of it, ostensibly, but inexplicably, as a 
witness to a non-existing signature, instead of in the obviously appropriate space to the right of 
where his signature appears, and above the word 'seller'.”65 
 
In view of the fact that there was doubt as to whether the document was formally valid or 
invalid, it was argued that extrinsic evidence was admissible to resolve that doubt.66  On 
the facts, such evidence would have indicated that the representative for the respondent 
had intended to sign in the space designated for the “Seller” and that his failure to do so 
was in fact a mistake.67 
 
The court disagreed.  It held that 
 
“[i]f [the representative’s] evidence is accepted, it explains why his signature appears as that of 
a witness, and why there is a blank above the word 'Seller', but it goes no further than showing 
that a mistake had been made.  It certainly does not show that the contract is valid, because 
[the representative] cannot by giving evidence transpose his signature on the document from 
where it actually appears under the words 'As witnesses' to the blank space above the word 




“[T]he defect in the agreement is one that unquestionably proclaims ex facie the document that 
the statutory formalities have not been complied with.  By no conceivable process of 
interpretation or construction can that defect be cured, for to transform [the representative’s] 
signature as a witness into a signature as seller would amount to nothing less than a 
reformation of the ostensibly inchoate agreement into a duly completed one.  The applicant 
cannot achieve his object without the rectification of the document, but the document is a nullity 
on the face of it, and accordingly the applicant is precluded from being afforded relief”.69 
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While the Brack and Republican Press cases appear to differ in the role which they ascribe 
to extrinsic evidence in the determination of formal validity,70 both demonstrate a strict 
approach to the first step in the rectification of agreements subject to formalities, because 
neither appears to approve of the argument that in cases of doubt, a court should adopt an 
approach which favours the validity, rather than invalidity, of such an agreement.71 
 
5 3 2 1 2 A lenient approach 
 
The second, more lenient approach to the first step is represented by cases like Chisnall 
and Chisnall v Sturgeon and Sturgeon72 (“Chisnall”), Papenfus v Steyn73 (“Papenfus”) and 
ultimately, Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles74 (“Intercontinental Exports”).  In 
Chisnall, the plaintiffs were the joint sellers of the property, while the defendants were joint 
purchasers.  The second plaintiff’s signature was described as that of the “seller’s spouse” 
(rather than of co-seller) while that of the second defendant was described as being given 
to assist her husband (rather than of the co-purchaser).75  Because these parties had 
ostensibly signed in the wrong capacities, the defendants argued that they could not have 
been said to have assented to the terms of the agreement as (co-)purchaser and (co-) 
seller respectively and the agreement was formally invalid.76 
 
The court held that the correct approach was not to limit itself to that part of the document 
which contained the parties’ signatures, but to look at the document as a whole in order to 
determine whether the parties had intended (also) to assent to the terms of the agreement 
as co-seller and co-purchaser.77  In response to counsel’s contention that the Brack case 
                                                          
70
 In Brack v Citystate Townhouses (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 364 (W) 368H-369C the court rejected the possibility 
that extrinsic evidence could be used to determine the formal validity of a written agreement, even in cases 
of doubt.  In Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 251F-G, Hurt J 
stated that such evidence should be admissible “ante omnia in any situation where there is doubt as to 
whether the document [is formally valid]”.  
71
 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 323 n 55 describe Brack v Citystate Townhouses (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 
364 (W) as adopting “‘n uiters formalistiese benadering”. 
72
 1993 2 SA 642 (W). 
73
 1969 1 SA 92 (T). 
74
 1999 2 All SA 304 (A). 
75
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was authority for the fact that a party who has signed in one capacity cannot be taken as 
having signed (also or instead of) in another,78 the court disagreed and pointed out that 
there, the court had come to its conclusion on the basis that  
 
“leaving blank the space where the seller would be expected to sign proclaimed that no one has 
signed as seller.  This indicium, 'all the more so' because signature took place 'as witness', was 
regarded as so dominant or even exclusive that it precluded the signature from (also or instead) 
being a token of execution of the seller.”79 
 
The second sentence of the quotation arguably amounts to a misreading of the Brack 
judgment.  There is no indication in that case that the court considered the possibility that 
a party can sign in two capacities.  It was not convinced by the argument that there was a 
certain degree of ambiguity due to the fact that the representative was indicated as acting 
on behalf of the seller, but signed in the space designated for a witness.80  According to 
the court, the problem was not that the document could give rise to two possible 
conclusions, one leading to validity and the other not, but that there was an overall failure 
to comply with statutory formalities because ostensibly, the deed did not reflect the 
signature of the seller or someone authorised to act on his behalf. 
 
By contrast, the court in Chisnall not only recognised the possibility that a party could sign 
in more than one capacity, but it also realised that the document was ambiguous in the 
sense that the second plaintiff and second defendant were described as seller and 
purchaser respectively in the body of the contract, but signed in other capacities at the end 
of it.  As the court notes, in cases of doubt, it should favour an interpretation which renders 
the agreement valid rather than invalid.81 
 
A similar approach underlies Papenfus where the plaintiff/purchaser signed in the space 
for the defendant/seller’s signature and vice versa.82  Elsewhere in the document, the 
plaintiff was clearly identified as the purchaser.83  Ex facie the document, a certain degree 






 Brack v Citystate Townhouses (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 364 (W) 368H. 
81
 Chisnall and Chisnall v Sturgeon and Sturgeon 1993 2 SA 642 (W) 647D. 
82
 Papenfus v Steyn 1969 1 SA 92 (T) 94D. 
83
 97A. 
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of ambiguity or uncertainty therefore existed as to the capacity in which either party had 
signed.  According to the Brack judgment, the facts in Papenfus could be distinguished on 
the basis that both a purchaser and a seller had signed the document, albeit incorrectly.  In 
other words, ex facie the document, there was compliance with statutory formalities.84  The 
problem in Papenfus was one of interpretation, because the document was ambiguous.85  
Again, this is a tenuous distinction to draw: the document in Brack also created ambiguity, 
because it identified the signatory as acting on behalf of the seller but reflected his 
signature in the space reserved for a witness.  
 
As discussed previously,86 in Intercontinental Exports, a suretyship identified the principal 
debtor as “Mr Frank Fowles” while the surety was described as “Frank Turner Fowles”.87  
The court decided that although the names reflected as principal debtor and surety were 
similar, they were not identical and, ex facie the document, did not necessarily refer to the 
same person.  Even if the two names were to be identical, it did not follow as a matter of 
course that they referred to the same person.88  The suretyship was therefore capable of 
being construed ex facie the document as reflecting a creditor, principal debtor and surety 
and was held to comply with the statutory formalities.   
 
The reason why Republican Press and Brack are characterised as adopting a strict 
approach while that of Intercontinental Exports, Chisnall and Papenfus is regarded as 
more lenient is not because the reasoning differs greatly: they all adopt an objective 
approach to determining whether, ex facie the document, there is compliance with 
statutory formalities.89  The differences lie elsewhere. 
 
                                                          
84




 Ch 3 (3 3 2 2). 
87
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 15. 
88
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 17.  See also Inventive Labour 
Structuring (Pty) Ltd v Corfe 2006 3 SA 107 (SCA). 
89
 See N Grové “Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC and Others” 1996 DJ 401 404; R 
le Roux “A Creditor Left To ‘Dree His Weird’” (1996) 4 JBL 157 158. 
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First, Intercontinental Exports, for example, recognises that formalities can be an 
“unnecessary stumbling-block”90 to rectification and that a court should thus adopt an 
interpretation consistent with validity where this is reasonably possible.  This seems to be 
a tempering of the approach adopted in Republican Press and Brack, where there was an 
outright rejection of the argument that in cases of doubt, a court should adopt an 
interpretation which favours formal validity rather than invalidity.   
 
Secondly, the leniency of the approach is reflected in the role it ascribes to extrinsic 
evidence in determining formal validity.  It was noted above that in Republican Press, Hurt 
J was confronted with the argument that a suretyship which identified two of the three 
parties as the same natural person could not be regarded as formally invalid for that 
reason alone.  Hurt J’s response, in full, was as follows: 
 
“It seems to me that there are two conclusive answers to this proposition.  The first is that if 
there are indeed two parties to the suretyship undertaking who have identical names, there will 
be no need for a rectification of the document and those parties would presumably be cited, and 
separately identified, in any proceedings in which the document and the question of its 
enforceability may come before the Court.  If it were pleaded, in such a case, that the document 
was invalid for non-compliance with s 6 [of the General Law Amendment Act], that plea could be 
disposed of by a replication to the effect that the identical names referred to two different juristic 
personae.  The second is that evidence would be admissible for the limited purpose of 
identification of the parties to the undertaking, provided always that the evidence does not 
encroach into the prohibited territory demarcated by the parol evidence rule ... It seems to me 
that such evidence would be admissible ante omnia in any situation where there is doubt as to 
whether the document refers to three separate parties to the contract of suretyship.”91 
 
With the last statement in the quotation, the judge appears to imply that extrinsic evidence 
would always be admissible as a matter of course in order to determine whether an 
agreement was formally invalid.  For example, if the suretyship identified both the debtor 
and surety as natural person “X”, extrinsic evidence would be admissible to determine 
whether “X” the debtor and “X” the surety were two different persons (in which case the 
                                                          
90
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 11.  See also Inventive Labour 
Structuring (Pty) Ltd v Corfe 2006 3 SA 107 (SCA) para 11. 
91
 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 251D-G. 
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suretyship would be formally valid) or one and the same person (in which case the 
agreement would be formally invalid). 
 
The court in Intercontinental Exports reacted to Hurt J’s exposition as follows: 
 
“With regard to the first answer, it seems to proceed from the premise that the suretyship 
undertaking is formally valid.  With regard to the second, the envisaged evidence would be 
admissible not to establish the document’s formal validity, but to give effect to an otherwise valid 
suretyship.  It would, for example, permit extrinsic evidence to be led to identify the actual 
creditor, principal debtor or surety, as the case may be, from among a group of such named in 
the written document … To that extent the quoted passage is not inconsistent with the views 
expressed above.  If by the last sentence is meant that evidence could be led to show, contrary 
to what appears ex facie the document, that a suretyship undertaking lacks formal validity (eg to 
show that two of the parties are the same) I would respectfully disagree.”92 
 
In other words, the court draws a distinction between the use of extrinsic evidence to apply 
the terms of a formally valid agreement to the facts and the use of extrinsic evidence to 
prove that an agreement is formally invalid, in spite of the appearance of validity ex facie 
the document.  To use the example given above: extrinsic evidence is permitted to show 
that debtor “X” and surety “X” are in fact father and son.  This admission of extrinsic 
evidence proceeds from the prior conclusion that the agreement is formally valid, which in 
turn is based on the fact that the two parties are natural persons: a reasonable 
interpretation in favour of formal validity assumes that the identified parties are in fact two 
different people.  By contrast, extrinsic evidence would not be admissible if it were 
tendered for the purpose of showing that contrary to this assumption, debtor “X” and surety 
“X” are in fact one and the same person in reality and that the agreement is therefore 
formally invalid, since such evidence would contradict what appears ex facie the document 
to be a formally valid agreement.93 
 
                                                          
92
 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 20. 
93
 It should be pointed out that this statement is confined to extrinsic evidence tendered for the purpose of 
proving formal invalidity and which contradicts what appears to be a formally valid agreement.  It is a 
different matter if evidence was tendered to prove that debtor “X” and surety “X” are the same person 
because there was no agreement upon the principal debtor for whom the surety accepted liability.  This 
evidence would show that there was a lack of consensus on one of the basic elements of a suretyship, which 
is always admissible (see ch 4 (4 3 4)). 
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Thus, Intercontinental Exports represents a more lenient approach also because it 
confines itself to determining formal validity by examining the document alone.  If, on the 
face of it, it appears to comply with statutory requirements, then a court must conclude that 
the agreement is formally valid, irrespective of whether there may be extrinsic evidence to 
prove the contrary.94   
 
The more lenient approach represented by Intercontinental Exports was recently 
confirmed in the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Van Oudtshoorn v Investec Bank 
Ltd95 (“Van Oudtshoorn”).  The appellant was identified as the surety, and the deed of 
suretyship stated that it was signed by the surety.  However, the actual signature on the 
document belonged to another party, without any qualification that that party was acting as 
a representative of the surety.96  The court confirmed that formal validity had to be 
determined by an examination of the document alone,97 and that in cases of doubt, a 
written agreement should be interpreted as being formally valid rather than invalid.98  
According to the court, the document could be interpreted in two ways: the first, which 
would render the agreement invalid, was that the document was signed by mistake; the 
second, leading to a conclusion of validity, was that the document had been signed by the 
surety’s representative.99  It was concluded that in the face of two possible constructions, 
one of which leads to the validity of the agreement, it is this construction which should be 
adopted.100  The deed was therefore held to be formally valid on the basis that it had been 
signed by the surety’s representative. 
 
The same approach to the role of extrinsic evidence in the determination of formal validity 
adopted in Intercontinental Exports and Van Oudtshoorn is also evident in cases dealing 
                                                          
94
 This is also illustrated in Inventive Labour Structuring (Pty) Ltd v Corfe 2006 3 SA 107 (SCA) paras 7-8, 12 
where the principal debtor and surety were identified as the same natural person.  The court held that the 
document was formally valid, despite the fact that there was only one “Dennis Corfe” in reality. 
95
 (558/10) [2011] ZASCA 205 (25-11-2011). 
96
 Para 35. 
97
 See also Swanepoel v Nameng 2010 3 SA 124 (SCA) para 16. 
98
 Van Oudtshoorn v Investec Bank Ltd (558/10) [2011] ZASCA 205 (25-11-2011) para 37. 
99
 Para 38. 
100
 Para 38. 
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with written agreements from which other material terms have been omitted (but where, on 
the face of these documents, there is no evidence of the omission101). 
 
For example, in Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen (1)102 (“Cohen (1)”) material terms had 
been omitted from certain suretyship agreements.  As discussed previously,103 these terms 
were first, that the plaintiff would not advance credit to the principal debtor in excess of the 
amount guaranteed by the defendant and secondly, that no credit would be advanced until 
the debtor had ceded its book debts to the plaintiff as security.104  The court held that  
 
“[w]here the parties to a suretyship agreement have reduced their agreement to writing and the 
writing prima facie complies with the requirements of s 6 of [the General Law Amendment Act], 
the surety cannot, in an action by the creditor based on the suretyship agreement, rely on the 
fact that material terms orally agreed upon prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of 
the written agreement have not been included in the written document in order to have the 
written agreement invalidated for non-compliance with the requirements of that section.  The 
only avenue open to the surety in such a case is to apply for rectification of the written 
agreement.  Until rectification takes place or in the absence thereof, the written agreements 
stands and such terms as may have been orally agreed upon but excluded from the document 
are irrelevant.”105 
 
Also in Brits v Van Heerden,106 (“Brits”) the court permitted the rectification of a deed of 
alienation where the parties omitted a term that the defendant would cede an insurance 
policy as part of the purchase price for the property.  Although not explicitly referred to by 
the court, this term was, at the very least, material to the parties' agreement.107   
 
While all these cases represent a more lenient approach to the determination of formal 
validity and compliance with the first step, they also appear to contradict certain other 
                                                          
101
 In other words, these are not cases where the omission is clearly indicated by a blank space.  In those 
cases extrinsic evidence is admissible in order to determine why there is a blank space in the document – 
see Johnston v Leal 1980 3 SA 927 (A) and the discussion in ch 4 (4 3 2). 
102
 1993 3 SA 846 (SE). 
103
 See ch 4 (4 3 4). 
104
 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen (1) 1993 3 SA 846 (SE) 847F. 
105
 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen (1) 1993 3 SA 846 (SE) 853B-D.  Rectification of the agreements was 
duly sought in the sequel to this case, Standard Bank of SA Ltd Cohen (2) 1993 3 SA 854 (SE). 
106
 2001 3 SA 257 (C). 
107
 See ch 3 (3 2 2). 
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decisions.  For example, it has been held that all the material terms of an agreement 
subject to statutory formalities must be reduced to writing in order for it to be valid.108  And 
in Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC109 (“Philmatt”) the court held that 
extrinsic evidence of an omitted material term is always permissible to show that an 
agreement subject to formalities is void.110 
 
The contradiction between the rule that all the material terms of an agreement subject to 
formalities must be reduced to writing and the cases allowing rectification of an agreement 
from which such a term has been omitted is more apparent than real.  For example, in 
Johnston v Leal111 (“Johnston”) the omission of what could have been a material term was 
apparent ex facie the written agreement (in the form of a blank space).  However, De Wet 
notes that  
 
“[v]ir sover ... te kenne gegee word dat die vermeende kontrak nietig is omdat ‘n wesenlike 
beding van ‘n voorafgaande mondelinge afspraak nie opgeneem is in die skriftelike stuk nie, 
kan ek nie daarmee saamstem nie.  Die beding is daarmee heen maar die kontrak in die 
skriftelike stuk bly bestaan.“112  
 
Provided a “deugdelike interpretasie”113 of the written document reveals what appears to 
be a complete contract, as was the case in both Cohen (1) and Brits, that contract will not 
be void and the omitted term is simply ignored.  The only way to enforce omitted material 
terms would be to seek rectification of the written document so that the terms can be 
included in the contract. 
 
A more fundamental and seemingly irreconcilable discrepancy is that which exists 
between cases like Cohen (1) and Brits on the one hand, and the conclusion drawn by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Philmatt.  It has already been noted that the court held that 
evidence of an omitted material term is always permissible when it is tendered to show 
                                                          
108
 See eg Stalwo (Pty) Ltd v Wary Holdings (Pty) 2008 1 SA 654 (SCA) para 7 and the discussion in ch 3 (3 
2 2). 
109
 1996 2 SA 15 (A). 
110
 25F-G.  
111
 1980 3 SA 927 (A). 
112
 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 324 n 56. 
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 324 n 56. 
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that the written agreement did not contain that term and is for that reason invalid.114  This 
is in spite of the fact that the document looks complete on the face of it.  However, when it 
comes to determining whether a document is formally valid for the purposes of rectifying it, 
the same evidence is disregarded for the purposes of determining whether there has been 
compliance with the first step.  The court did not consider the impact of its decision in the 
context of rectification, nor did it consider cases which had held the opposite.115  As 
pointed out previously, it relied on the statement in Johnston to the effect that extrinsic 
evidence to prove non-compliance with a statute is always admissible.  For this, Johnston 
in turn relied on an English case116 which does not necessarily support the conclusion 
drawn in either Johnston or Philmatt.  The implications of the Philmatt decision will be 
considered further in 5 3 3 below.  
  
5 3 2 2 Formal versus substantive invalidity  
 
Irrespective of whether a court adopts a strict or lenient approach to the determination of 
formal validity and ex facie compliance with statutory formalities, it is a separate question 
whether such a court would rectify the document if the agreement it embodies is 
substantively, as opposed to formally, invalid.  As discussed in the previous chapter,117 
formal validity relates to defects in the form of the transaction.  Substantive invalidity 
relates to the failure to comply with other requirements for contractual validity, like legality, 
possibility and certainty of performance.  As will become apparent below, South African 
courts limit the ambit of the first step so that only formal invalidity precludes the 
rectification of an agreement subject to formalities.  Ostensible substantive invalidity is 
therefore not an obstacle to a claim for rectification.    
 
                                                          
114
 See ch 4 (4 3 4). 
115
 In fairness, it should be pointed out that the subsequent case of Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v 
Fowles 1999 2 All SA 304 (A) para 20 also made no reference to the decision in Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v 
Mosselbank Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) when it concluded that extrinsic evidence is irrelevant 
when it comes to determining formal validity for the purposes of compliance with the first step. 
116
 Campbell Discount Co Ltd v Gall [1961] 1 QB 431. 
117
 Ch 4 (4 3 4). 
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The origin of the distinction between these different “types” of invalidity is attributed to 
Spiller v Lawrence,118 although there the court was concerned with distinguishing between 
the rectification of agreements which are not subject to statutory formalities and those 
which are.  Didcott J was required to consider whether a written agreement for the sale of 
shares, which included a term which amounted to the giving of financial assistance, could 
be rectified in spite of the fact that the document, on its face, appeared to record an invalid 
transaction.  In concluding that it could, the judge stated that in the case of agreements not 
subject to statutory formalities, “nullity is an illusion produced by a document testifying 
falsely to what was agreed.”119  In such a case, a court may consider the parties’ actual 
agreement and where this is valid, rectify the document accordingly.  However, in the case 
of agreements which are required to comply with formalities, “the cause of nullity is indeed 
to be found in the transaction's form … [and] the document itself is necessarily decisive of 
the issue whether the [formal requirements have] been met”.120  As discussed above,121 
where formalities are constitutive, a court may not consider the parties’ actual, underlying 
agreement, but is confined to determining whether the document itself represents a valid 
agreement.  In other words, where statutory formalities are prescribed upon pain of nullity 
for non-compliance, “[a]ppearance and reality coincide”.122 
 
Although the distinction in Spiller focused on the difference between the rectification of 
agreements not subject to formalities and those which are, this distinction has also been 
used to limit the ambit of the first step in the rectification of agreements subject to 
formalities.  The relevance of the distinction is as follows: where an agreement subject to 
formalities is formally invalid it may not be rectified, in spite of the fact that the parties may 
have a valid underlying agreement.  However, if an agreement complies with the relevant 
statutory formalities, but appears to be void for some other reason, then a court may 
consider the parties’ underlying agreement in order to determine whether this is in fact 
valid and if so, rectify the apparently (substantively) invalid written agreement.  
 
                                                          
118
 1976 1 SA 307 (N).  See Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Jason 1988 2 SA 78 (D) 82G ff; Headerman 
(Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd v Ping Bai 1997 3 SA 1004 (SCA) 1010D-H; Van der Merwe et al Contract 157 n 223. 
119
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An example of this is found in Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Jason123 (“Litecor Voltex”) 
where, ex facie the suretyship agreement, it seemed that the defendant had acted on 
behalf of the debtor company.  Throughout the document the defendant was referred to 
only as representative of the debtor company.124  According to the court, his unqualified 
signature as surety did not change the fact that he had signed in his representative 
capacity,125 with the effect that the principal debtor was standing surety for its own debt.  
On one view of the facts and in the light of decisions like Magwaza and Spiller, the 
document should not have been capable of rectification because it did not comply with 
statutory formalities.  However, the very opposite was held by Didcott J, the same judge 
who delivered judgment in the Spiller case. 
 
He held that the document he was being asked to rectify did not fall within the ambit of the 
rule set out in Magwaza, Dowdle and Kourie to the effect that “[one] cannot by rectification 
invest a document which is on the face of it null and void with legal force”.126  According to 
Didcott J, the difference between the document he was being asked to rectify and those 
before the courts in Magwaza, Dowdle and Kourie was that in the latter cases, the 
descriptions of the land sold were too uncertain to constitute sufficient recordals of one of 
the essential terms of a contract of sale of land.127  The rule laid down in these cases could 
not be said to apply to all contracts which were required to be in writing and which 
appeared to be void ex facie the document, but only to those which were void because 
they failed to comply with the relevant formal requirements.128  The judge held further that 
the distinction drawn for the purposes of rectification in the Spiller case – between 
agreements which are not subject to formalities and those which are – was only relevant 
when a court was faced with a claim for rectification of a document which failed to meet 
formal requirements.129  According to Didcott J, the document that he was being asked to 
rectify  
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“met all the formal requirements for a suretyship.  [But it] showed a fault of another sort.  And it 
showed that wrongly.  The actual agreement, the agreement intended all along, had none.  
Rectification was thus in order.”130 
 
It is difficult to determine the true import of the Litecor Voltex decision.  According to the 
court's own interpretation of the deed of suretyship, the surety had not signed in his 
personal capacity, but as representative of the debtor company.  Therefore, it would 
appear that the document was formally invalid, since it failed to identify three distinct 
parties as creditor, debtor and surety.131  On this interpretation, no distinction should have 
been drawn between the documents in Magwaza, Dowdle and Kourie on the one hand 
and the document in Litecor Voltex on the other, because they all failed to identify an 
essential term of the agreement. 
 
However, Litecor Voltex has also been interpreted as an example where the document is 
formally valid, but appears to be substantively invalid.132  Even though the surety signed 
the document in his representative capacity, three separate names nevertheless appeared 
ex facie the document.  Such an interpretation would explain Didcott J's statement that the 
document “met all the formal requirements for a suretyship” despite the fact that the surety 
had signed in the incorrect capacity.  Such an interpretation would also explain how 
Didcott J found support for his reasoning in the Spiller case.  According to the judge,  
 




 See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 158 n 226; Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates 
CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 254A-D, where Hurt J was of the opinion that on one interpretation at least, the 
document in Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Jason 1988 2 SA 78 (D) was formally invalid. 
132
 G F Lubbe & C Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract - Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 235 
n 4: 
“[Litecor Voltex] extends the reasoning in [Spiller] to contracts governed by statutory formalities.  A 
mistake in the expression of the parties creating the impression of substantial [ie substantive] invalidity 
may be rectified provided that the document on the face of it complies with the statutory requirements.” 
See also Nuform Formwork and Scaffolding (Pty) Ltd v Natscaff CC 2002 4 All SA 575 (D) 581; Republican 
Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 254H; Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd v 
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“[t]he distinction drawn [in Spiller] for the purposes of rectification between contracts governed 
by formal requirements and the rest free from such mattered … only when those on which they 
called did not duly answer them.”133 
 
This is a somewhat ingenious argument.  The Spiller case was not concerned with the 
rectification of an agreement subject to formalities, but sought rather to indicate why a 
written agreement not subject to formalities but which appeared to be void could be 
rectified, whereas an agreement for which writing is constitutive could not be so rectified.  
In the former, the writing is not constitutive and a distinction can be drawn between the 
written record of the agreement and the agreement itself.  Such a distinction cannot be 
drawn in cases where formalities are prescribed upon pain of nullity.  However, in Litecor 
Voltex Didcott J applies this reasoning to agreements subject to formalities by 
distinguishing between instances where such an agreement does not comply with formal 
requirements (and therefore cannot be rectified) and an agreement which does comply but 
appears to be invalid for some other reason (in which case a court may consider the 
parties’ underlying agreement).  In other words, the judge assumed that in the event of 
formal invalidity, the document is the sole embodiment of the parties’ agreement and that 
no distinction could be drawn between the recordal and that agreement.  However, when 
the document recording the agreement complied with the relevant formal requirements but 
appeared to be substantively invalid, then a distinction could be drawn between the 
document and the underlying agreement. 
 
Such an approach is of course inconsistent with the theory underlying the imposition of the 
first step in the rectification of agreements subject to formalities.  The document 
constitutes the embodiment of the parties’ agreement and it is surely the document which 
must be considered to determine whether the agreement complies with both formal and 
substantive requirements.  If the document is the sole manifestation of the parties’ 
agreement and bearing in mind the rule that a void agreement cannot be rectified, then 
both substantive and formal invalidity should preclude rectification.  As Van der Merwe and 
others have pointed out,  
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 Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Jason 1988 2 SA 78 (D) 83C-D.  To clarify: the distinction is only 
important where contracts subject to formalities do not comply with those formalities.  
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“[i]n a case governed by statutory formalities it is arguable that the legal act is fully identified 
with its documentary manifestation.  As a matter of logic, it might therefore be contended that 
the proper analysis is, in the words of Didcott J in the Spiller case, that ‘appearance and reality 
coincide … Nullity, when the document shows it, is no illusion’, and that rectification ought to be 
excluded.”134 
 
Nevertheless, the effect of the Litecor Voltex decision is to limit the ambit of the first step 
so that it precludes only the rectification of a document which does not appear to be 
formally valid; in the case of (mere) substantive invalidity ex facie the document, it seems 
as if a court is entitled to have regard to the parties' “actual” agreement. 
 
This limitation of the ambit of first step is also apparent in cases where there is no doubt 
whatsoever that statutory formalities have been properly complied with, but where the 
document appears to reflect a substantively invalid agreement. 
 
In Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd v Ping Bai135 (''Headerman'') the court ordered 
rectification of a deed of alienation which complied with statutory formalities but which, ex 
facie the document, appeared to relate to the sale of erven in an unproclaimed township.  
Such a sale was prohibited by certain ordinances and the failure to heed this prohibition 
rendered the sale void.136  However, as in Litecor Voltex, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
interpreted the Spiller distinction as prohibiting the rectification of agreements subject to 
formalities only in cases where the document fails to identify an essential term and is 
therefore formally invalid.137  Where, as here, the document indicated compliance with 
statutory formalities but had the appearance of substantive invalidity, the court was entitled 
to consider the parties' underlying agreement (which was not invalid) and to rectify the 
document accordingly, by inserting the correct description of the land sold. 
 
Van der Merwe and others cite Engelbrecht v Nel138 (''Engelbrecht'') as an example of a 
judgment where the apparent substantive invalidity ex facie the document precluded its 
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rectification, thus contradicting the Headerman decision.139  In the Engelbrecht case, the 
parties had concluded a written agreement for the sale of land.  In addition to indicating the 
deposit which had to be paid, and the amount of monthly instalments, the document 
originally indicated that a further “R2500 per month [would be paid] which shall be capital 
and interest at 18% on a reducing balance per month”.140  The amount of R2500 was 
subsequently deleted without the insertion of a new amount as replacement, and the rate 
of interest was replaced by the phrase “bank overdraft rate”.141 
 
The court held that the method of payment is a material term of the agreement and that it 
had not been reduced to writing with sufficient certainty.142  The same argument applied to 
the amended method of calculation of the interest rate.143  As a result, the agreement was 
void and could not be rectified. 
 
It is difficult to determine the true basis for the court’s decision that the agreement could 
not be rectified.  On the one hand, and as indicated in the previous paragraph, the court 
suggested that the agreement, or at least certain terms thereof, was void for vagueness.  If 
certainty of performance is characterised as a substantive, rather than formal, requirement 
for validity, then the Engelbrecht case does appear to contradict the conclusion in 
Headerman.  However, the prevailing judicial tendency, rightly or wrongly, characterises 
the requirement that the terms of an agreement subject to formalities should be reasonably 
ascertainable as a formal requirement, rather than a general contractual principle.  Where 
a material term of the parties’ agreement has not been reduced to writing in a manner 
which renders it sufficiently ascertainable, the written agreement is treated as formally, 
rather than substantively, invalid.144   This appears to be the reasoning underlying the 
following statement in Engelbrecht:  
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 See also eg Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme 2002 3 SA 653 (NC); Thathiah v Kahn 
NO 1982 3 SA 370 (D); Magwaza v Heenan 1979 2 SA 1019 (A); Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A); Vogel 
NO v Volkersz 1977 1 SA 537 (T).  
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“The principle enunciated in a number of cases and confirmed in Magwaza v Heenan 1979 (2) 
SA 1019 (A) at 1024F - 1029B is that there can be no rectification of a sale of immovable 
property unless, ex facie the deed of sale, it complies with the requirements of the relevant 
statute.  [Counsel for the defendant] tried to counter this argument by suggesting that the 
method of payment was not one of the essentialia of the agreement in question, in which event 
the agreement was not a nullity and could be rectified … [T]here is no substance in this 
submission.”145 
 
A more definitive statement to the effect that the failure to record a term setting out the 
method of payment with reasonable certainty results in formal invalidity can be found in 
Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk v Enal Eiendomme:146  
 
“Toegepas op die onderhawige saak sal dit meebring dat die koopprys sowel as die wyse van 
betaling daarvan, in die skriftelike dokument waarin die vervreemdingsakte vervat is, bepaal en 
behoorlik omskryf moet wees, of dat ‘n formule daaruit blyk waarkragtens dit met redelike 
sekerheid objektief bepaal kan word sonder ‘n verwysing na getuienis van die mondelinge 
consensus tussen die partye.  By gebreke daaraan sal die kontrak ongeldig en onafdwingbaar 
wees vanweë nie-nakoming van die bepalings van opskrifstelling soos vereis deur die gemelde 
art 2 van die Wet op Vervreemding van Grond.”147   
 
Both the lenient approach to formal invalidity and the judicial tendency to rectify 
agreements subject to formalities where they appear to be substantively invalid only, 
represent attempts to navigate the tension between giving effect to the policy 
considerations underlying statutory formalities on the one hand, and the need to do justice 
on the other.  This is illustrated in Papenfus v Steyn:148 
 
“Die Howe dring aan op die noulettende nakoming van [statutêre formaliteite], maar 
terselfdertyd waak ons Howe daarteen dat die [formele vereistes] so uitgelê en toegepas word 
dat die ongerymdhede waarteen die [vereistes] gemik is juis deur die uitleg en toepassing 
daarvan aangemoedig of bevorder word.”149 
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 Engelbrecht v Nel 1991 2 SA 549 (W) 552C-D.  Counsel for the defendant was correct on one aspect at 
least: the method of payment is not one of the essentialia of a sale of land, but rather constitutes one of the 
substantive incidentalia of the agreement, provided the parties have agreed on such a term and have 
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The question arises whether such judicial navigation, which often results in drawing 
tenuous distinctions, could not have been avoided altogether in the absence of the first 
step. 
 
5 3 3 Is ex facie compliance with statutory formalities necessary? 
 
It would appear that despite the rule that statutory formalities are constitutive in nature and 
that this precludes consideration of any underlying agreement or prior intention 
independent of the document for the purposes of determining ex facie compliance, not all 
courts subscribe to this rule.  At least in Litecor Voltex, as well as in those cases where 
substantive invalidity was clear ex facie the document, the court indirectly recognised the 
separate existence of such an underlying agreement.  A comprehensive evaluation of the 
approaches discussed above and their implications for the policy concerns informing the 
imposition of the two-step approach must be undertaken, since the real issue is whether 
the recognition of an underlying agreement is in fact subversive of statutory formalities 
from a functional perspective.  This will be addressed later in this chapter.150  For current 
purposes, certain preliminary points of criticism of the position that a document which does 
not comply with statutory formalities cannot be rectified, will be considered.   
 
First, it is unclear whether Weinerlein actually supports the proposition set out in Dowdle, 
and relied upon in Magwaza, that an agreement which is subject to statutory formalities 
cannot be rectified if it does not first comply with those formalities.  Presumably, the court 
in Dowdle was relying on the following portion of De Villiers JA’s judgment:151  
 
“By putting the agreement in writing and signing it the parties have complied with the provisions 
of s 30 [of Transvaal Proclamation 8 of 1902].  So far, therefore, as that section is concerned, 
the agreement stands ... We were pressed with the decision of the Transvaal Supreme Court in 
the case of Jolly v Herman's Executors 1903 TS 515 [“Jolly”] in which it was laid down that there 
                                                          
150
 See 5 3 5 below. 
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 In Dowdle’s Estate v Dowdle 1947 3 SA 340 (T) 354, Dowling AJ does not indicate which judgment in the 
Weinerlein case implies that non-compliance with statutory formalities precludes rectification.  However, in 
Vogel NO v Volkersz 1977 1 SA 537 (T) 557A-B, Botha J indicates that it is that part of De Villiers JA’s 
judgment quoted in the main text above.  This portion of De Villiers JA’s judgment is also cited in Magwaza v 
Heenan 1979 2 SA 1019 (A) 1025E-H.  
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is no vinculum juris between the parties to a mineral contract as long as the contract has not 
been notarially executed and duly registered in accordance with the Volksraad Besluit.  It was 
urged that Jolly's case gives a person a right to resile as long as the provisions of the Volksraad 
Besluit have not been complied with and that the plaintiffs have a similar right in the present 
case … But there is nothing inconsistent in this view of s 30 with the decision in Jolly's case.  No 
doubt s 30 gives either party the right to refuse to complete the agreement before it has been 
put into writing and signed, but there is nothing in the section to compel the same conclusion 
where the agreement has been reduced to writing and signed.  The two cases differ toto caelo.  
In the one case there is no contract between the parties, who are free to go on with the contract 
or not as they please.  In the other there is a concluded contract between them, contractus 
absolutus et perfectus est.  (C 4.21.17; C 4.38.15; Faber C 4.16.14; Perezius C 21.10.)”152 
 
Botha J expressed doubt in Vogel NO v Volkersz153 as to whether De Villiers JA’s 
judgment supported the general proposition that non-compliance with statutory formalities 
rendered a written agreement incapable of rectification.  As the judge points out, the court 
in Weinerlein was confronted with the question whether rectification of a written agreement 
for the sale of land, which complied with the relevant formalities but which failed to 
describe the merx accurately, would be contrary to the relevant statutory formalities.  It 
was not asked to consider what the case would be if the agreement did not comply with 
statutory formalities.154 
 
Malan goes even further and argues that De Villiers JA’s judgment could be interpreted to 
mean that the mere reduction of the agreement to a signed document is sufficient for a 
court to consider rectifying an agreement subject to statutory formalities.155  According to 
him,156 this quoted portion of the judgment should be understood in light of the argument 
made by counsel for the plaintiffs to the effect that the absence of a valid, antecedent 
contract between the parties precluded rectification of the written document in order to 
reflect the parties’ actual agreement.  This was because  
 
“[t]o seek to bind the plaintiffs to such a contract … it is not a sufficient compliance with the 
section to show that there is a writing signed by both parties, unless each term of the 
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antecedent verbal agreement has been embodied in the writing.  In the absence of such a term 
in the instrument the plaintiff cannot be said to have agreed to that term because he has not 
agreed to it in writing.”157 
 
According to Malan, De Villiers JA’s response indicates that all which is required is that 
there must be an instrument which can be rectified; the fact that it reflects a void contract 
is neither here nor there.158  Furthermore, the purpose of drawing the distinction with Jolly 
was simply to indicate that in that case, the basic formal requirements of notarial execution 
and registration had not been complied with, and as a result there was nothing to rectify.159  
Malan argues that where writing only is prescribed, and the parties have complied with this 
requirement, there is something to rectify, albeit not a fully enforceable and valid contract.  
Thus, 
 
“[w]at Appèlregter De Villiers dus bedoel, is dat die partye die kontrak op skrif gestel het; daar is 
dus iets om te rektifiseer en dit kan gerektifiseer word.  In die lig van voorgaande moet dit 
duidelik wees dat Appèlregter De Villiers nie bedoel het dat die skriftelike stuk op die oog af 
geldig moet wees nie; hy het bloot skrifstelling vereis in teenstelling met ‘n algehele afwesigheid 
van skrifstelling.”160 
 
Such an interpretation of De Villiers JA’s judgment does appear to resonate in the 
judgment of Wessels JA, where he states that  
 
“[a]ll therefore, that sec. 30 says in effect is that the Courts will not recognise any contract of 
sale as a legal act unless it is in writing, but once the contract is in writing the Court will not 
allow it to be used as an engine of fraud to extort from an adversary what the claimant knows 
that he never was entitled to and in order to prevent this it will cause the written contract ... to be 
rectified.”161 
 
Furthermore, Malan’s interpretation would appear to be more in line with the equitable 
origins of the remedy of rectification.  All three judgments in the Weinerlein case 
emphasise the fact that to allow a party to rely on a written document which does not 
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accurately reflect the parties’ intention is to allow that party to perpetrate a type of fraud.162  
The imposition of the first step, contrary to this fraud-prevention purpose of rectification 
(and, incidentally, of formalities), allows a party to rely on the formal invalidity of the 
document, in spite of the fact that the parties may have orally agreed on all the particulars 
of their agreement.  This does not seem to be consistent with the general equitable origins 
of the remedy of rectification emphasised in the Weinerlein case. 
 
Despite the possible merits of Malan’s argument, it does display some weaknesses.  For 
example he, like Dowling AJ in the Dowdle case, appears to lose sight of the fact that the 
court was not asked to consider whether the rectification of an agreement which did not 
comply with statutory formalities would be possible.  Furthermore, it is arguable that the 
relaxation of the prior concluded contract requirement has nothing to do with whether a 
formally invalid agreement can be rectified, but rather with what must be proved in order to 
succeed with a claim for rectification.  Nevertheless, Malan’s interpretation of De Villiers 
JA’s judgment does appear to present a solution to the problems which have arisen with 
the requirement that a document must first comply with statutory formalities before it can 
be rectified.  
 
In addition to the possibly suspect origins of the first step, its imposition has also led to the 
development of the rather tenuous distinction between formal and substantive invalidity in 
an attempt to avoid it.  As discussed above, it is unclear why the apparent formal invalidity 
of a document recording an agreement subject to formalities should preclude rectification, 
whereas substantive invalidity apparent ex facie the document would not.  Such a 
distinction is illogical.  If the effect of constitutive formal requirements is to equate the 
document with the parties’ agreement, then any kind of invalidity ex facie the recordal 
should preclude rectification on the basis that no obligation is created and as a 
consequence, that there is nothing to rectify.  Furthermore, cases like Litecor Voltex and 
Engelbrecht create doubt as to what exactly formal and substantive invalidity mean in the 
context of the first step.  This is not conducive to the certainty that the first step is 
supposed to promote.163  
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Even within the context of formal validity itself, there appears to be uncertainty over the 
extent to which extrinsic evidence is admissible in order to prove that a document is 
formally invalid.  Cases like Intercontinental Exports, Cohen (1) and Brits suggest that 
extrinsic evidence is never permissible to contradict what appears ex facie the document.  
Thus, if a document appears to record a formally valid agreement, the court will proceed to 
the second step, despite the fact that the actual agreement between the parties may not 
comply with formal requirements.  This rule applies to the essentialia of the agreement, as 
well as all other material terms. 
 
However, in Philmatt the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that evidence of an omitted 
material term is permissible when it is tendered to show that a written agreement, which is 
subject to formalities, did not contain that term and is for that reason invalid.  If the Philmatt 
case is taken as overruling contrary decisions, then it seems to have far-reaching 
implications for what the courts were doing in cases like Cohen (1) and Brits.  If it is true 
that an agreement subject to statutory formalities must contain all the material terms of the 
parties’ agreement, and that the failure to include such a term renders the agreement 
(formally) void, then cases which have proceeded to rectify agreements from which a 
material term has been omitted are arguably rectifying a nullity.  If this is so, then the first 
step, at least in these types of cases, is rendered nugatory. 
 
In any event, the requirement of apparent formal validity as a prerequisite to rectification 
appears to be based on a logical error about the nature of the remedy.  Statements to the 
effect that “[one] cannot, by rectification, invest a document which, on the face of it, is null 
and void, with legal force”164 and that “[being] a nullity, [an agreement subject to formalities 
cannot] be rectified so as to become a valid contract”165 presuppose that rectification, in 
itself, constitutes transformation and/or enforcement of a nullity.  This is incorrect: 
rectification simply corrects the document.166  In Spiller it was noted that rectification 
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 Dowdle’s Estate v Dowdle 1947 3 SA 340 (T) 354. 
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 Kourie v Bean 1949 2 SA 567 (T) 572. 
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 Boundary Financing Ltd v Protea Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2009 3 SA 447 (SCA) para 13; Kerr The 
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relates to and concerns the document, but that does not mean that the remedy is focused 
on the enforcement of the agreement it reflects.167  In other words, a distinction can be 
made between the correction of the document, which is the purpose of rectification, and 
the enforcement of the recorded agreement once corrected.  This distinction between 
correction and enforcement was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Akasia 
Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Shoredits Holdings Ltd.168  The court permitted the rectification 
of a written agreement despite the possibility (and the court considered it no more than a 
mere possibility) that the correction might render the written agreement too vague to be 
enforced.  According to the court, provided the parties’ common intention is clear, it is 
irrelevant that the rectification of the document may have the effect that there are no 
longer any enforceable rights and obligations.169  
 
Finally, there is an inherent contradiction in the South African approach.  When strictly 
applied, the first step to rectification ignores the existence of an underlying agreement 
because, as discussed above, the document itself is regarded as the sole embodiment of 
the parties’ agreement and therefore as the only determinant of the validity of the 
agreement.  However, when the further requirements for rectification are considered, 
South African courts recognise that the document is merely the recordal of an underlying 
agreement or at least a common continuing intention.  This is artificial: an agreement or 
common intention cannot exist for some purposes and not for others.  Arguably, the fact 
that local courts adopt a two-step approach promotes this artificiality by allowing them to 
regard the first step as an issue of compliance with statutory formalities and the second as 
a claim for rectification, whereas the actual issue should be whether the rectification of the 
document in the particular circumstances would subvert the functions of formalities.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
conceptually and therefore should be treated separately in a claim for rectification.  According to these 
writers, rectification should be permitted even where the document on the face of it does not comply with 
formalities.   
167
 Spiller v Lawrence 1976 1 SA 307 (N) 313A-D.  See also Tager 1977 SALJ 11; Lazarus v Gorfinkel 1988 
4 SA 123 (C). 
168
 2002 3 SA 346 (SCA). 
169
 Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Shoredits Holdings Ltd 2002 3 SA 346 (SCA) paras 14, 16.  In this 
regard the court did not refer to opinions to the contrary which indicated that when rectification would be 
pointless, eg when the parties’ prior agreement or intention is inchoate, a court will not rectify a document. 
See Spiller v Lawrence 1976 1 SA 307 (N) 308G; Bamford 1963 SALJ 528 534; Kerr The Law of Contract 
152. 
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5 3 4 A comparative perspective on the correction of written agreements  
 
As will become apparent, civilian and common-law courts are also required to determine 
the extent to which compliance with formal requirements should outweigh the need to give 
effect to what the parties actually agreed upon or intended.  It is therefore appropriate to 
consider how civilian and common-law courts would deal with this challenge.  
 
5 3 4 1 A civilian approach to the correction of errors in agreements subject to 
statutory formalities 
 
It was noted earlier that German law does not recognise a rule similar to the parol 
evidence rule, which excludes all extrinsic evidence when the document purports to be the 
sole record of the parties’ agreement.170  However, it does recognise a presumption in 
favour of the completeness and accuracy of a written document, which is even stronger in 
the case of agreements which must be reduced to writing by virtue of statutory formalities.  
Nevertheless, this jurisdiction also allows a written agreement to be brought into line with 
the parties’ actual intention when, by virtue of a mistake, the former does not constitute an 
accurate recordal of the parties’ consensus. 
 
As a preliminary point, there appears to be an inconsistency between allowing the parties’ 
subjective intention to override the objective meaning of the written terms and the 
(primarily) objective approach to interpretation adopted in this system.171  Since the 
                                                          
170
 See ch 4 (4 2 1). 
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 § 133 BGB states that when interpreting a declaration of intent, it is necessary to ascertain the true 
intention behind the declaration rather than being bound to its literal meaning.  However, § 133 BGB alone 
does not determine the meaning of a contract; it is applied in conjunction with § 157 BGB which requires an 
interpreter to interpret a contract with the requirements of good faith in mind, taking commercial practice into 
account.  Thus, the ostensibly subjective approach to interpretation in German law is in fact combined with 
various objective elements (B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise 2 ed (2006) 134).  This means that a declaration of intent is not interpreted in terms of 
the intention of the party making the declaration, but rather as it would be understood by a reasonable 
person in the position of the recipient of the declaration (See Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 
128 who states that “[t]he interpreter, to use a catchword repeated over and over again, has to adopt the 
‘objective perspective of the recipient of the declaration’ (‘objektiver Empfängerhorizont’)”; see also 
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meaning of a contract is purportedly determined from the perspective of a reasonable 
person in the position of the respective addressees of the declarations of intent, and not in 
accordance with the subjective intention with which these declarations were made, the 
stated intention of the parties as to the meaning of a term is usually regarded as 
irrelevant.172  This presents a doctrinal hurdle when the parties have recorded a written 
agreement which does not accurately reflect their intention. 
 
Rather than relying on paragraph 133 BGB to justify correcting such a written document, 
German courts approach this problem as a type of mistake in expression, and solve it 
according to the old Roman maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet: a false description does 
not vitiate the contract.  Incidentally, this maxim is also used in English law, but the scope 
of its application is narrower than in German law.  In the former jurisdiction, it is utilised in 
situations when the words used in a contract to describe the subject-matter, apply in part 
correctly and in part incorrectly to that subject-matter.  In such a case, a court will apply 
the correct part, and reject the incorrect part.173  Thus, the maxim is applied to remedy 
inconsistencies within the written document.174  In German law, the maxim allows a court 
to consider the parties’ actual agreement, which then prevails over the words used in the 
contract.  Although this appears to be inconsistent with the objective approach to 
interpretation adopted in this system, it is reconcilable with its underlying justification – it 
cannot be said that either party has justifiably relied on the objective meaning of the 
terms.175  Enforcing the contract as originally intended is also in accordance with the 
principle of good faith.176 
 
There are two categories of cases which are dealt with in terms of the falsa demonstratio 
principle.  The first group contains those cases which would be labelled as rectification for 
a common mistake in English and South African law.  The representative German case in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
subsequent to contract conclusion), previous negotiations, and subsequent conduct (Vogenauer 
“Interpretation” in Contract Terms 135). 
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 Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 140. 
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 See K Lewison The Interpretation of Contracts 5 ed (2011) § 9.05. 
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 Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 141; AJ Dunning & Sons (Shopfitters) Ltd v Sykes & Son 
(Poole) Ltd [1987] 1 Ch 287. 
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 Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 141. 
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this group is the well-known “Shark meat case”.177  Here, the parties concluded a contract 
of sale for haakjöringsköd, believing it meant “whale meat” in Norwegian, when in fact it 
meant shark meat.  The court found that both parties had intended to contract for whale 
meat, but had erroneously used the wrong word to express that intention; as a result, the 
court held that the legal relationship between the parties must be assessed as if they had 
used the expression “whale meat”.178  Another example of where the court gave effect to 
the parties’ actual intention is in the case where the contract described the land to be sold 
as parcels 31 and 32; the parties actually intended that an additional piece of land, parcel 
33, would also be sold.179  Here too the parties’ common intention took precedence over 
the incomplete description in the contract. 
 
The second group of cases to which the falsa demonstratio principle would be applied, 
consists of those which would be treated as rectification for a unilateral mistake in English 
and South African law: where one party was labouring under a mistake as to the meaning 
of a term and the other party was aware of this actual intention, but did not indicate that his 
own was different.  In such a case, the judge has 
 
“to determine the content of the contract in accordance with the intention of the [mistaken party].  
The reason for this is that, if both parties to the contract have understood a declaration of 
intention in a particular sense, it is this mutually corresponding intention, and not the words of 
the declaration, which is decisive.  It is not necessary that the recipient of the declaration 
embraces the true intention of the person making the declaration.  It is rather sufficient that he 
recognises the intention and concludes the contract in the knowledge of this intention.”180 
 
                                                          
177
 RGZ 99, 147 (08-06-1920) ( a translation of the judgment can be found in H Beale, B Fauvarque-Cosson, 
J Rutgers, D Tallon & S Vogenauer Ius Commune Casebooks for the Common Law of Europe: Cases, 
Materials and Text on Contract Law 2 ed (2010) 445-446). 
178
 In English law, this type of fact pattern would not be capable of being resolved through application of the 
falsa demonstratio principle.  The description haakjöringsköd fits the subject-matter “shark meat”; in such a 
case, “if the description, taken as a whole, does fit some subject without inaccuracy, the court cannot reject 
part of the description by the application of the principle” (Lewison Interpretation of Contracts 483-484). 
179
 BGHZ 87, 150 (25-03-1983) 152-155.  A similar case in English law is Craddock Brothers v Hunt [1923] 2 
Ch 126, where the court used the remedy of rectification to resolve the discrepancy between the description 
in the document and the parties’ actual agreement.  Again, the principle of falsa demonstratio would not be 
capable of application. 
180
 BGH NJW-RR 1993, 373 (translated in Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 142). 
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Vogenauer criticises the application of the falsa demonstratio principle (evident in the 
second sentence quoted above) to cases where one party is mistaken, and the other is 
aware of this mistake but does nothing to correct it.  He argues that the principle is seen as 
a narrow exception to the objective approach, and its application can only be justified by 
the existence of a common intention, something which is lacking in this type of fact 
pattern.181  He argues that an approach which is more consistent with the general 
approach to contractual interpretation in German law is that which was adopted in earlier 
case law.  In these cases,182 the courts relied on paragraph 116 BGB which provides that 
a declaration made by a party who secretly reserves to himself the intention not to be 
bound to the declaration (ie a reservatio mentalis) is not void for that reason alone.  For 
example, a declaration is made to sell parcels 31, 32 and 33, and the offeree accepts the 
offer, knowing that the offeror made a mistake (the intention was only to sell parcels 31 
and 32), and yet secretly reserves to himself the intention not to be bound to the offeror’s 
actual intention.  In such a case, the offeror’s actual intention will be enforced, because a 
reasonable person in the position of the offeree would have understood the declaration as 
it was intended.183  According to Vogenauer, this past approach of the courts is more 
consistent with the objective approach to interpretation in the German legal system, 
because it reinforces the idea that a declaration of intent is to be understood from the 
perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the recipient of that declaration, 
taking into account good faith and having regard to commercial practice (thus, in terms of 
the combined application of paragraphs 133 and 157 BGB).  A party who knows that the 
other party is mistaken but does nothing to correct it and who secretly reserves to himself 
the idea that he will not be bound to that party’s actual intention is acting in bad faith and, 
furthermore, cannot be said to have justifiably relied on the meaning of the words used.184  
                                                          
181
 “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 142. 
182
 RGZ 66, 427 (29-10-1907) 429; RGZ 92, 297 (18-09-1918) 299. 
183
 Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 142.  Cf Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 1 SA 418 (A) 424F-H, 
425D in which it was held that the unilateral mistake of the purchaser, of which the seller was aware, justified 
rectification on the basis that there was a “common intention”– the only common intention which could exist 
on the facts of that case was the purchaser’s intention to pay half the purchase price of the shares, coupled 
with the reasonable reliance that the seller also shared that intention.  See also the obiter dictum in 
Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling 1986 4 SA 914 927F-I, in which the court pointed out that 
rectification could have been claimed - on the court’s own interpretation of the facts of that case, such 
rectification would probably also have been justified on the basis of reliance theory.  
184
 Vogenauer “Interpretation” in Contract Terms 143.  See also Beale et al Ius Commune Casebook 455-
456. 




Thus, the German approach is to characterise situations where the document does not 
accurately represent the parties’ intention as a matter of interpretation or construction.  
This is largely due to the fact that this system does not recognise a rule similar in effect to 
the parol evidence rule – in principle, all extrinsic evidence is admissible in order to 
determine whether a written agreement is valid and what it means.185  The presumption 
which exists here as to the completeness and accuracy of a written agreement merely 
affects the weight of this evidence.  As discussed above, while Vogenauer appears to 
agree in principle with the German courts’ application of the falsa demonstratio principle to 
situations where the parties have a shared intention which is not accurately reflected in the 
written document, he argues that this principle is not appropriately applied in cases where 
there has been a unilateral mistake of which the other party was aware.  By suggesting 
that the more correct approach is one which emphasises that a party’s mental reservation 
does not, for that reason, render a contract invalid, he seems to be suggesting that the 
problem, at least insofar as it relates to unilateral mistakes, should be reclassified as one 
of contract conclusion.  
 
The falsa demonstratio principle, as it is applied in German law, presupposes that there is 
in fact an inaccurate or insufficient description of a term in the contract.  However, it also 
appears that when an essential term of the agreement subject to formalities is omitted 
from the contract, a German court will use the Andeutungstheorie to determine whether 
there is some allusion or ‘indication’ of this omitted term in the contract itself.186  If there is 
such an allusion, the court will permit evidence of external circumstances to discover 
whether the parties had in fact agreed upon the omitted term.187  As a second step, the 
court will then determine whether the contract is formally valid in light of these external 
circumstances.  The justification underlying this approach is that evidentiary certainty is 
trumped by the belief of the parties that they have concluded a valid agreement.188 
 
                                                          
185
 B Häcker “Mistakes in the Execution of Documents: Recent Cases on Rectification and Related 
Doctrines” (2008) 19 KLJ 293 306-307.  
186
 This theory is discussed in ch 4 (4 2 1). 
187
 See eg R Kanzleiter “§ 311b” in W Krüger (ed) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 2 
Allgemeiner Teil: §§ 241-432 5 ed (2007) n 64. 
188
 N 64. 
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In common-law jurisdictions, as in South Africa, this particular problem cannot be dealt 
with as one of interpretation, since the parol evidence rule precludes consideration of the 
parties’ prior agreement or intentions when interpreting a written agreement.  However, an 
examination of the way in which rectification proceeds in these common-law jurisdictions 
also indicates that a court will first rectify an agreement before determining its formal 
validity. 
 
5 3 4 2 The common-law approach to the correction of errors in agreements subject 
to statutory formalities  
 
Unlike South African courts, common-law courts do not hesitate to rectify an agreement 
subject to formalities, even when the documented recordal fails to comply with them.  This 
was not always the position in English law: until the authoritative decision in Joscelyne v 
Nissen,189 it was unclear whether a document recording an agreement subject to statutory 
formalities could be rectified to give effect to a prior oral agreement or whether the fact that 
that prior agreement did not constitute a valid contract precluded such a claim. 
 
However, the introduction of the “prior common intention” requirement in common-law 
jurisdictions allows a court to rectify the document so that it complies with the relevant 
legislation rather than because it does so.  Therefore, even where essential terms have 
been omitted from the document, these terms may be inserted, provided the traditional 
requirements for rectification have been met,190 namely that  
 
“(1) the parties had a common continuing intention, whether or not amounting to an agreement, 
in respect of a particular matter in the instrument to be rectified; (2) there was an outward 
expression of accord; (3) the intention continued at the time of the execution of the instrument 
                                                          
189
 [1970] 2 QB 86. 
190
 E Peel Treitel’s The Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 191, 348; C N Brown Corbin on Contracts 4: Statute of 
Frauds §§ 12.1-23.11 (1997) § 14.22; American Law Institute Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts 
(1981) § 156 (where it is stated that there is no meaningful distinction between errors of commission and 
those of omission); United States of America v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196; Craddock Brothers v Hunt 
[1923] 2 Ch 136; GMAC Commercial Credit Development Limited v Kalvinder Singh Sandhu, Kewal Singh 
Sandhu [2004] EWHC 716; Hughes v Payne 22 SD 293, 117 NW 363 (1908); Calhoun v Downs 211 Cal 
766, 297 P 548 (1931); Whiting v Diver Plumbing & Heating Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 560 569; Jireh Customs 
Limited v Clode [2008] NZHC 1665. 
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sought to be rectified; [and] (4) by mistake the instrument did not reflect that common 
intention.”191 
 
This phenomenon may be explained on the basis that the relevant legislation usually 
prescribes different consequences for non-compliance with statutory formalities.  For 
example, the English Statute of Frauds provides that when a guarantee does not contain 
all the terms of the parties' agreement, that guarantee is merely unenforceable, rather than 
void.  This means that  
 
“[t]he statute, in fact, only provides that no agreement not in writing and not duly signed shall be 
sued on: but when the written instrument is rectified there is a writing which satisfies the statute, 
the jurisdiction of the court to rectify being outside the prohibition of the statute."192 
 
Unenforceability means that common-law courts do not have to grapple with the apparent 
legal problem of rectifying a document which simultaneously constitutes the agreement 
between the parties and which appears to be a nullity.193  It allows a court to recognise that 
there is an underlying agreement or intention and to rectify a document which does not 
represent that agreement or intention accurately.  Unlike their South African counterparts 
furthermore, common-law courts are not faced with the apparent difficulty of distinguishing 
between the consequences of non-compliance with statutory formalities and the failure to 
record an agreement accurately.  As the above quotation illustrates, the relevant 
legislation makes it clear that non-compliance leads to unenforceability; since rectification 
is aimed at the correction of the document and not its enforcement, a court which grants 
the remedy does not circumvent the prohibition of the relevant statute.194   
 
Admittedly, not much can be gained from attempting to compare the consequence of 
unenforceability with that of nullity.  Something which is void is non-existent, and not 
merely incapable of being enforced.195   
 
                                                          
191
 Swainland Builders Limited v Freehold Properties Limited [2002] EWCA Civ 560 para 33. 
192
 United States of America v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196 200-201 per the Earl of Birkenhead. 
193
 Peel Contract 193 states that the contract can be concluded orally, but it can only be enforced if the 
contract has been reduced to writing. 
194
 GMAC Commercial Credit Development Limited v Kalvinder Singh Sandhu, Kewal Singh Sandhu [2004] 
EWHC 716 para 58. 
195
 See Tager 1977 SALJ 14-15. 
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Nevertheless, there are certain common-law statutes which prescribe invalidity for non-
compliance with statutory formalities.  The first is section 2(1) of the English Law of 
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.  However, unlike its South African equivalent, the 
Act also makes specific provision for the rectification of a deed in order to make it comply 
with statutory formalities.196  The fact that this remedy is statutorily permitted in spite of the 
fact that the agreement is void may suggest that the legislature was not aware of, or 
disagreed with, the idea that one cannot rectify a void agreement.  This makes a direct 
comparison between the South African and the English approach on the point somewhat 
difficult, although if the South African approach was as self-evident as the courts assume it 
to be, one would have expected some academic or judicial commentary on the apparent 
change in position adopted by the English legislature.197 
 
The California Civil Code is another statute which prescribes invalidity when certain 
agreements have not been reduced to writing.198  While the Code also contains a provision 
relating to the rectification of agreements, it does not explicitly authorise the rectification of 
a void agreement in order to comply with formalities.199  It is therefore useful to note how a 
Californian court would approach this issue.   
 
In Oatman v Niemeyer200 the Supreme Court of California was asked to rectify a deed of 
sale which failed to describe the property that was the object of the sale.  It held as follows: 
 
“There can, of course, be no question but that the deed was void in law, that is, that it failed 
wholly as conveyance of property since no property was described.  But the contention that, for 
                                                          
196
 S 2(4); see also Addendum A. 
197
 The change in position refers to the fact that prior to the promulgation of the Act, contracts for the sale of 
land were governed by the Law of Property Act 1925 which prescribed unenforceability in the event of non-
compliance with statutory formalities.  The imposition of nullity was a product of the English Law 
Commission’s recommendation in Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of Land (Law Com No 164) (1987).  
The change was suggested largely due to the uncertainty regarding the enforceability of letters “subject to 
contract” as memoranda and the scope of the doctrine of part performance (paras 1.4-1.9; see also chs 3 (3 
2 1) and 6 (6 4 2).  Despite the fact that non-compliance with statutory formalities now renders an agreement 
for the sale of land void, the Law Commission confirmed in para 5.6 that rectification would also be available 
under the new regime, without any comment on the apparent contradiction or inconsistency, at least from a 
South African perspective, in the notion that a void agreement may be rectified.  
198
 § 1624.   
199
 § 3399 simply reiterates the general common-law rules relating to rectification. 
200
 207 Cal 424, 278 P 1043 (1929). 
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that reason, it cannot be reformed fails to distinguish between a contract which is void for some 
fundamental reason and an instrument or writing which is void because of mistake in its 
preparation.  If the contract itself is void, as, for example, because it is immoral or because the 
parties have not agreed on all of its terms and there is, for that reason, no final contract or 
understanding between them, … reformation is impossible, since there is no valid contract to 
reform.  But this is entirely different from a case where there is a valid contract and the parties 
have endeavored to put it in writing, and have made a mistake in writing down its terms, or have 
endeavored in accordance with the contract to execute an instrument, such as a deed, for the 
purpose of carrying it out and, through mistake in the preparation of the instrument, the 
document fails, either wholly or partially, to accomplish such purpose.  The instrument may be 
void in such a case because of the mistake, but there is still a valid contract; and the contract 
being valid, equity will reform the instrument to make it what it should be, and would have been 
except for the mistake.  There is no making of a new contract in such a case.  There is but the 
making of a new instrument, either to correctly express the contract or to carry it into effect.”201  
 
This portion of the judgment is quoted in full as an illustration of a more tenable approach 
to the problem.  First, it indicates that even where formalities are constitutive, a logical 
distinction can be drawn between the document (instrument) and the underlying 
agreement or contract.  Secondly, it illustrates that rectification of a document which does 
not comply with formalities does not necessarily lead to the inescapable conclusion that a 
court is investing a void transaction with validity.  Under these circumstances, “[t]here is no 
making of a new contract”, but the correction of the document or deed which inaccurately 
reflects that agreement.  Finally, it places the correct question in the foreground: is the 
agreement that the parties concluded (and not necessarily its recordal) valid, or void? 
 
Arguably, the approach in both common- and civil law jurisdictions as described maintains 
a better balance between the need to promote the functions of statutory formalities and the 
need to give effect to the parties' true intention.  Logically, a document should first be 
corrected before one can determine whether it complies with the requirements for validity, 
both formal and substantive, and is therefore enforceable.202  In German law, all extrinsic 
evidence is admissible in order to determine the content of a written agreement.  If this 
evidence indicates that there has been a mistake in the recordal of the agreement, the 
falsa demonstratio principle and the Andeutungstheorie allow effect to be given to the 
parties’ true intention.  Only thereafter does a court determine whether the corrected 




 Brown Corbin on Contracts 4 234-236.  See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 157. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
193 
 
agreement is (formally) valid or void.  This is also the procedure followed in common-law 
countries, at least insofar as it relates to rectification: first correct the document and then 
determine its validity once corrected.  Of course, this does not mean that a document will 
always be rectified when it does not comply with formalities; it simply places the emphasis, 
correctly it is argued, on the true issue, which is whether the requirements for rectification 
have been met.  Whether the difference in emphasis between the South African approach 
on the one hand, and the common (and civilian) approach on the other, has any effect on 
the policy issues underlying the imposition of formalities is considered below. 
 
5 3 5 Rectification of a formally invalid document and the functions of formalities 
 
The rectification of agreements subject to formalities involves two conflicting principles.203  
The first, underlying rectification, is that effect must be given to the true agreement 
between the parties.  The other is that the functions of statutory formalities should not be 
circumvented.  In Magwaza, the court opted to give greater weight to the second principle 
and held that the rectification of an agreement which does not comply with statutory 
formalities opens the door to fraud, possible perjury and unnecessary litigation.204   
 
As a general rule, South African courts do not consider the policy considerations 
underlying formal requirements when determining whether an agreement subject to 
formalities should be rectified, perhaps because there is an assumption that formal validity 
automatically precludes the subversion of such functions.  This is certainly the impression 
created in Magwaza,205 where the court very briefly mentioned that in order to promote the 
evidentiary function fulfilled by formalities, effect must be given to the plain wording of the 
relevant statute.  This statement was made without considering the fact that while a 
document may appear to record a formally valid agreement, a mistake in that recordal 
renders the document inaccurate evidence of the parties’ agreement.  A document 
containing an incorrect description of land, for example, is no better evidence of the 
parties’ agreement than a document which contains no description at all.  Furthermore, 
there appears to be an inherent contradiction in an approach which stipulates the 
                                                          
203
 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 256A per Squires J. 
204
 Magwaza v Heenan 1979 2 SA 1019 (A) 1029F.  According to Friedman J in Thathiah v Kahn NO 1982 3 
SA 370 (D) 375B-C, this is the true ratio of that decision. 
205
 Magwaza v Heenan 1979 2 SA 1019 (A) 1029E-F. 
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requirement of formal validity as a precondition to rectification in order to prevent 
uncertainty and disputes and then allows rectification of that document, when the remedy 
in itself opens the door to uncertainty and disputes.206  However subsequent decisions, if 
they mention policy issues at all, have simply proceeded on the same assumption of 
automatic subversion as justification for the decision that a particular agreement cannot be 
rectified, without investigating whether the facts really merit such a conclusion. 
 
This point is illustrated by a closer examination of the decisions in Republican Press and 
Intercontinental Exports.  In the former case, the court justified its strict approach on the 
following basis: the majority, per Hurt J, emphasised that the Magwaza decision amounted 
to a clear policy statement that the intention of the legislator should prevail over the 
equitable remedy of rectification.207  The fact that giving effect to this intention may lead to 
anomalous results was not, according to the court, sufficient justification for adopting a 
“lenient” approach in determining whether a document should be rectified.208  Although 
Intercontinental Exports represents a less strict approach (by recognising that a document 
is formally valid when it is reasonably capable of an interpretation consistent with validity) 
the court nevertheless supported the majority decision in Republican Press.209  
 
In a previous chapter the following comment was noted:210 
  
“Chance may determine whether the transcription error in question, in addition to giving the 
same name to two parties, introduces a slight difference into the name thereby allowing the 
principle of Intercontinental Exports to operate or whether the name is identical so the case falls 
within Republican Press (Pty) Ltd”.211   
 
It was further noted there that this criticism loses sight of the difference in the facts of the 
respective cases: companies cannot have the same names (Republican Press) while 
natural persons can and do (Intercontinental Exports). 
                                                          
206
 Vogel NO v Volkersz 1977 1 SA 537 (T) 558F-G. 
207




 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles [1999] 2 All SA 304 (A) para 16. 
210
 See ch 3 (3 3 2 2). 
211
 C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s The Law of Suretyship 5 ed (2002) 71.  This opinion is expressed 
again in the sixth edition (76 n 73).  See also M Nortje “General Principles of Contract” 1999 ASSAL 154 
171; J T Pretorius “Surety Issues: A Survey of Recent Cases” (2006) 14 JBL 164 168. 




The criticism is more convincing however, when considered in the context of the policy 
considerations underlying the imposition of formalities.  In neither Republican Press nor 
Intercontinental Exports did the court consider whether its decision promoted the functions 
of formalities.  From this perspective, the latter decision fails to do so any better than the 
former.  In both cases, the document before the court constituted incorrect and misleading 
evidence of the true agreement between the parties.  In addition, and although this is 
rarely mentioned in cases dealing with formalities,212 the cautionary function of formalities 
had been fulfilled: the document in each case had been reduced to writing, thereby 
(presumably) giving the respective sureties an opportunity to consider the obligations they 
were undertaking.  When considered in this light, the different decisions (and approaches) 
in these two cases, while possibly strictly logically correct, do seem arbitrary. 
 
But what of decisions permitting rectification where the document creates the impression 
of substantive invalidity?  Do they, by limiting the ambit and effect of the first step, subvert 
the functions of formalities by recognising that there is an agreement independent of the 
document which records it?  While possibly contrary to the rule that the document is the 
sole manifestation of the parties’ agreement, it is suggested that these cases appear to 
promote at least the evidentiary function of formalities, since the document once rectified 
constitutes accurate evidence of the parties' (valid) agreement. 
 
This recognition that an inaccurate recordal constitutes misleading evidence of the parties’ 
true intention, and should be corrected for that reason, appears to underlie the application 
of the falsa demonstratio principle and the Andeutungstheorie in German law.  In the 
context of the sale of land, the comment has been made that where there is an inaccurate 
description of the subject-matter, it is (usually) only the evidentiary function of the 
document which fails; the function of writing as a means to warn and inform the parties is 
                                                          
212
 The minority judgment in Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 
proves to be one of the few exceptions.  Squires J alluded to the cautionary function of formalities when he 
said that “[t]he relevant party, in the form of the surety, has addressed himself and his mind to the completion 
of the document, but erroneously also recorded the creditor's name as that of the principal debtor.” (259I-
260A). 
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nevertheless fulfilled.213  This being the case, the document may be corrected in order to 
present an accurate record of the parties’ agreement.  A similar argument appears to 
underlie the common-law approach.  For example, it has been stated that  
 
“[t]he theory of reformation is that the instrument already is subjectively – i.e., to the parties – 
what they supposed it to be, and therefore that the statutory requirement of writing is, 
subjectively at least, satisfied; and that the ‘reformation’ is needed only to make the instrument 
appear to all the rest of the world as it appeared (and therefore legally was) to the parties when 
they signed it.”214  
 
It is therefore arguable that the requirement of formal validity as a prerequisite to the 
rectification of an agreement subject to formalities is not only illogical, inconsistently 
applied and uncertain in its ambit, but also unnecessary from a functional perspective.  
Cases like Republican Press and Intercontinental Exports illustrate that the first step does 
not really promote the functions of formalities any better than a decision like Litecor Voltex 
which appears to avoid it.  In fact, all that these cases really achieve is to “demonstrate the 
irrelevance of apparent formal validity as a litmus test for the rectification of a formal 
contract.”215 
 
A more convincing argument would be that statutory formalities are undermined when non-
compliance with formal requirements reflects the lack of agreement between the parties on 
a term which is required to be in writing.  Rectification in these circumstances would 
subvert formalities legislation by opening the door to the possibility of fraud and perjury.  
However, this subversion could be prevented through a proper consideration and 
application of the requirements of rectification.  It is these requirements which serve as the 





                                                          
213
 See Kanzleiter “§ 311b” in Münchener Kommentar 2 n 67.  Even where these warning and information 
functions of formalities have failed, the document is nevertheless corrected in order to ensure the parties’ 
reliance on the “workability” of the contract. 
214
 J H Chadbourn Evidence in Trials at Common Law by John Henry Wigmore 9 (1981) § 2417(3). 
215
 Nortje 1999 ASSAL 171. 
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5 4 The second step: the requirements for rectification 
5 4 1 Introduction 
 
Once it is proved that there has been compliance with statutory formalities ex facie the 
document, a party seeking rectification must prove that the parties shared a common 
intention which they intended to express in their written document, but which they failed to 
do by virtue of a mistake.216 
 
A claim for rectification of an agreement subject to statutory formalities therefore has four 
main elements: (i) there is a document which on its face complies with formalities; (ii) there 
is a common intention which is not reflected accurately in the document; (iii) such 
inaccuracy is the result of a mistake; and (iv) the document should be corrected in a 
certain way to give effect to the parties' common intention.217  This discussion will focus on 
the second and third elements, since the fourth depends on the facts and the first has 
already been discussed. 
 
5 4 2 The requirement of a “prior common intention” 
 
If the remedy of rectification was received from English law, then the South African courts 
preceded their English counterparts in the relaxation of at least one of its requirements, 
namely that it is sufficient to prove the existence of a prior common intention, rather than a 
prior valid contract, which is not reflected in the written document.  However, the meaning 
                                                          
216
 See Meyer v Merchant’s Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 253; Von Ziegler v Superior Furniture Manufacturers 
(Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 399 (T) 410H; Van der Merwe et al Contract 154.  Either the plaintiff or the defendant 
may seek rectification, but the latter may also raise the fact that the agreement sought to be enforced by the 
plaintiff is an incorrect recordal of their actual agreement, without simultaneously claiming that the agreement 
should be rectified.  Lombaard v Droprop CC 2010 5 SA 1 (SCA) para 12; Van der Merwe et al Contract 154 
n 195. 
217
 Even if the plaintiff could prove these elements, it is nevertheless possible that rectification could be 
excluded as a matter of law (see eg Nedbank Ltd v Chance 2008 4 SA 209 (D) para 9 for the exclusion of 
rectification once a concursus creditorum has been established) or by agreement (Bamford 1963 SALJ 537, 
although Kerr The Law of Contract 155 differs on this point).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
198 
 
of a prior common intention, as opposed to a prior contract, is not easy to determine, 
particularly in the light of the fact that courts often refer to it without elaboration.218   
 
In the Weinerlein case, the court had to consider whether an incorrect description of land 
in a written contract could be rectified, where the parties had previously verbally agreed 
upon the correct piece of land.219  Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the written contract 
could not be rectified because, in accordance with the English case of Mackenzie v 
Coulson220 there had to be proof of an “actual concluded contract [ie one which was both 
formally and substantively valid] antecedent to the instrument which is sought to be 
rectified”.221   
 
In English law, this prior valid contract requirement was particularly problematic when non-
compliance with statutory formalities, like seals, resulted in nullity rather than 
unenforceability.  For example, in W Higgins Ltd v Northhampton Corp,222 the plaintiff 
sought to have a document, which had been sealed by the defendant, rectified in light of a 
prior agreement which had been reduced to writing but had not been sealed.  The 
consequence of this omission was that the prior agreement was void for failure to comply 
with statutory formalities.  According to Romer J, the problem faced by the court in 
determining whether the prior valid contract requirement had been met was not that there 
was a prior oral agreement between the parties which could not be enforced (as would 
have been the case if the agreement had been subject to the Statute of Frauds), but that  
 
“there was no parol contract at all, no contract of any kind at all between the parties until the 
contract under seal was executed.”223   
 
The court held that where there was no preceding valid contract, the document could not 
be rectified in spite of the fact that both parties might have agreed fully on something 
different to that evidenced in the document.   
                                                          
218
 See eg Dormell Properties 282 CC v Renasa Insurance Co Ltd and Others NNO 2011 1 SA 70 (SCA) 
paras 32-37; Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 4 SA 388 (C) 395I-397A; Levin v Zoutendijk 
1979 3 SA 1145 (W) 1148A. 
219
 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 287-288. 
220
 (1869) LR 8 Eq 368. 
221
 375.   
222
 [1927] 1 Ch 128. 
223
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Had the court in Weinerlein decided to follow the English approach at the time, the claim 
for rectification would not have succeeded.  While there had been an oral agreement 
between the parties prior to its reduction to writing, this was invalid for failure to comply 
with statutory formalities – it could not, therefore, constitute a valid prior contract.  
However, De Villiers JA held that the rule in Mackenzie v Coulson224 was satisfied if the 
parties had arrived at a “consensus ad idem in the shape of an agreement”.225   
 
Thus, the Weinerlein decision introduced the distinction between a prior valid contract and 
a prior common agreement.  The former complies with all the validity requirements for a 
contract, including statutory formalities where relevant.  A prior common agreement has 
the necessary intention and animus contrahendi, but does not comply with all other 
requirements to constitute a fully enforceable and valid contract.226  This still does not 
explain the reference simply to a common intention as a requirement for a successful 
claim for rectification.  This development was ushered in by the decision in Meyer v 
Merchant’s Trust Ltd227 (“Meyer”). 
 
In this case, the appellant had signed a suretyship agreement which stipulated that he 
would act as surety for a certain company, provided that “the total amount that may be 
owing by Gabbe & Meyer ... shall not exceed ... £250”.  After summons had been issued, it 
was discovered that certain words had been omitted from the suretyship – the words “total 
amount” should have been followed by the phrase “recoverable from me notwithstanding 
the amount”.228  The respondent sought to have the suretyship rectified. 
 
                                                          
224
 (1869) LR 8 Eq 368. 
225
 Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 288.  Although De Villiers JA was of the opinion that the 
rule was satisfied by means of proof of an oral agreement, this is not the interpretation of Mackenzie v 
Coulson (1869) LR 8 Eq 368 which was adopted in subsequent English case law: see Faraday v Tamworth 
Union (1916) 86 LJ Ch 436 438; Craddock Brothers v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136 159-160; United States of 
America v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196 199, 200. 
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 See eg Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 (4) SA 388 (C) (“agreement in principle”); Akasia 
Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Shoredits Holdings Ltd 2002 (3) SA 346 (SCA), in which the court rectified the 
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In order to make sense of the court’s judgment, the facts upon which the court based its 
decision are quoted in full: 
 
“Turning now to the facts of the present case, we find that the draft guarantee was prepared by 
the respondent's attorneys in Johannesburg.  The document was sent by the respondent to 
Cooper [the respondent’s representative] who had several copies made for the several 
guarantors.  The signed copies were all correct with the exception of the one signed by the 
appellant.  I think there can be no doubt that the respondent intended to obtain, and until the 
error was discovered thought it had obtained, a guarantee in the form prepared by its attorneys, 
and not what the learned trial Judge rightly described as the commercially absurd document 
actually signed by the appellant.  As regards the appellant ... I agree with the learned trial Judge 
in his finding that the appellant ‘was aware at all material times that what was desired of him by 
his brother [a partner in Gabbe & Meyer] and what he gave was a guarantee for £250 for the 
benefit of the creditors.’  The document in question is dated 2nd July, 1934, but it is common 
cause that it was actually signed by the appellant on the 4th July or some days later.  On the 
evening of the 3rd July the appellant visited Marais, who is an attorney but was consulted 
merely as a friend.  According to Marais the appellant was reluctant to sign any guarantee.  
From Marais' house the appellant went to his brother, Christiaan, the partner in the firm of 
Gabbe & Meyer.  Christiaan was not called as a witness, but appellant admits that he tried to 
persuade him to sign the guarantee, and we can take it that he was successful in his 
persuasions, for the same evening the appellant wrote a letter to Marais as follows:  
 
‘Omtrent die garansie vir Gabbe en Meyer. Ek belowe om die waarborg vir £250 to teken mits daar 
verdere garansies vir £750 alreeds geteken is en die ooreenkoms tussen Gabbe en Meyer en die 
krediteurs tot ons satisfaksie sal wees. Ek sal u môre oplui en sake verder bespreek.’ 
  
There was no further consultation with Marais, the next step being the signature of the 
document by the appellant in Marais' office.  In his evidence the appellant stated that he merely 
agreed with his brother Christiaan to sign the document produced by the latter, and that he 
signed it without reading it and without troubling about its contents.  On further examination he 
had to admit that he knew that the creditors of the firm wanted guarantors to the amount of 
£1,000 (a fact moreover which appeared from the opening words of the guarantee), that each of 
the partners had to get £500 worth of guarantees, that Christiaan was looking for guarantors, 
and that Christiaan wanted the appellant to be one of the guarantors.  After a good deal of 
hedging in cross-examination he admitted that he knew the document was for £250, and in 
reply to a question from the Bench that he knew on the evening of the 3rd July that it was a 
guarantee for £250 that he had to sign.”229 
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It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the document could not be rectified because 
the respondent had failed to prove the existence of a prior agreement regarding the 
appellant’s liability, and was merely relying on a common intention of the parties prior to 
recording the agreement in writing.230 
 
While the court agreed that the respondent was relying on a common intention, it did not 
agree with the contention that the respondent’s claim for rectification should fail for that 
reason.  It held: 
 
“Proof of an antecedent agreement may be the best proof of the common intention which the 
parties intended to express in their written contract, and in many cases would be the only proof 
available, but there is no reason in principle why that common intention should not be proved in 
some other manner, provided such proof is clear and convincing.”231 
 
It is not entirely certain what the court intended to convey in this statement about the 
meaning of the concept “common intention”.  Viewed in isolation, it seems to suggest that 
there is no conceptual distinction to be drawn between an antecedent agreement and a 
common intention232 and that an agreement is only one way to prove the existence of a 
common intention.  A common intention could also be inferred, for example, from 
surrounding circumstances.233  This suggests that the only difference between a prior 
agreement and a common intention is that the former is articulated verbally, while the latter 
remains unexpressed and amounts to tacit consensus.   
 
This also appears to be the reasoning underlying the following statement by De Wet: 
 
“Vir verbetering is dit selfs nie nodig dat daar ‘n regtens bindende ooreenkoms moes bestaan 
het voordat die afspraak op skrif gestel is nie … Dit is selfs nie nodig dat daar ‘n in woorde 






 This is also an impression created in Van der Merwe et al Contract 154 where it is stated that “[p]roof of a 
prior or antecedent agreement (‘common intention’) on the terms of the contract is a sufficient basis for 
rectification.” (Footnote omitted). 
233
 See eg the court’s discussion of United States v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196, where De Wet CJ 
states that “[t]he common intention … was deduced from the surrounding circumstances” (Meyer v 
Merchant’s Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 256). 
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geformuleerde voorafgaande afspraak tussen partye bestaan het nie.  Ook waar die afspraak 
vir die eerste keer in die skriftelike stuk in woorde geformuleer word, kan dit nog verbeter word 
indien die stuk die bedoeling van die partye foutief weergee of formuleer.”234 
 
However, when examined in the context of other passages in the judgment, it is possible 
to interpret the Meyer judgment as suggesting that there is a very real difference between 
an actual agreement and a common intention, which is not solely related to the means of 
proof.   
 
For example, the court referred with approval to a statement by the American Law Institute 
to the effect that 
 
“[w]here both parties have an identical intention as to the terms to be embodied in a proposed ... 
contract ... and a writing executed by them is materially at variance with that intention, either 
party can get a decree that the writing shall be reformed so that it shall express the intention of 
the parties, if innocent third parties will not be unfairly affected thereby.”235 
 
The opening line of this quotation implies that rectification of an agreement, at least in the 
United States, is also possible where both parties’ subjective intentions happen to be 
identical; in other words consensus, which exists only if “the persons expressing the 
intentions are aware that their minds have met”,236 is unnecessary.   
 
In the course of its judgment, the court in Meyer also referred to United States v Motor 
Trucks Ltd237 and pointed out that the conclusion in that case, to the effect that there must 
be “an actually concluded agreement antecedent to the instrument which is sought to be 
rectified”238 did not correspond to the actual reasoning in the judgment.239  To illustrate, the 
court stated that  
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 De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 30.  See also Tager 1977 SALJ 11 who interprets Meyer v Merchant’s 
Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 as concluding that it is sufficient to prove that the parties came “’to a complete mutual 
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“the learned Judge [in United States v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196] proceeded to say that 
the question in issue was ‘whether or not it was the intention of the parties that the land and 
buildings, which had been paid for, should be inserted in the schedule.’  He examined the facts 
to determine the separate intention of each party, and came to the conclusion that both parties 
intended that the land and buildings should be included, and that therefore the appellant was 
entitled to rectification of the schedule to the agreement.  Nowhere in the judgment is there any 
allusion to a preceding agreement in respect of the land and buildings.  The common intention 
that the land and buildings should be included was deduced from the surrounding 
circumstances, and more particularly from the fact that the payments to the respondent 
company by the appellant had included sums in respect of these lands and buildings.”240 
 
Again, the implication is that rectification is possible even in the absence of a meeting of 
the minds because, according to De Wet CJ, the judge in the United States case 
“examined the facts to determine the separate intention of each party, and came to the 
conclusion that both parties intended that the land and buildings should be included”.  This 
also appears to be what the court did in Meyer: in the facts quoted previously, there was 
no indication that the respondent (acting through its representative) and the appellant had 
communicated their subjective understanding of the terms upon which they were 
contracting to each other in such a manner that there could have been a meeting of the 
minds.  A “common intention”, on these facts, appears to have been found by looking at 
each party’s respective intention, as inferred from the evidence presented to the court.  
Because these intentions corresponded (even though the parties were not aware of this), 
there was a “common” intention which was not reflected in the guarantee, thus entitling the 
respondent to have the document rectified. 
 
At this point, it should be noted that the court also cited other authority, rather selectively, 
as supporting its argument that proof of a prior common intention is sufficient for a claim 
for rectification. 
 
For example, the court referred to a statement by Wigmore241 which purportedly confirms 
its conclusion:   
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“Written contracts are not necessarily preceded by oral ones; the moment of assent, and thus of 
the beginning of the obligation, to the terms as finally settled upon may be the moment of 
signature of the writing – as in numerous negotiations by mail; and in such instances it is 
equally possible … for an erroneous term to be inserted in the draft at the last moment.  The 
correction of erroneous instruments therefore does not rest necessarily upon any assumption 
that a prior completed contract is being enforced …”.242 
 
It is not entirely clear how this relates to the court’s argument that a prior common intention 
is sufficient for rectification.  The quoted statement is made in response to the incorrect 
view of rectification as the enforcement of an oral contract.243  It is for this reason that the 
observation is made that a written contract is not necessarily preceded by an oral contract 
and that rectification, for that reason, cannot be regarded as the enforcement of an oral 
contract.  If anything, this quotation supports the notion that a written contract (which 
reflects “the moment of assent, and thus the beginning of the obligation”) may be corrected 
to reflect a prior oral agreement (“the terms as finally settled upon”); it does not go so far 
as to support rectification of a document to conform to a prior common intention. 
 
This selective use of sources is also evident in the court’s reference to two English cases, 
Shipley Urban District Council v Bradford Corporation244 (“Shipley”) and Crane v 
Hegeman-Harris Co Inc245 (“Crane”) as indicating that it is also sufficient in English law to 
prove a prior common intention, rather than agreement, in order to succeed with a claim 
for rectification.246  While it is true that a reference was made to the “concurrent intention of 
the parties” in Shipley,247 a close reading of the facts indicates that the court was in fact 
being asked to rectify a document in accordance with a prior oral agreement which was 
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 [1971] 1 WLR 1390 (the judgment was initially reported as Crane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc [1939] 1 All 
ER 662, but was re-reported in 1971, after it was pointed out in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 1389 
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was relied upon in Meyer v Merchant’s Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 (quoted further in the main text) appears in 
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void because it had not been sealed.248  It was therefore not concerned with the question 
whether a document may be rectified to conform to a prior common intention, but rather 
whether a written contract which had to comply with statutory formalities might be rectified 
in accordance with a prior agreement which did not.  The quotation from the Crane case is 
equally selective.249  The court there did indeed state that proof of a common continuing 
intention was sufficient for rectification, but it then went on to state that   
 
“if one finds that, in regard to a particular point, the parties were in agreement up to the moment 
when they executed their formal instrument, and the formal instrument does not conform with 
that common agreement, then this court has jurisdiction to rectify, although it may be that there 
was, until the formal instrument was executed, no concluded and binding contract between the 
parties.”250 
 
The use of these sources is puzzling and can mean one of two things.  Either the court in 
Meyer did not conceive of a common intention as something different from an agreement 
(other than the way it may be proved), in which case the court’s conclusion does not 
appear to be supported by the facts.  Or the court was intentionally selective in its use of 
sources, in which case a common intention is not the same as a meeting of the minds – 
such a conclusion is supported by the facts, but is wholly at odds with the generally 
accepted basis of contractual liability. 
 
Subsequent case law does not clarify the matter.  In Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings 
Ltd251 (“Humphrys”) the first respondent bought a company that transported and rigged 
heavy equipment and machinery.  Because its original business had been the removal, 
packing and storage of furniture and household effects, it sought to retain the services of 
the appellant, who had previously managed the company bought by it.252  It therefore 
concluded a written contract of employment and a restraint of trade which restrained the 
appellant from carrying on any business related to furniture removal, packing and 
storage.253  The first respondent alleged that the restraint of trade was incorrect, and 
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should have prohibited the appellant from carrying on any business related to the 
transportation and rigging of heavy equipment and machinery. 
 
From the evidence presented to the court, it was clear that the representative of the first 
respondent and the appellant had discussed, during negotiations, that the restraint would 
relate to the transportation and rigging of heavy equipment and machinery.254  Although 
the other terms of the restraint were only discussed in general terms,255 it appeared that on 
this point at least, the parties had reached agreement. 
 
Nevertheless, the court stated that 
 
“[w]e agree … that, on [the representative for the respondent’s] evidence, there was no binding 
antecedent oral agreement between [the appellant] and [the representative].  [H]owever, ... [the] 
respondents never relied on an antecedent oral agreement as the basis for their claim for 
rectification.  According to the evidence of [the representative], the parties intended that a 
binding restraint agreement would only come into existence upon signature of a written 
agreement.  Respondents' claim for rectification is based on the common intention of the parties 
regarding the nature of the business to which the restraint would relate.”256 
  
In this case, the court appeared to favour the interpretation of a “common intention” as 
amounting to a tacit consensus.  However, in Dormell Properties 282 CC v Renasa 
Insurance Co Ltd and Others NNO257 the court appeared to favour the second possible 
interpretation of the meaning of a “common intention”, namely the subjective intentions of 
the parties which have not been communicated to each other, but which correspond. 
 
A construction guarantee was given by the first respondent to a company responsible for a 
development project.  The company eventually converted into the appellant close 
corporation, and the appellant sought to have the construction guarantee rectified so that it 
would be identified as the party in whose favour the guarantee had been given.258  It 
alleged that the common intention was always that the guarantee would be in favour of the 








 2011 1 SA 70 (SCA). 
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employer of the building contractor responsible for the development and that the exact 
identity of the employer was irrelevant to the guarantor because it had received sufficient 
securities from the building contractor to protect its position.259  The guarantor however, 
disputed this and argued that there had never been any consensus prior to the conclusion 
of the guarantee that its purpose would be to benefit the employer of the building 
contractor.260 
 
The court concluded that the appellant and first respondent could not have agreed upon 
the identity of the employer because the first respondent had never been aware of the fact 
that the employer company had been converted to the appellant close corporation.261  The 
first respondent, in fact, had been informed by a broker of the particulars of the party (a 
company) in whose favour the guarantee had to be issued.   
 
However, after referring to the Meyer decision with approval, the court held that the 
common intention of the parties was indeed that the guarantee should benefit the 
employer of the contractor so that it would have sufficient funds to complete the 
development project, irrespective of the actual identity of the employer.262  It is suggested 
here, as in Meyer, that there was no actual meeting of the minds between the parties – 
“common intention” could only have meant that the respective subjective intentions of the 
parties coincided.  
 
The exact import of the Meyer decision therefore appears to be uncertain.  It is clear from 
the judgment that the best evidence of a common intention is an articulated agreement 
representing the parties’ meeting of the minds.  However, it is unclear from the judgment 
what a prior common intention means in the absence of an articulated consensus.  On one 
interpretation, it could simply mean a tacit meeting of the minds, inferred from the 
surrounding circumstances.  On another, it could mean the uncommunicated (albeit not 
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unexpressed), subjective intentions of the parties, inferred from the evidence presented to 
the court, which correspond up until the moment of contract conclusion.263 
 
This difficulty in determining the meaning of the prior common intention requirement has 
also been experienced in common-law jurisdictions.  It was eventually authoritatively 
decided in the English decision of Joscelyne v Nissen264 (“Joscelyne”) that proof of a prior 
common intention would suffice for a successful claim for rectification.  In this case, a 
father and daughter had negotiated that the father would transfer his business to his 
daughter, in return for which she would pay him a weekly pension as well as pay for his 
household expenses, including his gas, electricity and coal bills.  The court pointed out that 
 
“it was expressly agreed and intended that these particular items should be paid for by the 
daughter as such expenses and that [the parties] negotiated upon that footing: it is not disputed 
that father and daughter continued in this expressed accord thereafter and when they signed 
the agreement still intended that it should provide for such payment.”265 
 
By mistake, the responsibility for these bills was never indicated in the contract.  When the 
father sought to have the written agreement rectified, it was argued on behalf of the 
daughter that there was no prior valid contract in terms of which the document could be 
rectified.266  After examining earlier case law, the court confirmed the conclusion reached 
in the Shipley and Crane cases to the effect that a common continuing intention is 
sufficient, but added a qualification: there must be “some outward expression of accord”.267  
Since the court itself found that the parties had agreed upon the fact that the daughter 
would be responsible for payment of the bills, it is difficult to determine whether it 
considered the need to prove a prior common intention and an outward expression of 
accord as constituting aspects of one requirement, or as two separate requirements.  
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 The fact that a prior agreement or common intention must continue until the moment of contract 
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Bromley argues that the Court of Appeal was incorrect in adding the additional 
qualification.268  He points out that historically, it was never a requirement that the parties’ 
subjective intentions be communicated to each other before a document could be 
rectified.269  The only role that such an outward accord may fulfil is to assist in discharging 
the burden of proof.270  However, Smith argues that the court in Joscelyne did nothing 
more than to confirm the objective common-law approach to determining whether 
consensus between the parties has been reached.271  On such an interpretation, there is 
no difference between a prior common intention of which there is some outward 
expression of accord and an agreement.   
 
A middle way appears to be represented by certain Australian and New Zealand cases.272  
A particularly instructive case on the meaning of “an outward expression of accord” is that 
of Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd273 (“Ryledar”) in which Cambell JA held the following: 
 
“[W]hen the fundamental requirement for granting rectification is a continuing common intention 
of the parties, it is of more assistance to concentrate on what is needed before an intention of 
the parties to a negotiation counts as a common intention.  In my view, when that intention 
relates to the terms upon which they will contract with each other, it is still necessary for them to 
know enough of each other's intentions for it to be said that there is a common intention.  They 
might come to know of each other's intentions in this way through those intentions being directly 
stated, or they might come to know of them through the various other means by which one 
person's intention can become known to another person.  Those means can sometimes involve 
a process of conscious and deliberate inference.  Those means can sometimes involve simply 
perceiving a gestalt in a series of events.  Those means can depend to some extent on the 
people involved sharing a common understanding of how particular bodies of knowledge or 
markets or social institutions they are operating in work - the experienced surgeon, or the 
experienced chess player, can sometimes see what another surgeon, or chess player, is 
seeking to do, in a way that an inexperienced person cannot.  What matters for present 
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purposes is that for a negotiating party to perform actions or say words from which the other 
party can gather his or her intention is itself a form of communication.  Negotiation of any 
contract takes place in a context in which various facts are known or assumed by the 
negotiating parties.  Sometimes, for example, if a contract is negotiated in a context where there 
are well understood business practices and conventions, and nothing is said about those 
practices and conventions not applying, it can be legitimate to conclude that both parties to the 
contract intended to act in accordance with those practices and conventions, even if they did not 
expressly communicate to each other that they intended to act in accordance with those 
practices and conventions.  This view of what is needed before an intention is a common 
intention, accords, it seems to me, with the Australian case law since Joscelyne.”274 
 
In other words, while Australian law focuses on the subjective intentions of the parties, 
there must be some form of communication of these intentions between the parties before 
there is a “common intention”.  This corresponds with the first possible interpretation of the 
Meyer judgment, namely that a common intention is simply consensus inferred from 
surrounding circumstances.  This would also correspond with the interpretation of the 
requirement in the Humphrys case. 
 
However, the facts of the Meyer judgment do not fit squarely into this approach.  There the 
parties had never communicated their intentions to each other in a manner that could lead 
one to say that there was a tacit agreement between the parties not reflected in the written 
document.  The court’s conclusion that there was a common intention seems to be closer 
to Bromley’s argument than it does to either the English or Australian approach.  The 
parties each intended that the guarantor would be liable for a certain amount; these 
respective subjective intentions were never communicated to each other, but there was 
“clear and convincing proof” that these intentions corresponded.275  In other words, the 
distinction between the Australian and South African approach, on this interpretation, lies 
in what is accepted as proof of the common intention of the parties.  According to Ryledar, 
a common intention only arises if the parties’ subjective intentions have been 
communicated to each other in some form or another.  The implication of the Meyer case, 
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by contrast, is that this proof may also be found in objective evidence of each party’s 
intention, but that this intention need not have been communicated.  Smith has stated that 
 
“there is no reason why the parties should, in proving their subjective intentions, be confined to 
materials crossing the line.  One can see good policy sense in refusing to admit ex post facto 
recollection: the temptation to invent, gild or embellish, even unconsciously, will be too great.  
But materials not subject to such difficulties – e.g. documents which unequivocally manifest a 
party’s intention, but which do not cross the line – do not suffer from this disadvantage.”276 
 
Although the notion that a written agreement can be rectified on the basis of the parties’ 
subjective intentions which have never been communicated to each other is peculiar, it 
should be borne in mind that the court in Meyer did not rectify the suretyship on the basis 
of mere umanifested intentions.  To do so would have meant that the document was being 
corrected when there was no demonstrable “common” intention.  The purpose of 
rectification is to reflect the parties “common” intention in the written document on the 
basis that it would be unconscionable for one party to enforce the written agreement as it 
stands.  However, this unconscionability does not, and cannot, arise where no “common” 
intention can be found.277 
 
If the court in Meyer intended the concept of a common intention to denote something less 
than consensus, then the question remains as to what impact this has for agreements 
subject to formalities.  Should a court only rectify an agreement subject to formalities when 
there is evidence of a prior oral agreement (whether express or tacit) or should it also be 
permitted to do so when only a prior common intention has been proved?  Taking into 
account that there must be objective proof of each party’s intention and that these 
intentions must correspond, and the qualification that such proof should be clear and 
convincing, the possibility for fraud and perjury is minimised.  There should therefore be no 
reason why an agreement subject to formalities should not be rectified in order to 
correspond to the parties’ prior common intention, provided the proof is convincing.  
 
In view of this gradual relaxation of the prior valid contract requirement, it is appropriate to 
re-consider the decision in Magwaza.  By concluding that an agreement subject to 
formalities must appear to be formally valid ex facie its recordal before it can be rectified, 
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the court unwittingly seemed to re-introduce the prior valid contract requirement for these 
types of agreements.  This first step seems to be particularly illogical when it is considered 
together with the second step and the fact that it is sufficient to prove the existence of a 
prior common intention in order to succeed with a claim for rectification. 
 
In the absence of the antecedent requirement of ex facie compliance, could the court in 
Magwaza have rectified the parties’ written agreement?  Probably not.  The document 
recording the agreement provided that the precise boundaries of the land sold would be 
depicted in a diagram to be attached.  Such a diagram never eventuated.278  However, 
another diagram was eventually drafted by a surveyor appointed by the purchaser, but the 
boundaries of the land thus surveyed were wholly at variance with the description of the 
land in the document.279  The purchaser sought rectification of the document so that the 
description of the land there was in accordance with this diagram. 
 
While the purchaser may have intended that some of the boundaries of the land would be 
fixed by a surveyor, there was insufficient evidence to indicate that this intention was 
shared by the seller.  It would therefore have been impossible for the purchaser to prove 
that the parties shared a common intention to sell the land as identified by the surveyor in 
his diagram.280  A similar flaw characterises the agreement of the parties in the Dowdle 
case.281 
 
In both these cases, rectification would have been inappropriate, not because the parties 
failed to record an essential term of their agreement, but because they had neither agreed 
upon (whether expressly or tacitly) nor shared a common intention with respect to that 
essential term.  Rectification, if granted, would have resulted in the judicial creation of an 
agreement for the parties, rather than the correction of an error in its recordal. 
 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the requirement of mistake, brief mention should be 
made of the fact that a prior common intention is not always a prerequisite for a successful 
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 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 257H-J per Squires J. 
281
 Dowdle's Estate v Dowdle 1947 3 SA 340 (T) 348 read with 355.  The same argument is also made in 
Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 2 SA 246 (N) 258A-D per Squires J; Tager 
1977 SALJ 13-14. 
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claim for rectification.  It is also possible to rectify a written agreement where one party is 
mistaken, provided that the other party is aware of that mistake but does nothing to correct 
it.  In such a case, one cannot argue that the rectification of the document is in accordance 
with a common intention in the true sense, but rather that is in accordance with one party’s 
intention, coupled with the reasonable reliance that the other party has shared the same 
intention.282 
 
5 4 3 The requirement of “mistake” 
 
Traditionally, a document will be rectified when it fails to record the parties' agreement as a 
result of a common mistake of both parties, or the unilateral mistake of one party where 
the other party was aware of that mistake, but failed to draw the mistaken party's attention 
to it in order to secure an advantage.283  It is not a requirement that the mistake should be 
reasonable, and carelessness in the recording of the agreement should therefore not 
preclude a claim for rectification.284  To the extent that the majority judgment in Republican 
Press seems to suggest otherwise, by implying that a creditor should exercise greater care 
in drafting a suretyship document and that a court will not rectify a document when it does 
not exercise such care, this statement cannot be supported.285 
 
                                                          
282
 See eg Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 1 SA 418 (A) 424F-H, 425D; E Kahn “Rectification where Defendant 
Omits Term from Written Contract” (1957) 74 SALJ 127 130; Tager 1977 SALJ 11; Bamford 1963 SALJ 530.  
283
 In other words, a unilateral mistake caused by the other party's unconscionable conduct.  Weinerlein v 
Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 291 per De Villiers JA, 293 per Wessels JA and 294 per Kotze JA; 
Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 1 SA 418 (A) 426A; Otto v Heymans 1971 4 SA 148 (T) 156E-H; Humphrys v 
Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 4 SA 388 (C) 396E; Brits v Van Heerden 2001 3 SA 257 (C) 266I.  The 
statement in Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty) Ltd) v Pappadogianis 
1992 3 SA 234 (A) 238D per Harms AJA that rectification is precluded when there is a unilateral mistake fails 
to take into account that there are different types of unilateral mistakes, not all of which preclude a claim for 
rectification.  A unilateral mistake in the narrow sense exists when one party is mistaken and the other is 
aware of that mistake; however, South African courts are inclined to characterise as unilateral mistake, 
situations where the other party is unaware of the former’s mistake and is therefore himself mistaken about 
the former’s intention (in other words, a mutual rather than a unilateral mistake) – see Van der Merwe et al 
Contract 25.   
284
 See eg De Wet & Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 29-30; Van der Merwe et al Contract 156-157; Offit 
Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Knysna Development Co (Pty) Ltd and Others 1987 4 SA 24 (C) 28F-G; Humphrys v 
Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994 4 SA 388 (C) 399A-I. 
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However, there have been a number of cases which suggest that the courts pay mere lip 
service to the requirement of a mistake in the written recordal of the parties’ intention, and 
do not in fact apply it in practice.  One of the earliest of these cases is Mouton v 
Hanekom286 (“Mouton”).  In that case, the respondent had been suffering financial 
difficulties and in return for a loan from the appellant, agreed that his (the respondent’s) 
farm would be transferred into the appellant’s name.  This agreement was reduced to 
writing.  The parties also agreed that upon repayment of the loan and transfer costs, the 
appellant would re-transfer the farm to the respondent.  This agreement, however, was 
deliberately excluded from the written agreement of sale.   
 
Before turning to a discussion of the court’s judgment, it should be pointed out that at the 
time of conclusion of the written agreement, no formalities were prescribed for sales of 
land in the Cape.287  It has been suggested that the written agreement between the parties 
was a simulation,288 and that the actual intention was to conclude a fiducia cum creditore 
contracta289 – the agreement to re-transfer the land would then not have had to be in 
writing in any event, at least in terms of current legislation.290  However, it is argued that 
although the parties could have structured their agreement in this way, there was no 
indication that their actual intention was any different to their purported intention nor was 
there any suggestion that the parties had some ulterior motive to disguise the true nature 
of their agreement.291  For this reason, the following discussion proceeds on the 
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 1959 3 SA 35 (A). 
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 See ch 2 (2 2). 
288
 Lubbe & Murray Contract 220 n 7. 
289
 G F Lubbe & T J Scott “Mortgage and Pledge” in W A Joubert & J A Faris (eds) LAWSA 17(2) 2 ed (2008) 
para 325 n 4.  A fiducia cum creditore contracta is an out-and-out transfer of a right to a creditor as security, 
subject to a contractual obligation to re-transfer the right upon repayment of the loan. 
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 See A D J van Rensburg & S H Treisman The Practioner’s Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 2 ed 
(1984) 25. 
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 Mouton v Hanekom 1959 3 SA 35 (A) 38H-39A.  In Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 309, Innes J stated 
that  
“as a general rule, the parties to a contract express themselves in language calculated without subterfuge 
or concealment to embody the agreement at which they have arrived.  They intend the contract to be 
exactly what it purports; and the shape which it assumes is what they meant it should have.  Not 
infrequently, however, (either to secure some advantage which otherwise the law would not give, or to 
escape some disability which otherwise the law would impose), the parties to a transaction endeavour to 
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assumption that the parties did intend to conclude a written contract of sale and an oral 
pactum de retrovendendo.292   
 
In Mouton, the court was not prepared to decide whether this collateral oral agreement 
was inconsistent with the written sale agreement (in which case its proof would have been 
excluded by virtue of the parol evidence rule)293 but held that even if it were, the 
respondent was entitled to succeed with a claim for rectification.  In response to counsel's 
contention that the agreement could not be rectified because the parties were not 
labouring under a mistake at the time when they executed the document but had 
deliberately excluded the pactum de retrovendendo, the court held the following: 
 
“Die feit dat die partye uitdruklik ooreengekom het dat die ooreenkoms van terugkoop nie in die 
koopbrief vermeld sal word nie kan rektifikasie nie verydel nie.  Die gemeenskaplike bedoeling 
van beide partye was dat eiser die reg van terugkoop sal hê en as daar dan bepalings of 
woorde in die koopbrief is wat hierdie bedoeling onuitvoerbaar maak of in stryd daarmee is, dan 
is dit duidelik dat sodanige bepalings of woorde deur die partye per abuis ingeskryf is en is eiser 
geregtig op rektifikasie van die koopbrief ten einde dit in ooreenstemming te bring met die 
gemeenskaplike bedoeling van beide van die partye.”294 
 
The basis of the court’s decision appears to be that where there is a discrepancy between 
the parties’ prior intention or agreement and the document recording that agreement, the 
latter may be corrected to give effect to the former, even in the absence of a mistake in the 
recordal of that agreement.295  Although the Mouton decision seemed to have abolished 
the mistake requirement, Trollip J held that this was not so in the subsequent case of Von 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
disguise its true nature.  And when a Court is asked to decide any rights under such an agreement, it can 
only do so by giving effect to what the transaction really is; not what it in form purports to be.  [But] [t]he 
Court must be satisfied that there is a real intention, definitely ascertainable, which differs from the 
simulated intention.  For, if the parties in fact mean that a contract shall have effect in accordance with its 
tenor, the circumstances that the same object might have been attained in another way will not 
necessarily make the arrangement other than it purports to be.” 
292
 It follows from the discussion of pacta de contrahendo in ch 3 (3 2 1) that if a court were to be confronted 
with the same type of facts today, the pactum de retrovendendo (or at least that part of it relating to the 
substantive offer) would have had to be in writing to be formally valid. 
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 Mouton v Hanekom 1959 3 SA 35 (A) 39E-F. 
294
 39H-40A.   
295
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Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
216 
 
Ziegler v Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd296 (“Von Ziegler”).  While the judge 
acknowledged that the parties were not mistaken when they deliberately omitted the 
pactum from their written agreement,  
 
“their mistake (on the basis of the assumption made by the Appellate Division) was that their 
written contract was worded in such a way as to exclude their oral agreement from operating 
together with their written contract.  That was contrary to their common intention or oral 
agreement, and it was that mistake in their written contract that was allowed to be rectified.”297 
 
It is true that the court in Mouton stated that the parties shared the common intention that 
the plaintiff would have a right to re-purchase the farm and that “as daar dan bepalings of 
woorde in die koopbrief is wat hierdie bedoeling onuitvoerbaar maak of in stryd daarmee 
is, dan is dit duidelik dat sodanige bepalings of woorde deur die partye per abuis ingeskryf 
is”.298  However it is unclear how the court could have come to the conclusion that the 
parties had “per abuis” included certain terms or words in the written document which 
would have made their common intention unenforceable.  The terms of the written 
agreement were exactly as the parties intended.299  Furthermore, the courts in Mouton and 
in Von Ziegler seemed to ignore the fact that the parties had been informed by their legal 
advisor that the pactum should have been included in their written agreement.300 
 
Nevertheless, both the Mouton decision and Trollip J's interpretation of that decision in 
Von Ziegler have been held to be correct by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Tesven CC v 
South African Bank of Athens301 (“Tesven”).  The parties in Tesven had drawn up deeds of 
suretyship which failed to include oral suspensive conditions that the appellant's liability 
would only arise in certain circumstances.  The appellant asked that the suretyship be 
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 Mouton v Hanekom 1959 3 SA 35 (A) 39H-40A. 
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 See J L Buchanan “Relaxation of the Parol Evidence Rule” (1959) 76 SALJ 271 273 and also De Wet & 
Van Wyk Kontraktereg 1 30 n 91 who state:  
“Dat die skriftelike stuk in hierdie geval nie ‘verbeter’ kan word nie, behoort vanself te spreek, want dit 
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300
 See Mouton v Hanekom 1959 3 SA 35 (A) 38G and the discussion of both this case and Von Ziegler v 
Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1962 3 SA 399 (T) in Van der Merwe et al Contract 156 n 210. 
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rectified,302 not because its representative was mistaken as to the contents of the 
document, but because she had mistakenly believed that the prior oral agreements would 
operate in conjunction with the written agreement.303 
 
The court rejected the argument that  
 
“for a claim for rectification to be competent the mistake relied on must relate to the writing in 
the document … [T]hat a court cannot have regard to any other kind of mistake is not supported 
by authority nor is there any reason based on principle that can be relied on in support of it. … 
To allow the words the parties actually used in the documents to override their prior agreement 
or the common intention that they intended to record is to enforce what was not agreed and so 
overthrow the basis on which contracts rest in our law: the application of no contractual theory 
leads to such a result.”304   
 
On this basis, the court confirmed that the decision in Mouton was correct and that the 
ratio of that case, as interpreted by Trollip J in Von Ziegler, was directly applicable to the 
facts before it.305 
 
The implication of the Tesven judgment is that while a mistake is required before 
rectification can occur, that mistake may be in the recordal of the parties’ agreement or 
common intention, but could also be a mistake as to the effect of the written document and 
the fact that it precludes the oral agreement from operating in conjunction with the written 
one.306  It appears that the existence of such a mistake is inferred from the fact that there 
is a discrepancy between the parties' prior intention or agreement and the document 
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 S Cornelius “Rectification of Contracts and Evidence of Prior Oral Agreements” 2000 TSAR 563 565-566 
states that evidence of these suspensive conditions could have been tendered without a claim for 
rectification, because such evidence would not have contravened the parol evidence rule.  While it is true 
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recording that agreement.  This point is addressed in Otto v Heymans307 (“Otto”), in which 
it was stated that  
 
“of ‘mutual error’ altyd aanwesig moet wees ... skyn ... meer ‘n geval van logiese afleiding as 
van feitelike bewys te wees.  As daar eenmaal bewys is dat albei partye ‘n volgehoue bedoeling 
of verstandhouding gehad het ... om ‘n ander ooreenkoms te sluit as wat in die geskrewe stuk 
deur hulle beliggaam is, moet ‘n afleiding van foutiewe teboekstelling prima facie gemaak word 
... ‘Mutual error’, soos dit in die betrokke gewysdes voorkom, skyn my niks meer te wees as ‘n 
samevatting van die onderliggende begrip van ‘n volgehoue opset wat nie in die geskrewe 
kontrak volledige of juiste uiting gevind het nie.”308 
 
If South African courts are prepared to rectify a written agreement simply on the basis that 
there is a discrepancy between the document and the parties’ prior oral agreement or 
common intention, the question arises as to why it is necessary to attribute such a 
discrepancy to a mistake, even where the parties have deliberately excluded a term from 
their agreement.  Presumably, the answer to this question lies in the judicial attempt to 
navigate the tension which arises between the parol evidence rule on the one hand and 
rectification on the other. 
 
The function of the mistake requirement is to prevent a party from presenting evidence of a 
prior oral agreement or negotiations, purportedly as the basis for a claim for rectification, 
but in fact amounting to an attempt to circumvent the parol evidence rule.  It is true that not 
all instances of the presentation of extrinsic evidence arise because the parties have made 
a mistake in the recordal of their written agreement;309 however, the mistake requirement 
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 Otto v Heymans 1971 4 SA 148 (T) 156D-G.  A similar point is made in Offit Enterprises v Knysna 
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extrinsic evidence are discussed in detail in ch 4. 
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is a vital element in distinguishing between claims for rectification and attempts to present 
extrinsic evidence in an effort to vary or contradict the written agreement.310   
 
Thus, in the Von Ziegler case, Trollip J held that the parol evidence rule plays an important 
role in promoting certainty of transactions and, as a consequence, business efficacy.311  In 
order to prevent the watering down of this function, any attempt to prove the existence of 
an oral agreement not reflected in the written document had to be brought within the limits 
of rectification.312  One of these limits is the necessity that there should be a mistake, 
either in the document itself or as to its consequences.  In the absence of such a mistake, 
evidence of the prior oral agreement or common intention amounts to evidence which 
varies or contradicts the document and contravenes the parol evidence rule.313  Thus, 
while the deliberate exclusion of a term from the parties’ written agreement may amount to 
a mistake if the parties are unaware of the consequences of that exclusion, the same 
cannot be said where the parties reduce their agreement to writing, with full knowledge of 
the consequences of all aspects of that recordal.  In such a case, the exclusion of a term 
from that agreement would not be due to a mistake, and any attempt to prove the 
existence of that term would amount to an attempt to vary the written document.314 
 
Arguably, the Mouton case falls in this last category.  The parties were informed by a legal 
advisor that the oral pactum de retrovendendo should be incorporated in the written 
agreement.  The appellant replied that this was unnecessary because he and the plaintiff 
                                                          
310
 Strydom v Coach Motors (Edms) Bpk 1975 4 SA 838 (T) 841B-C. 
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were family and that he would keep his promise.315  It is therefore difficult to reconcile the 
court’s decision to rectify the written agreement with the justification for the decision given 
in Von Ziegler.  Not only was the term deliberately excluded from the written agreement, 
but the parties also seemed to do so with full knowledge of the consequences of the 
omission.316  Why else would the appellant have indicated that it was unnecessary to 
include the pactum de retrovendendo in writing because he would keep his promise to 
return the land to the respondent, if not in response to information that it would not be 
binding in its oral form? 
 
It appears that the true reason for the court’s decision in Mouton was not that the parties 
were mistaken, but rather that the court would be giving effect to the unconscionable 
conduct of the appellant in that case if it refused to rectify the document.  This is evident 
from the court’s response to the contention that to allow rectification of the document on 
the facts before it would circumvent the parol evidence rule: 
 
“[Daar was ‘n betoog dat] ‘n party tot 'n geskrewe ooreenkoms nie onder die dekmantel van 
rektifikasie die reëls van bewysleer kan omseil nie; dit is so, maar ewe min kan agter dieselfde 
reëls skuiling gesoek word vir die beoefening van bedrog of die ontduiking van ‘n kontraktuele 
verpligting.”317 
 
As support for this view, the court referred to a statement made by Wessels JA in the 
Weinerlein case that “the exception (exceptio doli) lies whenever the Court regards it as a 
fraudulent act to rely on your summum jus when you know full well that your claim is 
founded on a mutual error.”318 
 
Thus, while Mouton has been interpreted as allowing rectification even when the mistake 
is as to the consequences of the deliberate exclusion of a term, it is arguable that the court 
was more concerned with the fact that the appellant was acting in an unconscionable 
manner by relying on a document which he knew did not constitute an accurate reflection 
of the parties’ actual agreement.  In order to prevent this, it allowed rectification of the 
written agreement, in spite of the fact that the parties had deliberately excluded a part of 
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their agreement from the written record, and in spite of the fact that this was probably done 
with full knowledge of the consequences thereof.   
 
The Mouton decision therefore has profound implications for rectification, the parol 
evidence rule and statutory formalities.  First, to rectify a document in order to include a 
term which has been deliberately omitted from the parties' written agreement, with full 
knowledge of the consequences of that omission, is not in conformity with the general 
proposition that rectification only corrects the document but does not vary the parties' 
intention.319  It is one thing to argue that where the parties intended their written agreement 
to operate in conjunction with an oral agreement, and mistakenly thought that it could, 
rectification of the written document does not vary the parties’ prior intention;320 it is 
another thing entirely where the parties intended to reduce their agreement to writing with 
full knowledge of the consequences of doing so on any prior oral agreement not recorded 
in that document.  In such a case, the inference must be that the parties did not intend that 
prior oral agreement to be binding; rectification in these circumstances can amount to 
nothing other than an amendment of the parties' common intention and the variation of an 
existing agreement.321   
 
Secondly, to permit rectification of the written document in such circumstances is 
inconsistent with both the parol evidence rule and statutory formalities.  Both preclude 
extrinsic evidence of a prior oral agreement or common intention when the purpose of 
such evidence is to vary or contradict the written agreement.  It is for this reason that 
courts repeatedly emphasise the importance of a mistake: its presence distinguishes 
between claims for rectification on the one hand, and the introduction of extrinsic evidence 
to vary a written agreement in an attempt to circumvent the parol evidence rule and 
statutory formalities on the other.  From this perspective, the possibility that an oral 
agreement or common intention may override a written agreement whenever there is a 
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“discrepancy” between the two, even when that discrepancy is deliberate, considerably 
narrows the scope of both rules.322 
 
It is to prevent the circumvention of the parol evidence rule and statutory formalities, that a 
party must prove a mistake, in the true sense of the word, before he may succeed with a 
claim for rectification in common-law jurisdictions.323  This emphasis on the need to prove 
a mistake can also be traced back to the fact that historically, rectification could only be 
claimed in Courts of Equity.  A subdivision of the equitable jurisdiction of these courts was 
that of fraud, accident and mistake.324  Rectification could only be ordered if it fell within 
the ambit of one of these grounds.  These historical roots of the remedy of rectification are 
still evident in English law today: while a document may be rectified on the basis that the 
parties intended it to have a certain legal effect and mistakenly thought that it did,325 the 
remedy is not available if parties deliberately omitted a certain term or part of their oral 
agreement from the written document.326 
 
This position is confirmed in the recent English case of Ali Oun v Ishfaq Ahmad.327 The 
respondent had agreed to sell the lease of retail and residential premises to the appellant.  
The terms of the agreement were recorded in two documents.  The first described the 
property and the purchase price, as well as stipulating a sum to be paid in advance by the 
appellant.328  The second recorded the apportionment of the price between the premises, 
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the fixtures, fittings, goodwill and trading stock.329  However, the parties deliberately 
excluded this apportionment from the first document.330  The respondent alleged that the 
first document did not constitute a valid contract of sale, because it failed to include all the 
express terms agreed upon by the parties as required by section 2(1) of the Law of 
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.  On appeal, the appellant sought rectification of 
the first document. 
 
The court acknowledged that section 2(4) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act permitted the rectification of an agreement in order to make it comply with 
statutory formalities governing the sale of land.  However, the real issue was whether the 
provision permitted rectification of written agreements where certain express terms were 
deliberately omitted by the parties, or only those where the parties' claim met the 
conventional requirements of rectification.331  
 
The court considered case law which suggested that rectification was permitted where the 
parties had laboured under a mistake concerning the legal effect of a term or the 
document as a whole,332 and held that in one sense, the appellant and respondent had 
made such a mistake when they thought that the first document constituted a binding 
contract even though it did not contain all the express terms of their oral agreement.333  
However, in those cases where a document was rectified because of a mistake concerning 
the legal effect of the transaction or a term thereof, the parties had not deliberately omitted 
a term from their agreement.  The court continued: 
 
“[T]his express agreement to omit the term means that there is no defect or mistake in the 
recording of, or the expression of, the arrangement and it is beyond the ambit of rectification to 
write into the written agreement a term which the parties expressly agreed should not be so 
recorded.  I reach this conclusion applying what I understand to be conventional principles as to 
the availability of rectification and not some special set of rules as to rectification for the 
                                                          
329
 Para 5. 
330
 Paras 15, 63. 
331
 Para 35. 
332
 Paras 49-53. 
333
 Para 54. 
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purposes of section 2(4) of the 1989 Act.  In my judgment, this approach serves the legislative 
objective of section 2 of the 1989 Act.”334 
 
South African courts are not confined by the same historical origins of the remedy of 
rectification as their common-law counterparts.  In fact, while many seem to be of the 
opinion that rectification was received in South African law as a necessary corollary and 
narrow exception to the parol evidence rule, cases like Otto, Tesven and particularly 
Mouton seem to be guided by the broader equitable nature of rectification as emphasised 
by civilian sources, and which is directed at preventing unconscionable behaviour.335  
More importantly, they constitute examples of where an overemphasis on the importance 
of the certainty promoted by written agreements could have led to inequitable results and 
encouraged unconscionable conduct.  It was noted in previous chapters that this 
awareness of the potential abuse of the writing requirement has led South African courts to 
interpret the relevant legislation imposing such a requirement more flexibly than the exact 
wording of that legislation and its underlying purpose may suggest.336  This awareness 
also appears to inform some South African courts’ approach to the remedies available to 
parties in the event of non-compliance with statutory formalities.337  It would seem further 
that the same awareness is the (implied) basis for South African courts’ approach to the 
requirement that there must be a “mistake” in a written agreement before it may be 
rectified to conform to the parties’ actual agreement or common intention.   
 
5 5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the South African approach to the rectification of agreements 
subject to statutory formalities.  We have seen that it prescribes two steps before 
rectification can occur: first,338 there must be compliance with formal requirements ex facie 
                                                          
334
 Para 55 per Morgan J. 
335
 See eg the reference to Wessel JA’s statement in Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 292 in 
Mouton v Hanekom 1959 3 SA 35 (A) 40B to the effect that it amounts to a type of fraud to enforce a written 
agreement which does not accurately represent the parties’ actual agreement or common intention and the 
emphasis in Otto v Heymans 1971 4 SA 148 (T) 156A-D on the unconscionable conduct of the plaintiff in 
seeking to enforce a written agreement which did not correspond to the parties’ actual agreement.  
336
 See chs 2 (2 4 4) and 3 (3 3 2 1). 
337
 See ch 6 (6 4 4 3). 
338
 5 3. 
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the document and secondly,339 the (other) elements of a claim for rectification must be 
proved. 
 
In the first step, most courts adopt a form-for-form's-sake approach.  It is submitted that 
this emphasis on ex facie compliance with statutory formalities is misplaced, because in 
addition to being theoretically suspect, the application of the rule by South African courts is 
anything but consistent.  It is one thing to argue that the first step is required despite the 
fact that this may have anomalous results; it is another thing entirely when the requirement 
itself is counterproductive and lends itself to the drawing of tenuous distinctions.  
 
The first step further fails to promote the functions of formalities to any greater degree than 
would be the case if it did not exist at all.  In fact, it seems to encourage rather than 
prevent fraud.  The potential for abuse of the protection offered by statutory formalities 
exists whenever it is possible for a party to rely on a defence of statutory invalidity despite 
the fact that the parties' underlying agreement or common intention points to validity.  
Common-law courts are aware of this potential for abuse and rectify agreements subject to 
formalities so that the legislation does not become “an instrument for enabling sharp 
practice”.340  The fact that most common-law legislation prescribes unenforceability rather 
than nullity for a failure to comply with statutory formalities does not change the fact that 
the functions of formalities remain the same and that the relevant legislation in each case 
may be abused by unscrupulous parties.  South African courts on the other hand, beyond 
recognising the possibility that statutory formalities may be abused,341 seem to find 
themselves unable to devise a consistent solution to this problem.  If the imposition of the 
first step described in this chapter turns out to be an obstacle, it is surely incumbent on 
local courts to re-examine its necessity. 
 
In contrast to the apparent rigidity in approach to the first step in the rectification of 
agreements subject to formalities, South African courts appear to follow a far more flexible 
approach to determining whether the (additional) requirements for rectification of such 
                                                          
339
 5 4. 
340
 United States of America v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196 200; GMAC Commercial Credit Development 
Limited v Kalvinder Singh Sandhu, Kewal Singh Sandhu [2004] EWHC 716 para 53; Steinbach Credit Union 
Ltd. v Hildebrandt 37 Man R (2d) 192 (1985) para 20.  See also 5 3 4 2. 
341
 See eg Magwaza v Heenan 1979 2 SA 1019 (A) 1029E. 
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agreements have been met.  This is reflected in the curial relaxation of the “prior 
concluded contract” requirement (so that proof of a prior common intention is sufficient)342 
as well as the notion of what constitutes a mistake (so that even the deliberate omission of 
a term could qualify as one).343  The South African approach is not only more lenient than 
the common-law approach to these requirements, but it has also proceeded without 
consideration of the impact of these developments on the functions of formalities.   
 
This is particularly evident when it comes to the mistake requirement.344  On the one hand, 
the idea that parties can deliberately omit a term from their agreement and still succeed 
with a claim for rectification is contrary to both the purpose of rectification and the 
imposition of statutory formalities.  On the other, the equitable considerations underlying 
rectification and the awareness of the possible abuse of the writing requirement which are 
ignored in the first step appear to inform the courts’ approach to the deliberate omission of 
a term from a written agreement in the second step.  It is difficult to reconcile this disregard 
of statutory formalities in the context of rectification, with the emphasis on the importance 
of such formalities in the first step.  This discrepancy appears to be the result of the two-
step approach itself. 
 
By creating this artificial two-step procedure for the rectification of agreements subject to 
statutory formalities, South African courts have promoted an unnecessarily complicated 
approach to the observance of statutory formalities on the one hand and their role in 
rectification on the other.  Arguably, a better approach would be for the courts to consider 
themselves faced simply with the question whether a document, irrespective of whether 
there is ex facie compliance with statutory formalities, should be rectified in order to give 
effect to the parties' underlying agreement or common intention.  However, in answering 
this question, due weight should be given both to the functions of formalities and the 
requirements for rectification throughout the process. 
 
Such an approach would have the added benefit of providing an alternative solution to the 
problem of blank spaces in documents recording agreements subject to formalities.  In the 
                                                          
342
 5 4 2. 
343
 5 4 3. 
344
 5 4 3. 
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previous chapter,345 it was noted that the current South African approach regards an 
agreement subject to formalities as void if the document recording it contains blank spaces 
relating to material terms and the omission cannot be treated as one of the instances 
where extrinsic evidence is admissible.  An alternative solution, and one which has already 
been adopted in certain common-law jurisdictions,346 is to consider whether the document 
containing such blank spaces can be rectified.  If the first step were abolished, courts 
would be free to determine whether the parties had in fact reached agreement or shared a 
common intention regarding the content of that blank space, but had simply failed to 
complete it by virtue of a mistake. 
                                                          
345
 See ch 4 (4 3 2). 
346
 G M Andrews & R Millett The Law of Guarantees 5 ed (2008) 88-92; Whiting v Diver Plumbing & Heating 
Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 560 569; Jireh Customs Limited v Clode [2008] NZHC 1665. 
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CHAPTER 6: REMEDIES ARISING FROM NON-COMPLIANCE WITH 
STATUTORY FORMALITIES 
6 1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters dealt with the admission of extrinsic evidence to supplement or 
correct an incomplete or inaccurate recordal of the parties’ agreement.  What was 
considered there could also be seen as instances where parties attempt to convince a 
court that their written agreement should be enforced, either because it appears in two or 
more documents (incorporation by reference)1 or because, once corrected, the document 
constitutes an accurate reflection of the parties’ oral agreement (rectification).2 
 
This chapter considers the situation where the agreement does not comply with formal 
requirements and a party is therefore unable to rely on formal completeness as the basis 
for enforcing a claim.  In examining the various remedies which may become available to a 
party who has performed pursuant to such a formally defective contract, this chapter will 
be structured as follows: after an overview of the consequences that generally result from 
non-compliance with statutory formalities,3 the discussion will proceed to a comparison of 
the various remedies available in different jurisdictions.  These in turn are divided into two 
categories: remedies that are aimed at providing restitution where a contract is formally 
defective4 and remedies that could lead to the enforcement of the contract, whether 
directly or indirectly.5  The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the consequences of 




                                                          
1
 See ch 4. 
2
 See ch 5. 
3
 6 2. 
4
 6 3. 
5
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6
 6 5. 
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6 2 The general consequences of non-compliance with statutory formalities: 
voidness, voidability and unenforceability  
6 2 1 Introduction 
 
Depending on the type of transaction involved and the legal system in which the parties 
find themselves, non-compliance with statutory formalities may have different 
consequences.  The failure to comply with statutory formalities may render the agreement 
void.  Thus, both South African and German legislation governing suretyships and sales of 
land prescribe nullity for failure to comply with the statutory formalities.7  In England, the 
same consequence is prescribed for non-compliance with formalities relating to the sale of 
land.8  Or a statute may simply render the agreement unenforceable, as is the case with 
guarantees subject to the Statute of Frauds.9  Finally, non-compliance with formalities may 
render the agreement neither void, nor unenforceable, but voidable at the instance of one 
or both of the parties – a result which ensues in South Africa when a seller fails to inform 
certain purchasers of land of their cooling-off right in writing.10  These consequences 
determine the nature of the remedies available to a party who has performed in terms of a 
formally defective agreement.  For example, in South African law, remedies based on 
unjustified enrichment can only be used to effect restitution if an agreement is void – they 
are not available if an agreement is unenforceable or has been rescinded because it is 
voidable.11  It is therefore necessary to distinguish clearly between the concepts of 
voidness, voidability and unenforceability.  
 
The following discussion focuses on features of each of these concepts which explain why 
certain remedies become available in the event of non-compliance with a formal 
requirement.  Furthermore, an attempt will be made to explore why non-compliance may 
lead to one consequence and not another.  Both of these aims require that the concepts of 
voidness, voidability and unenforceability should be treated as if they have some fixed and 
                                                          
7
 See s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act and s 6 of the General Law Amendment Act (South Africa); § 311b 
and § 766 BGB, read together with § 125 BGB (Germany). 
8
 S 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellanous Provisions) Act. 
9
 S 4 of the Statute of Frauds. 
10
 S 2(2A) of the Alienation of Land Act and the discussion in 6 2 3 below. 
11
 See eg Crispette & Candy Co Ltd v Michaelis NO and Michaelis NO 1948 1 SA 404 (W) 408-409; Bisset v 
Boland Bank Ltd 1991 4 SA 603 (D) 611J-612B. 
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universal meaning, and the discussion proceeds on the assumption that they do, at least 
to the extent that certain basic features of each are recognised in all legal systems.  
However, there can be real difficulties in distinguishing between the different 
consequences of non-compliance at a theoretical and practical level, both within and 
between legal systems,12 and the fact that this discussion does not deal with these should 
be understood in the light of the scope of its aims, and not as an attempt to mask the fact 
that they exist.  
 
6 2 2 Void, voidable and unenforceable 
 
Nestadt JA made the following observations about a void or invalid13 contract in 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Insolvent Estate Botha t/a ‘Trio Kulture’:14   
 
“A void contract has been described as being 'devoid of any legal effect ... (I)t is as though no 
contract had been made ... It is a mere nothing ...' (Wessels' Law of Contract in South Africa vol 
1 para 639; see too De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4th ed at 80 - 1 and Christie 
The Law of Contract in South Africa at 335.)  As Innes CJ in Schierhout v Minister of Justice 
1926 AD 99 at 109 said: 
                                                          
12
 The source of this difficulty is classical Roman law, which had about 30 different terms to describe the 
notion of “invalid”, not all of which meant the same thing.  R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 679.  This lack of uniform terminology created difficulties for the 
commentators on the ius commune: in their attempts to distinguish between the concepts of voidness and 
voidability, for instance, they have been described as “blind men looking in a dark room for a black cat which 
wasn’t there” (Van der Westhuizen v Engelbrecht and Spouse and Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht 1942 OPD 
191 199 per Van den Heever J).  The difficulty persists in modern law.  Eg French and German law attach 
different meanings to the notion of “relative invalidity” (Zimmermann Law of Obligations 679 n 7).  In South 
African law, C C Turpin “Void and Voidable Acts” (1955) 72 SALJ 58 distinguishes between void and 
voidable acts (but has no difficulty in grouping both concepts under the term “invalid” (61)); A M Honoré 
“Degrees of Invalidity” (1958) 75 SALJ 32 identifies nine different types of invalidity (which include void, 
voidable and “inchoate” transactions); and a recent attempt to provide plain language drafting tips for 
contracts drafted in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 suggests that the phrase “null, void 
and no force and effect whatsoever” should be replaced with alternatives like void, invalid or unenforceable, 
which implies that these concepts are interchangeable (see E de Stadler & R Baitsewe “Plain Language 
Tips” (February 2012) Consumer Law Review <http://www.jutalaw.co.za/newsletter/newsletter/consumer-
law-review-january-2012-1/> (accessed 05-11-2012). 
13
 The concept of invalidity is used in the narrow sense of voidness and not as a general category denoting 
several different types of consequences (see n 12). 
14
 1990 2 SA 548 (A). 




'It is a fundamental principle of our law that a thing done contrary to the direct prohibition of the law is 
void and of no effect.  The rule is thus stated: “Ea quae lege fieri prohibentur, si fuerint facta, non 
solum inutilia, sed pro infectis habeantur; licet legislator fieri prohibuerit tantum, nec specialiter dixerit 
inutile esse debere quod factum est.”  (Code 1.14.5.)  So that what is done contrary to the prohibition 
of the law is not only of no effect, but must be regarded as never having been done - and that whether 




It follows that when an agreement is void, contractual remedies are not available to a party 
who has performed pursuant to such an agreement.  However, while the general point of 
departure is that the invalid contract may not be enforced,16 an enrichment remedy will 
often be available to such a party in order to reclaim his performance.17 
 
An enrichment remedy is not automatically available where a contract is unenforceable.  
This is because unenforceable contracts are valid, but may not be sued upon.18  
Therefore, the effect of unenforceability  
 
“is not to render the [contract] … void, still less illegal, but is to render the kind of evidence 
required indispensable when it is sought to enforce the contract”.19   
 
The fact that an unenforceable contract is nonetheless valid leaves open the possibility 
that remedies could be fashioned which may lead, directly or indirectly, to its ultimate 
enforcement.  For example, common-law jurisdictions have developed the doctrine of part 
performance in the context of certain agreements which are unenforceable for failure to 
comply with the formal requirements prescribed by the Statute of Frauds or its common-
law counterparts.  As discussed in greater detail below,20 a successful reliance on this 
doctrine results in an award of specific performance (or damages in lieu thereof).  
 




 There are exceptions to this general rule: see 6 4 below. 
17
 See 6 3 3 below. 
18
 See eg S J Whittaker “Form” in H G Beale (gen ed) Chitty on Contracts 1: General Principles 30 ed (2008) 
379 398. 
19
 Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App Cas 467 488. 
20
 6 4 2. 
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Unenforceability should not be confused with voidability.21  A contract which is voidable 
affords one or both of the parties the power to rescind the contract.  Until the right of 
rescission is exercised, the contract is both valid and enforceable.22  Once the contract is 
rescinded, it is retrospectively declared null and void ab initio.23  Since any performance 
made pursuant to a voidable contract before it is rescinded occurs in terms of a valid 
contract,24 the remedy used to reclaim one’s performance and which becomes available as 
a result of rescission, namely restitutio in integrum, is said to be contractual in nature.25  
 
While it is possible that non-compliance with a particular formal requirement could result in 
voidness, unenforceability or voidability, a discussion of the basic implications of these 
concepts does not explain why non-compliance should lead to one result and not another.  
The following section attempts such an explanation. 
 
6 2 3 “Balance of interests” analysis and the consequences of non-compliance with 
formal requirements 
 
In the absence of a general principle to explain them, the different consequences visited 
upon non-compliance with formal requirements appear to be imposed somewhat 
arbitrarily.  For example, it is not immediately apparent why non-compliance with section 
2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act, which provides that an alienation of land “shall … [not] 
                                                          
21
 See eg A T Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in A T von Mehren (ed) Int Enc Comp L VII (1998) 1 117 
n 859, 124 who equates unenforceability with voidability. 
22
 S W J van der Merwe, L F van Huyssteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed 
(2012) 116. 
23
 Bonne Fortune Beleggings v Kalahari Salt Works (Pty) Ltd 1973 3 SA 739 (NC) 743H; Davidson v 
Bonafede 1981 2 SA 501 (C) 510A; Maseko v Maseko 1992 3 SA 190 (W) 199E-F; Laco Parts (Pty) Ltd t/a 
ACA Clutch v Turners Shipping (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 279 (W) para 16. 
24
 By contrast, enrichment remedies become available if there is no legal ground at the time of performance 
– see J du Plessis The South African Law of Unjustified Enrichment (2012) 69, 106. 
25
 W de Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 ed (1987) 158-159; Van der Merwe et 
al Contract 116; Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 68 ff; Laco Parts (Pty) Ltd t/a ACA Clutch v 
Turners Shipping (Pty) Ltd 2008 1 SA 279 (W) paras 16, 18.  However, see eg D Visser “Rethinking 
Unjustified Enrichment: A Perspective of the Competition Between Contractual and Enrichment Remedies” 
1992 Acta Juridica 203 211 ff; Unjustified Enrichment (2008) 108-112; P H O’Brien “Restitutio In Integrum by 
Onbehoorlik Verkreë Wilsooreenstemming” 1999 TSAR 203 211 ff who argue that this view of restitutio in 
integrum is not the only, or even the best, way to classify the remedy.  
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be of any force or effect” if it is not in writing, should result in invalidity,26 while non-
compliance with section 2(2A) of the same Act, which provides that a purchaser’s cooling-
off right “shall” be contained in a deed of alienation, merely results in voidability.27  It 
appears that this problem is not unique to the sphere of statutory formalities.  Also in the 
context of legality, one finds that illegal restraints of trade and certain types of illegal 
wagers are regarded as unenforceable rather than void, in spite of the fact that legality is a 
constitutive requirement for a valid contract.28  The criterion for drawing this distinction is 
not apparent in case law: 
 
“The courts have certainly had occasion to express themselves on the reason for regarding 
some illegal contracts as unenforceable but not void ab initio.  Nevertheless, they have not done 
so, at least not to the extent that they have identified a single measure for distinguishing 
between invalidity and unenforceability.”29 
 
It has been suggested elsewhere30 that the distinction is based on a balancing of individual 
against social or public interests (social or public interests should be distinguished from the 
more abstract concept of public policy, which provides the means to determine the relative 
weight to be afforded to various interests31).  Where an agreement is, first and foremost, 
contrary to social interests, the tendency is to declare such an agreement void.32  Where 
the agreement primarily affects individual interests, and social interests only at a 
secondary level, then non-compliance with the requirement of legality will result in a lesser 
consequence like unenforceability or voidability.33 
 
                                                          
26
 The definitive case on the meaning of this phrase in the context of sales of land is Wilken v Kohler 1913 
AD 135, discussed further in the main text. 
27
 See Gowar Investments (Pty) Ltd v Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC
 
2007 3 SA 100 (SCA), 
discussed further in the main text. 
28
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 173-174.  A discussion of unenforceable wagers, and restraints of trade, can 
be found in T Floyd “Legality” in D Hutchison & C Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed 
(2012) 175 193-200; Van der Merwe et al Contract 182-188.  
29
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 174. 
30
 S van der Merwe & L F van Huyssteen “The Force of Agreements: Valid, Void, Voidable, Unenforceable” 
(1995) 58 THRHR 549; Van der Merwe et al Contract 175-176. 
31
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Although it has not enjoyed particular prominence in the South African context, a “balance 
of interests” analysis may also be used to explain why non-compliance with certain formal 
requirements results in invalidity, while in other cases the contract is merely voidable.  For 
example, in Wilken v Kohler34 (“Wilken”) the court was required to determine the legislative 
intention behind section 49 of the Free State Ordinance No 12 of 1906, which provided 
that an oral agreement for the sale of land would not be of “any force and effect”.  
According to Innes J, the purpose of such legislation was not to protect a particular class 
of persons, but to promote broader social aims: 
 
“Buyers and sellers of land form no class by themselves; nor do they suffer from any disability 
or weakness requiring protection.  The object of the Legislature could not have been specially to 
favour so indeterminate a body.  The idea, no doubt, was the same which underlay the English 
Statute of Frauds.  Recognising that contracts for the sale of fixed property were, as a rule, 
transactions of considerable value and importance, and that the conditions attached were often 
intricate, the Legislature, in order to prevent litigation and to remove a temptation to perjury and 
fraud, insisted upon their being reduced to writing … I am satisfied that the provision was 
adopted not for the advantage of any particular class of persons, but on grounds of public 
policy.  So that the section should be read not as making these …[oral] contracts voidable at the 
option of either of the parties, but as rendering them entirely void.”35 
 
Thus, a formal requirement which aims primarily at the prevention of fraud, unnecessary 
litigation and perjury is in the public interest, at least in South African law.  The formal 
requirements prescribed for suretyships have the same aim, and are also in the public 
interest.36  According to Innes J, this necessitates a conclusion that non-compliance with 
the formal requirements should result in invalidity.  
 
This “balance of interests” analysis can also be used to explain the imposition of invalidity 
for non-compliance with the formal requirements imposed for sales of land and suretyships 
in German law.  However the emphasis there is less on the overarching fraud-prevention 
purpose of form, and more on the specific functions served by formal requirements.  In 
                                                          
34
 1913 AD 135. 
35
 142.  A similar sentiment is expressed in the majority judgment of Solomon J (149).  Presumably the 
concept of “public policy” as it is used by Innes J in this quotation should be understood as denoting broader 
social or public interests, in contrast to the narrower concept of individual interests. 
36
 See eg Fourlamel (Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 1 SA 333 (A) 343A; Oceanair (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Sher 1980 1 
SA 317 (D) 326B; Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles [1999] 2 All SA 304 (A) para 9. 
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particular, the relevant formal requirements are imposed to prevent hasty decisions, the 
danger of which is emphasised in transactions relating to both land and suretyships.37  
Furthermore, the formal requirement should serve to warn parties that they are moving 
from negotiation to contract conclusion.38  However, no distinction is drawn, for the 
purposes of this caution, between sellers and buyers, or sureties (provided the latter do 
not fall within the merchant exception in paragraph 350 HGB39).  The consequence of 
invalidity for non-compliance with the relevant formal requirements is therefore in line with 
the notion that they serve the public interest and are not merely imposed to protect 
individual interests.40 
 
By contrast, when a particular formal requirement serves more individualised interests, the 
result of non-compliance should, according to the “balance of interests” analysis, result in 
voidability.  It seems that this is indeed the case, as is evident in the decision in Gowar 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC41 (“Gowar 
Investments”) which focuses on the failure to record a purchaser’s cooling-off right in a 
deed of alienation. 
 
The Alienation of Land Act was amended in 199842 by insertion of section 29A, which 
stipulates that certain purchasers of land have the right to revoke an offer to purchase the 
land, or to terminate a deed of alienation, within a period of five days after signature of the 
offer or the deed of alienation.  This cooling-off right is only available to a specific group of 
purchasers.43  The amending Act further inserted section 2(2A) which provides that “the 
                                                          
37
 B Markesinis, H Unberath & A Johnston The German Law of Contract: A Comparative Treatise 2 ed 
(2006) 84. 
38
 Markesinis et al German Law of Contract 84; R Kanzleiter “§ 311b” in W Krüger (ed) Münchener 
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 2 Allgemeiner Teil: §§ 241-432 5 ed (2007) n 1; M Habersack “§ 
766” in M Habersack (ed) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 5 Besonderer Teil III: §§ 
705-853 5 ed (2009) n 1. 
39
 See ch 2 (2 3 4). 
40
 D Einsele “§ 125” in F J Säcker (ed) Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 1 Allgemeiner 
Teil: §§ 1-240 6 ed (2012) n 56. 
41
 2007 3 SA 100 (SCA). 
42
 By virtue of the Alienation of Land Amendment Act 103 of 1998. 
43
 S 29(A)(5).  They are purchasers (a) of property not exceeding R250 000; (b) who are purchasing: (i) land 
used or intended to be used for residential purposes; (ii) an interest as defined in the Housing Development 
Schemes for Retired Persons Act 65 of 1988; (iii) a share in a share-block company which confers the right 
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deed of alienation shall contain the right of a purchaser or prospective purchaser to revoke 
the offer or terminate the deed of alienation”.  However, the consequence of non-
compliance with this provision was not indicated, and it was only in Gowar Investments 
that the uncertainty created by the conflicting decisions in Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical 
Centre CC v Cowar [sic] Investments (Pty) Ltd44 (failure to include the cooling-off right 
renders the deed of alienation voidable) and Sayers v Kahn45 (failure to include the 
cooling-off right invalidates the deed of alienation) was settled. 
  
In Gowar Investments, the court held that section 29A “is a typical piece of consumer-
protection legislation which is aimed at protecting the vulnerable, uninformed small buyer 
of residential property”.46  It is therefore arguable that this section does not aim to promote 
the broader social interests associated with section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act (the 
eventual successor of provisions like section 49 of the Free State Ordinance No 12 of 
1906 considered by Innes J), but is aimed at protecting only certain purchasers.47  This 
limited protective purpose also triggers section 2(2A): its function is to bring the right 
created by section 29A to the attention of the purchaser only.48  It was not intended that 
the seller should also have notice of this right: section 2(2A) merely requires “a deed of 
alienation” to contain this reference and not also the offer made by the purchaser.49  Due 
to the limited protective purpose of sections 29(A) and 2(2A), and the fact that the 
consequence of invalidity could not be inferred from the wording of the latter provision,50 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
to occupy land used mainly for residential purposes; (iv) a sectional-title unit; and (c) who are natural 
persons (trusts, companies, close corporations and the like are excluded).  
44
 2006 2 SA 15 (D) para 19. 
45
 2002 5 SA 688 (C) 694C-E. 
46
 Gowar Investments (Pty) Ltd v Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC 2007 3 SA 100 (SCA) para 11.  
The legislature apparently erred in making the cooling-off right available to all purchasers of sectional title 
units, rather than to purchasers of residential units only (see para 9). 
47
 Gowar Investments (Pty) Ltd v Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC 2007 3 SA 100 (SCA) para 6 
(iii).  See also 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC v Cowar Investments (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 15 (D) paras 
18-19. 
48
 Gowar Investments (Pty) Ltd v Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC 2007 3 SA 100 (SCA) para 11.  
This was also the finding of the court a quo: 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC v Cowar Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 2006 2 SA 15 (D) para 17. 
49
 Gowar Investments (Pty) Ltd v Section 3 Dolphin Coast Medical Centre CC 2007 3 SA 100 (SCA) para 13. 
50
 Para 12.  S 2(1) of the Act, which does prescribe invalidity, commences with the words “[n]o deed of 
alienation … shall … be of any force or effect”. 
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the court held that a deed of alienation which does not specify the cooling-off right of the 
purchaser is voidable at the instance of that purchaser, rather than void.   
 
One statute which does not appear to lend itself to this “balance of interests” analysis is 
the Statute of Frauds.  In its original form, the Statute prescribed unenforceability for both 
formally defective guarantees and alienations of land.  However, it will be recalled that the 
preamble to the Statute states that it was enacted “[f]or prevention of many fraudulent 
[p]ractices which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld by [p]erjury and [s]ubornation 
of [p]erjury.”  These concerns underlying the prescribed formal requirements were the 
same concerns which have led South African courts to conclude that the formal 
requirements imposed for sales of land and suretyships were in the public interest and that 
non-compliance should therefore result in invalidity.51  This discrepancy may be explained 
in one of two ways. 
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that a formal requirement which is intended to reduce 
fraud and perjury merely addresses evidentiary concerns and as such, is not in the 
broader public interest.  There is some academic support for this suggestion,52 and it may 
be that South African courts have attached greater importance to the fraud-prevention 
purpose of form than is justified, by imposing a consequence of invalidity rather than 
unenforceability for non-compliance.53  On the other hand, this argument presupposes that 
the reduction of fraud, perjury and unnecessary litigation must be equated with the 
evidentiary function of a formal requirement.  In a previous chapter it was argued that the 
overarching purpose of the formal requirements under discussion here is the reduction of 
fraud and related problems,54 and that this purpose is achieved, inter alia, by the 
evidentiary function of formalities.  
                                                          
51
 See also ch 2 (2 2) for a discussion of the historical conditions leading to the promulgation of the Statute. 
52
 K Zweigert & H Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law (tr T Weir) 3 ed (1998) 366-367, 371; I Englard 
“Restitution of Benefits Conferred without Obligation” in E Von Caemmerer & P Schlechtriem (eds) Int Enc 
Comp L X 7 ed (2007) 1 55.  
53
 It is entirely possible that legal systems may reach different conclusions on which interests are affected by 
a legal phenomenon.  Eg SA regards improperly-obtained consent as primarily affecting individual interests, 
which leads to the conclusion that a contract concluded in these circumstances is voidable.  Other legal 
systems regard this legal phenomenon as affecting broader social interests – see Van der Merwe & Van 
Huyssteen 1995 THRHR 565-567.  
54
 See ch 2 (2 3 3). 




If this analysis is correct, it explains the contradiction between the South African approach 
and the conclusions drawn by some academic commentators.  However, it does not 
explain the different consequences imposed for non-compliance with formal requirements 
which fulfil the same purpose, like section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act and the 
Statute of Frauds.  
 
It appears that the better explanation for this discrepancy is rather mundane.  Until the 
middle of the nineteenth century, English courts treated all formally defective contracts 
within the scope of the Statute of Frauds as void, rather than unenforceable.55  It was only 
in Leroux v Brown56 that the consequence of unenforceability was distinguished from that 
of invalidity.  Furthermore, the reason for the court’s conclusion was based solely on the 
fact that the provisions of the Statute of Frauds relating to different types of contracts were 
worded differently.57  Section 4 of the Statute provided that “no action shall be brought” on 
a guarantee or sale of land, for example, unless that agreement had been reduced to 
writing.  By contrast, section 17 of the Statute, which related to the sale of goods for £10 or 
more, provided that “no contract shall be allowed to be good” unless it complied with the 
writing requirement.  This difference in the wording of the sections led the court to 
conclude that non-compliance with section 17 meant that the contract was void, while non-
compliance with section 4 simply meant that the contract could not be sued upon.  At no 
point in the judgment is there any indication that the court’s conclusion was motivated by 
the opinion that section 4 was any less in the public interest than section 17.  The court 
also appeared to lose sight of the fact that the difference in the formulation of the two 
sections was probably due to the fact that they were drafted by different authors, and not 
because the intention was to prescribe different results for non-compliance with the 
different sections.58 
 
Whatever the motivation for the provision of unenforceability rather than invalidity in 
section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act now 
                                                          
55
 A W B Simpson A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit (1975) 
609, 612. 
56
 138 ER 1119 (1852). 
57
 1129 per Jervis CJ; 1130 per Maule J. 
58
 Simpson Common Law of Contract 612. 
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provides that a sale of land must be in writing in order to be valid.59  The reason for this 
change appears to be partly practical and partly policy-driven.  First, the English Law 
Commission suggested that the concept of unenforceability was too confusing:  
 
“The distinction … made between valid but unenforceable contracts, on the one hand, and 
invalid contracts, on the other hand, is probably not well understood.  Where the parties have 
acted in ignorance of the legal formalities it is probably preferable for any contract to be void, 
rather than for there to be a contract which is valid but enforceable by some means and not 
others and possibly enforceable against one party but not against the other.”60 
 
Secondly, the Law Commission felt that a consequence of invalidity would promote greater 
certainty and therefore reduce the possibility of fraud.61  In Yaxley v Gotts,62 it was noted 
that 
 
“[the] requirement that any contract for the disposition of an interest in land must be made in a 
particular documentary form, and will otherwise be void, … can be seen as embodying [the] 
conclusion, in the general public interest, that the need for certainty as to the formation of 
contracts of this type must in general outweigh the disappointment of those who make informal 
bargains in ignorance of the statutory requirement.”63 
 
6 2 4 Conclusion 
 
This discussion has attempted to provide a means to determine why non-compliance with 
formal requirements can lead to different consequences.  According to a “balance of 
interests” analysis, the fact that some formal requirements serve broader social interests is 
emphasised by a consequence of voidness in the event of non-compliance; a lesser 
consequence is imposed when a formal requirement serves more individualised interests.  
This is not to say that this relationship is always self-evident: the Statute of Frauds, for 
                                                          
59
 It should be pointed out that a similar consequence was suggested, albeit unsuccessfully, for formally 
defective guarantees – see English Law Revision Committee “Sixth Interim Report: The Statute of Frauds 
and the Doctrine of Consideration” (1937) XV Can Bar Rev 585 617.  The justification for the suggested 
change was that voidness emphasised the general fraud-prevention purpose of the formal requirements 
imposed for guarantees. 
60
 Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of Land (Working Paper No 92) (1985) para 5.7 
61
 Para 5.6. 
62
 [2000] Ch 162. 
63
 175. 
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example, prescribes unenforceability for non-compliance with its requirements, and yet it 
primarily serves a purpose which is in the public interest.  Nevertheless, a “balance of 
interests” analysis provides a satisfactory explanation for the different consequences 
imposed by modern legislation prescribing formal requirements, and it is arguable that the 
discrepancy between the purpose of the Statute of Frauds and the consequence of 
unenforceability should be viewed in light of the historical concerns which led to its 
promulgation. 
 
Since this “balance of interests” analysis has further revealed that different legislators are 
motivated by the same or similar concerns when imposing formal requirements, at least in 
the case of invalidity, one would expect that the approach to the remedies available to a 
party who has performed in terms of such an agreement would be the same across all 
legal systems.  This expectation will be disappointed: some award remedies which could 
lead to the (indirect) enforcement of the contract, in spite of the fact that it is formally 
invalid because the formal requirement was in the public interest.64  However, common to 
all the legal systems referred to, is the availability of an enrichment remedy to a party who 
has performed in terms of a formally defective agreement.  This, and other remedies which 
do not enforce such an agreement, will serve as the topic of the next section. 
 
6 3 Remedies aimed at restitution of performances made in purported fulfilment 
of formally defective contracts  
6 3 1 Introduction 
 
This section focuses primarily on remedies which arise from the invalidity or 
unenforceability of a formally defective agreement.65  Where a party has performed in 
terms of an alienation of land which is void for non-compliance with section 2(1) of the Act, 
South African law offers two possible remedies: the rei vindicatio where ownership has not 
                                                          
64
 See 6 4 below. 
65
 In passing, it should be noted that that in South African law, the failure to record the cooling-off right in a 
deed of alienation (which renders the agreement voidable) also results in a remedy for a purchaser or 
prospective purchaser.  Section 29A(4) of the Alienation of Land Act provides that where such a party has 
elected to rescind the contract, every person who has received money from him must refund it. 
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been transferred, and enrichment remedies where it has.66  In the case of suretyship 
agreements, only an enrichment action is available to a party who has performed pursuant 
to a formally invalid agreement.67  These remedies will now be considered.  
 
6 3 2 The rei vindicatio 
 
The general point of departure is that the owner of property may use the rei vindicatio to 
reclaim that property from any person who possesses it without his consent.68  The 
justification for the existence of the remedy is given by Jansen JA in Chetty v Naidoo:69    
 
“[O]ne of [the] incidents [of dominium] is the right of exclusive possession of the res, with the 
necessary corollary that the owner may claim his property wherever found, from whomsoever 
holding it [with the rei vindicatio].  It is inherent in the nature of ownership that possession of the 
res should normally be with the owner, and it follows that no other person may withhold it from 
the owner unless he is vested with some right enforceable against the owner”.70 
 
The availability of the rei vindicatio presupposes that ownership has not been transferred 
to the other party, which in turn depends on whether the requirements for the passing of 
ownership have been met.71   
 
The two “active elements”72 for the passing of ownership are delivery (which is effected by 
registration in the case of immovable property) and an intention to give and receive 
ownership (the real agreement).  It has also been said that an effective transfer of 
ownership may require a iusta causa traditionis73 – what exactly constitutes a iusta causa 
                                                          
66
 Akbar v Patel 1974 3 All SA 348 (T); Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A); Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 
1 SA 35 (SCA). 
67
 The reason why a surety will generally not have rei vindicatio to reclaim his performance is discussed in 6 
3 2 below. 
68
 Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 986 (T) 995I-996C (reversed in 
part on appeal in Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 2003 1 SA 204 (T), but not on 
this point); C G van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347-353; P J Badenhorst, J M Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) 242. 
69




 A discussion of these requirements can be found in Van der Merwe Sakereg 301-305. 
72
 D L Carey-Miller The Acquisition and Protection of Ownership (1986) 121. 
73
 Van der Merwe Sakereg 304. 
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and the extent to which it is relevant for an effective transfer of ownership depends on 
whether a legal system has adopted a causal or abstract system of transfer. 
 
In a causal system of ownership, the transfer of a real right is made dependent on the 
validity of the legal ground which is the reason for the transfer74 (usually, this legal ground 
takes the form of an obligation-creating agreement,75 and for current purposes it is 
assumed that the legal ground is such an agreement).  The requirement of a iusta causa in 
a causal system therefore means that there must be a valid underlying agreement before 
ownership will pass.76  In an abstract system, there is no causal relationship between the 
obligation-creating agreement and the real agreement.  The validity or invalidity of the 
former usually has no impact on the latter: provided the real agreement is valid, ownership 
will be transferred.77  Thus, a reference to a iusta causa in an abstract system is not a 
reference to a valid obligation-creating agreement, but is either a reference to the real 
agreement itself78 or a reference to the circumstances from which the real agreement is 
inferred.79 
 
The application of the abstract system of transfer of ownership in the context of movables 
has been settled law in South Africa for some time.80  However, the question of which 
system of transfer of ownership applies to immovable property was conclusively decided 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal only in the recent case of Legator McKenna Inc v Shea81 
(“Legator”).  There, the second appellant, acting in his capacity as curator bonis for the first 
respondent (who had suffered brain injuries), purported to sell Shea’s house to the second 








 Van der Merwe Sakereg 306.  In German law, the distinction between the obligation-creating agreement 
and the agreement which transfers the right of ownership is referred to as the Trennungsprinzip (“principle of 
separation”), while the notion that the validity of the second agreement is independent of that of the first 
agreement is known as the Abstraktionsprinzip (“principle of abstraction”).  See Markesinis et al German Law 
of Contract 27 ff. 
78
 Van der Merwe Sakereg 310. 
79
 Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 77; MCC Bazaar v Harris and Jones (Pty) Ltd 1954 3 SA 158 (T) 
161F. 
80
 Commissioner of Customs & Excise v Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd 1941 AD 369; Trust Bank van 
Afrika Bpk v Western Bank Bpk & Andere NNO 1978 4 SA 281 (A); Air-Kel (Edms) Bpk h/a Merkel Motors v 
Bodenstein 1980 3 SA 917 (A). 
81
 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA). 
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respondents, the Erskines.  The house was transferred to the couple.  Shea recovered 
from her injuries and claimed the return of her house against repayment of the purchase 
price on the ground that the sale agreement was void. 
 
The Erskines had presented the second appellant with a written offer to buy Shea’s house 
which he duly signed, but with the addition of the words “subject to approval of Master of 
High Court”82 next to his signature.83  According to Brand JA, the conditional acceptance of 
the Erskines’ offer amounted to a counter-offer which was never accepted in writing by the 
Erskines.84  As a result, no valid agreement of sale was concluded between the parties 
because, inter alia, their agreement did not comply with the formalities prescribed by 
section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.85 
 
The availability of the rei vindicatio on these facts depended on whether an abstract or 
causal system of transfer of ownership applied to immovable property in South African law.  
In this regard Brand JA confirmed that previous High Court decisions, which had held that 
the abstract system of transfer of ownership was applicable to immovable property, were 
correct.86  Therefore, provided there is registration (delivery) and a valid real agreement, 
ownership will pass to the buyer irrespective of whether the underlying agreement is valid 
or invalid.  Only if the real agreement is (also) invalid, will ownership fail to pass87 and will 
the rei vindicatio be the appropriate remedy to reclaim the property. 
 
This decision resolves the question of which system of transfer of ownership is applicable 
to immovables in South African law.88  However, there is no reference to the fact that the 
choice to adopt an abstract, rather than causal, system has important implications for both 
the original contracting parties and their subsequent successors-in-title, depending on 
                                                          
82
 Para 7. 
83
 In terms of the court order appointing the second appellant as curator bonis, the consent of the Master to 
the transaction was required (para 16).  
84
 Para 17. 
85
 Para 18. 
86
 Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 21.  The cases that the court refers to are Brits v 
Eaton NO 1984 4 SA 728 (T); Klerck NO v Van Zyl and Maritz NNO 1989 4 SA 263 (SE); Kriel v Terblanche 
NO 2002 6 SA 132 (NC).   
87
 Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 22. 
88
 The decision was subsequently confirmed in Du Plessis v Prophitius 2010 1 SA 49 (SCA) para 10; 
Oriental Products (Pty) Ltd v Pegma 178 Investments Trading CC 2011 2 SA 508 (SCA) paras 12, 26. 
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which alternative is chosen.  Where the validity of the legal basis (a iusta causa in the true 
sense) plays a decisive role in determining whether ownership is transferred, as it does in 
a causal system, the interests of the owner are afforded greater protection than those of 
the transferee or his successors-in-title.  When the causa is void, the owner is always 
entitled to reclaim the property from the transferee with the rei vindicatio, and even from a 
bona fide third party to whom the property is subsequently transferred.89  In an abstract 
system, greater protection is given to the transferee and his successors-in-title, because 
all that is required for the passing of ownership is a valid real agreement and registration.  
On the one hand, the relative lack of importance of the underlying obligation-creating 
agreement mitigates the potentially harsh consequences which may arise in a legal 
system with a negative system of registration as is the case in South Africa,90 and 
promotes the certainty of commercial transactions.91  On the other, favouring an abstract 
system of transfer means that the owner of property loses his right to reclaim that property 
with the rei vindicatio if the real agreement is valid.  In these circumstances, he is limited to 
an enrichment claim which affords him a personal right only, with the effect that he is 
treated simply as a concurrent creditor if the transferee becomes insolvent.92 
 
It is therefore important in an abstract system to determine when the real agreement 
(which is required for the transfer of both moveable and immoveable property) will be 
invalid, in which case the transferor retains the rei vindicatio, and when it will be valid, so 
that the transferor may only resort to an enrichment remedy.  In particular, and for the 
purposes of this discussion, it becomes important to determine whether the formal 
invalidity of the underlying agreement also affects the validity of the real agreement.93   
 
                                                          
89
 Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 75; Carey-Miller Ownership 124; Kriel v Terblanche NO 2002 6 SA 
132 (NC) para 23. 
90
 Van der Merwe Sakereg 310; Kriel v Terblanche NO 2002 6 SA 132 (NC) para 35.  A negative system of 
registration means that there is no assurance that the information contained in the register is correct.  It 
protects the true owner at the expense of a bona fide third party, who can become the victim of a faulty 
record (Van der Merwe Sakereg 342 ff; Meintjies NO v Coetzer 2010 5 SA 186 (SCA) para 9). 
91
 Van der Merwe Sakereg 311; Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 79.  See also Kriel v Terblanche NO 
2002 6 SA 132 (NC) para 37. 
92
 Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 79. 
93
 79-80. 
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This question was also discussed in Legator.  According to Brand JA, a mistake about the 
formal validity of the underlying agreement does not render the real agreement invalid.  
The judge comes to this conclusion for two reasons.  First, if a mistake regarding the 
formal validity of the underlying obligation-creating agreement were to prevent the passing 
of ownership, then this would amount to adopting a causal system of ownership, because 
the reason for the transfer would be decisive in determining whether ownership had 
passed or not.94 
 
Secondly, and related to the first point: if the underlying obligation-creating agreement is 
simply regarded as the reason for the transfer, then it follows that any mistake made about 
that reason constitutes a mistake in motive.  As pointed out by Brand JA, “a mistaken 
assumption about the validity of the underlying causa constitutes a mistake in motive”95 
and does not, as a general rule, invalidate the real agreement.  For these reasons, Shea 
was not entitled to reclaim the property using the rei vindicatio because ownership had 
been transferred to the Erskines, in spite of the fact that the underlying sale agreement 
was formally invalid. 
 
While this reasoning is persuasive, it is notable that Brand JA did not consider whether the 
legislature intended that the prescribed formal requirements should prohibit both an 
underlying obligation-creating agreement which did not comply with them and, by 
implication, the transfer of ownership pursuant to such an agreement.96   Nevertheless, 
while Brand JA paid no attention to this question in the context of the Alienation of Land 
Act, it was addressed in one of the High Court decisions referred to by the judge as 
support for the conclusion that an abstract system applies in South African law.   
 
In Kriel v Terblanche NO,97 Buys J stated: 
 
                                                          
94
 Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 23. 
95
 Para 24. 
96
 Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 80 state that if an agreement is subject to formal requirements, “it is 
necessary to inquire whether the achievement of the object itself is prohibited in the event of non-compliance 
with the said formalities” in order to determine whether the real agreement will be invalid.  Van der Merwe 
Sakereg 313-314 makes the same suggestion. 
97
 2002 6 SA 132 (NC). 
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“[Art 28(2) van die Wet op Vervreemding van Grond] is die artikel wat bepaal dat enige 
vervreemding van grond wat nie aan die bepalings van art 2(1) voldoen nie, in alle opsigte van 
die begin af geldig sal wees indien die koper en die verkoper ten volle presteer.  ‘n Koopkontrak 
van grond wat dus nietig is weens nie-nakoming van die vereistes vir ‘n geldige koopkontrak 
gestel in art 2(1) van die bepaalde Wet word deur art 28(2) gewettig, presies soos die geval ook 
sal wees by ‘n abstrakte stelsel van eiendomsoorgang ... [A]rt 28(2) sanksioneer ‘n abstrakte 
stelsel van eiendomsoorgang by onroerende goed.”98  
 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that unlike section 28(2), an abstract system of 
ownership does not “wettig” (legitimise) an invalid obligation-creating agreement - it 
operates on the assumption that the invalidity of that agreement does not affect the validity 
of the real agreement.  However, section 28(2) does indicate that the purpose of a sale of 
land is not prohibited: full performance of a formally invalid alienation will still result in a 
transfer of ownership.  In other words, the Alienation of Land Act prescribes formal 
requirements for sales of land as the means to achieve a certain end, but it does not 
prohibit that end or purpose of the sale of land itself from being achieved.99  It is in this 
sense that section 28(2) “sanctions” an abstract system of transfer of ownership because it 
allows for the transfer. 
 
In the above discussion, we have seen that the abstract system of transfer of ownership 
applies to both movable and immovable property.  This means that the rei vindicatio will 
only be applicable in the context of a formally defective sale agreement if the real 
agreement itself is (also) void, thus preventing the passing of ownership.  However, a 
mistake regarding the formal validity of the contract of sale will not vitiate the real 
agreement.  In such event, ownership will be transferred and the only possible remedy 
available to the party who has performed would be based on unjustified enrichment.100 
 
Before concluding this section, a few words are required on the rei vindicatio and transfers 
of money, which constitutes performance on the part of the purchaser of land and usually 
also of the surety.101  Where such a party has paid a sum of money in terms of a formally 
                                                          
98
 Para 48. 
99
 This point is also relevant when determining the effect of full performance on a formally defective 
agreement (see 6 5 below).   
100
 A claim of this nature was also found not to be available to Shea.  See 6 5 below. 
101
 See, in general, Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 34-36; 236-238. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
247 
 
invalid agreement, he will generally not be able to use the rei vindicatio to reclaim that 
sum.  This is due to the fact that the transferred funds are often mixed with the recipient’s 
funds, with the result that the latter becomes owner through original acquisition of 
ownership.102  In any event, it has been stated that 
 
“[m]ost money is … not real in any ‘physical’ sense, but ‘owned’ in the form of personal rights or 
claims against others.”103 
 
These personal claims include enrichment claims, which is the topic of the next section. 
 
6 3 3 Remedies based on unjustified enrichment 
6 3 3 1 Introduction 
 
The law of unjustified enrichment plays a greater role in an abstract system of transfer of 
ownership than in a causal system:  
 
“[‘n] [I]usta causa kan aanwesig wees selfs waar daar geen geldige verbintenisregtelike 
verhouding tussen die partye bestaan nie.  Derhalwe kan eiendomsreg oorgaan sonder dat die 
ontvanger verbintenisregtelik aanspraak kan maak op die vermöensverskuiwing, in welke geval 
die vermöensverskuiwing sine causa was.”104 
 
It follows that  
 
                                                          
102
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 236; First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO 
2001 3 SA 960 (SCA) para 16.  However, there are situations in which a bank may reverse a transfer or 
withhold payment of the funds to the account holder (see Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 34-36 for 
examples and relevant case law).  In the latter situation, the payer has a right to reclaim those funds and this 
has been described as a “quasi vindicatory” claim (Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 36 criticises this 
characterisation). 
103
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 236. 
104
 J C van der Walt “Die Condictio Indebiti as Verrykingsaksie” (1966) 29 THRHR 220 224.  See also De 
Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 169; S Eiselen & G Pienaar Unjustified Enrichment: A Casebook 3 ed 
(2008) 7 n (b); Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 33-34. 
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“it is by means of an enrichment action that the law attempts to heal the wounds that it itself 
inflicts (by virtue of the abstract transfer of ownership).”105 
 
In South African law, a plaintiff who has lost ownership of the transferred property and who 
wishes to institute an enrichment claim must show that his claim meets certain general 
requirements: the defendant must be enriched; the plaintiff must be impoverished; the 
defendant’s enrichment must occur at the expense of the plaintiff’s impoverishment; and 
the enrichment must be unjustified or sine causa.106  The plaintiff must further prove that 
his claim meets the requirements of a specific enrichment remedy; warrants an extension 
of a specific remedy by analogy; or demands the recognition of a remedy in an entirely 
new situation.107  In the context of a formally invalid agreement, the question is which 
enrichment remedy is appropriate.  However, before considering the appropriate 
enrichment remedies, it is necessary to distinguish between enrichment claims which arise 
because non-compliance with a formal requirement results in formal defectiveness and 
those which arise because non-compliance results in illegality.  This issue is not merely of 
academic interest – whether an agreement is invalid or illegal for failure to comply with a 
prescribed formal requirement determines not only which enrichment remedy is available, 




                                                          
105
 Zimmermann Law of Obligations 867, citing H Dernburg Bürgerliches Recht II 3 ed (1906) as the source 
of this idea.  See also Englard “Restitution of Benefits” in Int Enc Comp L X 4 n 6; R Zimmermann 
“Unjustified Enrichment: The Modern Civilian Approach” (1995) 15 OJLS 403 408. 
106
 See McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 2001 3 SA 482 (SCA) paras 15-25; Kudu Granite 
Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 5 SA 193 (SCA) paras 17-25; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 156 ff; 
Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 2, ch 2. 
107
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 2.  On the application of an enrichment remedy in an entirely 
new situation, see Kommissaris van Binnelandse Inkomste v Willers 1994 3 SA 283 (A) 333C-E; McCarthy 
Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC 2001 3 SA 482 (SCA) paras 8-10, in which Schutz JA recognised, 
albeit obiter, the possible introduction of a general enrichment action in the future.  The role of such an action 
would be to accommodate those facts which do not fall within the existing enrichment framework but where 
enrichment liability should be recognised nevertheless.  See also Visser Unjustified Enrichment 46 ff; Du 
Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 4 ff. 
108
 Eg the par delictum rule is applicable in the context of illegal agreements and could result in the denial of 
the plaintiff’s claim for the return of his performance.  See Visser Unjustified Enrichment 433 ff; Eiselen & 
Pienaar Enrichment 90-95; Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 112. 
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6 3 3 2 Statutory formalities and statutory illegality 
 
An agreement which is void for failure to comply with statutory formalities is not, for that 
reason alone, immoral or illegal.109  As De Vos states:110 
 
“Ongeoorloofde ooreenkomste moet nie verwar word met ooreenkomste wat ongeldig is omdat 
‘n formaliteit wat deur die reg voorgeskryf is, nie nagekom is nie … Waar die reg … ‘n bepaalde 
vorm as geldigheidsvereiste stel, kan mens nie by nie-nakoming van die vereiste van 
ongeoorloofdheid praat nie.  Die ooreenkoms is wel nietig weens ‘n vormgebrek maar geensins 
ongeoorloof nie.  Geoorloofdheid en nakoming van vormvereistes is twee afsonderlike vereistes 
vir geldigheid.”111 
 
If the agreement is void only because it does not comply with statutory formalities 
therefore, the appropriate enrichment remedy is not the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam 
causam, the central requirement of which is that performance must have occurred in terms 
of an illegal agreement.112  By contrast, if the content or goal of an agreement subject to 
formalities is prohibited by public policy or statute, then this remedy would be 
appropriate.113  The difficulty, however, lies in determining whether a particular statutory 
provision amounts to the prescription of a formal requirement or whether it is prescribing a 
requirement for the legality of the agreement.114   
 
                                                          
109
 Pottie v Kotze 1954 3 SA 719 (A) 725A; Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v 
Wasserman 1984 2 SA 157 (T) 161A-G.  
110
 Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 153. 
111
 162 (italics in the original). 
112
 Afrisure CC v Watson NO 2009 2 SA 127 (SCA) para 5; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 418; Eiselen & 
Pienaar Enrichment 81; Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 111; J C Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment 
in South African Law (tr J E Rhoodie) (2008) 262. 
113
 Visser Unjustified Enrichment 425.  This is illustrated, inter alia, in the discussion of cases like Dugas v 
Kempster Sedgwick (Pty) Ltd 1961 1 SA 784 (D) and Lydenburg Voorspoed Ko-operasie v Els 1966 3 SA 34 
(T) by De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 164.  The author suggests that the appropriate enrichment action 
in these cases was the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam because too much credit had been given in 
certain hire-purchase agreements which rendered the content of these agreements illegal and not simply 
void for failure to comply with the formal requirements set out in the Hire Purchase Act 36 of 1942.   
114
 The same point is made in Eiselen & Pienaar Enrichment 89-90 n (b); Du Plessis Law of Unjustified 
Enrichment 113-114. 
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For example, in Watson NO v Shaw NO115 (“Watson”) an agreement was concluded 
between a medical scheme and an insurance broker, in terms of which the latter would 
receive certain payments for the introduction of members to the scheme.  Some of these 
payments constituted broker’s commission and fell within the limit prescribed by statute.116  
Other payments were characterised as a periodic “service fee”.117  For the purposes of this 
discussion, the focus is on that part of the agreement relating to the legitimate broker’s 
commission. 
 
Fourie J was required to determine whether the agreement to pay broker’s commission 
was formally defective or whether it was in fact illegal.  Regulation 28(1)(d) of the Medical 
Schemes Act 131 of 1998 (“Medical Schemes Act”) provides that the parties must 
conclude a prior written agreement regarding broker’s commission, while section 66(1)(a) 
of the Act makes non-compliance with any provision of the Act (which includes the 
regulations) a criminal offence.  Before its deletion from the Act, section 66(1)(f) 
specifically provided that the failure to comply with the requirements prescribed for the 
conclusion of an agreement to pay broker’s commission amounted to an offence.  
 
According to the defendants, non-compliance with regulation 28(1)(d) rendered the 
agreement formally defective but not illegal.  Fourie J disagreed:  
 
“[T]here is no room for an interpretation of reg 28(1)(d) which relegates its requirement of a prior 
written agreement to a mere formality … [T]he regulation is explicit in prohibiting payment in the 
absence of a prior written agreement … [W]hat the legislature intended by means of this 
absolute prohibition, is that payment of broker fees in the absence of a prior written agreement 
is to be regarded as void and of no effect.  This intention of the legislature is … underscored by 
s 66(1)(f), which criminalises the payment of compensation to a broker, other than in terms of 
the prescribed conditions, ie in terms of a prior written agreement … [I]n prescribing a prior 
written agreement, the legislature did not merely impose a formality upon the contracting 
parties, but provided a statutory inroad into their contractual relationship in order to protect the 
interests of not only the scheme and broker, but also the interests of members of medical 
schemes … [T]hese indiciae permit only one conclusion to be drawn, namely that the legislature 
intended to render payments made contrary to the provisions of reg 28(1)(d) void.  It follows in 
                                                          
115
 2008 1 SA 350 (C). 
116
 Para 16.  See reg 28(2) of the Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998. 
117
 Para 16. 
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my view that the legislature intended to render an oral agreement to pay broker fees 
…illegal.”118    
 
This portion of Fourie J’s judgment shows that he confuses two questions, namely whether 
the agreement is illegal or formally defective on the one hand, and the further question of 
the appropriate consequence of non-compliance.   
 
The fact that the legislature intended that a particular agreement should be void for failure 
to comply with a formal requirement is an indication that it considered that requirement to 
be in the public interest.  As discussed above,119 invalidity is generally a consequence 
reserved for formal provisions which promote broader social aims, like the prevention of 
fraud and perjury.  However, the mere fact that such a provision promotes broader social 
aims and that for this reason, non-compliance results in nullity, is not sufficient to conclude 
that it is necessarily illegal; the public interest could be equally well-served by concluding 
that the failure to comply with the prescribed requirements renders the agreements to pay 
broker’s commission void for formal defectiveness only.  Invalidity is not reserved 
exclusively for illegal agreements and it cannot be decisive of the question whether non-
compliance should be characterised as a formal defect or an illegality.  Thus it is 
suggested that the more convincing indicator of illegality in this case (although not 
necessarily invalidity120) was the fact that provisions of the Medical Schemes Act explicitly 
criminalised a brokerage agreement which did not comply with the regulation 28(1) (a 
consequence which is not evident in statutes which prescribe formal requirements for the 
sake of formal validity alone).   
 
Unfortunately, this confusion was not addressed on appeal in Afrisure CC v Watson NO.121  
There the court concluded that the payments of a “service fee” were in fact broker’s 
commission in disguise; that this was illegal because it was in fraudem legis; and that 
therefore the entire agreement (including the broker’s commission which fell within the 
                                                          
118
 Para 28. 
119
 See 6 2 3. 
120
 Although a criminal sanction is often interpreted as an indication that the offending agreement is void, it 
may be that “the sanction provides adequate protection against the mischief that that the statute is directed 
against” in which case a further civil sanction is unnecessary.  See Floyd “Legality” in The Law of Contract in 
South Africa 182. 
121
 2009 2 SA 127 (SCA). 
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statutorily prescribed amount, but which was not the subject of a prior written contract) was 
tainted by this illegality.122  However, it did not appear to disagree with Fourie J’s 
conclusion that non-compliance with the formal requirements set out in regulation 28(1)(d) 
rendered the agreement illegal, and not merely formally defective,123 although it left open 
the question whether this agreement, in not complying with the prescribed formal 
requirements, would be illegal and therefore void or illegal and merely unenforceable. 
 
In the Watson case, the statute itself facilitated the conclusion that non-compliance with 
the prescribed formal requirement rendered the agreement illegal.  However, determining 
whether one is dealing with an agreement which is formally defective or illegal for failure to 
comply with a formal requirement becomes more difficult when a particular statute 
contains no indication pointing to either conclusion.  
 
An example of such a statute is the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 (“the Contingency 
Fees Act”).  At common law, an agreement in terms of which an outsider agreed to provide 
financial assistance to a potential litigant in exchange for a share of the proceeds should 
the latter be successful, was regarded as an illegal pactum de quota litis.124  The same 
applied to an agreement in terms of which a party was thought to “traffic, gamble or 
speculate in litigation.”125  Contingency fee agreements between a legal representative 
and his client also fell within the prohibition until the promulgation of the Contingency Fees 
Act. 
 
This Act makes provision for two types of contingency fee agreements: “no win, no fees” 
agreements126 and agreements which entitle the legal representative to a higher than 
                                                          
122
 Paras 34-38. 
123
 Paras 37-38. 
124
 Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 66 (SCA) para 26. 
125
 Para 26.  An exception to the rule prohibiting these types of agreements was recognised when the 
financial assistance was given in good faith to a litigant who had a valid claim to defend – in these 
circumstances, the agreement was not considered illegal (para 27).  In any event, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has now ruled that a pactum de quota litis between an outsider and a litigant, in which the former 
becomes entitled to a share of the proceeds should the litigant be successful, is no longer contrary to public 
policy (para 46). 
126
 S 2(1)(a). 
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normal fee if the client is successful, provided the fee remains within certain limits.127  Both 
types of agreements must be recorded in a prescribed written form and signed by the 
relevant parties.128  However, the Act does not indicate whether non-compliance with 
these formal requirements renders a particular contingency fee agreement formally 
defective only, or illegal as well.  Case law is also not particularly instructive, although it 
tends towards the latter conclusion. 
 
In Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative Ltd,129 the court held 
that  
 
“[t]he [Contingency Fees] Act was enacted to legitimise contingency fee agreements between 
legal practitioners and their clients which would otherwise be prohibited by the common law.  
Any contingency fee agreement between such parties which is not covered by the Act is 
therefore illegal.”130 
 
The last sentence of this quotation is ambiguous.  It is not clear whether the court intended 
to include those contingency fee agreements which, although formulated with the Act in 
mind, do not comply with the prescribed formal requirements.  Are these also contingency 
fee agreements “not covered by the Act”, leading to the conclusion that they are illegal and 
not merely formally defective?  Apparently so, according to Tecmed (Pty) Ltd v Hunter131 
(“Tecmed”).  
 
In this case the respondent attorney concluded an oral pactum de quota litis with the 
applicant, which would entitle him to a performance bonus if he successfully defended a 
claim which had been instituted against it.  Hunter misled the applicant into believing that 
the claim was successfully defended and the performance bonus was subsequently paid.  
Upon realising that it had been misled, the applicant claimed the return of what it had paid.  
Since the agreement in Tecmed did not comply with the formal requirements set out in the 
Contingency Fees Act, Van Rooyen AJ concluded that the agreement was “unlawful and 
                                                          
127
 S 2(1)(b) read with s 2(2). 
128
 S 3(1)(a) read with s 3(2). 
129
 2004 6 SA 66 (SCA). 
130
 Para 41. 
131
 2008 6 SA 210 (W). 
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void”132 and that “[w]hatever was paid in accordance with the pactum is recoverable by the 
applicant by way of the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam.”133   
 
While the acting judge indicated that a contingency fee agreement which does not comply 
with the prescribed formalities is illegal, he did not state his reasons for coming to this 
conclusion.134  According to Sharrock, the judge’s conclusion is incorrect, because it 
confuses a defect in form with illegality.135  He points out that the agreement between the 
applicant and respondent was formulated with the provisions of the Contingency Fees Act 
in mind, because the performance bonus fell within the limitations imposed by section 2(2) 
of the Act.136  The Act also does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the conclusion of 
contingency fee agreements which do not comply with the formal requirements set out in 
section 3.137  This leads Sharrock to conclude that the parties in Tecmed had concluded a 
lawful, albeit formally defective, contingency fee agreement.  As a result, the appropriate 
enrichment remedy on these facts was not the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam 
causam.138   
 
While there is some merit in Sharrock’s argument, it is ultimately not convincing.  The 
absence of a statutory provision prohibiting the conclusion of formally defective 
contingency fee agreements does not necessarily indicate that they are therefore legal.  It 
could equally be a reflection of the fact that the legislature was aware of the common-law 
position (contingency fee agreements are illegal) and that any additional reference to this 
in the Act would have been superfluous.  There is in any event an interpretative 
presumption that a statute is not intended to alter the existing common law more than 
necessary.139  Indeed, Visser states that the Contingency Fees Act only partially removes 
                                                          
132
 Para 29. 
133
 Para 29. 
134
 See also H Scott “Unjustified Enrichment” 2008 ASSAL 1249 1250. 
135
 “Contract” (October to December 2008) JQR para 2.3.1 
<http://ipproducts.jutalaw.co.za.ez.sun.ac.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&vid=Publish:10.10
48/Enu> (accessed 03-11-2012). 
136
 Para 2.3.1 n 12. 
137
 Para 2.3.1 n 13. 
138
 Para 2.3.1.    
139
 See eg L du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes (2002) 177 ff. 
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a pactum de quota litis from the ambit of common-law illegality.140  According to this writer, 
any agreement which does not comply with the formal requirements laid down by the Act, 
or which amounts to a simple agreement to give a legal representative a percentage of the 
award in a case, should still be regarded as illegal.  Visser’s argument receives some 
support, albeit obiter, in the recent judgment in Thulo v Road Accident Fund141 (“Thulo”) in 
which the following statements are made: 
 
“The legislature has expressly recognised that the civil-justice system is strong enough to 
withstand the abuses which could arise as a result of contingency-fee agreements between 
legal practitioners and their clients and it has made such agreements legal within carefully 




“[a] contingency fee must thus be raised in accordance with the [Contingency Fees] Act or it is 
unlawful.”143 
 
These comments suggest that contrary to Sharrock’s argument, a contingency fee 
agreement which does not comply with the relevant formal requirements remains illegal, 
and is not rendered merely formally defective.   
 
If this is indeed what the court intended to convey in the Thulo judgment, then it is 
arguable that this conclusion should be supported.  Contingency fee agreements can 
create a conflict of interest between a legal representative’s responsibilities to his client 
and his duty as an officer of the court.144  This concern does not disappear simply because 
certain contingency fee agreements may now be concluded in writing.  Furthermore, if the 
legislature intended non-compliance with the writing requirement to result in formal 
defectiveness only, it is not clear why it felt the need to provide that a contingency fee 
agreement should specify “the manner in which any amendment should be dealt with”.145  
                                                          
140
 Unjustified Enrichment 431. 
141
 2011 5 SA 446 (GSJ). 
142
 Para 49.9. 
143
 Para 49.11. 
144
 See Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 66 (SCA) paras 38, 
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It is a settled principle that any variation to an agreement subject to statutory formalities 
must be in writing.146  Again, if the intention was that formal non-compliance should render 
contingency fee agreements formally defective only, the provision relating to amendments 
of these agreements is superfluous. 
 
Leaving aside the overlap between illegality and formal defectiveness and the possibility 
that the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam may be the appropriate enrichment 
remedy in the event of such an overlap, which enrichment actions are available to a party 
who has performed in terms of an agreement which is void solely for failure to comply with 
statutory formalities? 
 
Two possible actions have been proposed.147  Where the party who performs labours 
under the mistaken belief that the formalities were complied with when they were not, the 
appropriate enrichment remedy is the condictio indebiti.148  Where however, the party who 
performs knows that the agreement is formally invalid, but does so because he assumes 
that the other party will also perform, the appropriate remedy is the condictio causa data 
causa non secuta.149  In the following two sections, these enrichment remedies will be 
discussed, in the context of formally invalid suretyships and sales of land respectively. 
 
6 3 3 3 Enrichment remedies and formally invalid suretyships 
 
According to Visser,150 a surety who pays in terms of a formally defective suretyship would 
be doing so either by mistake or to pay the debt of the principal debtor in any event.  He 
would not, however, be paying to achieve a future purpose.  The only enrichment remedy 
which could be available to a paying surety in these circumstances therefore would be the 
condictio indebiti.   
 
                                                          
146
 See ch 4 (4 3 5). 
147
 See De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 183; D Visser “Unjustified Enrichment” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s 
Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 1041 1067; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 459-460. 
148
 Enocon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Palm Sixteen (Pty) Ltd 1972 4 SA 511 (T); Botes v Toti Development Co 
(Pty) Ltd 1978 1 SA 205 (T). 
149
 Kennedy and Kennedy v Lanyon 1923 TPD 284; Pucjlowski v Johnston’s Executors 1946 WLD 1.   
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Visser does not expand upon these statements.  In order to determine how the author 
comes to this conclusion, the following example is used as illustration.  C lends a sum of 
money to D and, for added security, concludes a suretyship agreement with S in terms of 
which S will repay the loan amount should D fail to do so.  However, the suretyship is 
formally invalid.  When D defaults on the debt, C claims the amount of the loan from S, 
who pays in the mistaken belief that he is obliged to do so.  Can he now reclaim the 
amount with the condictio indebiti? 
 
As a point of departure, it should be borne in mind that there are at least two obligations 
relating to the repayment of the loan in this example: the first is created by the principal 
agreement between C and D, and the second created by the suretyship between C and S.  
In Gerber v Wolson,151 Van den Heever JA noted that 
 
“[t]he obligation of a surety and that of a principal debtor frequently have the same economic 
content, especially where the principal obligation sounds in the payment of a sum of money, but 
they are different obligations”.152 
 
Secondly, a successful claim based on the condictio indebiti must prove, among other 
things, that the payment was made indebite: there must have been no obligation, whether 
legal or natural, to make it.153  It is problematic in the above example that there is a valid 
obligation, created by the principal agreement between C and D, but no valid obligation 
created by the formally defective suretyship between C and S.  How then could a condictio 
indebiti be available to the surety if there is in fact a valid obligation to discharge, albeit it 
one which exists between C and D?  
 
The answer, it seems, lies in the theoretical explanation of performance as a means to 
discharge a debt.  According to South African law, performance will only discharge a debt 
if the actual act of performance is accompanied by a debt-extinguishing agreement.154  
                                                          
151
 1955 1 SA 158 (A). 
152
 Gerber v Wolson 1955 1 SA 158 (A) 166G.  See also G F Lubbe & C Murray Farlam & Hathaway 
Contract - Cases, Materials and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 399 n 5. 
153
 Frame v Palmer 1950 3 SA 340 (C) 346E-F; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 285-286; J G Lotz & F D J 
Brand “Enrichment” in W A Joubert & J A Faris (eds) LAWSA 9 2 ed (2005) para 212 (d). 
154
 Van der Merwe et al Contract 440-441; J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg & 
Handelsreg 1 5 ed (1992) 5; B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 2 SA 279 (A) 287G.  
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However, an effective debt-extinguishing agreement presupposes that there is in fact a 
valid debt to discharge.155  Furthermore, a surety who pays in terms of a suretyship usually 
intends to discharge his own debt, and not the debt of the principal debtor.156  The fact that 
the surety undertakes to pay on behalf of the principal debtor should the latter be unable to 
do so, does not change the fact that the surety’s obligation is separate from that of the 
principal debtor, and that the surety intends to discharge his own obligation, and not that of 
the principal debtor.   
 
Therefore, a surety who mistakenly pays in terms of a formally defective suretyship can 
reclaim his payment with the condictio indebiti,157 because he intends to discharge his own 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
For criticism of this approach, see J E du Plessis “Die Regsaard van Prestasie” (2002) 65 THRHR 59; Du 
Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 62. 
155
 See the obiter remarks to this effect in B & H Engineering v First National Bank of SA Ltd 1995 2 SA 279 
(A) 291G, 295F-G. 
156
 Support for this reasoning can be found in in the explanation provided by South African courts as to why a 
surety who has performed in terms of a valid suretyship is entitled to a cession of actions from the creditor 
after payment.  In Roman law, there was only one debt created in the triangular relationship between 
creditor, principal debtor and surety.  This debt was extinguished upon payment by the surety, which meant 
that a cession of rights by the creditor to the surety was not possible because there was nothing left to cede.  
This resulted in the fiction that the creditor sold his claims to the surety upon payment of the debt, the 
purchase price being the amount paid by the surety (see C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s The Law of 
Suretyship 6 ed (2010) 146-147).  In modern SA law however, and as pointed out in the main text above, it is 
now recognised that there are at least two obligations created by the creditor-debtor-surety relationship: one 
between the creditor and surety, and another between the creditor and principal debtor.  South African courts 
have explained that a surety does not intend to discharge the principal debtor’s obligation, but only his own 
accessory debt.  For this reason, a cession of rights against the principal debtor is still possible. See Gerber 
v Wolson 1955 1 SA 158 (A) 167A (per Van den Heever JA); African Guarantee & Indemnity Co Ltd v 
Thorpe 1933 AD 330 337 per Wessels CJ.  This reasoning is criticised in J J Henning & K L Mould 
“Suretyship” in J A Faris & L T C Harms (eds) LAWSA 26 2 ed (2011) para 300 on the basis that it is not 
consistent with the notion that the surety undertakes “to pay the principal debtor’s debt if the latter fails to pay 
it him- or herself”.  This argument fails to recognise that the surety undertakes to pay an amount which is 
equal to, or less than, the principal debt (Forsyth & Pretorius Suretyship 102) and not the principal debt itself. 
157
 This is assuming that a court concludes that the mistake was also excusable (see Affirmative Portfolios 
CC v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2009 1 SA 196 (SCA) paras 24, 29-30; Du Plessis Law of Unjustified 
Enrichment 132 ff), a conclusion which appears to depend on the facts of the case (see eg Willis Faber 
Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue 1992 4 SA 202 (A) 224E-G). For criticism of both the mistake 
requirement and the notion that such a mistake must be excusable in order to claim with this condictio, see 
Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 135-139, 168-171; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 316-331; H Scott 
“The Requirement of Excusable Mistake in the Context of the Condictio Indebiti: Scottish and South African 
Law Compared” (2007) 124 SALJ 827 854 ff. 
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debt, which does not exist because the suretyship agreement is formally invalid.  However, 
this enrichment claim would not be available if the surety knew that the suretyship was 
invalid but paid in any event: there is no mistaken belief that the debt is due and, in the 
absence of some other recognised ground justifying the application of this enrichment 
claim, the surety will not be entitled to institute the condictio indebiti.158  A surety who pays 
knowing that he has no obligation to do so, must be doing so because he intends to 
discharge the principal debtor’s obligation and not his own.159  In this type of fact pattern, 
the surety’s payment will discharge the valid principal obligation and he will not be able to 
reclaim the payment from the creditor. 
  
There appears to be no direct judicial authority either supporting or refuting this analysis, 
or indeed Visser’s statement that a surety who pays in terms of a formally invalid 
suretyship may reclaim his payment with the condictio indebiti.  However, it should be 
pointed out that it is considered self-evident in German law that a surety who has 
mistakenly paid in terms of a formally invalid suretyship is entitled to reclaim that payment 
because it was indebitum.160   
 
It is suggested that there may be practical reasons for the lack of South African case law 
on this point.  First, because the surety, as surety, often receives no direct benefit for 
undertaking such an onerous obligation, it is likely that when the creditor attempts to 
enforce the suretyship, the surety will seek to raise all possible defences to avoid paying 
the debt, including the formal invalidity of the agreement.  It is therefore unlikely that a 
surety will only establish that the agreement was formally invalid after he has paid the 
creditor.  
 
                                                          
158
 Frame v Palmer 1950 3 SA 340 (C) 346F; J G Lotz & F D J Brand “Enrichment” in LAWSA 9 para 212 (e); 
Visser Unjustified Enrichment 290 ff; Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 97.  A basic element of the 
condictio indebiti is a mistake as to liability.  If the plaintiff knew that the agreement was invalid but paid in 
any event, then the condictio indebiti will generally only be available if he can show that he was compelled to 
pay, and did so under protest (see eg Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 139 ff; there are instances 
where this enrichment claim is awarded even in the absence of mistake or compulsion (148-151), but these 
are not relevant to the discussion in the main text).    
159
 Again, this is assuming that there was no other reason for the surety to pay a debt which he knew was not 
due, like the threat of possible harm if he fails to pay (see n 158).  
160
 S Lorenz “§ 812” in N Horn (ed) Staudinger BGB: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse §§ 812-822 
(Ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung) (2007) n 47. 
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Secondly, it is possible that due to the nature of the relationship between the surety and 
principal debtor, the surety prefers to pay and to reclaim the amount from the debtor, 
without having to deal with the validity of the suretyship.  In other words, he would be 
paying the debt while knowing that the suretyship is formally invalid.  In such a case, the 
condictio indebiti would be excluded for the reasons stated above. 
 
Whatever the reason for the paucity of case law, any further discussion would become 
ever more speculative.  However, one last point should be noted: to the extent that there 
has been full performance of a formally invalid suretyship, it is possible that a surety may 
be precluded from reclaiming his performance with the condictio indebiti.  This is certainly 
the case in German law, where the third sentence of paragraph 766 BGB provides that full 
performance by a surety cures the defect in form.  It is unclear whether this curative effect 
of performance in terms of a formally invalid suretyship would also be recognised in South 
African law.  The Supreme Court of Appeal has formulated a general rule that full 
performance by both parties precludes any enrichment claim (unless the agreement is 
illegal).161  However, it is unclear whether this rule was intended to be applicable only to 
reciprocal performances or to unilateral ones as well.  This aspect will be examined in 
greater detail towards the end of this chapter.162  
 
6 3 3 4 Enrichment remedies and void sales of land 
6 3 3 4 1 Introduction 
Depending on the facts, the South African common law traditionally awarded either the 
condictio indebiti or the condictio causa data causa non secuta to a party who had 
performed in terms of a formally invalid contract for the sale of land.  The former remedy 
was available when the party who had performed did so in the mistaken belief that the 
agreement was valid (ie the transfer was made to fulfil an obligation which did not exist).163  
The latter remedy became available when the performance was made, not to discharge an 
apparently existing obligation, but to elicit a future counter-performance.  If the counter-
performance failed to eventuate, the performing party could reclaim the transfer with the 
                                                          
161
 Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 28. 
162
 See 6 5. 
163
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 190. 
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condictio causa data causa non secuta.164  The common-law position has been 
superseded by section 28(1) of the Alienation of Land Act which now provides a statutory 
enrichment claim to a party who has performed in part or in full pursuant to such a 
contract.165  Nevertheless, an overview of case law preceding the promulgation of the Act 
is useful, both because it highlights some peculiar aspects of the common-law approach 
(which has not been overturned explicitly) and because it places the provisions of the Act 
in context.166 
 
6 3 3 4 2 The South African approach at common law: the rule in Carlis v McCusker 
 
In Carlis v McCusker167 (“Carlis”), the parties had concluded an oral agreement for the sale 
of land.  The plaintiff had paid part of the purchase price, but the defendant failed to 
transfer the land, leaving him with both the money and the land.  The plaintiff sought to 
reclaim his payment. 
 
As his point of departure, Innes CJ stated that since  
 
“no man should be allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another, [a court] would not 
permit a man, who had verbally agreed to sell landed property, and had on faith of that 
agreement received the whole or portion of the purchase-price, to retain both the money and 
the land.”168 
                                                          
164
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 189-190.  Historically, the condictio causa data causa non 
secuta developed in Roman law to assist a party to reclaim a performance which had been made in terms of 
an agreement which did not fit into the fourfold division of valid contracts (Zimmermann Law of Obligations 
843-844).  With the recognition that all agreements are enforceable as a general rule, the scope of 
application of the claim is limited in modern law: someone who performs in order to receive a counter-
performance usually does so because a contract has been concluded between the parties (Zimmermann 
Law of Obligations 861).  The appropriate remedy for the party who does not receive the counter-
performance is one based on breach of contract, and not an enrichment claim.  The condictio causa data 
causa non secuta is therefore limited to situations in which there has been performance in the absence of a 
contract and the condictio indebiti or some other enrichment remedy is not applicable (861-862). 
165
 Similar statutory enrichment actions are created by s 9(1) of the Property Time-Sharing Control Act 75 of 
1983, s 18(1) of the Share Blocks Control Act 59 of 1980 and s 8(1) of the Housing Development Schemes 
for Retired Persons Act 65 of 1988. 
166
 Visser Unjustified Enrichment 460. 
167
 1904 TS 917. 
168
 923. 




In such cases, the court would come to the assistance of the buyer.  However, this general 
principle was qualified by Innes CJ to the extent that where the defendant was willing and 
able to perform his part of the bargain, no remedy would be available to the plaintiff 
despite the fact that the contract was void.169  The reason for this rule was policy-based: 
 
“[I]f the seller, acting in good faith, were willing and able to carry out his part of the inchoate 
understanding, on faith of which the money was paid, … [t]here would be no equity entitling the 
buyer under such circumstances to the assistance of the Court.”170 
 
In other words, the Carlis rule is an attempt to prevent formal requirements from being 
abused by a party who seeks to escape an agreement which, although it is formally 
defective, was nevertheless seriously intended.171 
 
Despite the laudable objective of the rule, it has nevertheless been subjected to criticism.  
One of the main points of criticism is that Innes CJ cited no authority for his proposition 
that where the defendant is willing and able to perform, the other party has no claim for the 
return of its performance.172  It has also been pointed out that the rule has no basis in the 
South African common law of unjustified enrichment.173   
 
As a result, the argument has been made that the rule has its roots in English law.174  For 
example, in Thomas v Brown175 (“Thomas”) the purchaser sought to reclaim her deposit 
paid in terms of an agreement which was unenforceable because it failed to comply with 
the Statute of Frauds.  Quain J refused to award the claim on the basis that the seller had 






 See Lubbe & Murray Contract 206 n 4; L Tager “General Principles of Contract” 1979 ASSAL 87 105-106; 
G F Lubbe “Law of Purchase and Sale” 1979 ASSAL 136 139-140. 
172
 Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A) 668H; CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 4 All 
SA 22 (C) 26. 
173
 Eiselen & Pienaar Enrichment 140-141 n (a); Visser Unjustified Enrichment 462. 
174
 See Visser Unjustified Enrichment 462; Eiselen & Pienaar Enrichment 140-141 n (a); E Kahn “General 
Principles of Contract” in H R Hahlo & E Kahn (eds) The Union of South Africa: The Development of its Laws 
and Constitution (1960) 441 483. 
175
 (1876) 1 QB 714.  See also Monnickendam v Leanse (1923) 39 TLR 445. 
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always been ready and willing to perform his side of the bargain.176  Thus, “as far as the 
restitutionary consequences of [contracts which have been partly performed] were 
concerned [Innes CJ] appears to have looked to decisions such as [Thomas], where a 
similar rule to that applied in [Carlis] is laid down.”177  To understand this statement fully, it 
is necessary to provide a brief overview of the English approach to enrichment claims. 
 
6 3 3 4 3 The English law on unjust enrichment 
 
In modern English law, a party who has performed in terms of a formally defective 
agreement is entitled to a claim for restitution, based on unjust enrichment.  The dominant 
English approach to unjust enrichment does not work with a set of general requirements 
which must be proved in addition to the elements of a specific enrichment claim.178  
Rather,179 in addition to proving that the defendant has been enriched by the receipt of a 
benefit gained at the claimant’s expense, the claimant must also indicate that it would be 
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit, due to the presence of an unjust 
factor.180  The mere fact that a contract is void is not sufficient to justify restitution, 
according to the orthodox view; similarly, the fact that a contract is unenforceable does not 
automatically preclude restitution: the decisive criterion is the presence or absence of an 
unjust factor.181 
                                                          
176
 Thomas v Brown (1876) 1 QB 714 723. 
177
 H Scott Unjust Enrichment by Transfer in South African Law: Unjust Factors or Absence of Legal 
Ground? DPhil thesis Oxford (2005) 294 (footnote omitted); Visser Unjustified Enrichment 462.  
178
 See 6 3 3 1 above. 
179
 This is the prevailing view.  P Birks Unjust Enrichment 2 ed (2005) ch 5 was of the opinion that a series of 
cases in the 1990s dealing with interest rate swap transactions indicated that English law had in fact adopted 
a civilian approach to enrichment law, because they illustrated that proof of an absence of basis was 
sufficient to succeed with a claim for restitution.  These swap transactions are discussed in 6 5 below.  
180
 C Mitchell, P Mitchell & S Watterson (eds) Goff & Jones The Law of Unjust Enrichment 8 ed (2011) 7-8. 
181
 See G McMeel The Modern Law of Restitution (2000) 172; S Meier “Restitution after Executed Void 
Contracts” in P Birks & F Rose (eds) Lessons of the Swaps Litigation (2000) 168 170, 172; G Virgo The 
Principles of the Law of Restitution 2 ed (2006) 127 ff.  It should be pointed out that simply because a 
common-law court awards a claim for restitution when the contract is unenforceable does not mean that 
unenforceability and voidness are regarded as synonymous (A Burrows The Law of Restitution 3 ed (2011) 
105; Birks Unjust Enrichment 126-127).  Doctrinally, a claim for restitution is available where an agreement is 
unenforceable because the basis  




One such unjust factor is the failure of consideration.  Consideration in the context of 
restitution does not mean, as in the English law of contract, the parties’ reciprocal 
promises.182  Rather, it means the performance of those promises: 
 
“Consideration in this restitutionary sense refers to the condition which formed the basis for the 
claimant transferring a benefit to the defendant.  It is when this condition fails that it is possible 
to conclude that the consideration has failed”.183 
 
The condition referred to here is performance by the defendant.  This is similar to the field 
of application of the condictio causa data causa non secuta, which operates when the 
plaintiff knows that the contract does not comply with statutory formalities and is therefore 
void, but performs in the expectation that the defendant will deliver his counter-
performance.184   
 
The question which arises is how the claimant must prove that there has been, or will be, a 
failure of consideration.  This can be shown in one of two ways: either he must prove that 
the contract has ceased to be operative or he must prove that the defendant is no longer 
willing and able to perform.185  In the case of the former, the need to show that the contract 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
“of such an action lies not in agreement but in restitution and the claim in restitution involves not enforcing 
the agreement but recovering compensation on the basis that the agreement is unenforceable.” (Pavey & 
Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 (HCA) para 19 per Deane J).  
However, awarding a restitutionary claim in this context does mean that a court must consider whether such 
an award does not defeat the policy considerations underlying the declaration of unenforceability.  This is 
considered in greater detail further in the main text.   
182
 Virgo Principles of Restitution 306. 
183
 Virgo Principles of Restitution 306.  The leading case on the meaning of consideration in the restitutionary 
sense is Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32 48. 
184
 As is apparent in the following statement in Kennedy and Kennedy v Lanyon 1923 TPD 284 287-288: 
“[T]he plaintiff's claim rested upon the defendant's inability or unwillingness to complete the contract.  If 
either is proved, the failure of consideration for the payment of the money, which is the foundation of the 
condictio [causa data causa non secuta], would be established.  So long as the defendant is ready and 
able to implement his bargain there is no failure of consideration and the plaintiff cannot recover money 
paid in pursuance of the inchoate contract.” 
185
 Virgo Principles of Restitution 310-311.  However, see Burrows Restitution 326 who argues that the 
requirements are cumulative, rather than in the alternative.  According to McMeel Modern Law of Restitution 
191, there appears to be no reason in principle why this should be so and Mitchell et al (eds) The Law of 
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has been terminated is to ensure that the law of restitution does not challenge the law of 
contract: while the contract remains operative, contractual rather than restitutionary 
remedies must be awarded.186  Once the contract ceases to be operative however, the 
contractual obligations are terminated and it follows automatically that the defendant is no 
longer able to perform his contractual promise.187  The latter alternative – proof that the 
defendant is unwilling or unable to perform – is important in the context of agreements 
which are unenforceable because they fail to comply with statutory formalities.  Here it is 
unnecessary to terminate the contract, because the law in any event does not recognise 
the contract as enforceable.  However, because the contract remains valid, it is necessary 
to prove that the defendant is no longer willing and able to perform,188 since it is only when 
the defendant is unable or unwilling to perform that one can say that there has been or will 
be a failure of consideration.   
 
An additional factor which a court will need to consider before it grants a restitutionary 
award in the context of an unenforceable contract, is whether such an award would 
undermine the policy considerations which rendered the contract unenforceable in the first 
place.189  This is illustrated in the Australian case of Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul.190   
 
The claimants were builders who had completed work for the defendant.  She refused to 
pay the sum which they maintained was due.  The New South Wales Licensing Act 1971 
prescribed unenforceability for building contracts which had not been reduced to writing.  
In principle, the builders were entitled to a claim for restitution (due to the failure of 
consideration) and the court had to address the question whether allowing such a claim 
would subvert the policy of the Act.  According to the court it would not – the policy 
underlying the imposition of writing (to prevent spurious claims against customers, and not 
to protect customers who had requested and accepted the work)191 would not be 
circumvented by making a restitutionary award.  This conclusion is supported by Birks:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Unjust Enrichment argue that the “willing and able” requirement should be reserved for cases falling within 
the ambit of the Statute of Frauds. 
186




 314, 350. 
189
 See Virgo Principles of Restitution 351; Birks Unjust Enrichment 256; Burrows Restitution 105.   
190
 (1987) 162 CLR 221 (HCA). 
191
 Para 14 per Mason and Wilson JJ. 




“[T]he desirable certainty promoted by the requirement of writing was sufficiently sanctioned by 
depriving the builder of his claim in contract.  It did not require to be reinforced by barring even 
his claim in unjust enrichment, thus leaving him unpaid for work actually done and accepted.”192 
 
Returning to the unjust factor of failure of consideration, this ground can also justify an 
award of restitution in the case of invalid contracts.  However, there does not appear to be 
an English case in which the contract was invalid (as opposed to merely unenforceable) 
and the court denied restitution simply on the basis that the defendant was willing and able 
to perform.193  Instead, failure of consideration is measured here according to whether the 
plaintiff actually received the expected counter-performance.194  It therefore appears that 
there is no foundation in modern English law for the view of Innes CJ in Carlis that the 
English “willing and able” defence would preclude an enrichment claim for the return of a 
performance made in terms of a void contract. 
 
6 3 3 4 4 Back to the South African common-law approach: criticism of the Carlis rule 
 
The application of the Carlis rule in the South African context leads to a stalemate: the 
defendant may rely on a void agreement as defence to an enrichment claim, without being 
bound to carry out his own part of the agreement; the plaintiff, in turn, has no remedies at 
his disposal to force the defendant to perform (because the contract is void) and cannot 
reclaim his performance as long as the defendant intimates that he is “willing and able” to 
perform.195  Therefore the rule blurs the distinction between an unenforceable, yet valid, 
                                                          
192
 Unjust Enrichment 256.  Birks also points out that some formal requirements “stand on the borderline with 
illegality”, in which case a restitutionary claim may be barred – see 256-257 for a discussion of the purpose 
of these types of formal requirements and the illustrative decision in Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384. 
193
 Meier “Restitution after Executed Void Contracts” in Swaps Litigation 209.  The writer comes to this 
conclusion after a survey of English cases on void contracts and restitutionary claims. 
194
 This is the traditional view of the meaning of failure of consideration.  After the swaps cases, failure of 
consideration could also mean, in the context of a void contract, the absence of a valid obligation.  See 6 5 
below. 
195
 J C de Wet & A H van Wyk De Wet & Yeats Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) 
289; P M Wulfsohn Formalities In Respect Of Contracts of Sale of Land Act (71 of 1969) (1980) 245.  Even if 
the defendant does perform, the plaintiff has no contractual remedies at his disposal if that performance is 
defective, precisely because the contract is void.  See Visser Unjustified Enrichment 465; A D J Van 
Rensburg & S H Treisman The Practioner’s Guide to the Alienation of Land Act 2 ed (1984) 73. 
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contract and a void contract by giving some effect to the invalid agreement.196  This was 
one of the reasons why the rule was rejected by the then Cape Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court:197  
 
“It is not for the court to give effect indirectly to contracts which Parliament has decreed should 
be devoid of effect”.198   
 
Finally, it should be stressed that that there are in fact two judgments in the Thomas case.  
Quain J held that a claim for restitution in terms of an unenforceable contract would fail as 
long as the defendant was willing and able to perform.199  Mellor J did not refuse restitution 
for that reason, but focused rather on the fact that the plaintiff had paid the deposit 
knowing that the contract did not comply with the Statute of Frauds200 and further, that she 
had led the defendant to believe that she would abide by the contract in spite of the fact 
that it was formally defective.201  In Mellor J’s judgment, the fact that the defendant 
remained willing and able to perform simply emphasised the unconscionable conduct of 
the plaintiff in seeking to escape an agreement which she knew to be formally defective, 
but which she nevertheless partly performed.202  If Innes CJ did base the Carlis rule on the 
Thomas case, then it seems that he combined aspects of both judgments without 
considering the fact that the reasoning in each was different.  He relied on the policy 
considerations informing Mellor J’s judgment – the notion that it is unconscionable to 
reclaim a performance from a contracting party who is ready and willing to perform - but 
disregarded the very particular facts which led to that conclusion.  Simultaneously, the 
Chief Justice adopted the defence formulated by Quain J, but again disregarded the 
consequence of unenforceability which inspired that defence.  The effect of the Carlis rule 
                                                          
196
 Spies v Die Hofster Goudmyn Maatskappy (Eiendoms) Beperk 1942 WLD 175 181 per Schreiner J.  
197










 According to the judge, 
“[t]he breaking off of the agreement was not in any sense the fault of the vendor.  He was always ready 
and willing to complete the purchase and execute a conveyance, but the vendee chooses to set up this 
question about the Statute of Frauds, and to say, ‘[a]lthough I can have the contract performed if I please, 
I repudiate it.’ Under these circumstances, I think it would be quite monstrous if the plaintiff could recover” 
(722-723). 
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is that the “willing and able” defence is applied in the context of a formally invalid 
agreement (for which it was never designed) to prevent unconscionable behaviour (even in 
cases where no such conduct is present on the facts). 
  
Despite these and other criticisms,203 the rule in Carlis was reaffirmed in an obiter 
statement in a subsequent Appellate Division decision204 and was consistently applied in 
the Transvaal.205  This led to some strange results.  For instance, in Mattheus v 
Stratford206 the buyer’s enrichment claim was denied despite the fact that the defendant’s 
willingness and ability to perform related to a performance which was impossible to 
define.207  Again in De Villiers NO v Summerson,208 the fact that the seller pleaded that he 
was willing and able to perform allowed him to rely on a forfeiture clause contained within 
the void oral agreement.209 
 
While the rule in Carlis was followed in the Transvaal, it was expressly rejected in the 
Cape in CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick210 and also held not to be 
applicable to the rei vindicatio211 or to hire-purchase contracts.212  In the latter context, 
                                                          
203
 As to which, see CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 4 All SA 22 (C) 26 ff. 
204
 Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135 145. 
205
 See eg Kennedy and Kennedy v Lanyon 1923 TPD 284; Mattheus v Stratford 1946 TPD 498; Pucjlowski 
v Johnston’s Executors 1946 WLD 1; Botes v Toti Development Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 1 SA 205 (T). 
206
 1946 TPD 498. 
207
 Mattheus v Stratford 1946 TPD 498 502.  See also De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg 
en Handelsreg 289 n 77; Wulfsohn Formalities 243; CD Development Co (East Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 
1979 4 All SA 22 (C) 32. 
208
 1951 3 SA 75 (T). 
209
 De Villiers NO v Summerson 1951 3 SA 75 (T) 80G-H.  See further De Wet & Van Wyk Die Suid-
Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 289 n 77; Wulfsohn Formalities 244; CD Development Co (East 
Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 4 All SA 22 (C) 32.  This judgment was subsequently overturned in Vogel NO 
v Volkersz 1977 1 SA 537 (T) 554D-E where Botha J held that “if a contract of sale is null and void, it is a 
legal impossibility to allow the seller to enforce the contract pro tanto by relying on a forfeiture clause 
contained in it in order to resist a claim by the purchaser for a refund of the purchase price paid by him 
pursuant thereto.” 
210
 1979 4 All SA 22 (C). 
211
 In Bushney v Joliffe 1953 4 SA 273 (W) 276C, the court held that in order for a plaintiff to succeed with 
the rei vindicatio it had to allege that the defendant was unwilling or unable to perform.  This was 
subsequently rejected in Akbar v Patel 1974 4 SA 104 (T) where Trengove J held that the court in that case 
had failed to distinguish between an enrichment claim (where the Carlis rule was applicable) and a claim for 
a return of property in which ownership had not been transferred (108C-H).  Trengove J’s conclusion was 
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such rejection rested on policy grounds: the purpose of the Hire Purchase Act 36 of 1942 
was to protect purchasers from “unscrupulous” hire-purchase dealers, a purpose that 
would have been nullified if the “willing and able” defence was held to be applicable.213 
 
6 3 3 4 5 The current South African approach: a statutory enrichment claim 
 
The conflict created by the Carlis rule, at least as it related to contracts for the sale of land, 
was resolved when the legislature introduced section 28 of the Alienation of Land Act, 
subsection 1 of which provides a statutory enrichment action where one party has 
performed in terms of a formally invalid contract.  Section 28(1) allows the purchaser to 
recover from the seller his performance;214 interest on any payments he may have 
made;215 reasonable compensation for necessary expenditure incurred in connection with 
the preservation of the land;216 and the cost of certain improvements to the land to which 
the owner or alienator expressly or tacitly consented.217  The seller, on his part, may 
reclaim his performance;218 reasonable compensation for the occupation, use and 
enjoyment of the land;219 and compensation for any damage caused to the property by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
subsequently confirmed in Patel v Adam 1977 2 SA 653 (A) 670A-D, a case which is discussed in detail in 
Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment in SA Law 263-264 nn 174, 176. 
212




 S 28(1). 
215
 S 28(1)(a)(i).  At common law, the seller was not obliged to pay interest unless he was in mora.  Wulfsohn 
Formalities 250; Pucjlowski v Johnston’s Executors 1946 WLD 1 7.  In Gibbs v Vantyi 2010 2 SA 606 (ECP), 
the court appears to have lost sight of the fact that this statutory provision now replaces the common law.  
There, a sale of land was held to be formally invalid.  The purchasers had paid a certain sum of money to an 
auctioneer (the sale did not to fall within s 3(1) of the Act which exempts sales of land by public auction from 
the formal requirements prescribed by s 2(1)) which consisted of the auctioneer’s commission and a deposit 
(608B).  Although the court held that the purchasers were entitled to reimbursement of the sum, it ordered 
that interest on that sum be calculated from the date of demand (611H-J).  However, interest on the deposit 
should have been calculated in terms of s 28(1)(a)(i), from the date of payment.  See also Du Plessis Law of 
Unjustified Enrichment 112 n 112. 
216
 S 28(1)(a)(ii)(aa). 
217
 S 28(1)(a)(ii)(bb).  By implication, the effect of this provision is that where the seller has not given his 
consent, he is entitled to keep the value of the improvement.  For criticism, see Visser Unjustified Enrichment 
466; De Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 196.   
218
 S 28(1). 
219
 S 28(1)(b)(i).   
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purchaser or anyone for whom he is vicariously liable.220  It is therefore unnecessary for a 
plaintiff to bring the claim for recovery of his performance within the parameters of one of 
the recognised enrichment actions.  Furthermore, section 28 does away with the defence 
of willingness or ability to perform.   
 
However, the Carlis rule has not yet been overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeal.  It is 
also possible that the legislature may prescribe formal requirements for the validity of other 
categories of agreements in the future, and the question may then arise whether the Carlis 
rule should be applicable.  It is suggested that the answer should be in the negative.  First, 
the “willing and able” defence appears to be reserved for valid but unenforceable contracts 
in English law; it has never been applied in the context of void contracts.  Secondly, 
recognising the “willing and able” defence to an enrichment remedy in the context of a void 
contract blurs the distinction between unenforceability and voidness: the plaintiff may not 
sue on the void contract and yet the defendant may rely on that same contract as a 
defence to any potential enrichment claim, simply by indicating that he is prepared to 
perform in terms of it.  Finally, while the rule appears to be directed at unconscionable 
reliance on a formal defect to escape a seriously intended agreement, it can also promote 
fraud.  The defendant need merely allege that he is willing and able to perform, but there is 
no remedy available to the plaintiff should the defendant have made that allegation 
dishonestly.221  It is therefore entirely possible that the defendant may allege that he is 
willing and able to perform as a dilatory tactic, while he searches for a better bargain 
elsewhere.  Should he find that better bargain and transfer the land to a third party, the 
plaintiff cannot prevent him from doing so, because there is no valid contract upon which 
to sue.   For these reasons, it is suggested that the rule should be abandoned in its 
entirety. 
 
While the Carlis rule itself is suspect, the policy consideration underlying its imposition 
merits further attention.  It was stated above that the rule is directed at preventing a party 
from relying on formal invalidity to escape an agreement which was seriously intended.  In 
South African law, this was taken into account when determining whether a party should 
be awarded an enrichment remedy; in other jurisdictions, this policy consideration informs 
                                                          
220
 S 28(1)(b)(ii). 
221
 See E Kahn Contract and Mercantile Law through the Cases (1971) 192–193; CD Development Co (East 
Rand) (Pty) Ltd v Novick 1979 4 All SA 22 (C) 36. 
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the award of certain remedies which lead to the enforcement, direct or indirect, of a 
formally defective contract.  It is these remedies which serve as the focus of the next 
section. 
 
6 4 Remedies that lead to the direct or indirect enforcement of a formally 
defective contract 
6 4 1 Introduction 
 
The preceding sections have shown that the consequences of non-compliance with 
statutory formalities vary according to the type of contract, the policy considerations 
underlying the particular formal requirement and the jurisdiction in question.222  We have 
also seen that a claim for restitution based on unjustified enrichment may be available to a 
party who has performed in terms of a formally defective contract, irrespective of whether 
the consequence of non-compliance is invalidity or unenforceability.223  The function of 
such a claim is “to restore economic benefits to the plaintiff, at whose expense they were 
obtained, and for the retention of which by the defendant there is no legal justification”.224   
 
However, there are circumstances in which an enrichment claim is thought to provide 
inadequate relief, so that a court may award a remedy which recognises a party’s reliance 
or expectation interest, even where formal requirements dictate that the contract is void or 
unenforceable due to non-compliance.  Thus, we find the doctrine of part performance and 
the use of estoppel in some common-law jurisdictions;225 in Germany, the courts may 
award a remedy on the basis of paragraph 242 BGB, or in terms of the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo.226  South African law is more restrictive than both its civilian and common-
law counterparts in this regard and does not currently appear to award a remedy which 
could lead to the enforcement of the contract, at least not in the absence of third-party 
involvement.  These alternative approaches will now be discussed, in order to determine 
whether they are in any sense useful and usable within the South African context.  For this 
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reason, what follows does not commence with an exposition of current South African law – 
the strictness of its approach to remedies in the context of statutory formalities only 
becomes clearer once the more liberal English and German approaches have been 
illustrated.  
 
6 4 2 The doctrine of part performance 
 
The doctrine of part performance reflects one of the earliest confrontations with the 
problems created by statutory formalities.227  In a previous chapter, it was stated that the 
Statute of Frauds was a legislative reaction to the procedural deficiencies in the law of 
evidence in seventeenth-century England.228  Nevertheless, 
 
“[i]t quickly became evident that if the seventeenth century solution addressed one mischief it 
was capable of giving rise to another: that a party, making and acting on what was thought to be 
a binding oral agreement, would find his commercial expectations defeated when the time for 
enforcement came and the other party successfully relied on the lack of a written memorandum 
or note of the agreement.”229  
 
The doctrine of part performance was a creation of the English courts of equity as a 
response to the second “mischief” described above.230  The remedy was traditionally only 
applied in the context of the sale of land, although there were dicta which suggested that it 
might also be applicable in the context of other formally defective agreements rendered 
unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds.231  The question is now irrelevant in English law, 
because the Statute no longer applies to any of the contracts falling within its original 
                                                          
227
 Simpson Common Law of Contract 614.  The Statute of Frauds was promulgated in 1677; the earliest 
authority on the doctrine of part performance is Butcher v Stapely 23 ER 524 (1685).  Estoppel became part 
of the English common law in the first half of the nineteenth century.  See E Cooke The Modern Law of 
Estoppel (2000) 16 ff.  
228
 See ch 2 (2 2). 
229
 Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering IN.GL.EN SpA [2003] UKHL 17 paras 2-3 per Lord 
Bingham.  See also English Law Commission Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of Land (Working Paper 
No 92) (1985) para 2.4. 
230
 H Burn & J Cartwright Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property 18 ed (2011) 964; Steadman v 
Steadman [1976] AC 536 540, 545. 
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scope except those of guarantee232 and an order of specific performance of a guarantee 
does not fall within the ambit of equity jurisdiction.233  Insofar as the doctrine applied to 
land transactions, it was codified in English law by the Law of Property Act of 1925.234  
Although it was subsequently abolished by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act, it still exists in other common-law jurisdictions, like Canada and Australia.  
 
According to the doctrine, a claimant who has partly performed an oral contract required to 
be evidenced in writing may claim specific performance of that contract when the 
defendant has allowed the claimant to alter his position in the belief that the former would 
also perform his part of the agreement.235  Its existence is based on two interrelated 
reasons.  The first is that the doctrine is directed towards solving the problem highlighted 
throughout this thesis, namely that statutory formalities can become a refuge for a party 
who seeks to deny the existence of an (otherwise valid) oral contract, despite having 
allowed the other contracting party to act on the assumption that such a contract exists.  
Thus, in Steadman v Steadman236 (“Steadman”) it was stated that  
 
“[i]f one party to an agreement stands by and lets the other party incur expense or prejudice his 
position on the faith of the agreement being valid he will not then be allowed to turn round and 
assert that the agreement is unenforceable.  Using fraud in its other and less precise sense, 
that would be fraudulent on his part and it has become proverbial that courts of equity will not 
permit the statute to be made an instrument of fraud.”237 
 
In other words, the doctrine of part performance is a kind of estoppel.238  
 
The second reason is that the act or acts of part performance by the plaintiff can prove the 
existence of the agreement itself, and therefore serve as a substitute for the memorandum 
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or note required by the relevant legislation.239  In the Steadman case, the court gave 
priority to the fraud-prevention purpose of the doctrine.  There, the parties had divorced 
and had orally agreed that Mrs Steadman would surrender her interest in the jointly-owned 
matrimonial home, in exchange for which Mr Steadman would pay her £1 500, and £100 in 
settlement of arrear maintenance.  The £100 was paid, but Mrs Steadman refused to 
execute the deed of transfer, because she was of the opinion that the former sum was less 
than what she ought to have been offered.240  Mr Steadman then sought to enforce the 
oral contract on the grounds of part performance. 
 
In giving effect to the notion that the primary purpose of the doctrine of part performance 
was to prevent fraud (rather than to give effect to conduct which served as an evidentiary 
substitute for a written document), the court relaxed the requirement that the act(s) of part 
performance must point unequivocally to the precise terms of the alleged oral contract.  It 
was sufficient if the claimant could show that his conduct indicated the existence of a 
contract and that his acts were consistent with that contract.241  The court was divided on 
the question whether the part performance must relate to a contract of land or whether it 
was enough simply that the claimant’s conduct constituted proof that a contract was 
concluded.242  Finally, the court seemed to be of the opinion that the payment of money 
was a relevant act of part performance in the circumstances.243  However, acts done in 
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contemplation of a contract are insufficient;244 what appears to be required is the 
performance of an obligation or the exercise of a right in terms of the oral contract.245   
 
A successful reliance on the doctrine results in the admission of evidence relating to all the 
terms of the contract and not only the terms proved by the act of part performance.246  
Since the remedy awarded is specific performance (or damages in lieu thereof247), it is 
difficult to accept that the doctrine does not enforce the oral contract.248  Nevertheless, it 
has been said that 
 
“in a suit founded on such part performance, the defendant is really ‘charged’ upon the equities 
resulting from the acts done in execution of the contract, and not (within the meaning of the 
statute) upon the contract itself.  If such equities were excluded, injustice of a kind which the 
statute cannot be thought to have had in contemplation would follow ... The matter has 
advanced beyond the stage of contract; and the equities which arise out of the stage which it 
has reached cannot be administered unless the contract is regarded.  The choice is between 
undoing what has been done (which is not always possible or, if possible, just) and completing 
what has been left undone ... It is not arbitrary or unreasonable to hold that when the statute 
says that no action is to be brought to charge any person upon a contract concerning land, it 
has in view the simple case in which he is charged upon the contract only, and not that in which 
there are equities”.249  
 
Therefore, the doctrine of part performance, while arguably subversive of the prescribed 
formal requirement, does represent an attempt to prevent that formal requirement from 
becoming an instrument of fraud. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
an action has no obvious link to any contract – see Whittaker “Form” in Chitty on Contracts 1 402; Maddison 
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The doctrine of part performance can only be applied, as a matter of logic, where a valid 
oral agreement is recognised separately from the recorded agreement.  It cannot apply 
where formalities are thought to be constitutive, since there cannot be performance of a 
non-existent contract.250  For this reason, the doctrine has been held not to be applicable 
in the South African context.251   
 
This conclusion was drawn early in the 20th century, in Jolly v Herman’s Executors.252  The 
plaintiff contended that the doctrine was applicable in spite of the fact that the contract 
between itself and the defendants was formally invalid.  The court responded as follows: 
 
“[T]he plaintiff's contention cannot be upheld unless this Court is able and willing to apply to 
contracts under the [Volksraad Besluit No 1422 of 12 August 1886] a doctrine similar to that 
applied by English equity courts to certain contracts falling within the Statute of Frauds.  By a 
long series of decisions it has been established that such contracts, even though verbal, will be 
enforced at equity if they have been part performed by the party suing on them … [These] 
cases … were all decided on the basis that that statute, while barring any legal remedy upon 
certain parol agreements, did not render the agreement itself null … But where, as in the 
present case, the legislature has declared that contracts not complying with certain formalities 
shall be void ab initio, those formalities cannot be dispensed with; and no court can, without 
doing an illegality, pronounce that such contracts are not void.”253 
 
Therefore, when an agreement is void, the doctrine of part performance is unavailable.  
This conclusion was reiterated in the subsequent Wilken case,254 and it is also the reason 
why the English Law Commission recommended that the doctrine of part performance 
would not be applicable under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act which 
provides that formally defective sales of land are void.255 
 
The Law Commission’s recommendation was motivated to a large extent by the 
uncertainty created by the Steadman case in determining which acts were sufficient for the 
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doctrine to be applicable and whether these acts must go to prove a contract relating to 
land.256  Furthermore, the Commission was of the opinion that the doctrine of part 
performance was “a blunt instrument for doing justice”.257  However, it did acknowledge 
that there could be instances where the inability to rely on the doctrine might lead to harsh 
consequences for the plaintiff.258  The Commission therefore suggested that other 
equitable remedies, like estoppel, should be retained in order to prevent injustice.  
Estoppel is discussed in greater detail below.259  The focus of the next section is the 
German approach to the provision of remedies which could lead to the enforcement of a 
formally defective contract.   
 
6 4 3 Paragraph 242 BGB and the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo 
 
In German law, where non-compliance with formalities results in invalidity, as it does in 
South Africa, it nevertheless appears that there is some recognition that circumstances 
may exist which would render it inequitable for a party to rely on a formal defect to escape 
the consequences of an agreement which was seriously intended.  In these situations, 
there are two possible remedies available to a party, the bases of which are found in 
paragraph 242 BGB (which stipulates that a party has a duty to act in good faith) and in 
the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo respectively.     
 
A remedy in terms of paragraph 242 BGB for non-compliance with formalities is only 
provided in exceptional circumstances, and on a case-by-case basis.260  A particularly 
illustrative case is colloquially known as Edelmann II.261  The plaintiff had bought a plot of 
land from the defendant in terms of a written agreement which was not notarised, but 
which bore the signature of the defendant’s managing director (who had also been the 
plaintiff’s boss at an earlier time).  When the plaintiff requested that the written agreement 
be notarially authenticated, the managing director responded that it was his “‘habit to 
honour his obligations no matter whether they were made orally, in writing, or were in 
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notarial form.’”262  When the plaintiff continued to insist that the agreement should comply 
with the formal requirements, the managing director replied by stating that he had signed 
on behalf of the defendant company, and that the contract was as good as a notarial 
act.263 
 
According to the court, the previous employment relationship between the plaintiff and the 
managing director meant that the latter “was in his eyes endowed with special authority”264 
which made it virtually impossible for him to insist that the agreement should be notarially 
authenticated.  Furthermore,  
 
“the defendant announced in such an emphatic manner his intention to perform the contract, 
which was invalid in form, by pledging his status and reputation and by referring to his business 
practice that he cannot resile free from contract without offending against good faith.  Reliance 
subsequently on the formal invalidity of the contract, constitutes an [inadmissible] exercise of his 
right, irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff was not in error as to the formal requirements.”265 
 
The court enforced the formally invalid contract, because the failure to do so would have 
led to a “totally unbearable” (schlechthin untragbar) result.266 
 
Therefore, before granting a remedy in terms of paragraph 242 BGB, a court will weigh up 
the following factors: knowledge on the part of the defendant that the contract was formally 
defective; the lack of such knowledge at the time of contracting on the part of the plaintiff 
(although Edelmann II indicates that this is not decisive); detrimental reliance by the 
plaintiff; and the adequacy of relief provided by enrichment remedies or in terms of the 
doctrine of culpa in contrahendo.267  The latter remedies are regarded as inadequate when 
they are incapable of alleviating a “totally unbearable” situation.  Such a situation arises in 
primarily two types of cases: where the (economic) existence of the innocent party would 
“be destroyed or substantially endangered” by not giving effect to the contract,268 or where 
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the guilty party has displayed a particularly serious breach of good faith by relying on the 
formal defect (which is usually found to exist where that party prevents the other from 
complying with a formal requirement and thereafter invokes the defect).269  If the plaintiff is 
successful in proving these requirements, specific performance will be awarded.270   
 
In terms of the culpa in contrahendo doctrine, parties incur a duty of care towards each 
other during the negotiation phase.  In the case of non-compliance with statutory 
formalities, relief is granted where one party knew or should have known of the formal 
requirement, while the other didn’t and was also not under a duty to inquire further.271  The 
relief granted in terms of this doctrine does not consist of specific performance but of 
reliance damages, because the former would amount to “‘performance of the contract and 
not the giving of damages … and thus amount to a setting aside of the … formal 
provision”.272  However, at least in one case, damages were measured according to what 
the party would have received had the contract been validly concluded.273  In effect, the 
remedy indirectly enforced the invalid contract. 
 
The doctrine of part performance and the remedies available in German law all share a 
common element: the notion that in certain circumstances it would be inequitable to allow 
a party to rely on formal defectiveness where the other party has reasonably acted on the 
assumption that the contract is valid and enforceable.  The need to do particular justice on 
the facts outweighs the policy considerations informing statutory formalities, with the result 
that the contractual expectation is enforced, either through specific performance or 
damages in lieu thereof.  In such a case, the outcome of strict insistence on formal 
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requirements would be “‘unconscionable’ or it would be ‘inequitable’ to allow the other 
party to go back on his promise”.274 
 
The last remedy, estoppel, is the topic of the following section.  It will become apparent 
that the same equitable considerations which underlie the remedies discussed thus far 
also inform the English courts’ approach to the use of estoppel in the context of formalities.  
In South African law, estoppel in this context is more problematic. 
 
6 4 4 Estoppel 
6 4 4 1 Introduction 
 
Estoppel operates to prevent one party (the representor) from denying the truth of a 
representation made by him where the other party (the representee) has acted on that 
representation to his detriment.275  In South African law, a successful defence of estoppel 
must therefore show that there has been a representation by the representor; detriment on 
the part of the representee; and a causal relationship between the representation and the 
detriment.276  It is also stated as a general rule, that a successful reliance on the defence 
should not result in the enforcement of an agreement which is prohibited by law.277  This 
rule applies to agreements which are invalid, inter alia because they are illegal, ultra vires 
or formally defective.278  As Steyn CJ put it in Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen:279 
 
“Dit is ‘n erkende beginsel van ons reg dat wat by direkte optrede in stryd met ‘n wetlike 
voorskrif van nul en gener waarde sou wees, nie deur indirekte optrede geldig gemaak kan 
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word nie.  So ‘n voorskrif wat teen ‘n bepaalde transaksie gerig is, tref ook enige optrede wat 
die voorskrif sou verydel.”280  
 
From a South African perspective therefore, the English Law Commission’s suggestion 
that estoppel could be used in certain instances despite the fact that a sale of land was 
void for failure to comply with formalities prescribed by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act is somewhat surprising.281  The next section will examine how estoppel is 
applied in the context of statutory formalities in English law, before considering whether 
there are any exceptions to the general rule in South African law. 
 
6 4 4 2 Estoppel and statutory formalities in English law 
 
English law also recognises, as a point of departure, the general rule that estoppel may 
not be used to circumvent the provisions of a statute.282  However, English courts are more 
willing than their South African counterparts to recognise that there are exceptions to the 
rule, even in the context of formalities.  This may be ascribed to the awareness that there 
are statutes which, “though declaring transactions to be unenforceable or void, are 
nevertheless not essentially prohibitory and so do not preclude estoppels”.283  An 
examination is required of the statutory provision, its purpose and the social policy behind 
it, before deciding whether estoppel will be successful.284   
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Such an examination occurred in Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering 
IN.GL.EN. SpA285 (“Actionstrength”).  Actionstrength, a sub-contractor, had not been paid 
by the general contractor and threatened the owner of the site (St-Gobain) with rescission 
of the contract and withdrawal of its labour.  A representative of the owner promised 
Actionstrength that if St-Gobain could not persuade the general contractor to meet its 
obligations, it would itself pay the appellant.  Relying on this promise, Actionstrength 
continued to provide labour.  The general contractor failed to pay and then St-Gobain also 
refused to pay.286 
 
Because the contract between Actionstrength and St-Gobain was a contract of guarantee, 
it was unenforceable because it had not been reduced to writing.  In determining whether 
Actionstrength could successfully estop St-Gobain from relying on the defence provided by 
the Statute of Frauds, Lord Hoffmann stated that the purpose of the Statute was the 
following: 
 
“The terms of the statute … show that Parliament, although obviously conscious that it would 
allow some people to break their promises, thought that this injustice was outweighed by the 
need to protect people from being held liable on the basis of oral utterances which were ill-
considered, ambiguous or completely fictitious.”287 
 
However, these policy concerns were insufficient in themselves to prevent estoppel from 
being applicable.  The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is not to protect particularly 
vulnerable classes of people, whose weaknesses may be exploited in the absence of 
some kind of statutory protection.288  Allowing estoppel to succeed in the latter case would 
render that protective purpose nugatory.  By contrast, the provisions of the Statute of 
Frauds are intended to prevent the imposition of liability based on “oral utterances” which 
were never made or ill-considered.  These policy considerations do not justify the 
automatic exclusion of estoppel.  This is an important point, because it emphasises that 
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statutory formalities can be imposed for different reasons, not all of which dictate that 
estoppel should be unsuccessful as a matter of course.  
 
The real reason why estoppel was unsuccessful in Actionstrength was because no 
representation, beyond the oral agreement concluded with St-Gobain, had been made to 
induce or encourage Actionstrength to believe that it was the recipient of an effective 
guarantee.  It was not enough that the creditor acted on the assurance given by the 
purported guarantor, since this is the case with every guarantee.289  To admit an estoppel 
on this representation alone would, in effect, amount to repealing the Statute.290  While 
Lord Hoffman declined to consider whether estoppel could ever succeed in the context of 
formally defective guarantees, three judges did suggest that it might, where there was an 
“extra ingredient” such as a representation that the guarantor would honour the agreement 
despite the absence of writing, or that it was not a contract of guarantee, or that the 
agreement would be confirmed in writing.291  In other words, the representation must 
consist of something more than the mere conclusion of an oral guarantee.  Because this 
“extra ingredient” was not present on the facts of this case, Actionstrength could not 
recover the £1.3 million due to it. 
 
Estoppel has also been considered in the context of formally defective sales of land.  The 
particular form of estoppel applied in this context is proprietary estoppel, which is 
 
“applicable where some action is taken by a person … in reliance on a mistaken belief as to his 
rights in or over land, or in reliance on expectations relating to land, where the landowner 
stands by or encourages the action in such circumstances that it would be unconscionable for 
him later to seek to enforce his strict legal rights.”292 
 
At the outset, it should be noted that there is some overlap between the doctrine of part 
performance and proprietary estoppel: 
 
“At a high level of generality, there is much common ground between the doctrines of 
proprietary estoppel and the constructive trust, just as there is between proprietary estoppel and 
                                                          
289
 Actionstrength Ltd v International Glass Engineering IN.GL.EN. SpA [2003] UKHL 17 para 25. 
290
 Para 26.   
291
 Para 9 per Lord Bingham, para 35 per Lord Clyde, and para 50 per Lord Walker. 
292
 Davis 1993 OJLS 101.   
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part performance.  All are concerned with equity's intervention to provide relief against 
unconscionable conduct”.293 
 
It has also been stated above that the doctrine of part performance is regarded as a form 
of estoppel.294  Nevertheless, there are some differences between them.  The doctrine of 
part performance requires that the plaintiff’s conduct must point to the existence of an 
agreement between the parties.  This is not a requirement of proprietary estoppel, where it 
is sufficient that the claimant has acted in reliance on the representations of the defendant; 
the existence of an agreement is irrelevant.295  Furthermore, a successful claim based on 
part performance results in the award of specific performance or damages in lieu thereof; if 
a court should not award specific performance, the claimant has no remedy.296  Proprietary 
estoppel is more flexible, and a court has a wide range of remedies at its disposal, 
including the granting of a proprietary right.297  Finally, while the doctrine of part 
performance may be available to both parties, it appears that proprietary estoppel may 
only be raised by the purchaser of land;298 the seller must be content with other forms of 
estoppel or other remedies.299 
 
As already discussed,300 the English Law Commission believed that its recommendation - 
non-compliance with formal requirements should result in the invalidity of a transaction 
relating to land - would render the doctrine of part performance obsolete.  Nevertheless, it 
believed that other equitable remedies, like estoppel, would still be available in cases of 
potential injustice.  Despite this confident assertion, the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act does not refer to estoppel; instead, section 2(5) simply states that “nothing 
in [section 2] affects the creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts.”   
 
                                                          
293
 Yaxley v Gotts [2000] Ch 162 176. 
294
 See 6 4 2. 
295




 Davis 1993 OJLS 101 113, 115.  In other words, proprietary estoppel can be a cause of action (see 
Cooke Estoppel 127 ff).  Although it has been said that estoppel cannot be used in this way in South African 
law (see eg Sonnekus The Law of Estoppel 197 ff), this rule was criticised as formalistic by Harms DP in 
Oriental Products (Pty) Ltd v Pegma 178 Investments Trading CC 2011 2 SA 508 (SCA) para 31.   
298
 Davis 1993 OJLS 103,105. 
299
 117 ff. 
300
 See 6 4 2. 
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This has created uncertainty as to the exact role which estoppel may play in the context of 
transactions relating to land.  For example, in Godden v Merthyr Tydfil Housing 
Association301 it was held that a party suing for damages for breach of contract may not 
raise estoppel to preclude the defendant from relying on the invalidity of an oral sale of 
land to proceed with such a claim, because it would be contrary to the provisions of the 
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act.302  Succeeding with estoppel in these 
circumstances would amount to enforcing a void transaction and result in exactly the kind 
of dispute that the requirement of writing, which promotes certainty, seeks to avoid.303 
 
However, in McCausland v Duncan Lawrie Ltd,304 the obiter statement was made by 
Morritt LJ that  
 
“[s]ection 2 of the Act of 1989 does not give rise to any illegality if its terms are not observed 
and the need for an estoppel arises in just those circumstances where there is no enforceable 
contract.  For my part I would not place weight on the contention that an estoppel … is 
impossible as a matter of law but it still has to be made out as a matter of fact.”305 
 
A case where estoppel could have succeeded as a matter of law and fact is Yaxley v 
Gotts306 (“Yaxley”). Yaxley and Gotts concluded an oral agreement in terms of which the 
appellant undertook to make certain improvements to, and manage, a block of flats in 
return for which he would acquire ownership of the ground floor.  This agreement was 
never reduced to writing, although the respondent did indicate that he would do so at a 
later stage (the “extra ingredient”).  Ownership in the ground floor was never transferred.  
On appeal, the respondent argued that the appellant was not entitled to estop him from 
relying on the formal invalidity of the oral agreement, but should rather have instituted a 
claim for restitution of the value of the work and services he had rendered.307 
 
However, Robert Walker LJ had 
                                                          
301










 [2000] Ch 162. 
307
 170. 




“no hesitation in agreeing … that the doctrine of estoppel may operate to modify (and 
sometimes perhaps even to counteract) the effect of section 2 of the [Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions)] Act … The circumstances in which section 2 has to be complied 
with are so various, and the scope of the doctrine of estoppel is so flexible, that any general 
assertion that section 2 is a ‘no-go area’ would be unsustainable.”308 
 
At the same time, the judge stressed the need to take into account the policy 
considerations underlying the imposition of formalities.309  As in the Actionstrength case 
where formalities relating to guarantees were considered, the formal requirements 
imposed on land transactions did not have as their purpose the protection of particularly 
vulnerable categories of persons: 
 
“Parliament's requirement that any contract for the disposition of an interest in land must be 
made in a particular documentary form, and will otherwise be void, does not have such an 
obviously social aim as statutory provisions relating to contracts by or with moneylenders, 
infants, or protected tenants.  Nevertheless it can be seen as embodying Parliament's 
conclusion, in the general public interest, that the need for certainty as to the formation of 
contracts of this type must in general outweigh the disappointment of those who make informal 
bargains in ignorance of the statutory requirement.  If an estoppel would have the effect of 
enforcing a void contract and subverting Parliament's purpose it may have to yield to the 
statutory law which confronts it, except so far as the statute's saving for a constructive trust 
provides a means of reconciliation of the apparent conflict.”310 
 
According to Robert Walker LJ, such reconciliation was possible where the facts met the 
requirements of both proprietary estoppel and a constructive trust, as they did in this 
case.311  As the judge noted, where there is an agreement or some understanding 
                                                          
308






 A constructive trust is defined as follows in Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 905: 
“A … constructive trust … is created by a transaction between the trustee and the cestui que trust in 
connection with the acquisition by the trustee of a legal estate in land, whenever the trustee has so 
conducted himself that it would be inequitable to allow him to deny to the cestui que trust a beneficial 
interest in the land acquired.  And he will be held so to have conducted himself if by his words or conduct 
he has induced the cestui que trust to act to his own detriment in the reasonable belief that by so acting 
he was acquiring a beneficial interest in the land.” 
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between the parties upon which the claimant has acted, then there is in effect no 
difference between the two remedies.  In both cases,  
 
“[e]quity enforces [the oral agreement] because it would be unconscionable for the other party 
to disregard the claimant’s rights”.312   
 
Beldam LJ went still further, by stating that it was possible that estoppel could succeed 
even where it did not overlap with a constructive trust: 
 
“I cannot see that there is any reason to qualify the plain words of section 2(5).  They were 
included to preserve ... equitable remedies.  I do not think it inherent in a social policy of 
simplifying conveyancing by requiring the certainty of a written document that unconscionable 
conduct or … fraud should be allowed to prevail ... [T]he provision that nothing in section 2 of 
the Act of 1989 is to affect the creation or operation of resulting, implied or constructive trusts 
effectively excludes from the operation of the section cases in which an interest in land might 
equally well be claimed by relying on constructive trust or proprietary estoppel.”313 
 
Although Beldam LJ’s judgment creates the impression that estoppel will succeed even 
when the facts do not also give rise to a constructive trust, this matter is not yet settled in 
English law.  For example, in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd,314 Lord Scott of 
Foscote made the obiter remark that proprietary estoppel could not succeed on its own, 
because “[e]quity can surely not contradict [a] statute”315 which provides that an oral 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Because the vehicle of a constructive trust has been specifically rejected in South African law (see Kerbyn 
178 (Pty) Ltd v Van den Heever and Others NNO 2000 4 SA 804 (W) 817 D-F; E Cameron “Constructive 
Trusts in South African Law: The Legacy Refused” (1999) 3 Edin LR 341), it is not discussed in detail in the 
main text. 
312




 [2008] 1 WLR 1752. 
315
 Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 1752 para 29.  Neuberger LJ also assumed that 
proprietary estoppel would not succeed if the facts did not also give rise to a constructive trust in Kinane v 
Mackie-Conteh 2005 WL 62273.  Discussion (and criticism) of the notion that proprietary estoppel must 
overlap with a constructive trust before it can succeed in the context of formally defective sales of land can 
be found in B McFarlane “Proprietary Estoppel and Failed Contractual Negotiations” 2005 Conv 501; G 
Owen & O Rees “Section 2(5) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1989: A 
Misconceived Approach?” 2011 Conv 495; Burn & Cartwright Law of Property 973-978. 
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agreement for the sale of land is void.  However, in Whittaker v Kinnear,316 the court 
pointed out that this remark was obiter, and that it was therefore not bound to follow it. 
 
Despite this uncertainty, one thing is clear: an English court will not refuse to entertain a 
defence of estoppel purely on the basis that the agreement fails to comply with statutory 
formalities and is therefore unenforceable or void.  Whether this means, in the context of 
sales of land, that proprietary estoppel must overlap with the requirements of a 
constructive trust before it will be recognised, or whether it is possible to entertain 
proprietary estoppel even where the facts do not (also) give rise to a constructive trust, is 
irrelevant for current purposes.  Both remedies recognise the existence of an oral 
agreement in spite of the fact that the relevant statute provides that that agreement is void 
or unenforceable, particularly when the refusal to recognise it would allow one of the 
parties to act in a fraudulent or unconscionable manner.   
 
6 4 4 3 Estoppel and statutory formalities in South African law 
 
It was stated above that it is a general principle of South African law that a contracting 
party will not succeed with a defence of estoppel if it would lead to the enforcement of an 
agreement which is void, inter alia, because it contravenes a statutory prescription.317  
                                                          
316
 2011 WL 2039893 para 30.  See also the earlier case of Shah v Shah [2002] QB 35, where estoppel 
succeeded even in the absence of a constructive trust.  
317
 See 6 4 4 1.  The same rule does not apply when a successful defence of estoppel would contravene a 
prescription imposed by the parties themselves.  Eg, estoppel could be relied upon, in theory at least, in the 
event of non-compliance with a non-variation clause, because such a clause will not protect a party against 
his own fraud.  See SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren 1964 2 SA 343 (O) 346B-E; Van As 
v Du Preez 1981 3 SA 760 (T) 765H; Nyandeni Local Municipality v Hlazo 2010 4 SA 261 (ECM) para 48.  
Estoppel was also referred to in passing by Steyn CJ in SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren 
1964 4 SA 760 (A) 765C, although it is unclear to what extent the Chief Justice though that it could be used 
to circumvent a non-variation clause – cf the conclusions of Margo J in Phillips v Miller (2) 1976 4 SA 88 (W) 
93G-H and Coetzee R in Barnett v Van der Merwe 1980 3 SA 606 (T) 610H-611D.  Another mechanism 
which may be available to counter an unconscionable reliance on self-imposed formalities is to categorise a 
particular requirement as amounting to the prescription of a mode of acceptance, rather than a formal 
requirement which is intended to be constitutive.  In Roberts v Martin 2005 4 SA 163 (C) 169G-H and Pillay v 
Shaik 2009 4 SA 74 (SCA) para 53, such a characterisation of a signature requirement (which was not 
complied with by one of the parties) allowed the respective courts to apply the reliance theory and to hold 
that a valid contract had been concluded on the facts.  Admittedly, there is a fine line between self-imposed 
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However, it does appear to be possible for a third party to rely on the defence against one 
of the original contracting parties to such an invalid agreement. 
 
In Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen318 (“Trust Bank”) the appellant discounted a 
number of hire-purchase agreements, or what appeared to be such agreements, in terms 
of the Hire Purchase Act 36 of 1942 (“Hire Purchase Act”).  The parties to these 
agreements were a partnership, as the seller, and a number of purchasers of motor 
vehicles.  In addition to the discounting agreement, the partners also bound themselves to 
the appellant bank as sureties for the debts of the purchasers.  Some of the hire-purchase 
agreements were void due to non-compliance with the section 7(1) of the Act, because the 
prescribed deposits had not been paid by the purchasers319 (contrary to what was 
contained in the written hire-purchase agreements320). 
 
When some of the debtors defaulted, the appellant instituted a claim against the 
respondent as surety.  The respondent alleged that because the hire-purchase 
agreements themselves were void, the suretyship agreement was also void.  The 
appellant sought to estop the respondent from relying on the defence of invalidity, 
reasoning that the respondent had intentionally created the impression that the hire-
purchase agreements were valid and that the appellant had acted on this representation to 
its detriment.321 
 
The appellant’s plea of estoppel succeeded.  According to Steyn CJ, the appellant was not 
attempting to enforce the invalid hire-purchase agreements, but the so-called “algemene 
ooreenkoms”.322  At this point, it should be stated that the reasoning of Steyn CJ is 
unclear.  The only agreement in terms of which the appellant could sue, was the 
suretyship contained in the “algemene ooreenkoms”.  In fact, the judge states that  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
formalities and prescribed modes of acceptance.  This matter is discussed further in C Pretorius “Reliance, 
Formalities and the Mode of Acceptance of an Offer” 2011 Obiter 453. 
318








 See eg 412C-H. 
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“[w]at wel geëis word, is die omgekeerde van die huurkoopkontrakte, nl. dat die verkoper aan 
die kopers se verpligtings moet voldoen.  Hierdie omgekeerde aanspreeklikheid is nie in die 
huurkoopkontrakte te vind nie ... Die respondent staan nie in vir die koper se verpligtings 
teenoor die verkoper nie, maar slegs vir sy verpligtings teenoor die sessionaris.  Hy sou hom 
trouens uit die aard van die verhouding nie in ‘n huurkoopkontrak as borg vir of medeskuldenaar 
van ‘n koper teenoor homself kon bind nie.”323 
 
However, later in his judgment, Steyn CJ says the following: 
 
“Die Hof a quo het die eksepsie gehandhaaf ook op grond daarvan dat die respondent se 
verpligtings as borg ingevolge die algemene ooreenkoms, die nietige huurkoopkontrakte aanvul, 
dat hulle as aanvullende verpligtings by nietige kontrakte self nietig is, en dat die Hof nie kan 
toelaat dat hierdie nietige verpligtings deur estoppel geldig gemaak word nie.  Indien estoppel 
egter om bogenoemde redes nie deur die tersaaklike beginsels betreffende die ongeldigheid 
van die [huurkoop]kontrakte uitgesluit word nie, sou dit volg, meen ek, dat dit ook nie uit hoofde 
van die ongeldigheid van aanvullende verpligtings uitgesluit word nie.”324  
 
What the judgment does not state clearly enough, is that the appellant was seeking to 
estop the respondent from relying on the invalidity of the suretyship agreement because 
the respondent had represented the principal debts to be valid, a representation which was 
not contradicted ex facie the documentation.  Steyn CJ held this to be a representation 
that allowed the defence of estoppel to succeed.  Furthermore, to enforce this invalid 
suretyship agreement did not contravene the objects of section 7(1) of the Hire Purchase 
Act, one of which was to discourage people from purchasing goods that they could not 
afford.325  If estoppel were to be raised by one of the original contracting parties against his 
counterparty, this protective function would be negated.  According to Steyn CJ, this would 
not be the case if estoppel was used to maintain the representation that the suretyship 
was valid: 
 
“Ek kan egter nie aanneem nie dat die wetgewer in art. 7(1) bedoel het om met die 
geldigheidsvereistes, in ‘n geval soos hierdie, ‘n niksvermoedende derde te verhinder om 
estoppel op te werp, en hom sodoende in dieselfde posisie te plaas as iemand wat die doel van 






 409F; 411G. 
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die wetgewer wou verydel.  Dit wil my voorkom dat die estoppel waarop die appellant hom 
beroep, nie in ‘n geval van hierdie aard deur genoemde beginsels uitgesluit word nie.”326 
 
This conclusion of the court finds approval with commentators such as Nienaber.327   
 
However, the Chief Justice goes on as follows: 
 
“[D]at ongeldigheid tussen twee partye ‘n beroep op estoppel deur ‘n derde uitsluit, is ook nie ‘n 
beginsel wat deur ons regspraktyk bevestig is nie”.328   
 
According to Nienaber,329 the court seems to be suggesting here that also where the third 
party claims in terms of the original invalid agreement, it may be possible to rely on 
estoppel (for example, on the facts of Trust Bank, if the appellant sued the purchasers in 
terms of the invalid hire-purchase agreements).  Selvan disagrees,330 and concludes that 
the statement made by the court does not mean that in every case where such 
circumstances arise, a third party may rely on estoppel.331  That may be true, but it doesn’t 
negate the fact that Steyn CJ did seem to consider that it was possible that in certain 
circumstances a third party could estop an original party from relying on the invalidity of 
the agreement.  
 
The minority judgment of Hoexter JA goes further.  According to him, 




 “Iets oor Verdiskontering, Estoppel en Borgtog” (1964) 27 THRHR 262 265.  Nienaber approves of the 
court’s conclusion on the basis that the enforcement of the agreement between the appellant and 
respondent was not prohibited by any piece of legislation and would also not promote a prohibited result.  He 
states: 
“Ons het hier wesenlik te doen met die geval van ‘n borg wat die indruk geskep het dat dat die 
hoofvordering geldig is terwyl hy voor sy siel geweet het dat dit nie die geval was nie.  In so ‘n geval 
behoort estoppel wel deeglik teen hom te kan geld.  Weliswaar is die borg se aanspreeklikheid 
aksessoor, maar die aksessore karakter is nie so deurdringend dat dit ongeoorloof sou wees om ‘n borg 
op grond van estoppel gebonde te hou aan die skyn waarvoor hy self verantwoordelik is nie, in weerwil 
van die nietigheid of ongeoorloofdheid van die hoofskuld.” (265; footnotes omitted). 
328
 Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Eksteen 1964 3 SA 402 (A) 413C. 
329
 1964 THRHR 266.    
330
 “Discounting, Estoppel and Suretyship – A Divergent View” (1965) 28 THRHR 231.  See the response to 
this article in P M Nienaber “Nogmaals Verdiskontering en Estoppel” (1966) 29 THRHR 51. 
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 Selvan 1965 THRHR 234. 




“[t]he doctrine of estoppel is an equitable one, developed in the public interest, and it seems to 
me that whenever a representor relies on a statutory illegality it is the duty of the Court to 
determine whether it is in the public interest that the representee should be allowed to plead 
estoppel.  The Court will have regard to the mischief of the statute on the one hand and the 
conduct of the parties and their relationship on the other hand.”332 
 
Hoexter JA acknowledged that the suretyship between the parties was invalid, but held 
that it was dolus on the part of the respondent to deny the very fact that he had held out to 
be true to the appellant.333  As a result, he also held that estoppel should succeed.334 
 
It seems to be contradictory to state that the law will not allow an agreement which is void 
for failure to comply with a statutory prescription to be enforced indirectly by means of 
estoppel when that estoppel is raised by one of the parties to the contract, but to hold that 
the same rule does not apply when a third party seeks to achieve a similar result.  In the 
more recent case of Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC335 (“Philmatt”), it 
would appear that the then Appellate Division was also prepared to accept that there may 
be room for a third party to rely successfully on estoppel, this time in the context of an 
agreement which was void for failure to comply with formalities.336   
 
                                                          
332




 Hoexter JA’s minority judgment subsequently formed the basis, inter alia, of the decision in Credit 
Corporation of SA Ltd v Botha 1968 4 SA 837 (N) in which it was held that an innocent third party (the 
appellant) was entitled to raise estoppel against the purchaser in order to enforce an agreement which did 
not comply with s 4 of the Hire Purchase Act 36 of 1942.  After referring to Hoexter JA’s statement quoted in 
the main text above, the court held that 
“[w]hile … the statute was designed to protect purchasers against their own indiscretion, it was not 
designed to protect them against persons innocent of the illegality.  Here the respondent was a party to 
the illegality and the appellant unaware of it.  [There] is no consideration of public policy which operates 
against the application of estoppel in the present circumstances.” (851I-852A). 
The status of this decision is uncertain in light of the subsequent judgment in Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank 
Developments CC 1996 2 SA 15 (A) which is discussed further in the main text. 
335
 1996 2 SA 15 (A). 
336
 However, see Van der Merwe et al Contract 141 n 99 who suggest that this case appears to have 
foreclosed the possibility that estoppel may be permitted when it would not subvert the policies underlying 
the relevant statute. 
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As discussed previously,337 the respondent offered to sell a number of properties to Wale 
Street Industrial Finance Limited or its nominee.  A written contract of sale was concluded, 
and the appellant was subsequently nominated as the buyer.  When the appellant 
tendered payment and demanded transfer of the properties in its name, the respondent 
alleged that the written agreement between itself and Wale Street was void because it 
failed to record a suspensive condition.  One of the defences raised by the appellant was 
estoppel. 
 
After confirming the general principle that estoppel cannot be relied upon to enforce a 
(formally) invalid contract,338 the court considered the contention that this does not apply 
when an innocent third party steps into the shoes of one of the original parties and relies 
on a representation that an agreement is valid.  In support of this argument, the appellant 
cited the statement by Hoexter JA quoted above.  The court dismissed the appellant’s 
argument on the following basis: first, no representation was made by the respondent that 
a formally valid deed of alienation had been concluded between the original parties.339  
Secondly, none of the other judges in the Trust Bank case concurred in Hoexter JA’s 
judgment.340  Finally, the basis for Hoexter JA’s judgment was dolus on the part of the 
respondent in that the respondent had specifically represented to the appellant that the 
hire-purchase agreements were valid when in fact they were not.  No such unconscionable 
behaviour was present on the facts of the current case.341 
 
It will be noted that the court did not refer to the statement made in the majority decision in 
Trust Bank that seems to have a similar effect to that in Hoexter JA’s judgment, albeit not 
stated as broadly.  Furthermore, the court in Philmatt did not expressly hold that an 
innocent third party can never rely on estoppel in the face of formal invalidity, merely that 
on the facts before it, no representation had been made as to the formal validity of the 
agreement.  It is therefore arguable that the possibility remains that a third party may 
successfully raise estoppel to prevent an original party from relying on the formal invalidity 
of the agreement. 
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It is perhaps appropriate to summarise the discussion of estoppel to this point.  We have 
seen that English law does not automatically exclude estoppel where an agreement is 
formally defective.  Rather, the focus is on the policy considerations underlying a particular 
formal requirement, in order to determine whether they also dictate that estoppel should 
not succeed.  In the context of formalities imposed for guarantees and sales of land, the 
general opinion seems to be that these formal requirements do not aim to protect 
categories of persons who are vulnerable to exploitation, oppression or overreaching.  For 
that reason, estoppel is not automatically excluded as a matter of law, although the facts 
may indicate that the requirements of estoppel have not been met.  While South African 
courts have not engaged in this type of policy-based analysis when estoppel has been 
raised by one of the original contracting parties to a formally defective contract, it did 
inform the judgment in the Trust Bank case, albeit in the context of an agreement which 
was void for failure to comply with another type of statutory prescription.  There the court 
specifically considered whether a successful plea of estoppel by a third party would 
contravene the protective purpose of the Hire Purchase Act and held that it would not.   
 
It is therefore unclear why a South African court considers itself unable to engage in a 
similar analysis when estoppel is raised by one of the parties to the formally defective 
contract.  Instead, it is repeatedly emphasised that formal requirements which are aimed at 
preventing fraud are imposed in the public interest and that, for that reason, estoppel may 
not be used to uphold a formally invalid agreement.342  A similar sentiment has been 
expressed in recent cases dealing with estoppel and ultra vires conduct on the part of 
public authorities.343  However, in those cases a decision to uphold a defence of estoppel 
against a public authority which had acted ultra vires might indirectly have condoned 
nepotism or patronage and ultimately have placed a disproportionate and unnecessary 
burden on taxpayers.344   
 
                                                          
342
 See eg Oceanair (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Sher 1980 1 SA 317 (D) 326B-C; Fuls v Leslie Chrome (Pty) Ltd 1962 
4 SA 784 (W) 788A-B. 
343
 See eg Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Others v Contractprops 25 (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 142 
(SCA) para 11; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v RPM Bricks (Pty) Ltd 2008 3 SA 1 (SCA) para 
16. 
344
 Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Others v Contractprops 25 (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 142 (SCA) 
paras 8-9, 12; City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v RPM Bricks (Pty) Ltd 2008 3 SA 1 (SCA) para 15. 
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By contrast, it is not self-evident that a decision to uphold a defence of estoppel in the 
context of a formally invalid contract could have equally broad ramifications for the public 
interest.  In fact, allowing a defence of estoppel to fail could promote, rather than prevent 
fraud.345  It is arguable that in this instance it is not in the public interest to allow a party to 
rely on formal requirements as a means to escape an agreement which was seriously 
intended.  In other words, it is sometimes necessary to give effect to an individual’s 
interest in enforcing a formally invalid contract in order to promote the public interest in 
preventing fraud or unconscionable conduct.  As Trakman states:346 
 
“[I]nterests of the parties inter se are themselves public interests that require judicial 
consideration in the same way as interests of the state and society are given public 
significance”.347 
 
To which Lubbe replies:348 
 
“Hierdie standpunt is volkome aanvaarbaar vir sover daarmee te kenne gegee word dat by die 
bepaling van die openbare belang nie slegs rekening gehou moet word met die algemene 
norme en oorwegings nie, maar ook individualiserend na besondere belange ter sprake by ‘n 
spesifieke transaksie, gekyk moet word.”349 
 
Accepting the general proposition that it is sometimes in the public interest to allow a 
defence of estoppel to succeed in spite of the existence of a formally invalid contract, does 
not imply that the mere conclusion of such an invalid contract constitutes a sufficient basis 
for a successful defence.  As indicated in Edelmann II, Actionstrength and Yaxley, and as 
suggested in the Trust Bank and Philmatt cases, there must be a representation made by 
the estoppel-denier to the estoppel-raiser (whether one of the contracting parties or a third 
party) that the agreement is valid or, perhaps, that he will abide by the agreement in spite 
of the fact that it does not comply with formal requirements.  Where a third party relies on 
the defence, it is suggested further that it should not be possible to discern, whether from 
the document itself or from surrounding circumstances, that the agreement upon which he 
                                                          
345
 A J Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed (2002) 146-147 also suggests that estoppel may be 
an appropriate mechanism to prevent an unconscionable reliance on formal invalidity. 
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 “Bona Fides, Billikheid en die Openbare Belang in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg” (1990) 1 Stell LR 7. 
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relies is formally defective.  For example, in Trust Bank the agreement appeared to be 
valid ex facie the document and it would have been unreasonable to expect the appellant 
to question every principal debtor as to the validity of his hire-purchase agreement.   
 
Whether knowledge of possible formal invalidity on the part of an original contracting party 
should preclude a defence of estoppel is a more complex issue.  However, Edelmann II 
and the minority judgment of Hoexter JA in Trust Bank both emphasise that in this case, a 
court should consider the relationship between the relevant parties and determine the 
extent to which the estoppel-raiser was in a position to insist that the formal requirements 
should have been met.  For example, in Mouton v Hanekom350 (which was discussed in 
the previous chapter351), the respondent was aware that the pactum de retrovendendo 
should have been included in the written sale agreement.  However, as the facts indicate, 
the respondent had little or no commercial experience while the appellant, his nephew, 
was a successful businessman;352 the appellant insisted that he would only assist the 
respondent with a loan if the latter sold his farm to him;353 the respondent was reluctant to 
do so and only agreed to the sale when the appellant promised that he could buy back the 
land for the same price plus transfer costs;354 and finally, when informed that the pactum 
de retrovendendo should be reduced to writing, the appellant stated that this was 
unnecessary because the parties were kin and he would keep his word.355  It is suggested 
that even though the respondent was aware that the agreement should have been in 
writing, the fact that he was at a commercial disadvantage and in a close relationship with 
the appellant meant that he was not in a position to insist that the formal requirements 
should be met.  The appellant on the other hand exploited the relative weakness of the 
respondent, in addition to indicating that he would honour the bargain.  For these reasons, 
it is suggested that this case provides a good example of a situation in which estoppel 
should succeed, notwithstanding the respondent’s knowledge that the pactum de 
retrovendendo should have been reduced to writing. 
 
                                                          
350
 1959 3 SA 35 (A). 
351
 See ch 5 (5 4 3). 
352
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In conclusion it is suggested that the South African courts reconsider their approach to the 
use of estoppel in the context of formal invalidity.  In comparison to its English and 
German counterparts, the South African approach to available remedies is highly 
restrictive.  We saw in a previous chapter that South African law recognises no exceptions 
to the applicability of formal requirements based on the characteristics or interests of the 
parties.356  This strict approach could be tempered somewhat by recognising that estoppel 
should succeed in circumstances which do not justify, or appear to be entirely at odds with, 
a strict insistence on compliance with formal requirements.  There are different reasons for 
the invalidity of contracts, not all of which necessitate the automatic exclusion of the 
defence of estoppel.  This is not a novel idea – for example, it underlies a court’s approach 
to determining whether an enrichment remedy is available and if so, which one.357  It is 
submitted that this notion should also inform its approach to the use of estoppel in the 
context of formally invalid agreements, both when estoppel is raised by a third party and 
when it is raised by an original contracting party.  The failure of South African courts to do 
so is at odds with their own approach to enrichment law and, as will become apparent in 
the next section, their approach to the curative effect of full performance of a void contract. 
 
6 5 Full performance of a formally defective contract 
6 5 1 Introduction 
 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the remedies available where there has been only 
partial performance of a formally defective contract.  The consequences of full 
performance will now be considered, both from an enrichment perspective and in the 
context of the functions of formalities.  It will become apparent that all the jurisdictions 
under consideration give effect to a fully-performed, reciprocal contract which does not 
comply with prescribed formal requirements.  Less certain, at least from a South African 
                                                          
356
 See ch 2 (2 3 4). 
357
 As discussed above (6 3 3 2), a SA court is required to determine whether an agreement is invalid 
because it is illegal or merely formally defective.  In the absence of a statutory enrichment remedy, the 
reason for the invalidity will determine which enrichment claim is applicable.  Furthermore, where there has 
been full performance of the invalid contract (see 6 5 below), the reason for the invalidity (and the policy 
considerations underlying such a sanction) may determine whether restitution is awarded in spite of the full 
performance.  See also Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 209-211.    
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perspective, is whether a court should also give effect to a formally defective contract 
which requires unilateral performance, like a suretyship. 
  
6 5 2 Full performance and enrichment law 
 
There appears to be a number of alternative explanations for the curative effect of full 
performance in the context of an invalid reciprocal contract.  For example, in the Wilken 
case, Innes J made the following obiter observation:  
 
“Neither party would be able to upset the concluded transaction on the mere ground that the 
causa stated in the deed of transfer was called a contract of sale, whereas it was in reality an 
agreement to sell, invalid and unenforceable in law, but which both seller and purchaser 
proposed to carry out … Neither party could say that he had been enriched at the expense of 
the other; and the traditio duly made with knowledge of all the facts and with the intent to pass 
the dominium and the price duly paid with similar knowledge and with the object of acquiring 
dominium would bind the respective parties.”358 
 
The first possible explanation is evident in Innes J’s statement that full performance of a 
reciprocal contract means that neither party has been enriched by the other’s 
performance.359  It is not entirely clear how the mere fact that the plaintiff has received the 
defendant’s performance cancels the latter’s enrichment – Du Plessis notes that “[t]he fact 
that the plaintiff was enriched by the counter-performance cannot somehow ‘neutralise’ the 
enrichment resulting from the plaintiff’s transfer”.360  It is presumably for this reason that 
the second, alternative explanation evident in the quotation above has been adopted in 
more recent judgments. 
 
This explanation focuses on the achievement of the purpose of the transaction: when the 
land has been transferred and the purchase price paid, each party’s purpose has been 
achieved and there appears to be no reason to upset this state of affairs.  Similar 
                                                          
358
 Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135 144. 
359
 The same explanation appears in MCC Bazaar v Harris & Jones (Pty) Ltd 1954 3 SA 158 (T) 162. 
360
 Law of Unjustified Enrichment 196 n 7.  Sonnekus Unjustified Enrichment in SA Law 263 n 173 disagrees 
(“once both parties have performed … neither may allege that the other has been unfoundedly enriched at 
his expense to the extent that restitution is necessary or desirable”).  
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reasoning underlies the following statement in the minority judgment of Marais JA in 
Wilkens NO v Bester.361  The judge pointed out that  
 
“[t]here are … instances in the law where the performance of obligations which, objectively 
regarded, were indebita, are nonetheless regarded effectively as if they were not”,362 
 
and referred to examples like full performance in terms of a formally defective sale of land, 
and transfers of ownership where the obligation-creating agreement was invalid, but the 
real agreement was not.363  Marais JA concluded: 
 
“Whether or not in any given case either of the parties may claim to undo the performance is [a] 
question the answer to which will depend upon the reason why the contract is invalid, but these 
[examples] illustrate at least that the law can, and often does, give effect to the mutual intention 
and intended acts of parties even if the contract pursuant to which the acts were performed was 
invalid.”364 
 
Brand JA expressed his approval of this “achieved purpose” analysis in the Legator 
case.365  According to the judge, the policy consideration underlying the curative effect of 
full performance of an invalid reciprocal contract is that  
 
“those who received exactly what they bargained for should not be allowed to escape the 
consequences of a bad bargain by means of an enrichment action which is intended to be an 
equitable remedy”.366   
 
The assumption is that a plaintiff who seeks to recover his performance when there has 
been full performance by both parties, is doing so purely for opportunistic reasons.367  It is 
not a goal of the law of unjustified enrichment to come to the assistance of a party who 
                                                          
361








 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 28.  See also Scott Unjust Enrichment by Transfer 310; J C Sonnekus “Is Die 
Ongegronde van Afgesproke Prestasie Steeds Verryking?” 2008 TSAR 605 610-612; Visser Unjustified 
Enrichment 469-470. 
366
 Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 28. 
367
 P Birks “No Consideration: Restitution after Executed Void Contracts” (1993) 23 WALR 195 199, 206 ff.  
See also S Meier “Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds” in D Johnston & R Zimmermann (eds) Unjustified 
Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002) 37 70. 
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claims the return of his performance simply because he no longer wants to achieve his 
original purpose - for example, because he has found a better bargain elsewhere. 
 
What exactly becomes of the void contract once fully performed, is not stated in the 
Legator judgment.  In the context of alienations of land, the question is irrelevant because 
the Alienation of Land Act explicitly provides that the contract is deemed to be valid ab 
initio once there has been full performance.368  In the absence of such a statutory provision 
however, why is an enrichment remedy denied when the parties achieve their mutually 
intended purpose?   
 
Again, there seems to be more than one possible answer.  The first is that the 
achievement of the purpose of the transaction means that a basis for the transfer is 
deemed to exist retrospectively.369  This argument could explain Solomon JA’s comments 
in the Wilken case on the effect of full performance of an invalid contract: 
 
“It was contended … that inasmuch as the land has been transferred and the purchase price 
paid under the verbal agreement, the contract must be treated as valid notwithstanding the 
provisions of the section.  For otherwise, the argument runs, the transfer itself could be set 
aside on the ground that it was based upon a void contract, and that, therefore, there was no 
legal causa for the transfer.  That question does not arise for decision in this case, and it is, 
therefore, better not to express a decided opinion upon it.  But I must say that I should feel great 
difficulty in holding that there was no causa for a transfer of land for which [the purchase price] 
had been paid.”370 
 
An alternative explanation for, and interpretation of, this reasoning is that the refusal of an 
enrichment action in the context of full performance of a void reciprocal contract is simply 
due to the fact that there has been no failure of consideration as understood in English 
law: the desired counter-performance has been received.371  According to Scott, Solomon 
JA  
                                                          
368
 S 28(2).  This is also the effect of full performance of formally invalid sales of land (§ 311b(1) BGB, 
second sentence), donations (§ 518(2) BGB) and suretyships (§ 766 BGB, third sentence) in German law.  
369
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 52 n 162. 
370
 Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135 149. 
371
 Scott Unjust Enrichment by Transfer 298; Visser Unjustified Enrichment 470.  Both authors reiterate this 
view in H Scott & D Visser “The Impact of Legal Culture on the Law of Unjustified Enrichment: The Role of 
Reasons” in E Bant & M Harding (eds) Exploring Private Law (2010) 153 155. 




“[c]learly did not believe that the basis (causa) of the parties’ performances was the validity of 
the contract itself.  Rather it was the other party’s reciprocal performance.”372  
 
It is not entirely clear how Solomon JA’s opinion that performance occurs in order to 
receive a counter-performance necessitates the conclusion that the effect of full 
performance must be explained in terms of an English unjust factor.  In fact, the last 
sentence of the quoted portion of his judgment appears to support a contrary conclusion, 
namely that “the achievement of the causa (purpose) of the transfers, results in the 
existence of a causa (legal ground) for their retention.”373   
 
In any event, the meaning of failure of consideration in English law has become decidedly 
complicated in the context of full performance of void contracts.  In a previous section it 
was stated that consideration, as it is used in the English law of unjust enrichment, means 
the expected counter-performance.374  Failure of consideration either means that no 
counter-performance has in fact been received or, in the context of formally defective 
unenforceable contracts, that the defendant is not willing and able to deliver his counter-
performance.  However, failure of consideration has received an alternative meaning in 
light of the so-called swaps cases. 
 
In the 1980s, a large number of English local authorities and banks concluded interest rate 
swap agreements.375  In 1992, the House of Lords declared these swap agreements to be 
void because they fell outside the powers of the local authorities and were therefore ultra 
vires.376  A series of subsequent cases then considered whether any payments made in 
terms of the void swaps could be reclaimed and if so, on what basis.  In some of these 
                                                          
372
 Unjust Enrichment by Transfer 298 (footnote omitted). 
373
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 52 n 162. 
374
 6 3 3 4. 
375
 Interest rate swaps have been described as follows:  
“[O]ne party promises to pay the other a fixed rate of interest on a notional sum for a fixed period, say 5 
per cent on £5 million for five years with quarterly settlement dates, and, on otherwise identical terms, the 
counter-party promises to pay a floating rate determined by a formula.  If interest rates fall the floating 
payer will pay less and will thus win; vice versa if they rise.” (Birks Unjust Enrichment 109). 
376
 Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 1. 
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cases,377 the swaps were “closed” in the sense that they had run their course and each 
party had received the bargained-for counter-performance.  Nevertheless, claims for 
restitution were granted, on the basis of failure of consideration.  Apparently, the 
consideration here was not the actual counter-performance, but the benefit of a valid 
obligation.  Neither party had received this, because the swap agreement was ultra vires 
and therefore void.378 
 
These decisions seem to be irreconcilable with other English cases on the full 
performance of formally invalid contracts.  For example, in Tootal Clothing Ltd v Guinea 
Properties Ltd379 (“Tootal”) the court held that the provisions of the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act are only applicable to executory contracts: 
 
“If parties choose to complete an oral land contract or a land contract that does not in some 
respect or other comply with section 2, they are at liberty to do so.  Once they have done so, it 
becomes irrelevant that the contract which they have completed may not have been in 
accordance with section 2”.380 
 
Tootal was not referred to in the decisions relating to “closed swaps”.  However, it has 
been relied on in a case decided after the swaps cases381 in which an oral agreement for 
the sale of land had been fully performed.  The concept of failure of consideration cannot 
explain these different results.  In both, the contracts were void and in both there had been 
full performance.  Yet restitution was awarded in one group of cases on the basis that the 
contract was invalid and full performance was regarded as irrelevant; in another, the 
invalidity of the contract itself was deemed insufficient, in the event of full performance, to 
grant a restitutionary remedy.  It is suggested, and this point will be addressed more fully 
                                                          
377
 See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington (1993) 91 LGR 323; Guiness Mahon & Co Ltd v 
Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council [1999] QB 215. 
378
 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington (1993) 91 LGR 323 367; Guiness Mahon & Co Ltd v 
Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council [1999] QB 215 227. 
379
 (1992) 64 P & CR 452. 
380
Tootal Clothing Ltd v Guinea Properties Ltd (1992) 64 P & CR 452 455.  The same reasoning – formal 
requirements apply only to executory and not executed contracts – has been used to explain the effect of full 
performance of a formally defective contract which is unenforceable in terms of the Statute of Frauds.  For a 
list of cases, see C N Brown Corbin on Contracts 4: Statute of Frauds §§ 12.1-23.11 (1997) 53. 
381
 Mirza v Mirza 2009 WL 6095 para 143. 
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below,382 that the different conclusions may be explained on the basis of policy 
considerations.  For current purposes, the point is that the meaning of failure of 
consideration has become rather problematic in English law and for this reason alone, 
should rather be avoided in any explanation for the curative effect of full performance of a 
void contract in South African law. 
 
In this discussion no distinction has been drawn between a party who performs in the 
knowledge that the contract is void, and one who performs in the mistaken belief that the 
contract is valid.  In Wilken, Innes J confined his remarks on the effect of full performance 
to parties who had acted “with knowledge of all the facts”.383  S 28(2) of the Alienation of 
Land Act also does not specify whether it applies in the event of mistake.  According to De 
Vos, the rule in Wilken, and also the provision in the Alienation of Land Act, should only 
apply where both parties have performed in full despite their knowledge that the 
agreement was void.384  Where a party mistakenly believed that the agreement was valid, 
he should not be precluded from reclaiming that performance with the condictio indebiti, 
despite performance by the other party.  The same conclusion was drawn in Jan van 
Heerden & Seuns BK v Senwes Bpk,385 but doubted in Hoffmann v Hoffmann.386 
 
The matter was settled in the Legator case.  Brand JA held that the curative effect of full 
performance would also apply where a party had performed in the mistaken belief that the 
contract was valid:   
 
“the condictio indebiti would normally be available because the transfer was motivated by a 
mistaken belief relating to the validity or the existence of the underlying agreement.  And [the 
                                                          
382
 See 6 5 3. 
383
 Wilken v Kohler 1913 AD 135 144. 
384
 Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid 189, 196. 
385
 2006 1 All SA 44 (NC) para 46.2.  The decision was overturned on appeal in Senwes Ltd v Jan van 
Heerden & Sons CC 2007 3 All SA 24 (SCA), although the court did not specifically address the conclusion 
that one party can still reclaim his performance when he mistakenly thought that the contract was valid 
despite the fact that there had been full performance.  Nevertheless, it did state that while it was 
unnecessary “to deal with any of the other conclusions arrived at by the court a quo … this court’s failure to 
do so must not be construed as an endorsement of their correctness” (para 32).  
386
 1999 2 All SA 80 (C) 86. 
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rule in] Wilken v Kohler would constitute an exception to the condictio indebiti for the same 
reason, ie that the purpose of the transaction had been achieved.”387 
 
For Shea, this conclusion meant that she had no claim at all for the return of her house.   
 
Brand JA does not explain why the achievement of the purpose of the transaction should 
render a mistake as to its validity irrelevant.  Birks has argued that in the event of full 
performance of a void contract, the force of the mistake as to the liability to perform is 
“spent”.388  More specifically, he states that 
 
“although [the claimant] would not have transferred but for his mistake, the supposed liability 
was no more than the means to the end which was desired.”389 
 
The “end” or ultimate purpose of the performance is receipt of the counter-performance.  
Therefore, the prejudice which could arise from a mistake regarding one’s liability to 
perform is only relevant where there has been no counter-performance, because the party 
who has performed cannot sue for that counter-performance.  There is no such prejudice 
once the counter-performance has been received, and any mistake regarding the validity 
of the contract which may have motivated a party to perform becomes irrelevant. 
 
To summarise: the reason why an enrichment claim is precluded in the context of full 
performance of a void reciprocal contract is because the purpose of the transaction has 
been achieved.  Each party has received exactly what it bargained for.  This “achieved 
purpose” analysis is applicable both where performance took place in the knowledge that 
the contract was void (which leads to the inference that the reason for performing is to 
receive the counter-performance390); and where such knowledge is absent (because the 
ultimate purpose of the performance is to receive the counter-performance, in which case 
the mistake as to one’s liability to perform becomes irrelevant).  Achieving the purpose of 
the transaction excludes an enrichment claim because (i) it renders the underlying contract 
valid ab initio (in the case of section 28(2) of the Alienation of Land Act); or (ii) it 
                                                          
387
 Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 28. 
388
 1993 WALR 230 n 137.   
389
 230 n 137. 
390
 This ties in with the condictio causa data causa non secuta being available if the knowing transferor’s 
purpose of obtaining counter-performance is not achieved.  See 6 3 3 4 1 above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
305 
 
retrospectively creates a legal basis for the transfer of the performance (or, rather less 
convincingly, because there has been no failure of consideration). 
 
Nevertheless, this “achieved purpose” analysis has its limitations.  First, it cannot operate 
to exclude enrichment claims in all situations.  For example, it will not be applicable in the 
context of a fully-performed agreement which is void because it is illegal: the parties have 
achieved the purpose of their bargain, but the law views that bargain or purpose with 
disfavour.391  Similarly, an enrichment remedy should not be denied where there has been 
full performance of a contract which is void due to a material mistake.  By definition, there 
has been a defect in the bargaining process and to give the parties exactly what they 
“bargained” for would be to ignore precisely this defect.  This leads to the second 
limitation: the “achieved purpose” analysis can only operate when there is clarity as to 
what performance the parties intended.392  Finally, it is unclear to what extent the analysis 
is applicable to contracts in which performance is unilateral rather than reciprocal.  These 
are essentially contracts of donation and suretyship. 
 
In the case of donations, the legislature has by implication provided that performance of a 
formally invalid contract of donation cures the defect in form.393  According to Visser, this 
curative effect of performance occurs because the purpose of the transaction, namely to 
discharge an obligation to donate, has been achieved.394  The reason or motive for the 
transfer becomes irrelevant once this occurs.  Arguably, one could use the same analysis 
in the context of full performance of a formally invalid suretyship.  The purpose of 
performance in terms of a suretyship is to discharge a debt;395 once there has been full 
payment, even if payment has occurred in terms of a formally invalid contract, this purpose 
is achieved and any mistake as to liability becomes irrelevant.   
 
                                                          
391
 See Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 1 SA 35 (SCA) para 29; Afrisure CC v Watson NO 2009 2 SA 127 
(SCA) para 49; Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 163. 
392
 Du Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 163. 
393
 S 5 of the General Law Amendment Act provides that  
“no executory contract of donation … shall be valid unless the terms thereof are embodied in a written 
document signed by the donor or by a person acting on his written authority granted by him in the 
presence of two witnesses.”  (Emphasis added). 
394
 Visser Unjustified Enrichment 473-474. 
395
 See 6 3 3 3 above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
306 
 
It is somewhat peculiar that the legislature did not provide for the curative effect of full 
performance in the context of suretyship agreements, particularly in view of the fact that 
the formal requirements for both donations and suretyships were promulgated in the same 
Act.  It is even more odd that the South African Law Revision Committee, upon whose 
recommendation these formal requirements were prescribed, clearly specified that they 
would only apply to executory contracts of donation (without providing any reasons for this 
decision) but made no similar express provision in relation to suretyships.396  The question 
then becomes: despite these apparent omissions, should full performance in terms of a 
formally invalid suretyship also preclude an enrichment claim?  This is addressed in the 
following section. 
 
6 5 3 Full performance and the functions of formalities 
 
A further explanation for the curative effect of full performance in the context of a formally 
defective agreement is one which looks at the policy considerations underlying the 
imposition of formalities.  As Marais JA noted in Wilkens NO v Bester,397 the question 
whether full performance by both parties in terms of a void contract should preclude an 
enrichment claim depends on the reason for the invalidity of the transaction.  A similar 
sentiment was expressed in Guiness Mahon & Co Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea London 
Borough Council,398 one of the English cases on restitution in the context of a closed 
swap.  Taking into account the fact that different policy considerations underlie the ultra 
vires doctrine and the formal requirements imposed for sales of land also assists in 
reconciling the contradictory English approaches to full performance in the context of void 
agreements.399  In the latter situation, the formal requirements are imposed to promote 
certainty as to what has to be performed.  These considerations fall away once there has 
been full performance.400  In fact, unwinding a fully-performed sale of land would create 
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 Second Report (15-16 June 1950) paras 38, 42 (unpublished report available at the Brand Van Zyl Law 
Library, UCT). 
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 1997 3 SA 347 (SCA) 362G. 
398
 [1999] QB 215 231-232. 
399
 Birks Unjust Enrichment 257; McMeel Modern Law of Restitution 176; Whittaker “Form” in Chitty on 
Contracts 1 428. 
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 In German law, an additional reason for the curative effect of full performance in the context of formally 
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uncertainty and a lack of finality.401  By contrast, the ultra vires doctrine was formulated to 
protect the public and the refusal to award restitution in this context would undermine this 
protective purpose by clothing ultra vires transactions with validity.402 
 
This brings us back to the question raised at the end of the previous section: should full 
performance of a formally invalid suretyship preclude an enrichment remedy?  In German 
law, the answer is in the affirmative: the third sentence of paragraph 766 BGB explicitly 
provides that full performance cures the defect in form and the suretyship is regarded as 
valid.  From the perspective of the functions of formalities, the traditional explanation for 
the curative effect of performance here is that the need to warn the surety of the potentially 
onerous obligation which he is undertaking becomes irrelevant.  This warning is thought to 
be necessary because the surety is usually not required to pay immediately upon 
conclusion of the contract.403  However, if the surety decides to pay in terms of a formally 
invalid suretyship, the act of parting with his money is thought to have been inspired by 
careful consideration in any event.404  In other words, it is assumed that when the surety is 
faced with a claim from the creditor, the threat of diminishing wealth would lead him to ask 
all relevant questions, including whether the agreement is formally valid.  If he pays 
voluntarily thereafter, the additional caution that would have been served by reducing the 
agreement to writing is regarded as superfluous. 
 
This explanation is sharply criticised by German academics.405  The reason for the 
criticism is based on the fact that the curative effect of full performance also applies where 
the surety mistakenly assumes that the suretyship is valid and therefore pays without 
question.406  As a result, the third sentence of paragraph 766 BGB has been described as 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
“Formal Requirements” in Int Enc Comp L VII 110; Einsele “§ 125” in Münchener Kommentar 1 n 48; T Krebs 
“In Defence of Unjust Factors” in D Johnston & R Zimmermann (eds) Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in 
Comparative Perspective (2002) 76 89. 
401
 Scott Unjust Enrichment by Transfer 285 n 88.   
402
 See statements to this effect in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [1992] 2 AC 
1 36; Guiness Mahon & Co Ltd v Kensington and Chelsea London Borough Council [1999] QB 215 229, 232-
233; Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349 387, 415. 
403
 Krebs “In Defence of Unjust Factors” in Unjustified Enrichment 89. 
404
 Von Mehren “Formal Requirements” in Int Enc Comp L VII 110.  
405
 See eg Einsele “§ 125” in Münchener Kommentar 1 n 48; H Heiss Formmängel und ihre Sanktionen: Eine 
privatrechtsvergleichende Untersuchung (1999) 279 ff. 
406
 Habersack “§ 766” in Münchener Kommentar 5 n 8. 
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a “rechtspolitisch-verfehlte Vorschrift”407 (roughly translated as “a doctrinally unsound 
provision”) because such a surety has not had the advantage of the warning which would 
have been provided by reducing the agreement to writing.   
 
Turning to South African law, the question is whether the German rule regarding the 
curative effect of full performance pursuant to a formally invalid suretyship should be 
adopted wholesale, or whether it should heed the criticism of the rule by German 
academics.  Although there is no case law on this point, the fact that neither the legislature 
nor the South African Law Revision Committee made provision for the curative effect of full 
performance in this context suggests that the answer should be in the negative, 
irrespective of the particular facts of the situation.  However, it is argued that a distinction 
can be drawn between a surety who pays knowing that the agreement is formally invalid 
and one who does so in the mistaken belief that the agreement was valid. 
 
As discussed above,408 and in the absence of compulsion, a surety who pays knowing that 
the agreement is formally invalid will not be entitled to reclaim his performance with the 
condictio indebiti.  The assumption is that in such a case, the surety intended to discharge 
the debt of the principal debtor and not his own (formally invalid) obligation.  In this 
scenario, the need to caution the surety is unnecessary and the need to protect the 
creditor’s reliance that the undue transfer was a donation should take precedence.409    
 
When the surety performs because he mistakenly believes that he is obliged to do so, it is 
argued that he should be entitled to reclaim his performance.  In this context, he would not 
have thought to query the validity of the agreement and full payment of the debt cannot be 
taken as evidence of the fact that the surety’s decision to perform was preceded by a 
careful consideration of whether he was obliged to do so.  By contrast, formal 
requirements are imposed for donations primarily to ensure that there was a serious 
                                                          
407
 Einsele “§ 125” in Münchener Kommentar 1 n 48. 
408
 6 3 3 3. 
409
 The traditional justification for requiring proof of a mistake before the condictio indebiti will be applicable is 
to show that the recipient was not entitled to rely on the undue transfer as a donation.  The same justification 
applies if a party can show that he was coerced into paying – although the transferor is not mistaken, the 
recipient of the undue transfer can hardly believe that the transferor intended to make a donation.  Du 
Plessis Law of Unjustified Enrichment 168-170. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
309 
 
intention to conclude such a transaction.410  Full performance of a donation provides ex 
post facto evidence of such an intention in any event and it is suggested that the 
legislature’s decision to make provision for the curative effect of performance in this 
context, irrespective whether the donor performed because he thought the donation was 
valid, is due to the fact that performance can be treated as the functional equivalent of the 
formal requirement.  Full performance of a formally invalid suretyship by a surety who 
mistakenly thought he was obliged to do so can never serve as the functional equivalent of 
the warning which the surety should have received regarding the nature of his obligations.  
For these reasons it is argued that full performance in this situation should not have a 
curative effect. 
 
6 6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has considered the remedies available to parties who have performed in 
purported fulfilment of contracts that do not comply with formalities.  These remedies 
depend, in theory at least, on whether such non-compliance results in voidness, voidability 
or unenforceability.411  This in turn is determined by the extent to which a formal 
requirement is imposed in the public interest or whether it serves more individualised 
interests.412  A “balance of interests” analysis has revealed that when a formality is 
imposed in the public interest, the tendency is to declare a formally defective contract 
invalid; a lesser consequence is imposed when the formality serves the interests of a 
particular class or even a specific group in a particular class.  
  
In South African law, the formal requirements imposed for sales of land and suretyships 
have always been held to be aimed at promoting the public interest.  For this reason, a 
party who has performed in terms of a formally invalid sale or suretyship is limited to a 
claim for restitution, whether based on statute or unjustified enrichment.413  He may not 
seek enforcement of such a contract, either directly or indirectly, by means of estoppel or 
                                                          
410
 See Van der Merwe et al Contract 140; Jordaan and Others NNO v De Villiers 1991 4 SA 396 (C) 400F-
G. 
411
 6 2 2. 
412
 6 2 3. 
413
 6 3 3.  Where performance has occurred in terms of a void sale of land, there is also the option of the rei 
vindicatio, although it is unlikely that the mere formal invalidity of the sale agreement would affect the 
transfer of ownership (see 6 3 2). 
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some other mechanism.  Apparently, to award such a remedy would contravene the policy 
considerations underlying formal requirements, including the prevention of fraud, and the 
resultant declaration of invalidity for non-compliance.414   
 
This strict insistence on the invalidity of a formally defective agreement where only one of 
the parties has performed, is not evident where both parties have performed in full.415  In 
this situation, the policy consideration underlying the declaration of formal invalidity is 
secondary to the policy consideration that each party has received what he bargained for 
and the assumption that the only reason why a party would want to reclaim his 
performance in this context is because he has found a better bargain elsewhere.  This 
explanation is used to justify section 28(2) of the Alienation of Land Act which explicitly 
provides for the curative effect of full performance pursuant to a formally invalid sale of 
land, but the general principle has been held to apply to full performance of all void 
reciprocal contracts, with some exceptions.  Whether full performance should have the 
same effect in the context of a formally invalid suretyship, where performance is unilateral, 
has not yet been determined.  Ultimately, it is suggested that full performance should have 
this curative effect if the surety knew the agreement was formally invalid; in the absence of 
such knowledge, it is argued that the need to protect a mistaken surety from the effects of 
his decision to perform should take precedence. 
 
By contrast, German and English courts adopt a more flexible approach.  In addition to 
awarding enrichment remedies and recognising the curative effect of full performance, 
these jurisdictions acknowledge that there are instances in which a party’s expectation or 
reliance interest should be protected, despite the fact that such a party has performed in 
terms of a formally invalid agreement.416  The remedies in terms of the doctrine of culpa in 
contrahendo and paragraph 242 BGB in German law, and estoppel in English law, are 
awarded when the strict insistence upon compliance with formal requirements upon pain of 
invalidity would condone unconscionable behaviour on the part of the defendant.  
Common to all these remedies is the notion that one party is relying on formal invalidity in 
order to escape an agreement which was seriously intended.   
 
                                                          
414
 6 4 4 3. 
415
 6 5. 
416
 See 6 4. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
311 
 
The current South African approach does not appear to be inclined to take into account 
equitable considerations when determining the appropriate remedy in instances of formal 
invalidity.  However, it has already been recognised in enrichment law, and in the context 
of full performance of a void contract, that a contract can be invalid for different reasons.  If 
a distinction can be drawn in these contexts between different types of policy 
considerations, then it should be equally possible for a South African court to do so in the 
context of formally invalid agreements.  Some formal requirements are imposed for 
protective purposes, which suggest that a successful reliance on estoppel would render 
that protective purpose nugatory.  Others, like those prescribed for suretyships and sales 
of land, are not aimed at addressing the vulnerabilities of particular classes of contracting 
parties, but are imposed for more general purposes, like the prevention of fraud, perjury 
and unnecessary litigation.  While the latter policy considerations are in the public interest, 
it is argued that it is equally in the public interest that a formal requirement should not be 
used to promote the type of unconscionable behaviour inherent in relying on a mere 
technical defence to escape an agreement which was seriously intended.  The merit in 
considering the German and English approaches in this regard is twofold: they support the 
type of policy analysis already discussed, and they clarify the considerations to be taken 
into account when determining whether a court should enforce a formally invalid 
agreement.  Therefore it is suggested that South African courts reconsider their approach 
to the application of estoppel in the context of a formally invalid agreement.  This 
reassessment would allow the South African law to develop and mature in line with its 
civilian and common-law counterparts and avoid the harshness inherent in the current 
position.  









(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates- … 
 
'alienate', in relation to land, means sell, exchange or donate, irrespective of whether such 
sale, exchange or donation is subject to a suspensive or resolutive condition, and 
'alienation' has a corresponding meaning; … 
 
'contract'- 
 (a) means a deed of alienation under which land is sold against payment by the 
purchaser to, or to any person on behalf of, the seller of an amount of money in more than 
two instalments over a period exceeding one year; … 
 
'deed of alienation' means a document or documents under which land is alienated; … 
 
CHAPTER I 
FORMALITIES IN RESPECT OF DEEDS OF ALIENATION … 
 
2 Formalities in respect of alienation of land 
 
(1) No alienation of land after the commencement of this section shall, subject to the 
provisions of section 28, be of any force or effect unless it is contained in a deed of 
alienation signed by the parties thereto or by their agents acting on their written authority. 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) relating to signature by the agent of a party acting on 
the written authority of the party, shall not derogate from the provisions of any law relating 
to the making of a contract in writing by a person professing to act as agent or trustee for a 
company not yet formed, incorporated or registered. 
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(2A) The deed of alienation shall contain the right of a purchaser or prospective purchaser 
to revoke the offer or terminate the deed of alienation in terms of section 29A … 
 
CHAPTER II 
SALE OF LAND ON INSTALMENTS … 
 
6 Contents of contract 
 
(1) A contract shall contain- 
(a) the names of the purchaser and the seller and their residential or business 
addresses in the Republic; 
 (b) the description and extent of the land which is the subject of the contract; 
 (c) if the seller is not the owner of the land, the name and address of that owner; 
(d) if the land is encumbered by a mortgage bond, the name and address of the 
person, or his representative or, in the case of a participation bond, the name and 
address of the nominee company, or its representative, in favour of whom the 
mortgage bond over the land is registered at the time the contract is concluded; 
 (e) the amount of the purchase price; 
(f) the annual rate at which interest, if any, is to be paid on the balance of the 
purchase price; 
(g) the amount of each instalment payable under the contract in reduction or 
settlement of the purchase price and interest (if any); 
 (h) the due date or the method of determining the due date of each instalment; 
(i) if the land is sold by an intermediary, the name and address of every other 
intermediary who alienated the land prior to the date the contract is concluded; 
(j) the amount or amounts of any transfer duty (if any) payable in terms of the 
Transfer Duty Act, 1949 (Act 40 of 1949), in respect of the land, and the name of 
the person or persons by whom such duty is to be paid; 
(k) the dates on which and the conditions on which the purchaser shall be entitled to 
take possession and occupation of the land; 
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 (l) the place where the payments shall be made; 
(m) the date on which the risk, profit and loss of the land shall pass to the 
purchaser; 
(n) a statement of the obligation (if any) of the purchaser to insure the subject 
matter of the contract; 
 (o) a statement- 
(i) of any amount which in terms of any law is payable in respect of the land 
as endowment, betterment or enhancement levy, a development contribution 
or any similar imposition and an indication of the person to and the person by 
whom it is so payable; and 
(ii) that no amount contemplated in subparagraph (i) is payable in respect of 
the land, if such is the case; … 
 (p) an indication of the party who shall be liable for the payment of the costs of- 
  (i) the drafting of the contract; 
  (ii) the recording thereof in terms of section 20; and 
  (iii) the transfer of the land; 
(q) if the land is not the subject of a separate title deed at the time the contract is 
concluded, the latest date at which the land shall be registrable in the name of the 
purchaser; 
(r) if the seller is the owner of the land, an undertaking by him that the land shall not 
be encumbered or further encumbered by a mortgage bond on or before the date 
on which the contract is recorded in terms of section 20; 
(s) the period within which the purchaser is obliged or may be compelled to take 
transfer of the land against simultaneous payment of all amounts owed by him in 
terms of the contract; 
 (t) a reference to- 
(i) the right of a purchaser under section 11 to perform the obligations of the 
owner or an intermediary; 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
315 
 
(ii) the right of the purchaser under section 17 to accelerate payments in 
terms of the contract and to claim transfer of the land against simultaneous 
payment of all the amounts payable by him to the seller in terms of the 
contract; 
  (iii) the right of the purchaser under section 20 to have the contract recorded; 
(iv) the rights and remedies of the purchaser under sections 13 (2), 16 (3), 23 
and 27; 
  (v) the obligation of the purchaser- 
(aa) in terms of section 9 to give the information referred to in that 
section to any mortgagee; 
(bb) in terms of section 15 (2) to accept a mortgage bond arranged in 
terms of that section on his behalf; 
(cc) in terms of section 21 (1) to give the information referred to in that 
section to the owner of the land; 
(vi) the limitation in terms of section 19 of the right of the seller to take action 
by reason of any breach of contract on the part of the purchaser. 
(2) The date which is stated in a contract in terms of subsection (1) (m), shall not be earlier 
than the date which is stated therein in terms of subsection (1) (k) as the date on which the 
purchaser shall be entitled to take possession of the land. 
(3) The aggregate amount of the instalments referred to in subsection (1) (g) which are to 
be paid during any of successive periods of 12 months following on the date of the 
contract, shall not be less than the interest which, in terms of the contract, would become 
payable during that period if all instalments were paid timeously. 
(4) The date stated in a contract in terms of subsection (1) (q), shall not be later than five 
years from the date of the contract. 
(5) If for whatever reason the seller is unable, after the date referred to in subsection (4), to 
tender transfer of the land against simultaneous payment of all the amounts payable to 
him by the purchaser in terms of the contract, the purchaser may cancel the contract, in 
which event the parties shall be entitled to the relief provided for in section 28 (1), or the 
purchaser may abide by the contract, in which event no interest shall be payable by him in 
terms of the contract as from the date in question until such time as such transfer is 
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tendered: Provided that this subsection shall not detract from any additional claim for 
damages which the purchaser may have. 
 
28 Consequences of deeds of alienation which are void or are terminated 
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), any person who has performed partially or 
in full in terms of an alienation of land which is of no force or effect in terms of section 2(1), 
or a contract which has been declared void in terms of the provisions of section 24(1)(c), 
or has been cancelled under this Act, is entitled to recover from the other party that which 
he has performed under the alienation or contract, and- 
 (a) the alienee may in addition recover from the alienator- 
(i) interest at the prescribed rate on any payment that he made in terms of 
the deed of alienation or contract from the date of the payment to the date of 
recovery; 
  (ii) a reasonable compensation for- 
(aa) necessary expenditure he has incurred, with or without the 
authority of the owner or alienator of the land, in regard to the 
preservation of the land or any improvement thereon; or 
(bb) any improvement which enhances the market value of the land 
and was effected by him on the land with the express or implied 
consent of the said owner or alienator; and 
 (b) the alienator may in addition recover from the alienee- 
(i) a reasonable compensation for the occupation, use or enjoyment the 
alienee may have had of the land; 
(ii) compensation for any damage caused intentionally or negligently to the 
land by the alienee or any person for the actions of whom the alienee may be 
liable. 
(2) Any alienation which does not comply with the provisions of section 2 (1) shall in all 
respects be valid ab initio if the alienee had performed in full in terms of the deed of 
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General Law Amendment Act 50 of 1956 
 
6 No contract of suretyship entered into after the commencement of this Act, shall be valid, 
unless the terms thereof are embodied in a written document signed by or on behalf of the 
surety … 
ENGLAND 
Law of Property Act 1925  
40(1) No action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or other disposition of land 
or any interest in land, unless the agreement upon which such action is brought, or some 
memorandum or note thereof, is in writing, and signed by the party to be charged or by 
some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised.  
(2) This section applies to contracts whether made before or after the commencement of 
this Act and does not affect the law relating to part performance, or sales by the court.  
 
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989  
 
2(1) A contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land can only be made in 
writing and only by incorporating all the terms which the parties have expressly agreed in 
one document or, where contracts are exchanged, in each. 
(2) The terms may be incorporated in a document either by being set out in it or by 
reference to some other document. 
(3) The document incorporating the terms or, where contracts are exchanged, one of the 
documents incorporating them (but not necessarily the same one) must be signed by or on 
behalf of each party to the contract. 
(4) Where a contract for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land satisfies the 
conditions of this section by reason only of the rectification of one or more documents in 
pursuance of an order of a court, the contract shall come into being, or be deemed to have 
come into being, at such time as may be specified in the order. 
(5) [N]othing in this section affects the creation or operation of resulting, implied or 
constructive trusts. 
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Statute of Frauds 1677  
 
4 No action shall be brought … whereby to charge the Defendant upon any special 
promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person … unless the 
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note 
thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some other 
person thereunto by him lawfully authorised. 
GERMANY 
 
German Civil Code (BGB) 
 
§ 125  Voidness resulting from a defect of form 
 
A legal transaction that lacks the form prescribed by statute is void. In case of doubt, lack 
of the form specified by legal transaction also results in voidness. 
 
§ 126  Written form 
 
(1) If written form is prescribed by statute, the document must be signed by the issuer with 
his name in his own hand, or by his notarially certified initials. 
(2) In the case of a contract, the signature of the parties must be made on the same 
document. If more than one counterpart of the contract is drawn up, it suffices if each party 
signs the document intended for the other party. 
(3) Written form may be replaced by electronic form, unless the statute leads to a different 
conclusion. 
(4) Notarial recording replaces the written form. 
 
§ 311b Contracts on plots of land, assets and an estate 
 
(1) A contract by which one party agrees to transfer or acquire ownership of a plot of land 
must be recorded by a notary.  A contract not entered into in this form becomes valid with 
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all its contents if a declaration of conveyance and registration in the Land Register are 
effected … 
 
§ 766  Written form of the declaration of suretyship 
 
For the contract of suretyship to be valid, the declaration of suretyship must be issued in 
writing.  The declaration of suretyship may not be made in electronic form.  If the surety 
discharges the main obligation, the defect of form is remedied. 
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